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Foreword
This volume represents the final output of a project entitled “Post-crisis social dialogue: 
Good practices in the EU-28”, implemented by the International Labour Office (ILO). 
The aim of the project is to document and analyze emerging trends and good practices 
in social dialogue and industrial relations, in the period following the economic and 
financial crisis in Europe. The project, which benefits from the financial and technical 
support of the European Commission (EC), focuses specifically on developments since 
2013, when countries began to exit the crisis, and examines the role of social dialogue 
in promoting sustainable policy reforms and job-rich inclusive recovery. 
This project is a follow-up to an earlier ILO/EC project, implemented between 2012 and 
2014, that analyzed the impact of structural reforms and fiscal consolidation policies 
on the industrial relations systems of five EU countries that were most hard hit by the 
2010 sovereign debt crisis, including those under structural adjustment programmes. 
The findings of that project were published in 2014.1
Under the current project, a series of in-depth national studies was carried out by 
reputed national scholars in a larger sample of eleven EU countries. These countries 
were selected to give a geographical balance and to ensure representation of the differ-
ent industrial relations systems prevailing in Europe, including the Nordic, Continental, 
Mediterranean, Liberal and Eastern European models. The research involved analysis 
of secondary sources of information as well as interviews with key stakeholders in each 
country. A comparative analysis was also prepared, capturing the main trends docu-
mented in the country studies, as well as in other EU Member States. 
A high-level tripartite knowledge-sharing conference, held at the Palais du Luxembourg 
in Paris on 20 May, 2016, provided the opportunity for the draft study findings to be 
presented and discussed. On the basis of this discussion, the draft reports were final-
ized and are brought together in this edited volume. 
The volume, in its entirety, provides valuable insights into the many factors that have 
influenced recent developments in social dialogue in countries of the European Union 
– including the evolving economic and political context, the effectiveness of national 
institutions for tripartite and bipartite social dialogue, as well as the processes of the 
European Semester. The volume sheds light on the heterogeneity of approaches to 
1  Papadakis, P.; Ghellab, Y. 2014. The governance of policy reforms in southern Europe and Ireland: Social dialogue 
actors and institutions in times of crisis (Geneva, ILO).
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social dialogue across European countries, clearly demonstrating there is no ‘one size 
fits all’ prescription for sustaining it through difficult economic times. It further shows 
how, where tripartite social dialogue was maintained through and after the crisis, it 
tended to produce positive outcomes in terms of promoting a return to positive eco-
nomic growth, ensuring social and industrial peace, sustaining competitiveness and 
employment, and contributing to an increase in productivity and wages.
We take this opportunity to express our sincere appreciation to each of the national 
researchers who undertook the country studies and, in particular, to the volume’s edi-
tors, Oscar Molina and Igor Guardiancich, for so ably overseeing and coordinating the 
research as well as for drafting the overview chapter; to Christian Welz of Eurofound 
for his insightful comments and contributions throughout the project; and to Raymond 
Maes and Tim Van Rie of the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion of the European Commission, for their invaluable support. We gratefully 
acknowledge the contributions made by participants in the tripartite conference in 
Paris, whose insights have helped strengthen the content of this book. They included 
representatives of the International Organisation of Employers (IOE), the International 
Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and the European social partners, as well as tripar-
tite delegations from 15 EU Member States and selected non-EU countries. 
Our gratitude is extended as well to the ILO project team, in particular Youcef Ghellab, 
head of the Social Dialogue and Tripartism Unit, who was responsible for project imple-
mentation; Caroline O’Reilly, Angelika Muller, Sarah Doyle and Germaine Ndiaye of 
DIALOGUE Unit; and Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead of Inclusive Labour Markets, Labour 
Relations and Working Conditions Branch (INWORK), for their various invaluable con-
tributions. Our sincere thanks go also to Sylvain Baffi and Marion Christophe of the 
International Training Centre of the ILO in Turin (ITC-ILO), for organizing two research 
seminars in Turin as well as the Paris conference, and to Cyril Cosme, Director of the 
ILO Office for France, for all his efforts to ensure the success of the Paris event. Finally, 
special thanks go to the two anonymous peer reviewers for their critical and helpful 
comments on the draft volume, to Frances Papazafiropoulos for editing the final text, 
and to Chris Edgar of the ILO Department of Communication and Public Information 
and José Garcia of the Official Meetings, Documentation and Relations Department for 
their support in producing this volume. 
It should be noted that the responsibility for opinions expressed in this book rests solely 
with its authors and its publication does not constitute an endorsement by the Interna-
tional Labour Office or the European Commission. 
Heinz Koller  Moussa Oumarou
Director  Director
Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia Governance and Tripartism Department
International Labour Office  International Labour Office
Geneva Geneva
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A message from Deborah Greenfield, 
ILO Deputy Director-General for Policy
The ILO enjoys a long history of close collaboration with the institutions of the European 
Union on key employment, labour and social policy issues, dating back to the first 
agreement signed in 1958. This collaboration ranges from our shared efforts to tackle 
child labour and other violations of fundamental rights at work in some of the world’s 
poorest countries to devising effective policy responses to economic crisis in some 
of its richest. Most recently, this collaboration has involved the analysis of emerging 
trends and good practices in the field of social dialogue and industrial relations across 
the Member States of the EU, focusing specifically on developments since 2013 as 
countries started to recover from the worst effects of the economic crisis.
Social dialogue and tripartism lie at the very heart of the ILO’s mandate to achieve social 
justice, yet these are not simply “good practices” in the common sense of the term 
today. Instead, it must be recalled that the ILO has its genesis in two post-crisis eras – 
first, at its founding in 1919, as Europe began its recovery from the devastation of the 
First World War, and then again in 1946, when the ILO became a part of the United 
Nations, as the world sought to reconstruct following the Second World War. 
The origins of social dialogue are enshrined in the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944), 
which states: “The war against want requires to be carried on with unrelenting vigour 
within each nation, and by continuous and concerted international effort in which the 
representatives of workers and employers, enjoying equal status with those of govern-
ments, join with them in free discussion and democratic decision with a view to the 
promotion of the common welfare.”
Social dialogue thus represents an active decision taken by the nations of the world as 
a means to tackle the economic and social challenges which inevitably flow from crisis, 
in order to ensure lasting peace and sustainable prosperity for all.
The present volume highlights that, after several years of negative growth, many EU 
countries have started to see modest positive growth. According to the European 
Commission’s economic forecasts, this modest growth has benefited from factors 
including low oil prices, favourable financing conditions and the exchange rate of the 
Euro. At the same time, however, significant economic challenges remain. Risks are 
becoming more pronounced and new challenges are surfacing, such as slower growth 
in China and other emerging market economies, weak global trade as well as geopo-
litical uncertainty. 
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So now is yet another time to rely on the promise of social dialogue to achieve balanced, 
sustainable and inclusive growth, and in particular, to address the widening inequalities 
that threaten recent gains made and that jeopardise a still quite fragile economic and 
social recovery. Indeed, one of the most worrying legacies of the crisis has been a fur-
ther rise in wage and income inequalities, along with the high structural unemployment 
that continues to plague the global economy. 
At the ILO, social dialogue is a critical component of the Decent Work Agenda. Social 
dialogue similarly lies at the heart of the European social model, through which states 
share certain core values, such as a commitment to full employment, social protection 
for all citizens, social inclusion and democracy. Both the ILO and the EU have seen 
social dialogue and tripartism endure through past periods of economic difficulty and, 
time and again, play an important part in devising measures to face the challenges. 
Yet the worsening economic climate and the urgency of reforms during the 2008-09 
crisis unfortunately led, in many cases, to reduced space for tripartite dialogue. Collec-
tive bargaining and industrial relations systems also frequently came under pressure, 
meaning that workers found it increasingly difficult to engage in meaningful nego-
tiations. Labour market reforms during the crisis period placed additional strain on 
these systems. 
As social dialogue and tripartism decline, the institutions that facilitate them also fray. 
Governments, representatives of employers and of workers have a joint responsibility to 
reinvigorate these institutions. Nothing short of serious political commitment and sus-
tained collaborative effort will enable them to rebuild themselves and to find new ways 
of working in pursuit of shared goals. 
Notably, the evidence presented in this volume suggests that those countries in which 
social dialogue has proven most resilient have also done better in weathering the crisis. 
Some of the country chapters reveal positive signs of a revitalization of social dialogue. 
National social dialogue institutions have proven to be key in this respect, not only as 
forums for discussion but also in helping to devise creative policy proposals for building 
a sustainable economic and jobs recovery, around which different interest groups can 
coalesce. The book indicates also the potential of the European Semester as an avenue 
that crosses national borders.
The aftermath of the crisis has opened up exciting new possibilities for tripartite and 
bipartite institutions to demonstrate their value in shaping a new social and economic 
contract. Governments and the social partners in Europe must seize upon this oppor-
tunity to engage in an informed debate, including on how to reinforce and modernize 
social dialogue institutions so they can better face the challenges ahead. The ILO 
stands ready to support its Constituents in this endeavor.
Deborah Greenfield
Deputy Director-General for Policy
International Labour Office
Geneva
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1.  Comparative overview:  
National trajectories and good 
practices in social dialogue
Oscar MOlina and igOr guardiancich
1. Introduction
The financial and economic crisis, which started in 2008, had important implica-
tions for social dialogue and industrial relations across Europe. Two well-differentiated 
periods can be observed. In the initial stages of the crisis (2008-10), many Govern-
ments adopted a neo-Keynesian policy response in order to boost demand – and the 
social partners were significantly involved in both the formulation and implementation 
of these policies. Thereafter, the deployment of fiscal consolidation programmes, as 
well as policies to reduce other macroeconomic imbalances, led to the weakening 
or discontinuation of tripartite social dialogue in a number of countries (Eurofound, 
2013; European Commission, 2013 and 2015b). The depth and duration of the cri-
sis, coupled with the implementation of fiscal consolidation policies over a short time 
period and under financial assistance programmes, reduced the space for negotiation 
between the social partners and governments. However, studies have also noted the 
existence of remarkable differences across countries (Papadakis and Ghellab, 2014).
Most EU countries witnessed a recovery in GDP growth and in employment starting in 
2013, with a consolidation in 2014 and 2015 (European Commission, 2015a; OECD, 
2014). Data show that most countries have exited the recession and are experiencing a 
recovery, nonetheless characterized by different pathways and levels of intensity. Even 
though the use of the term “post-crisis” may be premature in countries that are still 
experiencing low or even negative growth rates, we use it to refer to the period following 
the most intense years of recession across Europe, namely from 2013 until the end 
of 2015, which was the cut-off date for the national studies. Recent reports show that 
unemployment and income disparities between European Union (EU) countries wid-
ened during the crisis (European Commission, 2016). Moreover, some countries have 
experienced rising income inequality, a trend that persists even in the post-crisis period 
(European Commission, 2015a; Vaughan-Whitehead, 2016).
In this context, social dialogue could be expected to play a crucial role for achieving 
inclusive and sustainable recovery and for designing policies to fit national priorities 
(ILO, 2009). It is also essential for the rebuilding of trust between the social part-
ners and governments, which in many cases was eroded over the course of the crisis, 
particularly in those countries where social dialogue was discontinued. In its Commu-
nication on strengthening the social dimension of the Economic and Monetary Union 
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(EMU), the European Commission (EC) identified the reinforcement of the role of 
social dialogue in developing Eurozone-wide and national strategies as a policy priority. 
According to the EC, increased involvement of the social partners in framing and imple-
menting economic and employment policies needs to accompany the developments 
in monitoring and coordination mechanisms, if EMU governance is to be effective and 
inclusive. At the high-level conference on the new start for social dialogue held on 
5 March 2015, the EC called for greater involvement of the social partners in the Euro-
pean Semester at both EU and national levels (European Commission, 2015).
The recovery in economic and labour market conditions has not automatically trans-
lated into revitalized social dialogue in all countries. This should be a matter of concern 
for policy-makers, as social dialogue “can and should be a driving force for successful 
economic and social policies”.2
The differences between countries are reflected in the four scenarios of post-crisis 
social dialogue which are identified in section 4.2.1 of this overview chapter. In some 
countries, unilateral policy-making by the government remains the rule and the social 
partners’ role has been marginal in the post-crisis period. By contrast, other countries 
have witnessed an intensification of negotiations between the social partners and gov-
ernment at all levels, with a more consensual approach to policy-making.
Three sets of factors may help explain overall trends as well as differences in social 
dialogue dynamics across EU countries in the post-crisis period: the economic context, 
political conditions and national institutions. Turning first to the economic context, the 
analysis reveals certain characteristics of the post-crisis period that have posed chal-
lenges to a full-fledged recovery of social dialogue. In countries where growth was still 
sluggish, the social partners’ views sometimes diverged as to the policies needed to 
put the economy on to a more solid growth path, in particular regarding fiscal consoli-
dation and wage-setting. Whilst trade unions generally favour more expansionary fiscal 
stances with somewhat higher real wage increases, employers and governments tend 
to advocate the maintenance of fiscal balance and strong wage moderation (Eurofound, 
2014). The extent and manner of social partners’ involvement in the Semester process 
is seen to impact upon their agreement (or otherwise) on the policies needed for sus-
tainable growth (see section 4.2.3). Furthermore, where countries have seen income 
inequality rise during the crisis, this may have presented an additional obstacle to 
social dialogue’s recovery in the post-crisis period. Labour market segmentation, which 
exacerbates income inequality, means that trade unions may struggle to represent 
an increasingly heterogeneous workforce in social dialogue processes. Divergences in 
company size may also give rise to conflicting interests within employers’ organizations.
Second, the national political context may also help to explain cross-country differences 
in social dialogue in two ways. The first of these is the impact of the crisis on the legiti-
macy of political actors. In those countries hardest hit by the crisis, and which received 
financial assistance from international lenders, traditional political actors (including the 
social partners to a certain extent) were particularly called into question. The second is 
the fact that the crisis led to political instability in some countries, the governments of 
which curtailed social dialogue in consequence (see section 3.2).
2  Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility, Marianne Thyssen, at: http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-15-4633_en.htm
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Third, the analysis shows that institutions undeniably played a role in shaping social 
dialogue dynamics. In countries with a long tradition of institutionalized social dialogue, 
based on effective institutions for policy concertation and for collective bargaining, 
greater continuity and a revitalization of social dialogue is observed in the post-crisis 
period (see section 4.2.2). Institutionalization contributes to the building and mainte-
nance of trust through continuous contact between government and the social partners. 
When industrial relations institutions are also strong and well-articulated, bottom-up 
consensus seeking is more likely to dominate and contribute to the maintenance of 
national-level social dialogue.
A number of positive lessons may be drawn from the experiences of revitalization 
observed in the post-crisis period. One is the importance of bipartite social dialogue 
as a stepping-stone towards tripartite dialogue, especially in countries lacking formal-
ized mechanisms for tripartite social dialogue. In some countries where tripartite social 
dialogue was discontinued or weakened, bipartite dialogue between trade unions and 
employers has remained alive and delivered some important agreements. This is the 
case in Belgium, Finland, Slovenia and Spain, amongst others. By strengthening bipar-
tite social dialogue, including through company-level representation structures, the 
social partners provide the basis for subsequently developing tripartite social dialogue.
In addition, active and well-functioning tripartite institutions provide an anchor for social 
dialogue. These institutions help to avoid major breakdowns in the process – and pre-
vent the erosion of trust between and among the government and the social partners 
(ILO, 2013). In this vein, the crisis has shown how, in many countries, social dialogue 
is not self-sustaining but requires a firm and renewed commitment on the part of all 
the actors. Even in some countries with a strong social dialogue tradition, it sometimes 
proved impossible to bridge the gaps between the social partners and government 
during and since the crisis, in some cases leading to a questioning of the role of social 
dialogue. In other countries, by contrast, new institutions were created or dormant ones 
revived. The crisis has thus posed challenges, but also provided opportunities for these 
institutions to adapt to a new social and economic context. National governments and 
social partners should accordingly engage in a debate about how to modernize social 
dialogue institutions in order to enable them to produce the best outcomes in a con-
stantly changing world of work. The ILO can support such a process – and the EU is 
contributing to social dialogue functioning, including through financial assistance under 
the European Social Fund.
A greater focus on the process of social dialogue, whereby the social partners provide 
ongoing contributions to policy-making without necessarily signing any formal agree-
ment or pact, has proven valuable in some countries. When the objective of social 
dialogue is framed solely in terms of the conclusion of an agreement, this output 
becomes the sole indicator of success rather than the qualitative inputs made by the 
social partners. This may lead to a stop-and-go process that is more likely to end in 
failure than one that is more flexible in terms of the end goal of the dialogue.
This volume demonstrates the extent to which social dialogue matters in periods of cri-
sis and recovery.3 Those countries where social dialogue has proven most resilient have 
done better in weathering the crisis. Social dialogue remains a key tool of governance to 
3 The national studies presented in this volume generally take account of developments up to end December 2015.
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achieve the goals of competitiveness, economic progress, an equitable distribution of 
income and social stability. Moreover, social dialogue may also help EU countries con-
front the social and political challenges created in part by the crisis, such as the decline 
of the middle class and the growing disaffection of a significant segment of national 
populations. By giving a voice in decision-making to the people affected by those deci-
sions, social dialogue offers a highly effective tool to rebuild citizens’ confidence in the 
government and to achieve broad support for the necessary policy reforms.
The remainder of this chapter is divided up into four sections – followed by concluding 
remarks (section 6). Section 2 introduces the methodology and concepts used through-
out the study, justifying the case selection and the particular focus of this research. The 
third section presents the political and economic context of the post-crisis period in 
Europe. The fourth provides an overview of social dialogue dynamics in the post-crisis 
years, including broad comparative evidence on the role of National Social Dialogue 
Institutions (NSDIs) and the European Semester. Finally, section 5 analyses industrial 
relations and collective bargaining developments in the post-crisis years.
2. Methodology and concepts
The volume is composed of this overview chapter and eleven country studies. Due to 
the project’s financial limitations, it was not possible to cover all EU-28 countries in the 
research, and so a sample of eleven countries was selected. Notwithstanding, evidence 
of developments in countries not directly covered by the project has been included in 
this chapter, in order to illustrate some particularly important developments elsewhere. 
The selection of country cases was based on two criteria. First, the countries were cho-
sen to reflect the diversity of industrial relations systems in Europe (the independent 
variable): the Nordic (Sweden, Finland), Continental (Germany, France, the Nether-
lands), Mediterranean (Spain), Liberal (Ireland) and Eastern European models, the 
latter consisting of three sub-configurations (neo-corporatist in Slovenia, embedded 
liberal in Slovakia, and neoliberal in Lithuania; see Bohle and Greskovits, 2012). Sec-
ond, the countries illustrate different dynamics of social dialogue during the crisis (the 
dependent variable). Cases include countries where social dialogue was eroded during 
the crisis as well as others where it fared relatively well. Indeed, the former group of 
countries had been the subject of an earlier ILO/EC project, which focused on coun-
tries undergoing structural adjustment.4 Given the specific objective in this project to 
identify good practices, it was necessary to expand the sample so as to include addi-
tional countries in which positive developments were anticipated, which might provide 
policy lessons for those countries where social dialogue has encountered difficulties.
The country studies followed a similar research methodology and chapter structure. 
In order to enhance the studies’ consistency and comparability, authors were first pro-
vided with a detailed specification of the research objectives, questions and the topics 
to be covered in each country. Two coordination meetings, which brought together all 
the country chapter authors, enabled the development of a shared research approach. 
4  This project, which ran from 2012-14, was called “Promoting a balanced and inclusive recovery from the crisis in 
Europe through sound industrial relations and social dialogue: The impacts of the crisis in Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain.”
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Finally, members of the research coordination team5 revised draft versions of all chap-
ters – also in the light of comments by external peer reviewers – in order to guarantee 
high-quality standards for all contributions. The evidence presented in the country 
chapters comes from several sources. Interviews were held with Government officials, 
European Semester Officers, employers’ and workers’ organizations; on average, six 
interviews were carried out for each country study. Secondary sources, including offi-
cial documents, newspaper and scholarly articles, were reviewed. The volume has 
also benefited from comments and suggestions made by participants at the Tripar-
tite Knowledge Sharing Conference “Post-crisis social dialogue: Good practices in the 
EU-28” held in Paris in May 2016. The Conference provided an opportunity to obtain 
feedback on the draft research findings and for participants to discuss recent devel-
opments in industrial relations and to exchange experiences of social dialogue in the 
post-crisis period. 
This volume focuses on developments at the national level and, in particular, on devel-
opments in national level social dialogue processes. But it does not engage in an 
assessment of either the outcomes delivered by social dialogue or its impact on the 
labour market or economic growth. All country studies and the overview chapter ana-
lyse different social dialogue paths and their supporting mechanisms, without entering 
into a broader analysis of the relationship between social dialogue and socio-economic 
outcomes. However, as several participants at the Tripartite Conference pointed out, 
the analysis of social dialogue outcomes should be considered a priority for future 
research. In addition, although the main focus is at the national level, reference has 
been made to sub-national developments in social dialogue in those countries with 
more decentralized political and administrative structures. Moreover, the study adopts 
a supra-national, multi-level dimension by looking at the European Semester and the 
role of national social partners in this process. The transnational dimension is not 
addressed in the volume, as its focus on process, rather than outcomes, does not 
allow an assessment of the impact of developments in one country on another country.
As the objective of the research was to identify “good practices in social dialogue”, it 
is important to clarify at the outset what is meant by these terms in the context of the 
project. Regarding social dialogue, the ILO definition is used: “Social dialogue includes 
all types of negotiation, consultation or simply exchange of information between, or 
among, representatives of governments, employers and workers, on issues of common 
interest relating to economic and social policy”. The ILO definition of social dialogue is 
much broader than the EU definition as contained in articles 154-5 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). According to the EU definition, social 
dialogue refers to formal consultation with the EU social partners by the Commission on 
the content of proposals in the field of social policy, as well as their capacity to engage 
in a dialogue among themselves that may lead to contractual relations, including agree-
ments. On the basis of the broader ILO definition, “good practice” in social dialogue is 
used to refer to instances where governments have systematically involved the social 
partners in the process of formulation and implementation of policies, including labour 
market reforms, pension reforms, etc. For this project, the term also includes cases of 
5  The research coordination team comprised the authors of this chapter, and staff of the Social Dialogue and Tripartism 
Unit (DIALOGUE) of the ILO, of Eurofound, and of the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
of the EC.
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“a revitalization in social dialogue”, where governments have shifted from a unilateral 
approach to policy-making towards a more consultative one. 
In order to compare dynamics across countries and to map the diversity in the crisis 
and post-crisis periods, the concepts of “continuity” and “discontinuity” have been 
used. By continuity, we mean that the process of social dialogue was not interrupted, 
even if the outcomes may not have reflected all the views of the social partners. 
Conversely, discontinuity refers to an interruption in the dialogue between the social 
partners and the government. It is nonetheless important to recognize that this distinc-
tion may not always be clear. It is sometimes difficult to establish whether or not the 
dialogue was interrupted in practice, and the views of the social partners may even 
diverge in this respect.
In addition to tripartite social dialogue dynamics, the national studies also analysed 
post-crisis developments in industrial relations generally, and in collective bargaining 
specifically. The country chapters contain an analysis of developments in: wage set-
ting, given the relevance of wages to collective bargaining; the structure of collective 
bargaining, and in particular whether there has been a trend towards centralization or 
de-centralization; and collective bargaining coverage. Regarding wage setting, refer-
ence is made in most chapters to pressures for wage moderation6 or wage restraint in 
the context of the crisis. Whilst in some countries wage restraint relaxed in the post-cri-
sis period, pressures to continue a policy of wage moderation in collective bargaining 
remained strong in most countries. 
3. The economic and political context
3 1  The economic context
The relationship between economic conditions and social dialogue is neither linear 
nor direct. Economic crises are often associated with reduced room for manoeuvre 
and limited time available for reaching a compromise. On the one hand, under the 
institutional framework of the EMU, governments may find it more difficult to provide 
compensation for the adjustments required in social policies and labour market reg-
ulations. But, on the other hand, an economic crisis may also increase the incentive 
for governments to negotiate incomes policy and other structural reforms, in order to 
reduce social tensions and conflict. There are several examples of such positive experi-
ences in a crisis context, including Spain in the early 1980s, Ireland in the mid-1980s, 
Italy in the early 1990s and Germany in the early 2000s.
The impact and intensity of the crisis, which highlighted both the imbalances between 
EU Member States (Johnston and Regan, 2015; Hall, 2012) and the shortcomings 
of the EMU’s architecture (De Grauwe, 2014; Pisani-Ferry, 2014), varied significantly 
across the countries studied. According to Eurostat, when the recession reached its 
peak in 2009, the average contraction in GDP across the EU was 4.4 per cent. The 
worst affected countries were the Baltic States, where output fell by circa 14.5 per cent 
on average. Rather than the Eurozone periphery or the less developed new Member 
6  Wage moderation is taken to mean a wage policy through which wages or compensation per employee increase by 
less than the sum of productivity gains and the European Central Bank inflation target. Whenever this occurs, the 
purchasing power of wages declines.
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States, the worst performances were registered in Finland, Lithuania and Slovenia. 
Lithuania’s ‘financialized’ growth model relied on foreign net savings, which all but 
disappeared during the crisis. Finland was hit by multiple external shocks – while Slo-
venia’s crisis stemmed from its delayed privatization process and related governance 
challenges (see chapters by Jokinen and Guardiancich in this volume). Poland was the 
only country where the economy only slowed down, rather than contracted, recording 
2.6 per cent growth in 2009.
Of the eight countries that requested international financial assistance, five were part 
of the Eurozone (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and three were outside 
it (Hungary, Latvia and Romania). Currently, only Greece has still to graduate from 
a lending programme (the third Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece runs 
until 2018).
In 2012, the EU-28 as a whole entered a double-dip recession. In addition to Poland, 
11 countries have experienced steady economic expansion since 2009: Austria, Bel-
gium, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, France, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia and the 
United Kingdom. Five Member States (Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania and 
Sweden) experienced one more year of negative growth, while four countries experi-
enced two more years (the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Netherlands and Slovenia). 
The countries exhibiting the weakest economic performance were (and still are) con-
fined to Southern Europe, plus Finland. Croatia (2009-14) and Greece (2008-13) 
experienced six years of recession. Spain and Portugal (2011-13), and Cyprus, Finland 
and Italy (2012-14), entered a second recessionary period that lasted three years.
Such diverging economic performance means that distinguishing between the crisis 
and post-crisis periods in Europe is not as clear-cut as in the United States, where GDP 
growth unambiguously resumed in 2010. As there is no commonly accepted cut-off 
point for the crisis years in the literature on the EU’s recent economic performance, we 
have necessarily adopted an informed view on this, which may nonetheless be chal-
lenged. According to Eurostat data, the EU-28 and the Eurozone, after experiencing 
a double-dip recession, have recorded positive rates of economic growth (averaged 
across their respective Member States) since the second and the third quarters of 
2013, respectively. Hence, in this volume, we generally refer to the years 2008-12 as 
the crisis period, and the years 2013-15 as the post-crisis period.
Such an assessment also falls in line with the other major indicator of socio-economic 
malaise in the EU-28, namely the unemployment rate. Joblessness peaked in 2013 
at 10.9 per cent and declined slightly in 2014 to 10.2 per cent, indicating that a timid 
recovery got underway. However, just prior to this slight improvement, the differences 
between EU Member States were considerable – adding to the definitional ambiguity 
noted above. Eurostat calculates that, in 2013, unemployment rates ranged from just 
above 5 per cent in Austria and Germany to as much as 27.5 per cent in Greece and 
26.1 per cent in Spain. The highest rates were observed in Southern Europe: Croatia 
(17.3 per cent), Cyprus (15.9 per cent) and Portugal (16.4 per cent). Ireland, which 
also requested international assistance, registered an unemployment rate of 13.1 per 
cent. Finland’s labour market initially reacted well, but the economic outlook has been 
worsening more recently. Differences in national unemployment rates across the EU 
increased during the crisis, and show no signs of reversal in the post-crisis period 
(European Commission, 2016). The variance is even higher for youth unemployment. 
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Croatia, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain all had youth unemployment rates higher 
than 30 per cent (Greece and Spain higher than 50 per cent) as late as 2014. In Ger-
many, by contrast, it was lower than 8 per cent. Such disparities have already triggered 
substantial out-migration from countries with excess labour supply to those with skill 
shortages (European Commission, 2014). Among the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe with traditionally high unemployment, Poland and Romania fared relatively well, 
helped by the migration of their labour force to Western Europe (to Italy and Spain 
in the case of Romania, to Germany and the United Kingdom in the case of Poland) 
(Meyer, Bridgen and Andow, 2013).
One of the most worrying legacies of the crisis has been a further increase in both 
wage and income inequalities (European Parliament, 2015; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015; 
OECD, 2015). This is linked to: the increase in (long-term) unemployment and deepen-
ing labour market segmentation through the extension of low-paid jobs (Emmenegger 
et al., 2011); reductions in social benefits in some Member States (although fiscal 
consolidation programmes were in some cases designed so that richer income groups 
contributed more in relative terms, see Avram et al. 2013); and institutional factors 
related to declining coverage of collective bargaining or its decentralization (Bosch, 
2015; Jaumotte and Osorio-Buitron, 2015). Rising inequality challenges not only social 
cohesion, but also economic growth. In the short-term, aggregate demand is affected – 
while in the medium- and long-term, inequality makes it difficult to accumulate human 
capital (OECD, 2015). Finally, from the point of view of social dialogue, increased ine-
quality poses problems of representation and legitimacy to the social partners, with 
trade unions most negatively affected. In particular, widening disparities in wages and 
other working conditions make it increasingly difficult for trade unions to adopt com-
mon and acceptable positions for their constituency as a whole (Checchi, Visser and 
Van De Werfhorst, 2010).
3 2  The political context
Political conditions constitute another element affecting social dialogue dynamics; a 
crisis that leads to political instability and electoral weakness of governments can have 
both positive and negative effects. 
On the one hand, according to some scholars, the electoral weakness of governments 
may encourage social dialogue leading to tripartite agreements (Baccaro and Lim, 
2007). Weak government coalitions, such as minority governments relying on external 
support, may be more inclined to search for consensus in policy reforms than govern-
ments backed by a strong electoral majority.
On the other hand, governmental action is frequently constrained (for example, by the 
rules governing the EMU), leading to the unilateral adoption of policies during a crisis, 
rather than using established procedures of social dialogue. The legitimacy of such 
decisions, in terms of a government’s responsiveness to citizens’ concerns, may con-
sequently be weakened, potentially contributing further to political instability (Scharpf, 
2011; Streeck, 2011).
Partly as a consequence of citizens’ dissatisfaction and partly as a result of crisis mis-
management, at least eight Member States within the Eurozone have witnessed the 
collapse of one or several governments during the crisis (see table 1.5 of the appendix). 
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This research covers five countries whose governments underwent an unscheduled 
change: Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.
Beyond short-lived governments and the disaffection of voters, perhaps the most wor-
rying aspect of the impact of the crisis on European politics is the rise of populist and/
or radical parties on both the right and left. The former are chiefly located in Northern 
Europe and in several Central and Eastern European Member States, while the latter 
have sprung up mainly in Southern Europe.
4. Social dialogue dynamics and good practices  
 in the post-crisis period
4 1  Between continuity and discontinuity: Social dialogue during the crisis
In the realm of policy-making, one of the characteristics of the crisis period starting 
in 2008 was a greater recourse to government unilateralism. After an initial response 
phase in which social dialogue played an important role (Ghellab, 2009; Freyssinet, 
2010), the involvement of the social partners was progressively curtailed from 2010 
onwards. To a greater or lesser extent, all governments adjusted their fiscal balances 
and implemented fiscal consolidation policies, with reductions in social expenditure 
and public sector employment (Vaughan-Whitehead, 2013). Moreover, this adjustment 
took place in a relatively short time frame under the pressure of international financial 
markets and institutions. Altogether, this reduced the possibilities for fruitful social dia-
logue and political exchange due to the limited resources available and the tight reform 
schedule.
There were, however, significant differences between countries, not only in the exist-
ence (or otherwise) of a discontinuity in social dialogue but, and more importantly for 
the sake of this volume, in its duration. Some of these differences can be appreciated 
in table 1.6 of the appendix, which contains a summary of the main findings for the 
crisis period. A more detailed exploration of the links between the resilience of social 
dialogue and the correct operation of individual National Social Dialogue Institutions 
(NSDIs) is presented in section 4.2.2. In principle, we can expect NSDIs to play a role 
in supporting tripartite social dialogue and favouring its continuity. But this relationship 
is mediated by other institutional, economic and political variables, hence making it 
difficult to establish a direct link between the two. This confirms the results of previous 
scholarship; the differences between countries were not only related to the prevailing 
institutional setting (e.g., the functioning of NSDIs), but also, crucially, to the socio-eco-
nomic context (Hyman, 2010).
In the initial phase of the financial and economic crisis, social dialogue played an impor-
tant role in devising and implementing national responses to mitigate its social and 
labour market impacts (Rychly, 2009; Ghellab and Papadakis, 2011). In many cases, 
these responses adopted a neo-Keynesian approach aimed at sustaining demand 
through increased public expenditure, under the assumption that the crisis was of a 
temporary nature. As a consequence, most European governments, and in particular 
those of Southern European countries and Ireland, came under heavy pressure from 
financial markets to reduce their budget deficits sharply and immediately (Papadakis 
and Ghellab, 2014). The adjustment and structural reforms implemented after 2010 
10 TALKING THROUGH THE CRISIS | SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS TRENDS IN SELECTED EU COUNTRIES
took place in a context in which social dialogue was either assigned a less important role 
or was abandoned.
Five of the eleven countries included in this study experienced a discontinuity in tri-
partite social dialogue during the economic crisis: Belgium, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovenia 
and Spain (see also European Commission, 2015b). In Finland, the discontinuity 
occurred in the post-crisis years. Only in Slovenia did this discontinuity happen despite 
the existence of relatively strong tripartite bodies that had previously sustained tripartite 
social dialogue in line with its neo-corporatist tradition (a unicum in Central and Eastern 
Europe). In Ireland, it might be argued that there was some form of ‘soft’ institution-
alization of social dialogue through the periodic renewal of partnership agreements 
(Avdagic, Rhodes and Visser, 2011). In the case of both Lithuania and Spain, despite 
the existence of NSDIs, tripartite social dialogue developed mostly at the margins of 
these institutions in a non-formal way, although for different reasons. 
In the remaining countries studied, no major discontinuities occurred although, in 
many of them, social dialogue faced difficulties and mounting tensions during the cri-
sis period of 2010-13 (France, the Netherlands and Slovakia), or after it (Finland), 
as detailed in the following section. The only exceptions were Germany and Sweden. 
This means that, even in countries where social dialogue was continuous, it was not 
immune from tensions and difficulties, as might be expected in a period of deep adjust-
ment and structural reform. What characterizes these countries is precisely the actors’ 
capacity to overcome the difficulties, through a variety of compromises and trust-build-
ing measures.
4 2 Social dialogue in the post-crisis period
4.2.1 Overview of main developments and good practices in social dialogue
Social dialogue in the post-crisis period is characterized not only by a diversity in 
national patterns but also by the features of social dialogue processes, as shown in 
table 1.7 of the appendix. Four scenarios may be identified, taking into consideration 
tripartite social dialogue experiences both during and since the crisis period – irre-
spective of whether there was discontinuity or not (see table 1.1 below). First, in some 
countries there is continuity in the post-crisis period relative to trends during the crisis. 
This may be attributed to there being a lack of social dialogue in both periods – first 
scenario (i) – or to the fact that it was maintained throughout – second scenario (ii). The 
third scenario (iii) consists of a revitalization of social dialogue in the post-crisis period, 
following a situation of discontinuity during the crisis. Finally, a fourth scenario (iv) con-
sists of discontinuity in the post-crisis period, following continuity during the crisis itself.
These scenarios constitute a simplification of a much more complex reality, as the 
actual paths observed are usually not so clear-cut. Furthermore, more recent develop-
ments in some countries seem to suggest movements in the opposite direction to that 
indicated in the table. In addition, even in countries with similar overall patterns, there 
can be significant differences in other dimensions of social dialogue, such as the issues 
negotiated, its tripartite or bipartite character, or the role of the State in relaunching it. 
In a number of countries, social dialogue was discontinued for some but not all issues 
– while in others, tripartite dialogue stopped whereas bipartite dialogue continued. As 
discussed in section 2 (“Methodology and concepts”), the notions of “continuity” and 
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“discontinuity” should be treated with caution, and are used here merely as a means 
to map and simplify the wide variety of national situations described in this volume.
Table 1.1 Post-crisis scenarios of social dialogue
Post-crisis (2013-15)
Continuity  
of social dialogue
Discontinuity  
of social dialogue
Crisis 
(2008-12)
Continuity of 
social dialogue
(ii) France (*), Germany,  
the Netherlands, Slovakia, 
Sweden
(iv) Finland
Discontinuity of 
social dialogue (iii) Belgium, Lithuania, Slovenia (i) Ireland, Spain
Source: Authors’ own analysis based on country reports. 
(*) This was the position in France up to the end of 2015. In the first quarter of 2016, there was a breakdown in social 
dialogue linked to proposed labour law reforms, as explained in the post-script to chapter 4 of this volume. 
Using these categories, a first group of countries is those in which a discontinuity in 
social dialogue under adjustment policies persisted in the post-crisis period (scenario 
(i)). Among the countries analysed, two have exhibited this path to the fullest extent: 
Ireland and Spain. Interestingly, it was precisely these two countries that had enjoyed 
strong social dialogue processes during the pre-crisis years, which produced several 
pacts and agreements (European Commission, 2009). In the case of Ireland, following 
the abandonment of formal social partnership, the only space left for social dialogue 
between the Government and trade unions is now in the public sector, in a sort of 
exclusive bipartite process. There are no expectations in the short-term of a return to 
the formal tripartite social partnership model. However, it is important to acknowledge 
the way in which the Irish partnership logic, when applied to public sector reform, 
contributed towards minimizing social unrest during the adjustment. In the case of 
Spain, tripartite social dialogue ceased in 2011, and although some agreements have 
since been signed on specific issues, the dialogue has remained very limited in scope. 
By contrast, bipartite social dialogue between unions and employers has proved more 
resilient; two pacts have been signed establishing general guidelines for collective bar-
gaining. Despite the fact that Ireland and Spain have exhibited relatively high growth 
rates since 2014, this has not led to a re-launch of tripartite social dialogue, due in 
part to political instability. In fact, in the case of Ireland, there is even a shared per-
ception among policy-makers that social partnership was partly responsible for the 
crisis. Other countries whose social dialogue experience comes close to this scenario 
(not included in this volume), include Italy, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Greece. In 
Greece and Portugal, some agreements on specific labour market issues have been 
signed recently, opening the door (as happened in Spain) to a gradual revitalization of 
social dialogue in the short term.
There is a second group of countries in which social dialogue has proved resilient – 
and has even strengthened during the post-crisis period (scenario (ii)). This includes 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Sweden. A first point to note is the very 
different institutional settings in these countries, which have nonetheless contributed 
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to keeping social dialogue alive in all cases. Germany has neither a formalized process 
of tripartite social dialogue nor a federal-level tripartite social dialogue institution. And 
yet, when compared to other countries (e.g., Spain), this absence of formal institu-
tions has not been a weakness but rather a strength, by guaranteeing the involvement 
of the social partners in policy-making through so-called crisis summits. In Sweden, 
strong bipartite institutions have played an important role at sectoral and company 
levels in sustaining social dialogue and the involvement of the social partners in the 
policy-making process. In France, tripartite institutions were instrumental in sustaining 
social dialogue during both the crisis and post-crisis periods. As in Germany, the cre-
ation of ad hoc institutions has also played a key role in underpinning social dialogue 
(see box 1). Nonetheless, tensions have recently arisen in the context of labour market 
reforms. The Slovakian case is characterized by a strong institutionalization of social 
dialogue, which largely explains its continuity. Despite some serious disagreements 
between the social partners and the Government and the fact that no bipartite or tri-
partite pacts have been signed since 2010, tripartite social dialogue institutions have 
continued to function. In the case of the Czech Republic, social dialogue was restored 
in 2014 (Eurofound, 2014a). Finally, the Netherlands has exhibited resilience in social 
dialogue notwithstanding some tensions experienced between October 2010 and April 
2012; these did not relate directly to the crisis, but to longer-term trends of decreasing 
unionization and the increasing flexibilization of labour markets. Despite these tensions, 
the “Polder” model has continued to deliver agreements on a number of important 
issues, including some with a strong redistributive character such as pensions.
In a third group of countries, social dialogue somewhat weakened during the crisis, 
as indicated by an increase in unilateral government regulations; but it nonetheless 
delivered policy outcomes and has been maintained or even revived in the post-crisis 
period (scenario (iii)). This is the case for Belgium, Lithuania and Slovenia. Among 
these countries, Belgium and Slovenia stand slightly apart, as they have experienced 
a further deterioration since 2014 and 2015, respectively. In the case of Belgium, the 
tensions recently experienced in the social dialogue process have not modified the 
embedded neo-corporatist structures. In Slovenia, employers withdrew from the 2015-
16 social agreement shortly after it was signed, showing how there is still little trust 
between the social partners. Within this group of countries, Lithuania experienced a 
discontinuity in social dialogue in the early years of the crisis when the Government 
adopted a unilateral approach to policy-making. In the post-crisis period, there has 
been some evidence of a recovery in social dialogue – with the conclusion of a number 
of agreements, including on the implementation of the Youth Guarantee and the min-
imum wage. However, the Government’s adoption of a labour market reform without 
genuine consultation with the social partners has contributed to an atmosphere of dis-
trust, thereby posing an important obstacle for consolidating a revival of social dialogue. 
One of the EU-28 countries not included in the study, but which falls into this category, 
is Portugal. The newly elected Socialist Party committed to reviving social dialogue 
in areas relating to collective bargaining, a return to a 35-hour working week, and an 
increase in the minimum wage.
Finland belongs to a fourth group of countries, in which continuity of social dialogue 
during the crisis was followed by discontinuity in its aftermath (scenario (iv)). Here, 
tripartite social dialogue remained alive until 2015 when it was abandoned, coinciding 
with a deterioration in the economic context and a change of Government.
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Box 1.1  Social summits and social conferences sustaining social dialogue  
in France
Tripartite social dialogue throughout the crisis and post-crisis periods in France has taken 
place mostly in bodies without a legal foundation: ‘social summits’ and ‘social confer-
ences’  These are accordingly temporary and ad hoc forms of social dialogue 
At the outbreak of the crisis, a number of social summits were convened under Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s Presidency (2007-12), albeit not at regular intervals  Social summits saw the 
participation of the President of the Republic, together with the general secretaries of 
employers’ and workers’ organizations  The summits had two functions: first, to present 
the Government’s plans for social policy and to solicit feedback from employers' and 
workers’ organizations; and second, in some cases, to invite these organizations to open 
negotiations on issues proposed by the Government, in the framework of a procedure 
created by the 2007 Act on the modernization of social dialogue 
In 2012, President François Hollande announced the organization of an annual social 
conference  These conferences were expected to play a pivotal role in relations between 
the Government and the social partners  The agenda of social conferences is broader 
than that of the social summits, requiring preparatory bilateral or tripartite meetings to 
establish working methods and issues for discussion  At the end of the conference, the 
Government makes public a 'social roadmap’ setting out the conclusions drawn from the 
discussions, as well as the agenda for the forthcoming year 
The main advantage of this formula is that it allows for an exchange on social policy at 
the highest level  The procedure not only enables the Government to demonstrate its 
commitment to social dialogue but also allows the employers’ and workers’ organizations 
to assert their legitimacy as influential actors in the social policy domain 
While there is thus considerable diversity in national trends in the crisis and post-crisis 
periods, there are also certain commonalities that deserve to be highlighted. 
First, a trend towards a more prominent role for bipartite social dialogue may be 
observed in many countries, including Belgium, France, Ireland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Spain. In most cases (except Ireland), bipartite social dialogue takes the form of 
union-employer peak-level or inter-sectoral negotiations. This is clearly illustrated in 
three countries: in Spain, with its peak bipartite inter-sectoral agreements on the coor-
dination of collective bargaining signed in 2012 and 2015; in Belgium, with its so-called 
‘104 national collective agreements’ on company-level employment plants signed in 
2012; and in France, with its 2015 social dialogue agenda. In Ireland, bipartite social 
dialogue refers to union-government bargaining in the public sector. A number of expla-
nations may be advanced for the increasing importance of bipartite social dialogue, 
whether in the absence of tripartite social dialogue (as in the case of Spain) or along-
side it (as in the cases of Belgium, France, Slovakia and Slovenia). This development 
might be interpreted as the social partners’ response to an erosion of trust in gov-
ernments, following the latters’ unilateral adoption of policies during the crisis years. 
Furthermore, strengthened bipartism might bring about the restoration of some degree 
of coordination of collective bargaining and industrial relations in the post-crisis period. 
In so doing, employers’ and workers’ organizations seek to enhance their legitimacy 
and autonomy in industrial relations. Sweden provides an example of this, where a 
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strong and well-articulated collective bargaining system has traditionally provided the 
basis for stable and strong social dialogue (Kjellberg, 1998).
Box 1.2  The resilience of bipartite social dialogue in Spain through peak 
inter-sectoral agreements
In a context of weak tripartite social dialogue, interviewees unanimously highlighted the 
resilience of peak bipartite social dialogue as a good practice in the crisis and post-cri-
sis periods in Spain  This was certainly not a new development; already in the 1990s, 
when tripartite social dialogue was experiencing some discontinuities, peak union-em-
ployer agreements had offered an important mechanism for coordination in collective 
bargaining  The social partners interviewed considered that signing these agreements 
in a very difficult economic and political context represented a significant step towards 
re-launching social dialogue 
Bipartite social dialogue between trade unions and employers maintained its vitality 
and, in July 2015, the social partners signed the III Inter-confederal Agreement on 
Employment and Collective Bargaining 2015-2016-2017  Although the negotiations 
took longer than expected, due to a disagreement about wage increases, trade unions 
and employers finally agreed on guidelines for collective bargaining in the forthcoming 
three-year period  Bipartite social dialogue has accordingly shown greater resilience 
than tripartite dialogue, consolidating a trend initiated in the 1990s (Molina and Rho-
des, 2011)  Interviews with both employers’ and workers’ organizations confirmed their 
strong commitment to the governance of collective bargaining through peak bipartite 
agreements 
More recently, and prior to the political uncertainty arising from the December 2015 
elections, the social partners created a working committee responsible for elaborating 
proposals for negotiation with the future coalition Government  By so doing, they sought 
to demonstrate their readiness to negotiate with any Government and to contribute to 
consensus-building  This shows the significance of bipartite social dialogue, – not only 
as a governance mechanism for industrial relations but also as a leverage point for 
re-launching tripartite dialogue 
Another interesting development is the greater focus placed on the process of social 
dialogue. Under this approach, social dialogue does not have the sole objective of 
signing a social pact or an agreement; instead, emphasis is placed on the actual pro-
cess by which the social partners and the government share information and views, 
and contribute to the design of more socially sustainable policies. This facilitates the 
building of trust between the actors involved. When social dialogue is only revitalized 
in order to sign an agreement, a failure in negotiations can lead to mutual blame and 
distrust among the actors involved. By contrast, a greater emphasis on the process 
itself minimizes these risks – whilst gradually facilitating consensus building on a range 
of issues. This approach can be observed in several countries, and in particular those 
in which social dialogue has proved more resilient, including France, Germany and 
Slovakia. In the case of Germany, the crisis and post-crisis periods have shown how ad 
hoc, non-formalized social dialogue can be very effective in providing responses to the 
challenges posed by the economic context (see box 1.3).
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In order to restore trust between the social partners and government when tripartite 
social dialogue has been discontinued, a number of countries have signed fairly narrow 
agreements around specific issues. This was the case in Spain, where an agreement 
aiming to protect and redeploy the long-term unemployed was signed in the post-crisis 
period. Similarly in Greece, a pact on undeclared work was signed following a period 
in which social dialogue had been severely curtailed under the adjustment caused by 
the sovereign-debt crisis (Eurofound, 2015a). Narrow pacts thus played a particularly 
important role in countries where fiscal consolidation and adjustment were accompa-
nied by unilateral implementation (Avdagic, Rhodes and Visser, 2011). In such cases, 
finding common ground on less controversial issues can put in place the foundations 
for building a broader consensus on policies with a larger distributional impact.
Box 1.3 Crisis summits and new regional NSDIs in Germany
The involvement of the social partners in policy-making at federal level during the crisis 
and post-crisis periods took the form of crisis summits attended by all relevant actors, 
as well as bipartite meetings between representatives of the Government and either the 
trade unions or the employers  These less formalized structures were effective in deal-
ing with the crisis, mobilizing all actors and facilitating consultation on the measures 
to be taken 
These informal ad hoc mechanisms allowed for greater flexibility in the relationship 
between the social partners and the Government and responded to particular junctures 
at which the social partners’ input to a specific policy problem was deemed especially 
valuable  Two aspects are worth highlighting in this approach  First, it underlines the 
social partners’ capacity to provide robust problem diagnosis and propose policy meas-
ures  Second, it focuses on both the process of social dialogue and its policy outcomes 
The strong sectoral- and company-level industrial relations institutions in Germany 
support and render effective the non-institutionalized mechanisms for consultation 
and social dialogue at peak level  They not only require the social partners’ commit-
ment to the successful implementation of a particular policy but also legitimize their 
involvement 
There were also important developments at regional level in the area of social dialogue  
In 2011, the State of Brandenburg in eastern Germany introduced a standing social 
dialogue committee  It thus raised the issue of the on-going role that the social part-
ners might play in a stable economic climate and not only during times of crisis  The 
committee brings together the heads of the German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB), 
the regional employers’ organization for Brandenburg-Berlin (UVB), and the collective 
bargaining partners from five sectors: metalworking and electrical, chemicals, hotel 
and catering, construction and retail 
The committee’s main objective is to strengthen industrial relations institutions and, in 
particular, to extend collective bargaining coverage  Financial incentives are provided 
to help achieve this goal  Projects are supported at the sectoral level with funding from 
the European Social Fund (ESF), under Brandenburg’s social partnership guidelines  
To be eligible, projects must contribute to improved work organization in Brandenburg’s 
companies and to an effective social partnership either at the company level (co-deter-
mination) or sectoral level (pioneering collective agreements) 
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Finally, certain innovative good practices in social dialogue can be highlighted. In some 
countries, new social dialogue institutions were created to deal with the challenges 
posed by the crisis. This was the case in Slovakia, where new tripartite and bipartite 
bodies were established (see box 1.4). In this country, and also in Lithuania, the ESF 
was used in order to improve the social partners’ technical capacities so as to enhance 
their role in social dialogue. The case of Brandenburg, Germany, provides an example 
of social dialogue institutionalization at the regional level, in response to the State’s 
previous lack of institutionalized structures for dialogue and its low collective bargaining 
coverage. This experience stands in contrast to the trend towards the suppression or 
dismantling of (regional) social dialogue institutions in other EU countries. Meanwhile, 
Poland witnessed the replacement of employment councils by tripartite labour market 
councils, and the tripartite commission on social and economic affairs by a social dia-
logue council (Eurofound, 2015h).
Box 1.4 New tripartite and bipartite bodies in Slovakia
In Slovakia, some new bodies were created during the crisis and post-crisis periods in 
order to strengthen social dialogue  The Council for Solidarity and Development (RSR) 
was set up in 2012  It is an informal consultative body of the Government, bringing 
together officials from peak employers’ and workers’ organizations  Although the RSR 
has a purely consultative role, the social partners expressed a shared perception in 
interviews of the importance of these consultations for Government decision-making 
on particular issues  On average, about four meetings of the RSR are held each year 
Moreover, in the period 2010-14, the National Centre of Social Dialogue was created 
with support from the ESF  Project activities included assistance to tripartite consul-
tations at the national and sectoral levels, and to bipartite social dialogue at sectoral 
and company levels  Senior representatives of the social partners in industry and con-
struction signed the Contract on Cooperation on 31 January 2013, and established the 
Industry Bipartite, a body for consultation and coordination of their activities (although 
not for collective bargaining) 
Other countries, rather than creating new institutions, reactivated existing dormant 
institutions and other mechanisms for consultation. This was the case in France where, 
although social summits had been organized before the crisis, they were held only 
rarely – and under exceptional circumstances. Another example is Greece, where the 
tripartite Supreme Labour Council (ASE) was reactivated in the area of collective dis-
missal (Countouris et al., 2016). Finally, in Belgium, the Flemish Economic and Social 
Council was strengthened. 
It is worth noting that a number of national social dialogue institutions have celebrated 
anniversaries in recent years, including the National Tripartite Cooperation Council 
(NTCC) in Latvia in 2014, and the Tripartite Council in Lithuania and the Social and 
Economic Council of the Netherlands (SER) in 2015. On these occasions, constitu-
ents reviewed their achievements and challenges in the area of social dialogue, and 
renewed their commitment to the principles of tripartism and social dialogue as tools 
for consensus building in shaping social and economic outcomes.
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4.2.2 The role of National Social Dialogue Institutions 7
The ILO promotes the institutionalization of social dialogue in order to sustain tripar-
tism in member States. The ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization 
(adopted in 2008) recognizes the Convention on Tripartite Consultation (International 
Labour Standards), 1976 (No. 144) as being of particular significance for labour market 
governance (ILO, 2011). The European region has to date recorded, among all world 
regions, the highest number of ratifications of Convention No. 144, which in most cases 
has resulted in the strengthening of National Social Dialogue Institutions (NSDIs).
NSDIs are institutions for formalized social dialogue that, depending on the country, 
play distinct roles -whether as fora for the exchange of information, for consultation 
(where the social partners give their opinions, which are then given government con-
sideration), or for negotiations in which the social partners may become key players 
in the formulation of socio-economic policy and where mutual trust is key. Yet, NSDIs 
per se are neither unambiguously necessary nor sufficient to ensure effective social 
dialogue. Under certain circumstances – for example, where strong and autonomous 
social partners exist – social dialogue can be self-sustaining, even in the absence of 
institutional backing.
Wide discrepancies exist across Europe in the composition, regulation, mission, man-
date and gender equality credentials (see box 1.5) of NSDIs (see ILO, 2013). According 
to data collected by the ILO on the EU-28 plus Norway (see table 1.8 of the appendix), 
NSDIs can take four different configurations. First, “bipartite bodies” are institutions in 
which labour unions and employers’ organizations appoint members who act as rep-
resentatives of their organizations. Second, “bipartite-plus bodies” additionally include 
representatives of other organized interest groups, such as consumers, cooperatives 
or even independent experts. Third, “tripartite institutions” include representatives of 
the government, of employers and of workers; and, fourth, “tripartite-plus bodies” also 
include other organized civil society interest groups. Table 1.2 shows how the configura-
tion of NSDIs in the eleven countries studied evolved over the pre- to post-crisis period.
Box 1.5 Gender equality in NSDIs
As regards gender equality in social dialogue, some positive trends can be observed in 
Europe  The participation of women and men on an equal footing in decision-making 
processes remains a priority for national authorities, the EU and the ILO  The French 
bipartite-plus Economic, Social and Environmental Council (CESE) is one of the EU’s 
and world’s leaders, with 46 per cent of women among its 233 members  Several 
NSDIs have improved their level of female participation (e g  Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Finland and Slovenia)  However, further efforts are needed as the proportion of women 
members remains below 20 per cent in nearly half of the EU Member States  Attention 
to this issue should be raised at the level of NSDIs – and of the organizations partici-
pating in these bodies (Muller and Doyle, 2013) 
7  This section draws heavily on information provided by the ILO Social Dialogue and Tripartism Unit, on the characteristics 
of NSDIs, as presented in table 1.8 of the appendix.
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The country reports also document a wide variation with respect to the effectiveness 
of NSDIs during and after the recession of 2008-09. The success of these institutions 
in sustaining or revitalizing social dialogue in the post-crisis period differed markedly 
across the countries studied. The relationship between the continuity in social dialogue 
(as discussed in section 4.2.1) and the strength of the NSDIs in any given country is 
complex and non-linear. In particular, other socio-economic and political factors come 
into play, such as the severity of the crisis or weakness of the executive – over which 
the government and the social partners may have limited or no control. 
Table 1.2 NSDIs before and after the crisis
Before the crisis After the crisis
Belgium 5BP • 1BP+ • 1TP 5BP • 1BP+ • 1TP • 1TP+
Finland 2TP+ 2TP+
France 1BP+ • 6TP • 1TP+ 1BP+ • 7TP • 1TP+ • (1TP)
Germany – 1TP • 1TP+ • (1TP)
Ireland 1TP+ 2BP+ • 1TP+
Lithuania 1TP 1TP
Netherlands 1BP • 1BP+ 1BP • 1BP+
Slovakia 1TP 1BP • 1TP • (2TP+)
Slovenia 1TP 1TP
Spain 1BP+ 1BP+
Sweden – –
BP – Bipartite; BP+ – Bipartite-Plus; TP – Tripartite; TP+ – Tripartite-Plus. The table shows the number of permanent 
NSDIs, with ad hoc NSDIs given in parentheses.
Testifying to this complexity is the fact that, among the six countries that experienced 
discontinuity in social dialogue at some point (namely Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Lithu-
ania, Slovenia and Spain), two (Slovenia and Finland) had quite strong and functional 
NSDIs that had previously sustained tripartite social dialogue. Consequently, despite 
the fact that these two countries were among the worst hit in the Eurozone, their tri-
partite and tripartite-plus NSDIs coped, relatively speaking, rather well. In Slovenia, 
the tripartite Economic and Social Council was endowed with quasi-legislative func-
tions, which maximized the autonomy of the social partners in the formulation of labour 
market policy, and helped revive social dialogue after it broke down. In Finland, the 
tripartite-plus Economic Council sustained social dialogue more or less continuously 
until very late in the period under examination, before being challenged in 2015.
Countries with weaker NSDIs have, in general, fared less well. Although in some coun-
tries (including Belgium, where NSDIs have been challenged, and Lithuania, where 
they were overridden by governmental unilateral action), social dialogue more or less 
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reverted to normal after the crisis, the same cannot be said of others. In the latter 
group, the discontinuity in social dialogue went hand-in-hand with either a curtailment 
of the functions of the NSDIs (such as in Ireland and Spain) or a fundamental restruc-
turing of them (as in Hungary and Romania). In neither case did social dialogue return 
to normality in the post-crisis period.
As for those countries with a stronger tradition of social dialogue, the existence of NSDIs 
was not a pre-condition for keeping social dialogue alive, as the cases of Germany and 
Sweden neatly show. However, where NSDIs were present, they were conducive to the 
maintenance of social dialogue when there was the political will to do so.
Examples of good practices abound:
• In several countries, despite the strained economic and political situation, the 
NSDIs continued to play a significant role in devising social pacts and policy 
solutions (e.g. in France, the Netherlands and Portugal).
• A number of NSDIs in Central and Eastern Europe agreed on effective anti-crisis 
measures at the onset of the recession (e.g. in Bulgaria, Poland, Slovenia).
• Some Member States established new formal bodies precisely to cope with the 
crisis or with longer-term trends (e.g. France, Germany and Slovakia).
To sum up, there is only an imperfect correspondence between the developments in 
national social dialogue and the existence of NSDIs. If the existence of a NSDI is not 
in itself a sufficient condition for continuing social dialogue, experience shows that it 
does play a positive role when this process needs to be resuscitated. And, when a 
functioning NSDI is abolished or weakened, it is more likely that social dialogue will 
also stall, and that its subsequent revival will be problematic. The Great Recession 
has reopened the debate on the importance of NSDIs for social dialogue, and one of 
the major objectives of this debate should be to demonstrate more convincingly how 
closely and strongly the two are indeed linked in practice. NSDIs should become key 
institutions upon which effective social dialogue is able to rely at all times. As far as the 
NSDIs in the countries covered by the research are concerned, we shall now analyse 
them in more detail.
Before the crisis, only three EU Member States lacked a national tripartite social dia-
logue institution: Germany, where the Government often consults the social partners 
on an ad hoc basis; Sweden, which relies almost entirely on bipartism; and the United 
Kingdom, where industrial relations institutions are fragmented (there is, however, a 
bipartite-plus Low Pay Commission). In Sweden, regular tripartite consultations at all 
levels supplement bipartite action, and the crisis had no tangible impact on the con-
duct of industrial relations, while German institutions underwent some changes during 
the recession (for details, see chapters by Anxo and Lesch and Vogel in this volume). 
Ad hoc bipartite– but especially tripartite – meetings in Germany were used to formu-
late responses to the crisis (e.g. the economic crisis summits at the Federal Chancellery 
or at ministerial levels); but although the experience was deemed to have been useful, 
it was not considered necessary to set up a permanent NSDI. Nonetheless – as men-
tioned in section 4.2.1 – the State of Brandenburg established a standing tripartite 
social dialogue council in 2011, which is also endowed with negotiation functions. Ber-
lin is currently working towards its own version of this approach, and other States may 
follow suit. A tripartite-plus minimum wage commission has also been operating since 
the introduction of the Federal minimum wage in 2014.
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The number of EU Member States without a permanent or functioning NSDI has 
increased slightly since the crisis. In Estonia, social dialogue has been weak since 
independence in terms of its contribution to policy outcomes, and the National Tri-
partite Commission was suppressed in 2009 at the time of strong protests against the 
Government’s unilateral reform of labour market regulations.
In Ireland, the initially prominent tripartite-plus National Economic and Social Council 
(NESC), where the social partners used to negotiate and conclude agreements, has 
since played a lesser role in government policy-making. Employers and the Govern-
ment expressed the opinion that it often substituted for Parliament as the locus of 
policy-making. Since 2009, some of its policy-making functions have been reduced 
(see Regan, this volume), meaning that there is no longer a fully functioning national 
tripartite social dialogue institution in Ireland. Two bipartite-plus fora have de facto 
replaced the tripartite-plus institution. The National Economic Dialogue (NED) is one 
of these, and in 2015 it focused on the national budget, but has largely consultative 
functions. In Italy, the Government proposed in 2015 to abolish the constitutionally 
mandated bipartite-plus National Economic and Labour Council (CNEL) as part of 
a broader institutional reform.8 This proposed reform, however, had little to do with 
the suspension of social dialogue during the crisis, which was due mainly to tensions 
between the various Governments and the unions (Culpepper and Regan, 2014).
Even though bipartite or bipartite-plus NSDIs are relatively widespread in the EU-28 
(outside our sample, Austria, Greece – before 2014 – and Luxembourg relied exclu-
sively on them, while Bulgaria and Denmark had tripartite institutions as well), only four 
countries in this study had them in place before the crisis; and Ireland and Slovakia 
established them only recently. Spain is among those countries that have traditionally 
worked with bipartite-plus NSDIs. Belgium, France and the Netherlands have different 
mixtures of bipartite (or bipartite-plus) and tripartite (or tripartite-plus) institutions. Sev-
eral Central and Eastern European Member States, as well as Cyprus, Finland, Malta 
and Portugal, rely mainly on tripartite and tripartite-plus bodies.
Belgium, Finland and Spain are among those countries where social partnership came 
under strain and recovered to only a limited extent during the crisis. The Spanish Eco-
nomic and Social Council has a narrow advisory role and thus its influence is limited. 
The frequent use of urgent procedures for passing laws, as well as the suppression of 
regional Economic and Social Councils in several Autonomous Communities, further 
contributed to weakening the role of social dialogue in Spain (see Molina and Migue-
lez, this volume). Concerns remain that a reform of the NSDI is still needed in order to 
enhance its functions, to include new societal actors where appropriate – and perhaps 
also to strengthen its focus on reporting on socio-economic issues, a function that 
proved influential during the crisis years.
Some Belgian NSDIs were also challenged – but in a context where, especially at 
the regional level, strong social partnership served to mitigate some of the tensions. 
The bipartite-plus Central Economic Council’s (CRB-CCE) main task is to draft techni-
cal reports for wage negotiations. However, not only has the drafting of these reports 
become a matter of contention between the social partners, but also the Council has 
addressed other non-core issues, such as mobility, energy etc., thus drifting from its 
8 The proposed reform was rejected in a public referendum held in December 2016.
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core expertise. The National Labour Council (NAR-CNT) is a bipartite forum for the 
conclusion of national cross-industry collective agreements and it delivers opinions on 
matters of social concern. But tensions between the social partners have reduced the 
applicability of its recommendations to actual regulations. Despite this, negotiations 
have continued relatively unabated at the regional level and produced several agree-
ments. In Finland, where it is not yet possible to talk of a post-crisis period, negotiations 
at the tripartite-plus Economic Council have functioned more or less efficiently in the 
crisis years. Nonetheless, relations between the social partners significantly wors-
ened in 2015, when employers withdrew from collective bargaining. As a result of the 
stalemate, the Government made the unprecedented declaration that it might take uni-
lateral action, possibly so as to urge the social partners to draft a pact (this happened 
in early 2016).
In the Netherlands and France, NSDIs have not been challenged; on the contrary, they 
have maintained their profile and role. In the Netherlands, tripartite agreements are still 
concluded in the bipartite-plus Economic and Social Council (SER), while the bipartite 
Dutch Labour Foundation discusses labour and industrial relations issues and provides 
advice to the Government, including for the preparation of annual reports on the social 
partners’ contributions to the goals of the Europe 2020 strategy. France also presents 
a story of relative success. The most fruitful tripartite negotiations and consultations 
took place in informal, ad hoc social summits or social conferences, which allowed 
for an exchange of views and practice on social and labour policy at the highest levels 
(see box 1.1). With respect to the several bipartite-plus, tripartite and tripartite-plus 
bodies, these mainly had a consultative role during the crisis. The Economic, Social 
and Environment Council (CESE) and other councils seek to build a broad consen-
sus among the social partners on relatively uncontroversial issues; despite the quality 
of their reports, their political impact is uncertain. More specialized fora such as the 
Employment Advisory Council (a tripartite-plus body created in 2005 to analyse struc-
tural changes in the labour market) do not, for their part, have to achieve consensus 
among their members, and are therefore in a position to produce reports which are 
subject to widespread debate.
Outside the countries studied for this report, tripartite social dialogue in Portugal was 
challenged during the crisis but the tripartite institutions played an important role in 
revitalizing it afterwards. Two tripartite agreements were negotiated in the Standing Com-
mittee for Social Concertation (CPCS), which played a role in implementing, monitoring 
and evaluating several measures contained in the January 2012 pact entitled ‘Commit-
ment for growth, competitiveness and employment’ (European Commission, 2015b).9
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries had mainly tripartite institutions in place 
before the crisis, with the exception of Bulgaria, which also had a bipartite-plus insti-
tution. These bodies were created in the early 1990s for three main reasons: as a 
countermeasure to the strikes that occurred during the transformational recession; 
as a way of sharing responsibility between governments and the social partners for 
privatization and social reforms; and as an alternative mechanism for labour market 
regulation given the weakness of collective agreements (Mailand and Due, 2004). 
9  During the Tripartite Knowledge Sharing Conference (Paris, 20 May 2016), a representative of the General 
Confederation of Portuguese Workers (CGTP-IN) noted that, although the CPCS continued to meet during the 
economic crisis, it served to provide, for the most part, a platform for disagreement between the tripartite constituents. 
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Their role in decision-making is subject to debate. Ost (2000) talks of ‘illusory corpo-
ratism’, under which political elites implement tripartism so as to comply with EU norms 
and share responsibility with a marginalized labour movement. Other authors depict a 
more positive picture: Vaughan-Whitehead (2000) argues that the social partners were 
usefully involved in the EU accession process, while Rychly (2009) claims that social 
dialogue eased the worst impacts of the transition.
In most CEE countries, NSDIs had only an advisory role – and the number of success-
fully concluded social agreements was therefore relatively low. In Hungary, in early 
2012, the Government replaced the tripartite National Interest Reconciliation Council, 
which had been vital throughout the transition. The new bipartite-plus institution, the 
National Economic and Social Council, includes social and scientific civil society organ-
izations and Hungary’s historical churches, but excludes state representatives, who are 
only observers to the Council’s plenary sessions. Most of its wage-setting and co-de-
termination prerogatives have been repealed. Similarly, the tripartite Economic and 
Social Council in Romania has been recast as a public institution of national interest, 
whose membership has been widely extended and the Government representatives 
replaced by members of civil society (Bernaciak, 2015). At the same time, however, the 
Government created a national tripartite council for social dialogue, tasked with hosting 
discussions between the Government and the social partners on labour market issues 
(Chivu et al., 2013). As regards the other CEE countries, there was an intensification of 
tripartism during the early years of the crisis. This worked well for developing short-term 
anti-crisis measures to protect jobs, but broke down during the tougher negotiations 
on fiscal consolidation and structural reform measures. Despite these ups and downs, 
tripartite institutions in post-socialist countries seem broadly to have maintained an 
unchanged role; indeed, even certain positive developments have occurred.
Among the cases analysed, Slovenia endowed its tripartite Economic and Social Council 
(ESS) with quasi-legislative functions. Between 1994 and 2009, it produced eight social 
pacts, which dealt not only with incomes policy and minimum wages but with all kinds of 
socio-economic issues (Stanojevic and Krašovec, 2011). During the crisis, the ESS did 
not undergo any significant changes, but its activities ground to a halt in 2010-11, when 
both employers and workers boycotted its meetings in opposition to (different) poli-
cies implemented by the Government. The ESS resumed its normal functioning around 
2014-15, but relations between the social partners remain strained, as evidenced by the 
withdrawal of employers from the newly signed Social Agreement of 2015-16.
In Slovakia, the social partners claim that the operations of the Economic and Social 
Council (HSR) have been strengthened and regularized. During the crisis, two ad hoc 
tripartite-plus consultative bodies were created: the Council for the Economic Crisis 
(RHK), which operated between 2009 and 2010, and the Council for Solidarity and 
Development (RSR), an informal body chaired by the Premier. The social partners 
established the Industry Bipartite in 2013, a cross-sectoral body for consultation and 
the coordination of employers’ and unions’ activities. In Lithuania, the social partners 
were critical of the Government’s alleged failure to strengthen the capacity of the Tripar-
tite Council and to take their opinions into account, and its tendency to override social 
dialogue by taking unilateral action, in particular concerning labour market reforms.
The wide diversity of forms that NSDIs take throughout Europe – and this applies to 
the periods before, during and after the crisis – demonstrates that there is no ideal 
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model, or ‘one-size-fits-all’, when it comes to national institutions; rather, these reflect 
the particular history, traditions and economic, political and social conditions of the 
country concerned. Moreover, they must be dynamic and flexible enough to adapt to 
change over time.
4.2.3 The role of the European Semester 10
The European Semester has become an important mechanism for economic policy 
coordination across EU Member States and is part of the so-called ‘silent revolution’ 
announced by the European Commission’s President Barroso when he introduced the 
‘six-pack’ on European economic governance in 2011.11 Within the policy cycle, each 
Member State submits every year it’s National Reform Programme (NRP) which out-
lines the main measures it will take to implement the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
(BEPG) and includes information on economic and employment policies, in parallel 
with the Stability Programme or Convergence Programme. The European Council 
examines the implementation of the Member States’ employment policies, based on 
the NRP and the opinions of the Employment Committee (EMCO). Member States 
also have an opportunity within the EMCO of reviewing each other’s performance. The 
Council and the Commission then prepare a joint annual report, presented at the same 
time as the Annual Growth Survey (AGS), which is later accompanied by country-spe-
cific recommendations (CSRs).
The contribution of social dialogue to the European Semester is regarded as particu-
larly important for the achievement of a socially sustainable recovery. Therefore, the 
European Commission urged the Member States to step up the involvement of the 
social partners (European Commission, 2013; 2014) at both EU and national levels. 
The establishment of European Semester Officers (ESOs) in 2012 was an important 
step in this regard. ESOs are economic policy experts who are based in the EC Rep-
resentations in Member States. In several cases, the ESOs have proved conducive to a 
positive development of relations between EC officials, the government and the social 
partners. At the EU level, the social partners are now consulted prior to the publication 
of the AGS. Since 2015, Country Reports are published three months earlier than was 
previously the case, in order to allow for a more informed debate among the actors 
concerned. The social partners at the European level have welcomed both the dialogue 
with EMCO and the Social Protection Committee (SPC), as well as the preparatory 
committees for the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council 
(EPSCO). At the national level, it has been recommended that governments consult 
the social partners during the drafting of the NRPs and also that the social partners be 
involved in the work of the ESOs, in line with the new Employment Guidelines.
Assessments of the process to date have been mixed, especially with respect to the 
social partners’ capacity to engage with it. Some studies depict the European Semester 
as a mechanism for supranational surveillance over economic policies, while social pol-
icies and social dialogue play a marginal role (Costamanga, 2013; Schulten and Müller, 
10  This section was drafted mainly by Christian Welz and Ricardo Rodriguez Contreras of Eurofound, and Pablo Sanz of 
Notus. It draws on Eurofound, 2016a. 
11  The ‘six-pack’ refers to six EU laws that came into force on 23 November 2011, under which Eurozone countries that 
do not comply with the revised Stability and Growth Pact, or are found to be in a position of ‘excessive macroeconomic 
imbalance’ would be automatically sanctioned by specified fines.
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2012). Erne (2015) posits that without doubt “the new regime’s league tables, CSRs, 
corrective action plans, and potential fines for non-compliance are effectively eroding 
the bargaining autonomy of the social partners.” This is further exacerbated when 
even national parliaments have no say in the face of governmental rule by decree. 
Other scholars highlight certain positive aspects such as the creative adaptation to the 
new conditions of the European Semester, which have strengthened the role of social 
and employment actors, such as EMCO and the SPC (Zeitlin and Vanhercke, 2015). 
Moreover, Bekker (2014) argues that the evolutionary nature of the European Semes-
ter opens up new opportunities for a ‘social Europe’, as evidenced by the fact that the 
CSRs reflect a good balance between the economic and social goals of employment 
and social policies. Erne (2015), however, disputes such an interpretation and warns 
that: “not all CSRs that deal with social and employment issues ‘can be considered 
socially oriented’”.
We espouse a rather agnostic view on the European Semester. First, it is still too early 
to appreciate the longer-term impact of the European Semester on national social dia-
logue. The Juncker Commission pledged in 2014-15 to step up the involvement of the 
social partners with an aim to make this common practice in the coming years, and 
also to streamline the CSRs addressed to Member States by reducing their number 
and detail; the full effects of these changes remain to be felt. Second, the nature of 
recommendations varies between policy fields and over time. For example, although 
certain employment-related recommendations might not seem to be socially oriented 
(e.g. because they advocate a reduction in employment protection legislation), this may 
well change at a later stage, while recommendations in other fields may have a more 
explicit social orientation. As Clauwert (2015) and Guardiancich and Guidi (2016) show, 
the number of recommendations regarding the fiscal sustainability of pensions reduced 
in recent CSRs while the coherence and comprehensiveness of Country Reports 
increased. Additionally, some institutional actors have shifted positions, advocating that 
greater attention be paid to benefit adequacy measures. Third, this volume is concerned 
more with the process whereby the social partners are integrated into European poli-
cy-making (at national and, partly, supranational levels) than with the policy outcomes 
which result from it (which have both domestic and transnational consequences). In this 
final respect, the country studies portray a mixed picture regarding the involvement of 
the social partners. Such a portrayal may, however, be due in part to the different per-
spectives of the authors: while some authors focused on the more procedural aspects 
of the Semester, others paid greater attention to issues such as social partner autonomy.
Eurofound’s survey (2016a) for 2011-14, which focuses on the procedural side of the 
social partners’ involvement in the European Semester, is more upbeat in its assess-
ment. Employers’ and workers’ organizations contributed to the formulation and/or 
implementation of NRPs in 22 countries. The forms of their involvement are sum-
marized in table 1.3. A total of 19 Member States held tripartite meetings, whether 
within already-established NSDIs (in the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia and, outside 
our studies, in the Czech Republic, Luxembourg and Malta), within tripartite ad hoc 
committees (in Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) or within specific bodies created 
in the context of the Europe 2020 Strategy (Bulgaria and Denmark) or the European 
Employment Strategy (France). In Estonia, Germany and Luxembourg, separate meet-
ings were held regularly with trade unions and employers, whereas in Italy they were 
scheduled only when negative reactions from the social partners were foreseeable. In 
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Lithuania and Spain only written consultations were held at first, but tripartite meetings 
are now held on an ad hoc basis (Spain) or within the Tripartite Council (Lithuania) (see 
chapters by Molina and Miguelez, and by Petrylaite in this volume).
Table 1.3  Forms of social partner involvement in National Reform Programmes12
Tripartite meetings Other forms of involvement
Standard 
tripartite body
Specific 
‘European 
committee’
Tripartite ad hoc 
committees/
meetings
Separate 
meetings with TU 
and EO
Only written 
consultation
CZ, LU, MT, NL, 
SI, SK
BG, DK, FI, FR, 
PL, SE
AT, BE, CY, ES  
(since 2014), IT, 
LV, UK
DE, EE, IT, LU ES (up to 2014), LT
Source: Eurofound (2016a). TU = Trade unions; EO = Employers’ organizations. (n=22)
The degree of institutionalization of the social partners’ involvement in NRP can be 
assessed according to three criteria: the frequency and regularity of involvement, the 
adequacy of the time allocated to information-sharing and consultation, and whether or 
not there is balanced consultation with employers’ and workers’ organizations respec-
tively (see table 1.4).
Table 1.4  Involvement of the social partners in National Reform Programmes
Frequency of 
consultation
Time allotted to information-sharing and 
consultation (I&C) and number of meetings
Balance in 
consultation with  
TU and EO (n=21)
Regular and 
predictable
Irregular/  
ad hoc
Enough 
time  
for I&C
Insufficient 
time  
for I&C
Only one 
meeting
More 
than one 
meeting
On an 
equal 
footing
Unbalanced
AT, BE, BG, 
DE, DK, EE, 
FR, LT, LV, 
MT, NL, PL, 
SE (since 
2013), SI 
and SK
CY, CZ, ES, 
FI, IT, LU, 
UK
AT, BE, 
CY, CZ, DE 
(EO), DK, 
EE, FI, LT, 
MT, NL, PL 
SE, SK, UK
BG, DE 
(TU), ES, 
FR, IT, LU, 
LV, SI,
BG, DE, ES, 
FI, FR, LU, 
LV, MT, NL, 
SI, UK
AT, BE, CY, 
CZ, DK, EE, 
IT, LT, PL, 
SE, SK
AT, BE, CZ, 
DE, DK, EE, 
ES, FI, FR, 
IT, LT, LU, 
LV, MT, NL, 
PL, SE, SI, 
SK, UK
BG, CY
Source: Eurofound (2016a). (n=22)
In Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Slo-
vakia and Sweden, the involvement of the social partners is high, as they do well on 
all three criteria. Seven countries – Czech Republic, Germany, Finland, France, Latvia, 
Slovenia and the United Kingdom – do well on two of the three variables. The social 
12  AT (Austria), BE (Belgium), BG (Bulgaria), CY (Cyprus), CZ (Czech Republic), DE (Germany), DK (Denmark), 
EE (Estonia), EL (Greece), ES (Spain) FR (France), FI (Finland), HR (Croatia), HU (Hungary), IE (Ireland), IT (Italy), 
LT (Lithuania), LU (Luxembourg), LV (Latvia), MT (Malta), NL (Netherlands), PL (Poland), PT (Portugal), RO 
(Romania), SE (Sweden), SI (Slovenia) SK (Slovakia), UK (United Kingdom).
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partners’ involvement is least institutionalized in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Italy, Luxembourg 
and Spain, which score positively on one or none of the criteria considered.
The views of the social partners on the NRP are taken into consideration to only a 
limited extent across the EU. According to the country studies on Belgium and the 
Netherlands under this project, the social partners’ views were integrated into the NRP, 
although in Belgium, they claim insufficient involvement at the drafting stage (see Van 
Gyes, Terlinden and Vandekerckhove, this volume). In Sweden, the social partners’ 
comments on the NRP, the CSR and the Europe 2020 strategy were taken into con-
sideration and annexed to the NRP (see Anxo, this volume). In Finland and Malta, the 
social partners reportedly also significantly shaped the process, and in Austria, Poland 
and Spain their views were annexed to the NRP. Elsewhere, the influence of the social 
partners was circumscribed to specific topics or was otherwise limited.
Eurofound (2016a) suggest that substantial institutionalization is almost a prerequisite 
for the social partners to be able to contribute to the NRP design and implementa-
tion. The only exception appears to be Finland where, despite their quite irregular and 
unpredictable involvement, the social partners seem to have had a tangible impact on 
the NRP (see Jokinen, this volume). At the same time, institutionalization alone is not 
sufficient: in some highly institutionalized countries, such as Austria, Denmark, Estonia 
and Poland, the social partners lament their limited impact on the NRPs. In Lithuania, 
they reportedly failed to produce constructive proposals despite the Government urging 
them to do so (see Petrylaite, this volume). Medium and low institutionalization tends 
to correlate with limited or no influence of the social partners on the NRPs. In Bulgaria, 
Cyprus and Spain, either or both the employers and/or workers feel excluded from the 
NRP process. But in only three countries (Croatia, Hungary and Romania) were the 
social partners largely absent from both the formulation and the implementation of the 
NRPs (Eurofound, 2016a).
Two main lessons may be drawn. First, while the existence of formal structures for the 
involvement of the social partners does not in itself guarantee the institutionalization of 
social dialogue, most such structures enshrine sound procedures to ensure the regu-
larity and predictability of consultations within the European Semester. Second, even 
when social dialogue is institutionalized, this does not necessarily imply that the social 
partners’ views will always be taken into serious consideration while drafting the NRP. 
In sum, despite some undeniable progress, as documented in the country studies, the 
EU institutions and the European social partners agree that a stronger involvement of 
employers’ and workers’ organizations is needed in both European and national pro-
cesses of the European Semester.
5.  Industrial relations and collective bargaining  
in the post-crisis period (2013-15)
5 1  Overview of the impact of the crisis on industrial relations and collective 
bargaining
The impact of the crisis on industrial relations and collective bargaining has been 
analysed in several reports and studies (European Commission, 2015b, Eurofound, 
2013; 2015, Welz and Broughton, 2014). All of them agree, first, on the existence of 
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significant differences across EU countries. In some countries, the crisis triggered an 
intensification of long-term trends in industrial relations and collective bargaining, but 
without bringing any structural change to existing practices and institutions in its wake. 
By contrast, in other countries (including those facing large macroeconomic imbal-
ances and challenges), changes and reforms introduced during the crisis have been 
far-reaching and entail a significant departure from existing practices. This is the case 
in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Second, these studies demonstrate an accel-
eration in the reform path of industrial relations. In this respect, also, the differences 
between countries are remarkable, with some exhibiting very little change, while others 
experienced a number of changes in industrial relations in a short period of time.
There has been no particular intensification of the decline in trade union membership 
as a consequence of the crisis (European Commission, 2015). In the decades preced-
ing it, a steady increase in employment – combined with stable to slightly declining 
trade union membership – resulted in a downward trend in density rates (i.e. the share 
of employees who are trade union members). However, when the crisis hit, this trend 
was mitigated but not halted as job losses were concentrated, at least in the initial 
stages, in low-skilled services and among young workers, where unionization rates are 
generally low. Moreover, economic adjustment and fiscal consolidation led to a reduc-
tion in public sector employment, where unionization rates are typically the highest 
in the EU. Overall, then, the decline in trade union membership continued as part of 
a long-term trend across the EU. Nonetheless, in the case of trade unions, the crisis 
has contributed to an intensified pressure for mergers, in an attempt to increase their 
strength and efficiency, and to compensate for their declining income from member-
ship fees.
On the employers’ side, no significant impact of the crisis was reported, either in terms 
of membership or in organization (Bechter and Brandl, 2015). If anything, the crisis 
triggered increased intra-organizational tensions in some countries, between federa-
tions representing different interest groups, i.e. large versus small firms.
With respect to collective bargaining, the crisis has led to an intensification of trends 
towards de-centralization (Marginson and Welz, 2015). Two mechanisms can explain 
this development. First is the extension of opt-out clauses that allow company-level 
agreements not to incorporate terms and conditions negotiated at higher levels. Sec-
ond is the reversal of the favourability principle. According to this principle, there is a 
hierarchy in the application of collective agreements whereby those establishing less 
favourable conditions for workers cannot prevail over those establishing more favoura-
ble ones. This principle had been introduced in many countries in order to stop the use 
of company-level agreements to erode working conditions negotiated at sectoral level.
The decline in collective bargaining coverage also accelerated during the crisis (Visser, 
Hayter and Gammarano, 2015). In some countries, reforms were introduced to limit 
the (automatic) extension of collective agreements as well as their extension upon 
expiry. This triggered an increase in the number of workers not covered by agreements. 
Even though collective bargaining coverage remains relatively high – thanks largely 
to extension mechanisms (Schulten, Eldring and Naumann, 2015) – its generalized 
decline in the private sector can be linked to an observed increase in income inequality 
(Bosch, 2015). Other analysts, however, contend the opposite – that in countries where 
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extension mechanisms lead to high collective bargaining coverage in excess of union 
density, the resulting higher unemployment rates lead to increased inequality (Jaumo-
tte and Osorio-Buitron, 2015).
Finally, regarding collective bargaining coordination, the most important change brought 
about by the crisis was an increase in government intervention in some countries, 
particularly in wage-setting in either the private or public sectors. This process has 
nonetheless manifested itself in very different ways. In some countries, governments 
unilaterally instigated reforms in industrial relations and collective bargaining; in others, 
they became actively involved in the negotiation of wage agreements or collective bar-
gaining reforms with the social partners.
5 2 Post-crisis developments in industrial relations
In a post-crisis context of economic recovery, with significant differences in speed 
and intensity across countries, some of the tensions affecting industrial relations and 
collective bargaining might be expected to relax once a more favourable economic cli-
mate sets in, widening the margins and time for compromise to be reached. This would 
certainly be the case for wage setting (particularly in the public sector), but also for 
extension mechanisms in collective bargaining, working time and employment clauses. 
Given the importance of industrial relations and collective bargaining – especially for the 
reduction of inequalities – particular attention should be paid to their recent evolution in 
the post-crisis period. It should be asked whether there has been a slowdown or even 
a reversal of the trends observed during the crisis. Are any of the changes introduced 
during the crisis now being consolidated? We will look first at developments concerning 
workers’ and employers’ organizations and the State, respectively, and attention will 
then be directed to collective bargaining (see table 1.9 in the appendix).
5.2.1 Trade unions try to revitalize and attract new members, mergers continue
In the post-crisis period, we are witnessing some attempts to revitalize the trade unions’ 
role in the political and industrial relations spheres. In addition to the unions’ declining 
membership in some countries, coupled with their diminished capacity to influence 
industrial relations developments, the crisis added new challenges. The most important 
was a generalized erosion in the public perception of trade unions in some countries, 
including Ireland, Italy and Spain (Culpepper and Regan, 2014). However, there are 
some exceptions such as the Czech Republic, where a recent survey showed that pub-
lic perceptions had improved (Eurofound, 2015b).
The evidence from the country studies suggests that the intensity of the decline in 
public perceptions has moderated in the post-crisis period. This is due partly to the 
improvement in economic conditions, but also to the fact that, in some countries, trade 
unions are developing new strategies to revitalize their role in the industrial relations 
and political spheres. In Finland, for example, notwithstanding a very high density rate, 
trade unions organized a media campaign in 2014 to reverse the membership decline 
and encourage new affiliations to trade unions. In some other countries, policies imple-
mented in the post-crisis period may positively impact union membership. Examples 
include Sweden, where an increase in unemployment benefit introduced by a reform in 
2014, may serve to bring to a halt or even reverse trade union membership decline. In 
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Lithuania, an amendment to the law in 2013 provided new rules for representation and 
workers’ rights at company level. In the Netherlands, where declining density is chal-
lenging the legitimacy of trade unions and collective bargaining more generally, trade 
unions are making special efforts to reach out to groups that are poorly represented 
and unionized, such as immigrants and the self-employed. 
The trend towards an internal reorganization of trade unions, initiated during the cri-
sis years in response to financial pressures, is continuing in the post-crisis period. 
Membership losses, together with reduced public subsidies in some countries, have 
forced trade unions to intensify merger processes. Such processes are particularly 
evident in four countries: Finland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Spain. In some countries, 
mergers have occurred between sectoral federations within confederations (Lithuania, 
Slovakia and Spain), while in others there have been mergers between different trade 
unions (Finland). But the opposite trend may be observed in other countries, such 
as Slovenia, where a higher fragmentation of unions is reported (see Guardiancich, 
this volume).
5.2.2 Employers’ organizations’ membership remains stable
For employers’ organizations, the evidence suggests stability in membership in the 
post-crisis period. Some countries experienced membership losses even before the 
crisis, a trend that intensified in a number of cases during it. In some countries, these 
membership losses have contributed to the decline in collective bargaining coverage, 
particularly in those where automatic extension mechanisms are not in place. This is 
the case in Slovenia, for example. Moreover, in the case of France, a law has been 
approved to change the representativeness rules for employers’ organizations. It has 
the twofold objective of establishing more transparent criteria to negotiate collective 
agreements and reducing fragmentation on the employers’ side. One of the rea-
sons why membership is sometimes unattractive is because companies that adhere 
are bound by sectoral collective agreements, hence reducing the flexibility allowed 
by decentralized wage bargaining. By way of example of a strategy to counter this 
constraint, employers’ organizations in Germany introduced OT membership (OT 
stands for ohne Tarifbindung), allowing companies to join the employers’ organiza-
tion without binding them to sectoral level wage agreements (Silvia and Schroeder, 
2007). Moreover, in order to enhance their representativeness, employers’ organiza-
tions are engaging in organizational change and the delivery of new services (Brandl 
and Lehr, 2016).
Another significant development concerns the relationships between different employ-
ers’ organizations. Company size constitutes a first source of difference between these 
entities. Differences reported during the crisis between those employers’ organizations 
representing small companies and those representing large companies persist in some 
countries (Nonell and Medina, 2015). Such differences have been detected even in 
the Nordic countries, where long-term trends in industrial relations have made col-
lective action increasingly challenging for employers, and changed their perceptions 
of the advantages of coordinated collective bargaining (Ibsen, Andersen and Dølvik, 
2016). By contrast, in some countries, the opposite trend is observed; in Lithuania, for 
example, unity of action between the main employers’ confederations was agreed in 
December 2013. 
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Some employers’ organizations have challenged the role and efficacy of centralized 
social dialogue in a crisis context. In the Netherlands, a new employers’ organiza-
tion (ONL) was created in response to discontent over slow decision-making under 
the ‘Polder’ system. Similarly, in Spain, the Employers’ Council for Competitiveness 
(CEC), was created by some of the country’s largest companies to perform a lobby-
ing role, alongsidesocial dialogue as a mechanism to advance employers’ interests. 
In Finland, the Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) experienced internal ten-
sions in 2012 when the export-oriented employers’ federations criticized centralized 
wage-setting.
5.2.3 State intervention remains high
The State is continuing to play an important role in industrial relations and collective 
bargaining in many countries in the post-crisis period. According to Howell (2016), 
this stronger role of States in regulating employment relations follows a long-term trend 
observed in many EU countries of weakening industrial relations institutions. This 
State intervention, however, varies greatly across countries in its intensity, focus and in 
the mechanisms used (Molina, 2014). For instance, the unilateral State regulation of 
industrial relations continues in some countries in the post-crisis period – particularly 
those with a Statist tradition, such as France; indeed, when the social partners failed 
to reach an agreement in that country, a law was passed in August 2015 introducing 
changes in consultation bodies and collective bargaining at company level. Moreover, 
the State has announced a new reform in 2016 that will change the rules on sec-
tor-level collective bargaining. In Belgium, the Government taking office in October 
2014 enacted a temporary suspension of the wage indexation mechanism. Finally, 
in Finland, the Government taking office in 2015 announced its intention to pass 
statutory legislation in some areas that were previously regulated through autono-
mous collective bargaining, hence limiting the issues that could be negotiated by the 
social partners.
The public sector has been particularly affected by this trend, with a generalized shift 
towards State unilateralism in public sector industrial relations (Bach and Bordogna, 
2013). In the post-crisis period, certain Governments have nonetheless repealed some 
of the unilateral decisions taken with respect to public sector employees during the cri-
sis (e.g. Spain, Ireland and Italy). Moreover, in the case of Greece, collective bargaining 
for civil servants was restored in 2015. Alongside this, however, there are some coun-
tries in which State unilateralism persists. In Portugal, for example, the Government 
maintained a blockage on around 500 local-level Government collective agreements 
(Eurofound, 2015c). In Croatia too, a unilateral wage freeze on public sector employees 
imposed in 2014 was extended until March 2015.
In some countries, State intervention aimed to enhance the autonomy of the social 
partners. This was the case in countries with a tradition of autonomous collective 
bargaining, such as Germany, where a new Act on Strengthening the Autonomy of 
Collective Bargaining was passed in 2015. On the one hand, the law sanctioned Ger-
many’s shift towards a hybrid collective bargaining system by the introduction of a 
statutory minimum wage (Bosch, 2015). On the other hand, it aimed to increase cov-
erage of collective agreements by simplifying the mechanisms for the extension of 
sectoral minimum wage agreements.
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5.2.4 Tensions in wage-setting
The wage-setting context in most EU countries is still characterized by moderate nomi-
nal collectively negotiated wage increases. However, in a context of low inflation, limited 
real wage increases are now being reported in many countries (Eurofound, 2015). From 
an ILO perspective, wage rises that are in line with increased productivity are both sus-
tainable and stimulate further economic growth by increasing households’ purchasing 
power (ILO, 2013a). For the EC as well, it remains important that real wages continue to 
move in line with productivity over the medium term (European Commission, 2016b).
Nonetheless, trade unions in some countries have pointed to the need to allow for 
moderate, but higher, real wage increases in order to sustain the economic recov-
ery by boosting demand. Trade unions have criticized the maintenance of an internal 
devaluation strategy (Müller et al., 2015), whilst some analysts argue for greater wage 
moderation in the medium term in order to increase employment and avoid a return 
to large current account deficits (Decressin et al., 2015). As a consequence, some 
tensions have arisen in those countries with centralized wage-setting coordination 
mechanisms. This has been the case in Spain, for example, where disagreement 
between unions and employers on wage increases delayed the signing of the most 
recent peak inter-sectoral agreement. In Austria, employers’ organizations in the met-
alworking sector proposed using the average EU inflation rate, rather than the Austrian 
rate, as a benchmark for negotiating wage increases (Eurofound, 2015e). Similarly, in 
the case of Belgium, the Socialist trade union ABVV/FGTB rejected the agreement for 
moderate wage increases in 2015 and 2016. Finally, in Finland, under pressure from 
the new Government in 2015, trade unions and employers disagreed over policies to 
enhance economic competitiveness.
5.2.5 Decentralization continues, but without major reforms
The structure of collective bargaining has not experienced major changes in the post-cri-
sis period. During the crisis years, many countries introduced mechanisms to strengthen 
the role of company-level agreements in collective bargaining, in order to increase 
wage-setting flexibility and make collective bargaining more responsive to firms’ needs. 
There was accordingly an intensification of decentralization (Marginson, 2015). In the 
post-crisis period, no major reforms have occurred to change the relationship between 
different bargaining levels. The trend towards decentralization continues, particularly in 
those countries lacking a tradition of coordinated collective bargaining and strong social 
partners, such as in some countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Bernaciak, 2015a). 
In Austria, a debate was opened in 2015 regarding the introduction of opt-out clauses 
(Eurofound, 2015d). In Germany, the Collective Agreement Unity Act was passed in 
2015 and stipulates that, when two collective agreements exist in a single company, 
only the one signed by the trade union with the highest number of affiliates will apply.
In a number of countries, changes have taken place in workplace collective representa-
tion structures, including works councils. In the Netherlands, for example, a bill was 
presented in 2015 to enhance the rights of works councils with regard to equal pay 
for women and men; a separate bill concerned works councils’ influence on the terms 
of pension agreements and to their right to be informed on changes to pension fund 
policy (Eurofound, 2016b). 
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5.2.6 Attempts to enhance the sectoral coordination of collective bargaining
One result of the intensification in decentralization of collective bargaining over the 
crisis period was a weakening of governance capacity, in particular of sector-based 
coordination (Keune, 2015). In the post-crisis period, some attempts have been made 
to enhance the coordination of collective bargaining. Decentralization continues, but 
often under the umbrella of sectoral agreements. This is the case in France and Swe-
den, where legislation is envisaged to reduce the number of sectoral agreements whilst 
maintaining the full autonomy of company-level bargaining, so as to reduce fragmenta-
tion and increase coordination. In Greece, a bill agreed between the social partners and 
the Government to restore the pre-crisis framework for collective bargaining, including 
the minimum wage, included measures to enhance the role of sector-level collective 
bargaining. However, this bill did not pass into law (Eurofound, 2015f).
In other countries, centralized inter-sectoral agreements still play an important role in 
coordinating collective bargaining, and wage-setting in particular. This is the case in 
Finland and Spain. In Finland, the Government urged the social partners to sign a new 
centralized agreement in order to contribute to wage stability in 2013.
5.2.7 Stabilization of collective bargaining coverage
Collective bargaining coverage, which declined significantly during the crisis, has sta-
bilized in the post-crisis period and has even increased in some countries. This is 
the case in Slovakia, for example, where in 2014 the Government allowed extensions 
without employer consent, thereby increasing the number of employees covered by 
collective agreements. In France, the reform of 2016 is expected to allow for the expan-
sion of collective bargaining to small firms. Some other countries seem also to see 
a recovery in coverage, including Croatia where a recent report forecast a return in 
collective bargaining coverage to its pre-crisis level (Eurofound, 2015g). Particularly 
interesting is the recent reform in Romania, where a sharp decline in collective bar-
gaining coverage was recorded during the crisis. An amendment to the Social Dialogue 
Law, introduced in December 2015, allows the representative federations at sectoral 
level to conclude collective agreements in establishments which lack a representative 
company-level trade union, thus contributing to reverse the downward trend in cover-
age (Eurofound, 2016). 
By contrast, in other countries, the rules allowing for the extension of collective agree-
ments continue to be questioned. This is the case, for instance, in Finland, where the 
employers’ federation challenged the general applicability principle of collective bar-
gaining – under which collective agreements are extended to non-unionized workers 
– in 2014. In Portugal, coverage remains low due to a decline in collective agreement 
extensions during the crisis; however, there is some evidence of a recent increase in 
coverage (European Commission, 2016a).
6. Concluding remarks
If social dialogue is to contribute fully to the achievement of a sustainable and inclusive 
recovery, both political commitment and the institutions necessary for the meaningful 
involvement of the social partners must be maintained in the post-crisis period. Even 
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in countries where social dialogue has proved most resilient, long-term trends and 
crisis-related factors have both contributed to putting it under strain. In those coun-
tries where social dialogue was discontinued, rebuilding trust between the actors is 
taking time. This analysis has demonstrated that social dialogue is not, in many cases, 
self-sustaining, but requires active policy intervention and institutional support to revi-
talize its role. At the same time, in order to make social dialogue effective, the social 
partners need to enhance their own technical and operational capacities. Indeed, the 
tripartite partners must renew and reinforce their commitment to tripartism and social 
dialogue as a tool to deal with the future challenges of a very rapidly evolving world of 
work. Given the depth of the adjustments required in some countries to exit the crisis, 
social dialogue will be key for minimizing social and political instability – which could 
result in costly delays to policy implementation – and for ensuring effective outcomes 
(e.g., by alerting policy-makers to emerging issues and keeping employment as a policy 
focus) (ILO, 2013).
This analysis has highlighted the diversity of mechanisms and policy options for the 
revitalization of social dialogue in the post-crisis period. In some countries, non-in-
stitutionalized ad hoc social dialogue has provided an effective mechanism for the 
involvement of the social partners in policy-making. In others, National Social Dialogue 
Institutions have facilitated negotiations with the social partners. There is no “one-
size-fits-all” policy prescription to revitalize social dialogue. Country-specific factors, 
including the political and socio-economic context, the characteristics of the social 
partners and the legal framework for industrial relations, all need to be taken into 
account when determining what would be the most effective path to follow. The guid-
ance provided by ILO instruments, including the Tripartite Consultation (International 
Labour Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 144), which has been ratified by most EU 
countries, the Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, and the Global Jobs 
Pact, can help to enhance the role and impact of social dialogue and tripartism as tools 
for promoting a sustainable economic and labour market recovery in Europe.
The European Semester provides an opportunity for the social partners to be more 
intensively involved in policy-making, but the evidence to date shows that the full poten-
tial of their engagement is still to be realized. The diversity in mechanisms, as well as 
in the degree and outcomes of social partner involvement in the European Semes-
ter, mirrors to a large extent the diversity found in other aspects of social dialogue 
across the countries studied. The crisis has made clear the multi-level character of 
social dialogue, whereby supra-national processes increasingly affect the dynamics at 
national level. Actors at both national and supra-national levels have to deploy adequate 
resources, financial, human and institutional, with a view to enabling social dialogue to 
remain viable and recover its key role in decision-making processes. The nature and 
magnitude of the economic and social challenges ahead render the active involvement 
of the social partners, the incorporation of their views, and the use of their institutional 
resources, indispensable for successful policy design and implementation.
Industrial relations dynamics in the post-crisis period are similarly characterized by 
diversity, and actors and institutions are facing many challenges. In the countries where 
important reforms of industrial relations and collective bargaining occurred during the 
crisis period, no reversal has since been observed. In other countries, the industrial 
relations landscape is generally characterized by stability, with only a few countries 
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having partially modified their institutional frameworks in the post-crisis period. During 
the crisis, the role of the State as both regulator and mediator in industrial relations 
increased in many countries, and it is now important to restore a certain degree of 
autonomy to the social partners. Having effective dispute resolution mechanisms in 
place is particularly important in this respect. Despite the intensification of decentral-
ization, multi-employer bargaining remains a dominant feature in most EU countries, 
but the erosion of sectoral collective agreements may present an obstacle to achieving 
greater coordination. It will therefore be important to ensure compatibility between the 
flexibility accorded by decentralization and the maintenance of sector-level coordination 
of collective bargaining. A form of coordinated decentralization, in which sector-level 
agreements provide the framework for company-level bargaining, would facilitate the 
achievement of an appropriate balance between competitiveness and equity. For this to 
happen, strong and effective organizations on both the employers’ and workers’ sides, 
possessing the technical capacity to implement sectoral guidelines, are essential.
Finally, this study suggests several fruitful avenues for further research. First, to better 
equip NSDIs to face the emerging challenges in the world of work, there is a need for 
a comprehensive assessment of their capacity to represent the interests of a changing 
workforce. Second, more research is required on social dialogue at the enterprise level 
in different EU Member States. Finally, the fundamental changes underway in the very 
nature of labour relations point to an urgent need for a careful analysis of the relation-
ship between economic competitiveness and social dialogue at national, sectoral and 
company levels.
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Appendix
Table 1.5 Crisis-related changes in Governments
No. of Governments 
(2008-15)
Circumstances of the crisis-related change in the 
Government 
Belgium 6 Leterme I – Resignation after the BNP Paribas Fortis affair
Finland 5 Katainen – Intra-coalition crisis after VAS (Left Alliance) left in 
2014 due to dispute over spending cuts 
France 6 Valls I – Resignation after declarations by Minister of Economy 
against austerity measures 
Germany 3 
Ireland 3 Cowen – Intra-coalition crisis leading to the Green Party’s 
withdrawal and the Government’s fall 
Lithuania 3 
The Netherlands 3 Rutte I – Withdrawal of external support by the Freedom Party 
(PVV)
Slovakia 3 Radicová – No confidence vote over the parliamentary support to 
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
Slovenia 5 Pahor – Intra-coalition crisis, following the referendum on social 
and labour market reforms 
Spain 3 Zapatero II – Did not stand for re-election in relation to handling 
of the economic crisis 
Sweden 3 
Source: Authors’ own assessment based on country studies of ILO/EC research project.
Table 1.6 Continuity / discontinuity of social dialogue during the crisis (2008-12)
Co
un
tr
y
Continuity / 
Discontinuity 
Predominant 
form of 
social 
dialogue: 
Tripartite / 
bipartite
Cumulative 
GDP 
change at 
constant 
prices  
(2008-12) 
(%)
Unemployment 
rate (2011) (%)
Successive Governments 
(2008-15)
Fr
an
ce
Continuity Tripartite 1.2 9.2 Fillon II – Union for a Popular 
Movement (UMP)(2007-2010) 
Fillon III – UMP (2010-12) 
Ayrault I – Socialist Party (2012) 
Ayrault II – Socialist Party 
(2012-14) 
Valls I – Socialist Party (2014) 
Valls II – Socialist Party (2014-) 
S
ˇ
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Co
un
tr
y
Continuity / 
Discontinuity 
Predominant 
form of 
social 
dialogue: 
Tripartite / 
bipartite
Cumulative 
GDP 
change at 
constant 
prices  
(2008-12) 
(%)
Unemployment 
rate (2011) (%)
Successive Governments 
(2008-15)
Sl
ov
en
ia
Discontinuity
(Boycott of 
Economic and 
Social Council 
(ESC) in 2010-11. 
Referendum that 
brought Pahor’s 
Government down 
followed unilateral 
Government 
interventions.)
Tripartite -8.6 8.2 Janša I – Slovenian Democratic 
Party (2004-08) 
Pahor – Social Democrats 
(2008-12) 
Janša II – Slovenian Democratic 
Party (2012-13) 
Bratušek – Positive Slovenia 
(2013-14) 
Cerar – Moderate Centre Party 
(2014-) 
Sp
ai
n
Discontinuity
(Unilateral 
interventions since 
2011)
Tripartite and 
bipartite 
-7.0 21.4 Zapatero I – Spanish Socialist 
Workers' Party (2004-08) 
Zapatero II – Spanish Socialist 
Workers' Party (2008-11) 
Rajoy – People’s Party (2011-15) 
Fi
nl
an
d
Continuity 
(discontinued in 
the post-crisis 
period)
Tripartite -4.5 7.8 Vanhanen II – Centre Party  
(2007-10) – Majority
Kiviniemi – Centre Party  
(2010-11) – Majority
Katainen – National Coalition 
Party (2011-14) – Majority
Stubb – National Coalition Party 
(2014-15) – Majority
Sipilä – Centre Party  
(2015-) – Majority
Th
e 
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
Continuity Tripartite -1.8 5.0 Balkenende IV – Christian 
Democratic Appeal (2007-10)
Rutte I – People's Party for 
Freedom and Democracy 
(2010-12) 
Rutte II – People's Party for 
Freedom and Democracy (2012-) 
Ge
rm
an
y
Continuity Bipartite 2.2 5.8 Merkel I – Christian Democratic 
Union (2005-09) 
Merkel II – Christian Democratic 
Union (2009-13) 
Merkel III – Christian Democratic 
Union (2013-) 
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Co
un
tr
y
Continuity / 
Discontinuity 
Predominant 
form of 
social 
dialogue: 
Tripartite / 
bipartite
Cumulative 
GDP 
change at 
constant 
prices  
(2008-12) 
(%)
Unemployment 
rate (2011) (%)
Successive Governments 
(2008-15)
Be
lg
iu
m
Continuity 
(erosion in the 
post-crisis period)
Tripartite and 
bipartite
2.3 7.2 Verhofstadt III – Open Flemish 
Liberals and Democrats (2007-08) 
Leterme I – Christian Democrat 
and Flemish (2008) 
Van Rompuy – Christian Democrat 
and Flemish (2008-09) 
Leterme II – Christian Democrat 
and Flemish (2009-11) 
Di Rupo – Socialist Party 
(2011-14) 
Michel – Reformist Movement 
(2014-) 
Ir
el
an
d
Discontinuity 
(in private sector, 
but continuity in 
public sector)
2009-15 (private 
sector)
Tripartite -2.7 14.7 Ahern III – Fianna Fáil (2007-08) 
Cowen – Fianna Fáil (2008-11) 
Kenny – Fine Gael (2011-) 
Sw
ed
en
Continuity Bipartite 2.9 7.8 Reinfeldt I – Moderate Party 
(2006-10) 
Reinfeldt II – Moderate Party 
(2010-14) 
Löfven – Social Democrats (2014-)
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Discontinuity
(Unilateral 
Government 
intervention (no 
consultation of the 
Tripartite Council) 
led to protests in 
2009)
Tripartite -4.7 15.4 Kirkilas – Social Democratic Party 
(2006-08) 
Kubilius II – Homeland Union – 
Lithuanian Christian Democrats 
(2008-12) 
Butkevicius – Social Democratic 
Party (2012-)
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Continuity Tripartite and 
bipartite 
3.7 13.7 Fico I – Direction – Social 
Democracy (2006-10) 
Radicová – Slovak Democratic 
and Christian Union – Democratic 
Party (2010-12) 
Fico II – Direction – Social 
Democracy (2012-) 
Source: Authors’ own assessment based on country studies of ILO/EC research project. 
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Table 1.7 Social dialogue in the post-crisis period (2013-16) 
Co
un
tr
y Continuity / 
revitalization / 
discontinuity
Predominant form 
of social dialogue: 
Tripartite / 
bipartite
Role of NSDIs in 
social dialogue 
in the post-crisis 
period
Role of European Semester 
in social dialogue in the 
post-crisis period
Fr
an
ce Continuity Both tripartite 
and bipartite, but 
tripartite dominant
Important Not very important. Limited to 
communication of each actor’s 
diagnosis and/or proposals.
Sl
ov
en
ia
Continuity, but trust 
remains at low level 
among actors
Tripartite, with 
increasing role for 
bipartism 
Very important; the 
Social Agreement 
2015-16 first signed 
but later rescinded 
by employers 
Raising awareness among 
the social partners; gradually 
increased role in formulation 
of the National Reform 
Programme (NRP).
Sp
ai
n
Discontinuity 
remains in tripartite 
social dialogue
Tripartism role very 
weak; bipartism 
showed resilience
Not important Not very important. Social 
partners critical of the time 
for and limited role of social 
dialogue. 
Fi
nl
an
d Discontinuity Tripartite Not very important There is some form of 
institutionalization, but the 
impact of social partners in the 
NRP is judged to be limited.
Th
e 
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s Continuity Tripartite Very important Social dialogue affects the 
NRP, but outside the context 
of the European Semester. 
Involvement of social partners.
Ge
rm
an
y Continuity within an ad hoc setting 
for tripartite Social 
Dialogue
Bipartite is 
dominant, but 
tripartite social 
dialogue alive within 
an informal setting
Not important. 
However, formal 
NSDIs at regional 
level have been 
created recently
Strong involvement of the 
social partners in the European 
Semester.
Be
lg
iu
m
Continuity, but some 
tensions between 
social partners 
and government 
appearing in 
2014-15
Bipartite and 
tripartite
Traditionally very 
important, both 
for bipartite and 
tripartite social 
dialogue, but 
struggling in recent 
years
Not very important. Social 
partners critical of the time 
for and limited role of social 
dialogue.
Ir
el
an
d Discontinuity Bipartite (Public Sector Unions 
– Government)
Traditionally 
important, but its 
role is increasingly 
limited
Social partners have not been 
involved
Sw
ed
en Continuity Bipartite Not important The social partners contribute 
to the NRP and are invited to 
consultations about CSRs.
S
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Co
un
tr
y Continuity / 
revitalization / 
discontinuity
Predominant form 
of social dialogue: 
Tripartite / 
bipartite
Role of NSDIs in 
social dialogue 
in the post-crisis 
period
Role of European Semester 
in social dialogue in the 
post-crisis period
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Continuity Mostly tripartite Tripartite Council 
very weak; new 
tripartite plus 
bodies created 
(NEST) with unclear 
functions; tripartite 
social pact and 
bipartite collective 
agreements 
signed with little 
substantial effects.
Not very important, but signs 
of greater involvement of the 
social partners in recent years.
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Continuity Tripartite, with 
increasing role for 
bipartism 
Important. However, 
various additional 
tripartite fora have 
been established to 
tackle the crisis.
The social partners lack 
professional means. They 
participate in the preparation 
of the NRP, but CSRs are not 
consulted on at the tripartite 
Economic and Social Council.
Source: Authors’ own assessment based on country studies of ILO/EC research project.
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Table 1.8 National social dialogue institutions in European Union countries13 1415161718
Co
un
tr
y1
4 National Social Dialogue 
Institution (title in the 
original language, date of 
creation)
Structure15 Nature 
(permanent / 
ad hoc)
Membership / 
% women16
Comments (functions17 
and scope; membership 
of AICESIS18)
Au
st
ria
*
Parity Commission 
(Paritätische Kommission)
Bipartite Permanent Four subcommittees: 
Advisory Council for Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs 
(Beirat für Wirtschafts- 
und Sozialfragen); 
Subcommittee on 
International Issues 
(Unterausschuss für 
Internationale Fragen); 
Subcommittee on Wages 
(Lohnunterausschuss); 
and 
Subcommittee on Com-
petition and Prices 
(Wettbewerbs- und 
Preisunterausschuss).
Advisory Council for 
Economic and Social Affairs 
(Beirat für Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialfragen) (1963)
Bipartite-plus Permanent 21 members 
9% women
Be
lg
iu
m
Labour National Council 
(Conseil national du travail 
/ National Arbeids Raad) 
(1952)
Bipartite Permanent 26 members 
30% women
National collective 
agreements
Mandatory consultation on 
drat labour law
Member of AICESIS
Central Economic Council 
(Conseil central de 
l’économie / Centrale Raad 
voor het bedrijfsleven) 
(1948)
Bipartite-plus Permanent 48 members 
35% women
Concertation on economic 
policies
Preparation of technical 
reports for wage 
negotiations
Member of AICESIS
13  The table presents data on the main National Social Dialogue Institutions (NSDIs) (some regional structures are also 
listed). Most countries also have several permanent and ad hoc expert commissions and panels, often appointed by 
the Government, which are included only if their purpose is of particular relevance to the ILO-EC research project on 
post-crisis social dialogue.
14  Countries marked with “*” are not included in the ILO-EC research project on post-crisis social dialogue in the 
European Union. The table provides data for 28 European Union (EU) Member States, Norway and the European 
Economic and Social Committee (EESC).
15  The following terminology is used to describe the composition of the national institutions: bipartite – organizations of 
workers (W) and employers (E); bipartite-plus – (W), (E) and “others” (civil society organizations and independent 
experts); tripartite – Government (G), (W) and (E); tripartite-plus – (G), (W), (E) and “others”.
16  The composition by gender is constantly changing depending on nominations by the participating organizations. The 
figures provided are for 2015-16.
17  As all the institutions have general policy advisory/consultative functions, only specialized features are mentioned.
18  The International Association of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions (AICESIS) collaborates with the 
ILO, including on a joint database on NSDIs, which may be accessed at: http://aicesis.org/database/
S
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Co
un
tr
y1
4 National Social Dialogue 
Institution (title in the 
original language, date of 
creation)
Structure15 Nature 
(permanent / 
ad hoc)
Membership / 
% women16
Comments (functions17 
and scope; membership 
of AICESIS18)
Be
lg
iu
m
“Group of Ten” 
(Interprofessional 
Agreements – IPA) (2007) 
Bipartite Permanent 11 members 
18% women
Informal negotiating group 
of the employers and trade 
union confederations for 
centralized collective 
bargaining
High Council for Prevention 
and Protection at Work 
(Conseil supérieur pour la 
prevention et la protection 
au travail / Hoge Raad voor 
Preventie en Bescherming 
op het Werk )
Tripartite-
plus
Permanent 47 members 
40% women
Mandatory consultation 
on health and safety 
regulations
National Pension Committee 
(2015)
Tripartite Permanent 25 members 
37% women
Discussion on pension 
reform
Flemish Social and 
Economic Council (Sociaal 
Economische Raad van 
Vlaanderen – SERV)
Bipartite Permanent 20 members 
30% women
Consultation on 
employment and industrial 
policies
Walloon Social and 
Economic Council (Conseil 
économique et social de 
Wallonie – CESW)
Bipartite Permanent 50 members 
33% women
Consultation on 
employment and industrial 
policies
Brussels area Social and 
Economic Council (Conseil 
économique et social 
de Bruxelles-capitale / 
Economische and Sociale 
Raad voor het Brussels 
Hoofstedelijk Gewest) (1995)
Bipartite Permanent 50 members 
33% women
http://www.ces.irisnet.
be/fr 
Bu
lg
ar
ia
*
Economic and Social Council 
(Икономическият и 
социален съвет)  
(2001)
Bipartite-plus Permanent 36 members 
29% women
Member of AICESIS
National Council for 
Tripartite Cooperation 
(Национален съвет 
за тристранно 
сътрудничество)  
(1993)
Tripartite 9 members, 
0% women
12 branch (bi-partite) 
Councils for Social 
Cooperation
Agreement in 2010 on  
59 anti-crisis measures
http://www.saveti.
government.bg/web/
cc_13/1
National Council for 
Employment Promotion
Tripartite Permanent
National Council on Gender 
Equality
Tripartite Permanent
S
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Co
un
tr
y1
4 National Social Dialogue 
Institution (title in the 
original language, date of 
creation)
Structure15 Nature 
(permanent / 
ad hoc)
Membership / 
% women16
Comments (functions17 
and scope; membership 
of AICESIS18)
Cr
oa
tia
*
Economic and Social 
Council (Gospodarsko-
socijalnog vijeie – GSV) 
(2002)
Tripartite Permanent 14 members 
13% women
There are five committees 
with tripartite 
representation on:  
(i) wage policy, tax 
system and living 
standards; (ii) social 
policy, (iii) employment, 
education and labour 
market; (iv) legislation, 
collective bargaining and 
rights’ protection; and (v) 
sustainable development, 
economy, energy and 
climate change.
In addition, there are 
sectoral committees for 
road transport, railways, 
tourism, construction, 
textile-clothing-leather 
and forestry and timber. 
They have tripartite 
composition with different 
gender balance.
There are 21 ESCs at the 
county level.
Cy
pr
us
* Labour Advisory Board 
(2006)
Tripartite Permanent 14 members 
7% women
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
*
Council of Economic and 
Social Agreement (Rada 
hospodáiské a sociální 
dohody – RHSD) (1990)
Tripartite Permanent 21 members 
25% women
In 2014, new procedural 
rules strengthened the 
role of social partners for 
preparing legislation and 
statutory rules.
Member of AICESIS
There are Regional 
Councils of Economic and 
Social Agreement (Krajské 
Rady hospodáiské a 
sociální dohody).
De
nm
ar
k*
Danish Economic Council 
(Det økonomiske råd)(1962)
Tripartite-
plus
Permanent 25 members 
8% women
Advisory body
Danish Employment 
Council (Danmarks 
Beskæftigelsesråd)
Tripartite Permanent Employment policies
Regional and local 
employment councils 
(Regionale og lokale 
beskæftigelsesråd)
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Co
un
tr
y1
4 National Social Dialogue 
Institution (title in the 
original language, date of 
creation)
Structure15 Nature 
(permanent / 
ad hoc)
Membership / 
% women16
Comments (functions17 
and scope; membership 
of AICESIS18)
National 
Cooperation Council 
(Samarbejdsnævnet)
Bipartite Permanent Cooperation council 
administrating the 
Cooperation Agreement 
(2006) between LO 
(Danish Confederation 
of Trade Unions) and DA 
(Confederation of Danish 
Employers – Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening)
Es
to
ni
a*
In Estonia, there is no 
social dialogue institution 
of general competency. 
The National Tripartite 
Commission was 
suppressed in 2009
Estonian ILO Tripartite 
Council (1991)
Tripartite Permanent 12 members 
92% women
Issues of collaboration 
with the ILO
Fi
nl
an
d
Economic Council 
(Talousneuvosto) (1966) 
Tripartite-
plus
Permanent 19 members 
21% women
Information/consultation 
on economic and 
monetary policy
Member of AICESIS
Information Committee 
on Cost and Income 
Developments (TUKUSETO)
Tripartite Permanent
Fr
an
ce
Economic, Social and 
Environmental Council 
(Conseil économique, social 
et environnemental – CESE) 
(1958)
Bipartite-plus Permanent 233 members 
46% women 
The Economic Council 
was created in 1924 
and mentioned in the 
Constitution of 1946. It 
became the Economic and 
Social Council in 1958 
and the CESE in 2008.
www.lecese.fr – Member 
of AICESIS
Employment Policy Council 
(Conseil d’orientation pour 
l’emploi) (2005)
Tripartite-
plus
Permanent 48 membres, 
27% women
Preparation of diagnosis 
on trends in employment 
and of proposals on 
employment policies 
Social Dialogue Committee 
for International and 
European Issues (Comité 
du dialogue social pour les 
questions internationales 
et européennes – CDSEI) 
(1998)
Tripartite Permanent 16 social 
partners 
(8+8) + 
ministries 
concerned by 
the agenda
Information and 
consultation with social 
partners
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Co
un
tr
y1
4 National Social Dialogue 
Institution (title in the 
original language, date of 
creation)
Structure15 Nature 
(permanent / 
ad hoc)
Membership / 
% women16
Comments (functions17 
and scope; membership 
of AICESIS18)
Fr
an
ce
Consultative bodies Tripartite Permanent National Collective 
Bargaining Commission 
(Commission nationale de 
la négociation collective 
– CNCC); National 
Employment Committee 
(Conseil national de 
l’emploi, CNE); Pensions 
Advisory Committee (le 
Conseil d’orientation 
des retraites); the 
National Committee for 
Employment, Training 
and Vocational Guidance 
(le Conseil national de 
l’emploi, de la formation 
et de l’orientation 
professionnelle (CNEFOP); 
Committee on Working 
Conditions (le Conseil 
d’orientation sur les 
conditions de travail 
(COCT); the National 
Council on Labour 
Relations ( le Haut 
conseil du dialogue social 
(2008)); the National 
Council for Lifelong 
Vocational Training 
(Conseil national de la 
formation professionnelle 
tout au long de la 
vie, CNFPTLV).
Social Summits (up to 
2011), Social Conferences 
(since 2012)
Tripartite Ad hoc Variable Chaired by the President 
of France, 2010-15
Ge
rm
an
y
No NSDI
Economic Crisis Summits 
(2008-2010), informal 
consultations
Tripartite Ad hoc
Minimum Wage Commission 
(Mindestlohnkommission) 
(2014)
Tripartite-
plus
Permanent 9 members
Tripartite Social Dialogue 
Council of the State of 
Brandenburg (2011)
Tripartite Permanent 14 members 
21% women
The Berlin Dialogue was 
set up in 2013
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Co
un
tr
y1
4 National Social Dialogue 
Institution (title in the 
original language, date of 
creation)
Structure15 Nature 
(permanent / 
ad hoc)
Membership / 
% women16
Comments (functions17 
and scope; membership 
of AICESIS18)
Gr
ee
ce
*
Economic and Social 
Council (Μήνυμα του 
Προέδρου της – ΟΚΕ) 
(1994)
Bipartite-plus Permanent 62 members 
8% women
Member of AICESIS
Supreme Labour Council 
(ASE)
Tripartite Permanent 6 Sections (Section 
on Gender Equality 
established in 1984)
In charge of requests, 
inter alia, on collective 
redundancies (since 
2014) and the extension 
of collective agreements
Government Council for 
Employment (2014)
Tripartite Permanent Convened by the 
Prime Minister at his/
her convenience (one 
meeting since 2014)
National Social Protection 
Committee
Tripartite-
plus
Permanent
National Committee for 
the Equality of Men and 
Women
Tripartite-
plus
Permanent
Hu
ng
ar
y*
National Economic and 
Social Council (Nemzeti 
Gazdasági és Társadalmi 
Tanács – NGTT) (2011)
Bipartite-plus Permanent 32 members 
0% women
Member of AICESIS
Consultative body
Permanent Consultative 
Forum of the Industry 
and the Government 
(Versenyszféra és a 
Kormány Érdekegyeztetö 
Fóruma – VKF)
Negotiation on minimum 
wage; consultation on 
labour-law related issues
Ir
el
an
d
National Economic and 
Social Council (NESC) 
(1973)
Tripartite-
plus
Permanent 34 members 
29% women
Advisory role to the Prime 
Minister’s Office 
Member of AICESIS
National Economic 
Dialogue (2015)
Bipartite-plus Permanent Expression of views on 
the State budget
Low Pay Commission 
(2015)
Bipartite-plus 9 members
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Co
un
tr
y1
4 National Social Dialogue 
Institution (title in the 
original language, date of 
creation)
Structure15 Nature 
(permanent / 
ad hoc)
Membership / 
% women16
Comments (functions17 
and scope; membership 
of AICESIS18)
Ita
ly
*
 No national social dialogue 
institution 
The National Economic and 
Labour Council (Consiglio 
Nazionale per l’Economia 
e il Lavoro – CNEL, 1957, 
bipartite-plus, consultative 
body for Parliament 
and the government), 
member of AICESIS, was 
suppressed in 2015 (64 
members, 9% women)
However, it is still partially 
functioning in 2016 
(it keeps the national 
database on collective 
bargaining, continues to 
do some monitoring of 
the labour market and 
integration of migrants)
La
tv
ia
* National Tripartite 
Cooperation Council (1996)
Tripartite Permanent 21 members 
33% women
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Tripartite Council of the 
Republic of Lithuania 
(Lietuvos Respublikos trišale 
taryba – LRTT) (1995) 
Tripartite Permanent 21 members 
30% women
Tripartite councils also 
exist at municipal level
Tripartite Council (Social-
economic Council) of the 
Republic of Lithuania 
(Lietuvos Respublikos 
trišale taryba  
(socialine-ekonomine 
taryba) (2010)
Tripartite Permanent
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g*
Economic and Social Council 
(Conseil économique et 
social) (1966)
Bipartite-plus Permanent 39 members 
10% women
Member of AICESIS
http://www.ces.public.lu/
fr/index.html 
Tripartite Co-ordination 
Committee (Comité de 
coordination tripartite) 
(1977)
Tripartite Permanent
Permanent Committee of 
Labour and Employment 
(Comité Permanent du 
Travail et de l’Emploi 
– CPTE)
Tripartite Permanent Employment, working 
condition, occupational 
safety and health
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Co
un
tr
y1
4 National Social Dialogue 
Institution (title in the 
original language, date of 
creation)
Structure15 Nature 
(permanent / 
ad hoc)
Membership / 
% women16
Comments (functions17 
and scope; membership 
of AICESIS18)
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g*
Economic Committee 
(Comité de conjoncture)
Tripartite Permanent Monitoring of the situation 
of companies forced 
to resort to short-time 
working arrangements 
and to propose, if needed, 
compensatory payments 
to companies resorting to 
short-time work.
Women’s Labour Committee 
(Comité du travail féminin)
Tripartite Permanent
M
al
ta
*
Malta Council for Economic 
and Social Development 
(MCESD) (2001)
Tripartite-
plus
Permanent 17 members 
9% women
Member of AICESIS
Issues of economic and 
social relevance including 
cost of living adjustments, 
skills, working time, 
unemployment, utility 
prices, budget proposals, 
etc.
Employment Relations 
Board
Wages, working time and 
other issues involving 
employment conditions, 
including relevant 
legislation.
Th
e 
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
Economic and Social 
Council (Sociaal 
Economische Raad – SER) 
(1950)
Bipartite-plus Permanent 33 members 
24% women
Member of AICESIS
Labour Foundation 
(Stichting van de Arbeid – 
STAR) (1945)
Bipartite Permanent National consultative 
body incorporating Dutch 
employers’ federations and 
trade union confederations 
http://www.stvda.nl/ 
No
rw
ay
* 
Contact Committee 
(Kontaktutvalget)
Tripartite Permanent 12 members 
58% women
Economic policy; Leader: 
Prime Minister
Employment and Pension 
Policy Council (Arbeidslivs- 
og pensjonspolitisk råd) 
(created in 2004)
Tripartite Permanent 10 members 
60% women
Leader: Minister of Labour 
and Social Affairs
Technical Calculation 
Committee for Wage 
Settlements (1967)
Tripartite Permanent 14 members 
42% women
https://www.regjeringen.
no/en/topics/labour/
lonn-og-inntekt/innsikt/
inntektspolitikk-og-
lonnsoppgjor/tbu/
id439434/
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Co
un
tr
y1
4 National Social Dialogue 
Institution (title in the 
original language, date of 
creation)
Structure15 Nature 
(permanent / 
ad hoc)
Membership / 
% women16
Comments (functions17 
and scope; membership 
of AICESIS18)
Po
la
nd
*
Social Dialogue 
Council (Rada Dialogu 
Społecznego) (2015)
Tripartite Permanent 59 members 
18% women
Replaced the Tripartite 
Commission for 
Social and Economic 
Affairs (Trójstronna 
Komisja ds. Społeczno 
Gospodarczych – TK) 
(1994), (tripartite-plus; 
62 members, 11% 
women); member of 
AICESIS
There are vivodeship 
(regional) social dialogue 
councils
http://www.dialog.gov.
pl/en/ 
Tripartite Commission 
Team for Cooperation with 
the ILO
Tripartite Permanent Established, inter 
alia, for the purposes 
of the ILO Tripartite 
Consultation 
(International Labour 
Standards) Convention, 
1978 (No. 144).
Centre for Social 
Partnership (Centrum 
Partnerstwa Społecznego)
State-controlled 
institution responsible 
for promoting social 
dialogue (through 
instigating and 
maintaining public 
debate, research and 
publishing activities) 
http://www.cpsdialog.pl/ 
Po
rt
ug
al
*
Economic and Social 
Council (Conselho 
Económico e Social -CES) 
(1991)
Tripartite-
plus
Permanent 66 members 
21% women
Member of AICESIS
www.ces.pt/5 
Standing Committee 
for Social Concertation 
(Comissão Permanente 
de Concertação Social – 
CPCS) (1984)
Tripartite Permanent 13 members 
8% women
CPCS is a sub-
committee of the CES for 
the promotion of social 
dialogue and conclusion 
of agreements www.
ces.pt/9 
Labour Relations Centre 
(Centro de Relações 
Laborais – CRL) (2012)
Tripartite Permanent 12 members 
(24 in total 
with deputies)  
33% women 
Consultation and advice 
on social dialogue and 
collective bargaining 
(e.g. employment, 
vocational training) 
www.crlaborais.pt 
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Co
un
tr
y1
4 National Social Dialogue 
Institution (title in the 
original language, date of 
creation)
Structure15 Nature 
(permanent / 
ad hoc)
Membership / 
% women16
Comments (functions17 
and scope; membership 
of AICESIS18)
Ro
m
an
ia
*
Social and Economic 
Council (Coniliul Economic 
si Social – CES) (1997)
Bipartite-plus Permanent 45 members 
11% women 
Labour relations, fiscal 
and financial policies, 
public health policies, 
social protection policies, 
education www.ces.ro
Member of AICESIS 
National Tripartite Council 
for Social Dialogue 
(Consiliul Naţional 
Tripartit pentru Dialog 
Social – CNTDS) (2011)
Tripartite Permanent Minimum wage, labour 
relations, labour disputes
Advisory board of the 
National Agency for 
Employment (Agenţia 
Naţională pentru 
Ocuparea Forţei de 
Muncă – ANOFM)
Tripartite Permanent
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Economic and Social 
Committee (Hospodárska 
a sociálna rada Slovenskej 
republiky – HSR SR) 
(2006)
Tripartite Permanent 79 members 
8% women
A national tripartite 
social dialogue exists, 
under diverse names, 
since the establishment 
of the Economic and 
Social Concertation 
Council (Rada 
hospodárskej a sociálnej 
dohody – RHSD) in 
1991 in the-then 
Czechoslovakia 
Council for the Economic 
Crisis (Rada pre 
hospodársku krízu – RHK) 
(2009)
Tripartite-
plus
Ad hoc Consultative body of the 
Government
Abolished in 2010
Council of Solidarity 
and Development (Rada 
solidarity a rozvoja – RSR) 
(2012)
Tripartite-
plus
Ad hoc Informal consultative 
body chaired by the 
Prime Minister (about 
four annual meetings)
Industry Bipartite (2013) Bipartite Permanent 8 members (five 
employers’ 
associations 
and three 
trade unions)
Consultations and 
coordination of members´ 
activities, including 
participation in tripartite 
HSR SR
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Co
un
tr
y1
4 National Social Dialogue 
Institution (title in the 
original language, date of 
creation)
Structure15 Nature 
(permanent / 
ad hoc)
Membership / 
% women16
Comments (functions17 
and scope; membership 
of AICESIS18)
Sl
ov
en
ia
Economic and Social 
Council (Ekonomsko-
socialni svet – ESS) (1994)
Tripartite Permanent 26 members 
27% women
Consultative function, 
a quasi-bargaining 
function (though not 
collective bargaining 
in its proper sense), 
which means that ‘social 
agreements’, pay policy 
agreements and other 
tripartite accords are 
negotiated within its 
framework.
Member of AICESIS
Sp
ai
n
Economic and Social 
Council (Consejo 
Económico y Social) (1991)
Bipartite-plus Permanent 61 members 
23% women
Member of AICESIS 
Several ESCs were 
suppressed in 
regions (Autonomous 
Communities) by 
2012-14
Sw
ed
en
No national tripartite 
social dialogue 
institution
The industrial relations 
system is essentially 
bipartite but with 
regular tripartite 
consultations. The social 
partners are represented 
on parliamentary 
and governmental 
committees responsible 
for drawing up 
employment and social 
policies
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
*
No national social 
dialogue institution
Low Pay Commission (LPC) Bipartite-plus Permanent 9 members 
33% women
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
on
* European Economic and 
Social Committee (Comité 
économique et social 
européen)
Bipartite-plus Permanent 350 members 
28% women
www.eesc.europa.eu
Sources: National institutions; country studies of ILO/EC research project 2015-16; AICESIS-ILO joint database; 
EurWORK (the European Observatory of Working Life – Eurofound). 
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Table 1.9  Industrial relations and collective bargaining in the post-crisis period 
(2013-15)
Co
un
tr
y Role of the State in 
regulating industrial 
relations and trend in 
the post-crisis period
Collective bargaining 
structure and trend 
in the post-crisis 
period
Wage bargaining 
coordination
Collective bargaining 
coverage and trend in 
the post-crisis period
Fr
an
ce High, stable Sector-company, stable Medium, sectoral High, stable
Sl
ov
en
ia Medium, declining Cross-industry 
and sectoral, 
decentralization
High, cross-Industry 
and sectoral 
High, declining
Sp
ai
n High, stable Sector–company, 
decentralization
Medium-high, cross-
Industry and sectoral
Medium-high, declining
Fi
nl
an
d Low, increasing Cross-industry and 
sectoral, stable
High, cross-industry High, stable
Ir
el
an
d Low, stable Company, 
decentralization
Low, company Low, declining
Th
e 
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s Medium, stable Sector-company, stable High, cross-industry 
and sectoral
High, increasing
Ge
rm
an
y Low, increasing Sector-company, stable High, sectoral and 
cross-industry through 
pattern-setting
Medium-high, declining
Be
lg
iu
m Medium, increasing Cross-industry and 
sectoral, stable
High, cross-industry High, stable
Sw
ed
en Low, stable Sector-company, stable High, cross-Industry High, declining
Li
th
ua
ni
a Low, increasing Company, stable Low, no coordination 
above company level
Low, declining
Sl
ov
ak
ia High, stable Company-sector, stable Low-medium, sectoral Low-medium, declining
Source: Authors’ own assessment based on country studies of ILO/EC research project.
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2.  Belgian social dialogue since the crisis: 
The ups and downs of an organized 
system of industrial relations
guy Van gyes, laurianne Terlinden and seM VandekerckhOVe
1. Introduction
Belgium is traditionally cited as a model of democratic corporatism in international com-
parisons (Woldendorp, 1997), insofar as socio-economic policy is developed through 
a centralized, national system of social dialogue, in which employers’ and workers’ 
organizations take part in consensus negotiations on the formulation and implementa-
tion of government policy. Although there can be a high level of polarization at times, 
and dialogue does not always lead to compromise, the institutional apparatus tends 
to remain intact within a situation of relative social peace. A coordinated bargaining 
system and policy concertation are important institutional pillars. But how have these 
key features of Belgian social dialogue fared since the crisis? Have there been any 
important changes and innovations? 
This chapter focuses on the period 2012-15 – during which a second economic 
dip, linked to the Eurozone crisis, resulted in a period of economic stagnation, rising 
unemployment and continued fiscal problems. Having finally resolved a four-year 
ethno-linguistic dispute and spurred by European recommendations, Belgian pol-
icy-makers embarked upon ambitious reform trajectories, targeting fiscal austerity 
and international cost competitiveness. Between 2011 and 2014 the country was 
governed by a broad multi-party coalition of Socialists, Christian Democrats and Lib-
erals, led by the Prime Minister Elio Di Rupo. Since autumn 2014, Charles Michel 
has been leading a centre-right government of Liberals, Christian Democrats and the 
New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) – a Flemish nationalist right-wing party that entered 
government for the first time. Although institutional continuity prevails, the reforms 
ushered in new constellations, approaches and innovations, which constituted a chal-
lenge for social dialogue. Much changed, especially for the trade unions, which still 
enjoy large-scale support among the workforce – with a union density rate exceeding 
50 per cent. The unions launched political strikes and protests against the govern-
ment(s), struggled to participate within a changed framework of social dialogue, and 
were on the receiving end of radical criticism by both politicians and the media.
For this study, the authors made extensive use of the monitoring work that the HIVA 
Institute for Work and Society – together with the Institute for Labour Studies (IST) of 
the University of Louvain (UCLouvain) – conducts for the EurWork Observatory of Euro-
found, and referred to existing literature (especially from the Centre for socio-political 
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research and information – CRISP). The authors also conducted four interviews with 
seven key players in Belgian social dialogue (see appendix for list).
Table 2.1 Main actors in Belgian social dialogue at national level
Trade unions:
Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (CSC/ACV) 1.7 million members
General Labour Federation of Belgium (FGTB/ABVV) 1.5 million members
General Confederation of Liberal Trade Unions of Belgium (CGSLB/ACLVB) 290,000 members
Employers’ organizations:
Belgian Federation of Employers (FEB/VBO); Union of Independent Entrepreneurs (UNIZO); Union of 
Middle Classes (UCM); Federation of Belgian Farmers (BB); Confederation of Social Profit Enterprises 
(UNISOC).
2. The economic and political context
2 1 Period of economic stagnation
Belgium is an open economy, strongly integrated in the European Union (EU) and Euro-
zone, and with a large share of company capital in foreign hands or invested abroad. It 
enjoys high living standards based on high productivity, while a welfare state provides 
broad coverage for many of its citizens. It combines high public debt with high taxes 
(on labour). The economy has been moving progressively towards a service-based 
economy over recent decades.
In general, Belgium is recognized as one of the European countries that dealt relatively 
well with the economic and financial crisis in a first period. The 2008–09 banking crisis 
was nevertheless a major blow. The Government managed the situation by bailouts, 
selling off or nationalizing banks, providing bank guarantees and extending the deposit 
insurance. After a first period of economic recession in 2008 and 2009, employment 
started to expand again between 2009 and 2011. This period of economic recovery 
was followed by a second dip in the second half of 2011 (Bulté and Struyven, 2013), 
when Belgium entered a period of stagnation and started to suffer the same economic 
problems as other Eurozone countries. Unemployment reached a ten-year record high 
of 8.5 per cent in 2014. However, also in 2014, the Belgian economy took a slow turn 
for the better. Growth reached 1 per cent in 2014 with company investments and net 
external trade as drivers. The country has entered, according to the European Com-
mission (EC), a period of slow-moving recovery with growth considerably lower than 
pre-crisis levels.
Internal private demand, stimulated by continued (nominal) wage growth, played an 
important role as an economic stabilizer throughout the crisis – but this wage growth 
also resulted in a further deterioration of external cost competitiveness. Inflation floated 
in 2012-2013 around 0 per cent. High public debt has been a constant characteristic 
of the country for many years. The crisis pushed public debt even further into the 
red. In 2009, the deficit reached a high of 5.5 per cent of GDP, and consecutive gov-
ernments are still struggling to get it (clearly) below the 3 per cent marker of the EU 
Stability and Growth Pact. Consolidated public debt reached 106.5 per cent of GDP at 
the end of 2014.
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Table 2.2 Main economic indicators, 2007-14
2007-11 2012 2013 2014
GDP growth rate (%) 1.1 0.1 0.3 1.3
Current account balance (% of GDP) 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
Domestic demand (annual % change) 1.3 -0.2 -0.7 0.6
Unemployment rate (% of labour force) 7.6 7.6 8.4 8.5
Public deficit (borrowing as % of GDP) -2.9 -4.1 -2.9 -3.2
Gross debt (% of GDP) 95.9 103.8 104.4 106.5
Nominal unit labour costs (2010 = 100) 102.7 106.2 108.5 108.5
Gross wages and salaries (hourly average) (Euros) 37.8 38.1 38.1 37.9
Harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP) 2.4 2.6 1.2 0.5
Labour productivity (Euros per hour worked) 45.8 45.7 45.9 n.a.
Source: European Commission (2015) Spring Economic Forecast, and Eurostat.
The Belgian labour market has a rather low employment rate, especially of older work-
ers (HRW, 2013 and 2015). Vulnerable groups such as low-skilled people and migrants 
often find it difficult to obtain a job. Women are increasingly participating in the labour 
market and they have been hit less by the employment crisis. Part-time work had risen 
to 25 per cent of all jobs by 2013. Temporary unemployment was high in the first crisis 
period, peaked again in 2013, but decreased thereafter. There has been no increase 
in temporary contracts (8 per cent) and atypical working hours. Poverty indicators have 
remained relatively stable at an aggregate level since 2008. Nonetheless, this overall 
stability is a result of slightly decreased poverty risks for the elderly – whereas poverty 
risks have increased for some vulnerable groups in the labour market, namely the low 
skilled or persons living in households with very low work intensity. The indicators thus 
point to an increased social divide among the population of working age (Federal Public 
Service-Social Security, 2015).
2 2 Slowly leaving political instability behind
Belgium is a complicated country from a political point of view (Deschouwer, 2012). 
Over the past few decades, fundamental constitutional state reforms have created a 
federal structure based on the recognition of three Communities and three Regions. 
The Communities enjoy autonomy in cultural and educational policy fields, and the 
Regions have competence over policy matters like industrial and employment policy. 
Belgian management of the economic crisis was from the start hampered by political 
instability linked to ethno-linguistic tensions and State reform. During half of the period 
2007-11, the country had either no Federal government or only a departing one. The 
dispute culminated in a constitutional and linguistic discussion about the splitting of 
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the electoral district Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (‘BHV’ case). Successive governments 
continued to struggle with the issue. Elections in 2010 resulted in a clear win for the 
non-traditional Flemish nationalist and conservative New Flemish Alliance (N-VA). It 
took 541 days before a new coalition agreement could be reached at the Federal level. 
In December 2011, the Di Rupo Government was finally sworn in, composed of the six 
traditional parties (the Flemish and Walloon Socialists, Christian Democrats and Liber-
als). It was followed in 2014 by a centre-right Government (Michel), which left the Social 
Democrats out of the coalition for the first time since 1988 and had no majority in the 
French-speaking part of the country; but it now included the largest party – the N-VA.
3. Role of social dialogue in national policy-making
3 1 Tradition of policy concertation
Organized social dialogue has an established position in the Belgian political system 
of “consociationalism”. This can be defined as a form of democracy in which har-
mony in segmented societies is maintained through the distinctive role of elites and the 
autonomy of organized interests (Deschouwer, 2012). Social partners are frequently 
consulted by policy-makers on important issues, not only in the fields of social and 
employment policy. According to a number of authors (Kuipers, 2006; Hemerijck and 
Visser, 1999), key bodies at the national level in this neo-corporatism are: 
• The National Labour Council (NAR-CNT): composed of the “most representative” 
employers’ and workers’ organizations. It is a forum for the conclusion of national 
cross-industry collective agreements. Furthermore, it has general competence to 
give its opinion on “matters of social concern” (Van den Broeck, 2010).
• The Central Economic Council (CRB-CCE): responsible for submitting opin-
ions or proposals relating to the national economy. It has been granted a key 
task under the 1996 Law on Competitiveness and Employment. Each year, the 
Council Secretariat has to draft a technical report monitoring the various aspects 
covered in the Law, in particular wage and labour costs developments in Bel-
gium and neighbouring countries (Palsterman, 2010).
Numerous other concertation bodies exist at national, sector and regional levels. The 
regional bodies – for example, the Social and Economic Council of Flanders (SERV) – 
have been growing in importance (Installé, Ongena and Verlinden, 2010). The social 
partners are directly involved in policy implementation as they govern the national 
social security agencies, vocational training funds and employment agencies. One of 
the most concrete examples of this dialogue is that the Government is authorized to 
reach agreement with the social partners, on a biannual basis, on the increase in social 
benefits within a specific budgetary envelope (correlation of benefit increase with the 
welfare in the country) (Hemerijk and Marx, 2010).
3 2 A three-phase deterioration in policy concertation
3.2.1 Phase 1: Anti-crisis management in partnership (2008-11)
As already stated, the Belgian economy certainly fared relatively well in the first years 
of the crisis. Various explanations are cited. In addition to the linkage with the Ger-
man economy, which also responded quite positively, automatic stabilizers contributed 
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significantly to the situation. Belgium has one of the highest rates of these social pro-
tective types of automatic stabilizers (Dolls et al., 2012). Indeed, a number of factors 
undeniably played a key role in securing the income of households and hence in sta-
bilizing demand and output. These included: the wage indexation mechanism, the 
centralized wage formation, the generous social protection (in particular the unem-
ployment benefit of unlimited duration) and the progressive tax system. These existing 
instruments were complemented by specific additional anti-crisis measures. The short-
ening of working time, by having recourse to and extending the existing temporary 
unemployment system, was a central feature of these measures.
In December 2008, the Government announced a stimulus plan to revive the economy: 
VAT-reductions in construction, new infrastructure projects and a reduction of electric-
ity costs. The development of the plan coincided with the social partners’ negotiations 
of their biannual cross-sectoral agreement that secured purchasing power (see section 
4 for details). The Government also decided, in follow-up to the talks with the social 
partners, to minimize the consequences of the forecast employment crisis by improving 
the temporary unemployment system for blue-collar workers – which was achieved by 
increasing the rate of the temporary benefit. It was further agreed to adopt an additional 
scheme to reduce working hours for white-collar workers. In this first crisis period, 
collaboration between the social partners and the Government to tackle the crisis was 
thus high. This partnership was, however, still hampered by the enduring political crisis.
3.2.2 Phase 2: Moderate austerity and the Di Rupo Government (2012-14)
In December 2011, more than 500 days after the 2010 elections, the Di Rupo Gov-
ernment was finally sworn in. In that year, the Belgian economy had encountered 
unforeseen difficulties: growth was stagnating and the economy moved into recession. 
The Eurozone crisis was growing and the international rating agencies were downgrad-
ing the loan credibility of the Belgian State. The new Government quickly embarked 
upon an ambitious reform and austerity programme, in the hope of keeping the country 
out of the Eurozone debt crisis and preventing it from direct international intervention. 
The new Government also quickly agreed on important constitutional reforms, devolv-
ing more responsibilities to the Regions.
Box 2.1  National Collective Agreement 104 on company-level employment plans
The Di Rupo Administration, aspiring to complement the reduction of early retirement 
policies by positive incentives to keep more employees in the 55-65 age category at 
work, asked the social partners to develop a framework agreement for company-level 
employment plans  This National Collective Agreement 104 (agreed in June 2012) 
suggested a non-exhaustive list of initiatives that employers could use in drawing 
up an annual ‘company employment plan for recruiting and/or retaining 45+ year-
old employees’  Initiatives included: recruiting new 45+ staff, training and developing 
competencies, introducing career guidance, carrying out internal transfers, adapting 
working hours and conditions to meet the needs of older employees, preventing and 
ameliorating physical barriers, and recognizing acquired competencies  A condition was 
that the employer must negotiate the plan with the union representatives 
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The first social and labour market reforms were introduced in Parliament before Christ-
mas 2011 – reforms in the early retirement system being the most important among 
these. Although the pensionable age remained at 65 years, the general goal of the 
reforms was that everybody would work at least two years longer. The measures raised 
the minimum age for the country’s popular early retirement option from 60 to 62 years 
and made it harder to stop working earlier. The swift and unilateral introduction of these 
reforms sparked a direct reaction from the trade unions. A 24-hour general strike was 
organized on January 30, 2012. Nevertheless, tripartite talks resumed after the strike 
and resulted in a series of measures that ‘smoothed’ the transition to the new early 
retirement system. Transition measures and continued exemptions for long careers or 
arduous work were integrated.
A tense climate of economic restructuring and EU budgetary monitoring placed extra 
pressure on Di Rupo’s Government. Since 2009, Belgium had been placed in the 
corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), requiring severe budget cuts 
to decrease its deficit. In November 2012, the Government reached agreement on 
a budget that followed European guidelines and focused on economic recovery. It 
stated that it would also tackle the labour cost gap and strengthen competitiveness. 
The budget included measures to contain wage growth. Although the automatic wage 
index was retained, the composition of the index basket was altered in order to temper 
its effect. Moreover, the budget imposed a wage freeze for 2013–14 other than the 
automatic index-linked increase. The aim was to reduce the labour cost gap with neigh-
bouring countries by 1.6 per cent, reinforcing Belgian competitiveness and stimulating 
employment. It was the first time since the crisis that the Belgian Government had 
intervened openly and before negotiations had started in the biannual wage bargaining 
round. Unions reacted quickly and said that continuing talks on a national cross-sector 
agreement for 2013-14 made no sense.
Members of the Government, meanwhile, stated that while they understood the con-
cerns of the unions, they stood by their policy. In order to keep social dialogue ongoing, 
the Government asked the social partners to discuss a number of other topics – some of 
which were defined as ‘partial agreements’. These covered the technical implementa-
tion of the wage freeze and the reduction of labour costs reduction by tax redemptions, 
as well as the recurring decision to adapt social allowances to cost-of-living changes, 
improve the minimum wage, and abolish the age-discriminatory youth minimum wage. 
A consensus was reached at the last moment. In addition, the social partners reached 
agreement on a proposal to make working time calculations more flexible (‘annualis-
ation’ and ‘counting overtime’). In addition, in July 2013, an agreement was reached 
between the social partners about the (partial) harmonization of the two main employ-
ment statutes, namely the statutes of blue- and white-collar workers. With a deadline 
of the Constitutional Court acting as a ‘sword of Damocles’, a compromise was struck: 
a single dismissal procedure for all employees, both white- and blue-collar.
3.2.3 Phase 3: Strong austerity under the Michel Government (2014-15)
After the elections of May 2014, a centre-right government was formed. Headed by 
the Walloon liberal Michel, it became operational in the autumn and embarked upon 
an ambitious reform plan, focusing on austerity measures and reforms to increase 
cost competitiveness. Although the previous Government had managed to stabilize the 
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public debt ratio, unemployment had reached a record high of 8.4 per cent. Drawing 
upon EU recommendations – inter alia – for inspiration, the Government defined new 
priorities and adopted a series of measures in 2015 (see table 2.3).
Table 2.3 Reform priorities and measures of the Michel Government, 2015
Priority Measures taken in 2015
Structural balance of 
State budget by 2018 
• 0.7 per cent per year structural savings; a total of 8 billion Euros in cuts; 
2.5 billion in 2015
Tax shift • 7.2 billion Euros tax shift, transferring part of the tax burden from labour 
to consumption, pollution and capital gains – with a view to reducing 
employers’ social security contributions from 33 to 25 per cent
Dissolution of the 
labour cost gap
• On April 22, 2015, the Federal Parliament approved the index jump,  
a temporary freeze on the automatic wage indexation, skipping the next  
2 per cent increase. See also tax shift.
Activation as 
employment policy
• Age of early retirement increased from 60 to 62 years, with certain 
transitional arrangements.
• The specific end of career credit (private sector), which allows for a 
decrease of working hours until retirement, was limited. The time credit 
between 50 and 54 years was abolished, and the limit of new applications 
was raised from 55 to 60 years (with exceptions);
• Integration programme to reintegrate those suffering from long-term 
illness;
• Increased degressivity of unemployment benefit;
• Temporary unemployment made less attractive (e.g. back to pre-crisis 
rules);
• Stricter rules for integration allowance (young people entering the labour 
market);
• Creation of flexi-jobs in hotel and restaurant sector (second job with social 
tax reduction).
Pension reform • Increase in the state pension age: 65 remains the legal pension age until 
2024; in 2025, it will increase to 66, and in 2030 to 67 years. It will also 
become easier for retired citizens to be professionally active;
• Establishment of the National Pension Committee and the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Work.
The measures introduced by the Michel Government represented an important change 
of direction for the country and sparked discussions, protests and power struggles, not 
the least between the social partners. Trade unions raised serious concerns about the 
quality of social dialogue in Belgium and the limited bargaining room left by the new 
measures. A ‘hot’ autumn of trade union protest followed, with a mass demonstration 
(comprised of 120,000 people) in Brussels, regional strikes and a general strike on 
15 December 2014, immediately after the inauguration of the government. The key 
issues of the protest were: the announced ‘index jump’; the increase in the retirement 
age; a general feeling of ‘unfair’ or ‘unequal’ savings; and a plea for a big tax shift to 
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capital. The employers’ associations urged the trade unions to come back to the nego-
tiating table.
Social dialogue then entered into a period of uncertainty throughout 2015, during 
which tensions between right-wing politicians and the trade unions fluctuated con-
siderably. As the President of the largest trade union ACV-CSC stated: “We have as 
unions less impact than ever”. Trade unions continued to rally against the Government, 
and participated in a broader coalition of protest movements. After the summer, and 
to ‘commemorate’ one year of the Michel Government, the unions organized another 
large-scale protest march of 100,000 demonstrators in Brussels. Parties within the 
Government reacted with suggestions to revise the right to strike, questioning trade 
union involvement in unemployment benefit administration and proposing a minimal 
service in the event of railway strikes. 
Yet, at the same time, bipartite and tripartite social dialogue at the national level 
resumed. A national wage agreement was struck (see section 4). Agreements were 
reached on some transitional measures in relation to the increasing age of (early) 
retirement, although not without difficulties. Other important agreements related to the 
minimal guarantees of occupational pension schemes and night work in e-commerce. 
Discussions are still ongoing on a possible revision of the 1996 Law regarding employ-
ment and competitiveness (the “Wage Norm Law”) and on the implementation of the 
pension reform. The Federal Government also established an advisory National Pen-
sion Committee, comprising representatives of the various governments (Federal and 
regional) and the social partners. In addition, a roundtable was set up by the Minister 
of Employment to discuss new plans on sustainable work.
3.2.4 Difficult policy concertation on major reforms
Overall, a mixed picture of social dialogue in the labour market and social policy 
reforms emerges. Agreements between the social partners did play the major role 
in some of the reforms pertaining to labour market flexibility and social benefits – but 
in others they did not. Furthermore, we may observe that in the key social reform of 
the period 2012-15, namely the pension and retirement age changes, social dialogue 
played only a minor role, and this was limited to implementation technicalities and 
transition measures.
Table 2.4  Involvement of the social partners in main labour market and social 
reforms 2012-15
Main role
(national agreement)
Social dialogue impact 
on implementation 
No role
Labour market flexibility
Working time (2012) X
Temporary agency work (2013) X
Flexi-jobs in Horeca (2015) X
Night work e-commerce (2015) X
S
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Main role
(national agreement)
Social dialogue impact 
on implementation 
No role
Activation policies
Restrictions unemployment 
benefit (2012/15)
X
Career leave system (time credit) 
(2012/2015)
X
Reform early retirement 
(2012/15)
X
Sustainable work (2012-13) X
Pension reform (2014-15) X
However, the increased rallying of trade unions against government policies through 
strikes and demonstrations mirrors this reduced role of social concertation (see 
table 2.5).
Table 2.5 Overview of main union protests 2012-15
During Di Rupo Government During Michel Government
15/11/11 Union militants concentration in 
Brussels, 6,000 participants
06/11/2014 Mass demonstration,  
120,000 participants
02/12/11 Demonstration, 60,000 participants November – December 2014 3 Regional strike days
22/12/11 Strike in the public services 15/12/2014 General strike
30/01/12 General strike 31/03/2015 March ‘Heart over austerity’,  
17,000 participants
21/02/2013 Demonstration, 35,000 participants April 2015 Provincial strike action days ABVV-FGTB
14/03/2013 Protest meeting union militants 07/10/2015 Mass demonstration,  
100,000 participants
April-May 2013 Regional demonstrations 
ABVV-FGTB
3 3  Role of social dialogue in the European Semester
3.3.1 Pre-crisis period: the Lisbon Agenda as an inspiring guideline
As a founding EU Member State, Belgium’s membership has never been called 
into question, and this Europeanism has always been shared by the social partners 
(Plessers, 2007). These beliefs and traditions led to a kind of genuine ‘technocratic’ 
participation – by the social partners – in the adoption/transposition of European 
social policy into the Belgian context. Indeed, the Belgian social partners were 
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involved, during the pre-crisis period, in the implementation of the European Employ-
ment Strategy (EES) and in drafting the National Reform Programme, as part of 
the revised Lisbon Agenda. The consultations were organized within the two main 
national representative bodies in Belgium, namely the Central Economic Council 
(CRB-CCE) and the National Labour Council (NAR-CNT). Social partners’ delegates 
have regular contacts and discussions with the Belgian participants in European 
policy committees. 
3.3.2 Belgium under supervision in the new governance
Much has changed since the introduction of the new Semester approach. In 2009, 
Belgium was directly placed in the corrective arm of the SGP procedure of fiscal con-
solidation and had to commit to bringing the deficit below 3 per cent and to pursuing 
corrections of the structural deficit by at least 0.75 per cent of GDP. Although targets 
have been changed and postponed, it took until 2014 for Belgium to escape the threat 
of sanctions. The new Government in 2011, and the next one, embarked upon a range 
of austerity measures to reach agreement with the European Commission (EC) on the 
path to fiscal consolidation and to avoid tighter controls. Confronted with EC evaluations 
of ‘some’ or ‘limited’ progress, difficult and not always transparent negotiations were 
repeatedly held between Belgium and the European authorities (Vanden Bosch, 2014; 
Perin, 2015).
Although the EC recommendations for structural reforms evolved over time, they 
repeatedly concerned the same key areas and increasingly focused on issues in which 
there is a clear tradition of social dialogue in Belgium. These included the long-term 
sustainability of State finances; the (cost) competitiveness of the economy; and the 
need for labour market reforms and for shifting taxes from labour to other incomes. 
Long-term financial stability was strongly linked to the financing of the pension system 
and thus the need to reform the retirement rules. The recommendations related to cost 
competitiveness concerned the core business of Belgian social dialogue, the wage-set-
ting mechanism. Since the start, the EC has advised Belgium to reform its wage-setting 
system, including wage indexation and the Law of 1996; and in its most recent coun-
try-specific recommendations, it made additional references to the issue of productivity 
and the role innovation has to play.
3.3.3 Belgian social dialogue in the Semester process
The involvement of the social partners has changed drastically since the introduction of 
the new Semester approach. Information and consultation have been transformed into 
an informal process, in which time and space for serious social dialogue are missing. 
The CRB-CCE and NAR-CNT still try to organize information exchange. The Belgian 
social partners regularly meet members of the Employment Committee (EMCO) and 
exchange views with experts of the Belgian Desk of the European Commission. The 
information network of the pre-crisis period is thus still intact, but is no longer followed 
by a formal, explicit and extensive consultation process.
Consultation takes the form of informal meetings of representatives of the social part-
ners and the Prime Minister’s Cabinet – and their frequency varies. There are at least 
two meetings per Semester. The first allows the parties to have a first exchange of 
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views about how the Government should draft the National Reform Programme (NRP). 
Once the NRP has been drafted and discussed with the regional governments, another 
meeting is held to allow the social partners to react – but their comments are not for-
mally annexed to the NRP.
Interviewees for this study particularly expressed regret about the lack of social dia-
logue in the final stage of negotiations. The process works as follows: Belgium comes 
up with a plan, the EC formulates recommendations, and agreement is reached upon 
a set of policy measures. These measures often involve issues in which the social 
partners have a long tradition of involvement. According to the union side: “It is the 
Government that usually delivers the reform programme, which does not require 
approval by the social partners. There is only limited space for social dialogue and 
input from social partners”. The employers’ side adds: “Social partners would like 
to be consulted when the agreement is concluded, in order to discuss how it will be 
concretized in Belgium”.
A key example is the increase in the retirement age from 65 to 67 years. Although this 
measure was certainly ‘popping-up’ in discussions on Belgian pension reform, it was 
not part of the electoral programme of any party that joined the Government in 2014. 
In the eyes of the social partners, especially the trade unions, the measure was intro-
duced as a ‘fait accompli’ with reference to Europe (Struyven and Pollet, 2015).
3 4 Struggling concertation bodies
In these difficult times for policy concertation, the main bodies involved in dialogue 
have struggled to maintain their role and function. 
Since the 1990s, one of the main duties of the Central Economic Council (CRB-CEE) 
had been to prepare the technical report that was used as a starting point for the 
biannual discussion on the wage norm. In the crisis period, the drafting of this report 
became more and more difficult as each side questioned different aspects of the 
wage gap calculation. The report became increasingly part of the political compromise 
needed to reach a wage agreement, rather than an objective analysis. After unilateral 
action taken by the Government in 2013, the functioning of the 1996 Law has become 
even more questionable. A possible revision is on the current Government’s agenda. 
The General Secretary of the Council described the situation as follows: “There are dif-
ferent indications that something doesn’t work. In 1996, the Secretariat had a certain 
autonomy regarding the technical reports. Nowadays, the social partners themselves 
set the agenda. This leads to changes regarding the timing, but also the content of the 
report. (…) Moreover, the advice of the CRB-CCE concerns fewer issues of a political 
nature, and is more in relation to socio-economic matters, such as policies on mobility, 
energy, etc.”. 
As many labour cost/competitiveness discussions have remained locked in stalemate, 
there has been greater recourse to expert panels for policy guidance – indeed, this 
has been a general trend during the post-crisis period. These expert commissions 
are either ad-hoc or permanent, but they are almost always appointed directly by 
the Government, including, for example, the Pension Experts Commission and the 
expert group on ‘Labour costs, wage subsidies, labour productivity and training efforts 
of enterprises’. 
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The story for the National Labour Council (NAR-CNT) runs somewhat differently. In 
recent years, it has provided more advice than in the past (Cox, 2013). This may 
be attributed to the Government’s heightened social and labour policy reform activity 
since 2011, as well as to its multi-party coalition structure. Policy-makers look to the 
advice (especially joint advice) from the Council for support for new initiatives to help 
them cope with the political wheels of power. But the role of the Council as driver or 
instigator of new regulations is very restricted – partly due to the fact that the political 
side wants to take the lead, and partly due to rising tensions between the employers’ 
and workers’ side on the core issues of macroeconomic governance (e.g. the focus 
on competitiveness and austerity). As a result, the Council’s activities, and especially 
national collective agreements, have become more technical than before, as there is a 
complex, multi-level set of regulations on each issue.
Box 2.2 New national agreement on temporary agency work
On 16 July 2013, at the National Labour Council (CNT-NAR), the social partners con-
cluded Collective Agreement 108 on temporary work and temporary agency work  The 
following changes were introduced:
• Daily work contracts are now permitted for the ‘flexibility needs’ of the ‘customer-user’  
There has to be proof that the flexibility is needed  ‘Customer-user’ employers must 
consult their works council or a trade union delegation, explaining why such contracts 
are necessary 
• A new condition allows the hiring of temporary agency workers for the ‘reason of 
insertion’  Temporary agency workers can now fill vacant posts for a maximum of six 
months  After this ‘trial period’, a permanent contract can be offered but it is not 
compulsory  
• New procedures oblige ‘customer-user’ employers and temporary work agencies to 
notify trade unions when temporary agency workers are employed 
The regional concertation bodies seem to have fared better. Tripartite agreements 
have continued to be concluded, especially in Flanders. Examples are the Career 
Agreement in 2012 and the Jobs Pact of 2015 in Flanders. In Wallonia, concertation 
focused on the consecutive Marshall plans of the Walloon government to revitalize 
the economy. Nevertheless, an ongoing discussion has emerged about the role of the 
social partners as a result of the sixth State reform devolving certain powers to the 
Regions, in which social partners were traditionally involved in the governance; an 
example is the child-care benefit system. Finally, at the regional level, tripartite social 
dialogue initiatives were undertaken in the case of restructuring and plant closures 
that hit a particular local province hard; for example, a Strategic Action Plan for the 
Limburg region was drafted, following the closure of a major plant of the car manu-
facturer Ford.
4. Wage-setting and collective bargaining
Collective bargaining and especially wage bargaining in Belgium is known for a high 
degree of coordination. A sector-dominated structure is framed by two-year cross- 
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sectoral bargaining, automatic wage indexation, a central wage norm and a legal min-
imum wage (Vandekerckhove and Van Gyes, 2012; Dumka, 2015). During the crisis, 
no major institutional changes were made in these wage-setting mechanisms (Verman-
dere and Van Gyes, 2014; Dumka, 2015). However, some key trends can be detected: 
a) a ‘controlled’ decentralization as a result of innovative measures; and b) wage freezes 
and cuts by increased State intervention.
4 1 Institutional continuity 
4.1.1 Traditional sector-based structure
The basic law on collective bargaining has not been revised in recent years. Each com-
pany and employee is assigned to a sectoral joint committee (Rombouts, 2003). More 
than 150 joint (sub) committees decide on such matters as pay levels, classification 
schemes, working time arrangements, training and occupational welfare benefits. In 
some sectors, a tradition of company agreements as the dominant form has always 
existed. These are mainly sectors containing large companies, in which wage costs 
represent only a small part of total costs, but the workforce has a high operational value 
(for example, the steel industry). When all parties sign the sectoral agreement, its legal 
extension by Royal Decree is rather straightforward and nearly always applied. Opening 
clauses are very rare and only exceptionally adopted. 
This sectoral level of collective bargaining has stayed intact since the crisis. Although 
exact figures are lacking, the practice of sectoral bargaining is still pervasive throughout 
the private sector; coverage rates are around 85 to 90 per cent and have not diminished. 
4.1.2 Centralized instruments of coordination
This sector-dominated structure is framed in a set of centralized instruments for wage 
bargaining coordination. The instruments that organize the coordinated floor in the 
wage bargaining are biannual cross-sectoral programming, a minimum wage, and 
automatic wage indexation. The minimum wage system has been maintained since 
the crisis and even strengthened, as a national agreement was adopted in March 2013 
with a view to gradually abolishing the lower minimum wage for young workers. The 
automatic wage indexation is discussed in section 4.3, together with the State-imposed 
wage norm system. In this section, we shall briefly discuss the evolution in biannual 
cross-sectoral wage bargaining, a system that has been maintained – although not 
without difficulty, particularly when the Government started to intervene more directly 
in the period 2012-15.
Since the 1960s, with some interruptions, national negotiations in the private sec-
tor have taken place every two years outside the official social dialogue structures 
(CRB-CCE and CNT-NAR). These result in national cross-sectoral agreements, which 
cover all companies in the private sector (Cox, 2012). The (informal) bargaining group, 
called the Group of Ten, consists of key representatives of the national social partners. 
These ‘social-programming’ agreements constitute political and moral commitments 
and need not be legally binding, although the Government may still enforce them. 
Regarding wages, the two-yearly sectoral and company bargaining has been coordi-
nated through a wage norm since the mid-1990s (see section 4.3). In the first crisis 
period, the “interprofessional” agreement (IPA) 2009-10 played an important role in 
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tackling the economic recession, whereas in later years it became increasingly difficult 
to strike an agreement; on the unions’ side, full support has not always been secured. 
Table 2.6 National cross-sectoral ‘programming’ by the Group of Ten, 2009-16
Period of agreement (or not) Main content Support and implementation
2009-10 
Agreement ‘exceptional’ crisis 
character.
• Wage premiums (above 
indexation) of 125 Euros in 2009 
and 250 Euros in 2010, without 
increasing costs for employers;
• Eco-cheques: pay check is a 
voucher, granted with social tax 
exemptions, focusing on buying 
ecological or ‘green’ consumer 
goods;
• Temporary unemployed higher 
benefit; employers’ new social 
tax reductions to recruit long-
term unemployed.
Full support; implementation by 
collective agreements.
2011-12
Difficult, joint proposal 
rejected.
• A postponement of discussion 
on whether or not to maintain 
automatic wage indexation 
system;
• A very limited wage rise of 0.3% 
above inflation rate;
• A roadmap for harmonizing blue-
collar and white-collar statutes 
into one uniform statute.
Two unions reject proposal; 
implemented by the 
Government.
2013-14
Despite high hopes, talks 
collapsed after wage freeze by 
the Government.
• Not relevant.
2015-16
In tense climate, agreement 
reached because some wage 
increase possible, ‘look-alike’ 
IPA.
• Wage norm set at 0.5 for the 
total wage bill, creating the 
possibility to increase the gross 
wage by 0.37%. Additional 
envelope of 0.3% made available 
to accord in other, less taxed 
types of pay, thus less costly for 
employers. 
• In recurrent negotiations about 
‘welfare adaptation’ of social 
benefits, agreement stipulated 
that all minima (for pensions, 
unemployment and disability 
compensation) be increased by 
2%, but with differences for 
particular groups.
ABVV-FGTB withdrew from 
negotiations; only agreement 
by a Group of Eight and 
mainly implemented by the 
Government.
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In the period 2013-14, this technique played no role at all. In the 2011-12 and 2015-
16 periods, the main parts of the proposals were implemented by the Government 
whereas, in the 2009-10 period, the social partners implemented them by collective 
agreements (see table 2.6).
4 2 Decentralized innovations ‘framed’ by sector approaches
There have recently been a number of new topics in collective bargaining. These have 
included: the development of occupational pension schemes, in addition to the rather 
low legal pension scheme in the private sector; experimentation with ‘innovation-agree-
ments’; and the opening up of funds for ‘sustainable work’ (see box 2.4).
Box 2.3 Innovations in sectoral bargaining: the chemical industry
As part of the strategy that Di Rupo launched at the end of 2013, a new law stated that, 
at the sectoral level, an agreement had to be concluded on innovation during the first 
year after the signing of a new IPA  It should include a report on the innovation perfor-
mance and commitment to improve innovation, and would be based on a ‘scoreboard’  
The national social partners broadened the approach to sectoral ‘structural challenges’  
By the end of 2014, about 22 joint committees had already made an agreement on the 
necessary scoreboard  Some included improvement issues  This policy initiative thus 
got off to a slow start, but also brought about some interesting innovations  
An example is the agreement reached in the chemical industry (18 February 2015)  
On the basis of this agreement, the sector plans joint talks on seven specific points 
related to competitiveness, innovation, and sustainable work  In a press statement, the 
social director of the employers’ organization Essencia concluded: “We want the unions 
to engage in a broad debate on both the product and process innovations, as well as 
on innovations in work organization  This agreement provides an opportunity for all 
social partners to optimally connect the competitiveness of the Belgian chemical and 
life sciences industry to employment  This collective agreement provides us with the 
opportunity to engage in an innovative social dialogue ” In the new sectoral agreement 
for 2015-16, the sector also introduced a Demography Fund  As indicated by the legal 
wage norm, the maximum room for wage increases could be complemented in 2016 
by an additional 0 3 per cent increase of average labour costs  The social partners in 
the chemical industry decided to reserve this 0 3 per cent for the occupational pension 
scheme (0 15 per cent) and for the financing of a Demography Fund (0 15 per cent)  
The Fund aims to develop projects and allocate budgets in order to keep workers at 
work longer, in a motivated and feasible way  
These new initiatives, but also the wage freezes, have contributed to a growing but 
‘controlled’ number of company agreements, in addition to – and not instead of – 
sectoral or national initiatives. The continued wage moderation has consolidated an 
ongoing trend of granting additional wage benefits at company level in stronger sectors 
and larger companies. A key instrument has been the framework developed by the 
national Collective Agreement No. 90 of 20 December 2007 concerning non-recurrent 
result-related bonuses. A Belgian employer may grant a benefit to his/her employees 
in the form of a non-recurrent performance-related collective bonus, but only when a 
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predetermined objective has been achieved. A plan determining this objective is con-
firmed either by a company collective agreement or by an act of accession approved 
by the sectoral joint committee. In a collective agreement, the target must be clearly 
defined, the objective concretely formulated, the monitoring methodology and target 
period stipulated, and the payment date agreed upon. There can be multiple objec-
tives in a single plan. Examples of objectives include: achieving a specific sales or 
revenue growth; realizing a specific project; obtaining an official quality standard cer-
tificate; and reducing absenteeism. Up to a certain amount, such bonuses are exempt 
from income tax and carry a reduced social tax. The number of employees receiv-
ing a bonus increased from 150,000 in 2008 to 600,000 in 2014 (figures from the 
Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue – FODWASO). This 
represented 1,688 company agreements and 4,698 accession acts in 2014 (Central 
Economic Council, 2015, p. 63).
4 3 Increased State intervention since 2012: freezes and index jump
In the 1990s, the requirements to qualify for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
became the central issue of a political exchange of wage moderation for a host of active 
labour market policies and negotiated changes in the welfare state (entitlements and 
benefits) (Hassel, 2006). Rationalizing public finances and embracing the mantra of 
competitiveness led to increased pressure on the organized system of wage bargaining 
in Belgium. As in other Eurozone countries, a kind of ‘competitive corporatism’ devel-
oped, which preserved the sector-dominated bargaining structure, while also involving 
an increased role for the State and politics. The key instrument was a Law to promote 
employment and preserve external competitiveness, adopted in 1996. While the exist-
ing apparatus was geared towards minimum floors and maintaining workers’ incomes, 
the new Law focused on wage moderation and upper limits to preserve competitiveness. 
Wage bargaining is monitored and a forecast weighted growth in average foreign hourly 
labour costs (in France, Germany and the Netherlands) acts as an upper limit (termed 
the ‘wage norm’). The monitoring and forecasting is conducted by the secretariat of the 
CRB-CCE and, based on their reports, the Group of Ten decides on an indicative wage 
norm. When agreement cannot be reached, the Government can impose the norm by 
law. The revised Law of 1996 is not simply about wages, but also involves discussion 
on issues of employment, investment, social expenses and innovation.
Since the crisis, the back-up procedure of State intervention has become much more 
important. Negotiations on the IPA 2011-12 failed; and the proposed agreement was 
rejected by two union confederations. The Government subsequently imposed the 
draft-IPA and, as a result, the norm was no longer indicative but imperative. The first 
Government implementing austerity measures went even further and imposed a wage 
freeze (above automatic indexation) as the norm, before discussions between the social 
partners had even started. For 2015-16, this arrangement was reversed and the Michel 
Government imposed a planned ‘index jump’ of 2 per cent of the automatic wage 
indexation and a limited space of 0.5 per cent for sectoral bargaining. Since austerity 
measures were introduced, Belgian governments have thus gone even further than the 
intervention possibilities foreseen in the Law of 1996.
These interventions happened amidst continued discussions and differences of 
opinion about the automatic wage indexation and possible revision of the 1996 Law 
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– stimulated also from 2012 onwards by European Semester recommendations. Bel-
gium is one of the few countries in Western Europe that still practices nearly universal 
automatic index linking for setting wages (NBB, 2012; Eurofound, 2010). Pay and 
social security benefits are linked to a consumer price index in order to prevent the 
erosion of purchasing power by inflation. Often misunderstood by critics, this system 
is not centrally organized, but rather a patchwork of sectoral level mechanisms freely 
agreed upon by sectoral joint committees. They differ in their timing, indexation sys-
tem, calculation of the moving average of the index, rounding rules, target groups and 
other details. The only restriction imposed by law is the mandatory use of the ‘health 
index’, which is the normal consumer price index excluding cigarettes, alcohol and 
car fuel. At the end of 2015, the indexation was only temporarily suspended, and no 
attempts are being made to abolish the system. Political discussions to revise the 1996 
Law are being conducted.
5. Conclusions
5 1 Overview
On the one hand, the Belgian system of social dialogue during the period 2012-15 
has demonstrated institutional continuity and resilience. Embedded neo-corporatist 
structures have not been changed. Due to the new State devolution process, some 
minor adjustments are ongoing. But workplace social dialogue – the process of tens of 
thousands of employee representatives being informed and consulted by management 
in more than 5,000 workplaces on a monthly basis – is still alive and well in place in the 
country. Sectoral joint committees and bodies continue to deliver new agreements on 
wages and other labour conditions, covering (almost) the whole economy; automatic 
wage indexation, although suspended in 2015, has not been abolished; the minimum 
wage has been strengthened.
On the other hand, centralized wage coordination has come under the direct supervi-
sion of the Government since 2013 (this happened before in the 1980s and 1990s). 
Tripartite policy concertation has run into serious trouble – especially since 2014, when 
the conservative Michel government came into power. The evolving case of pension 
and retirement reform is a telling example of how policy concertation can be reduced 
instead to social dialogue about issues of policy implementation alone. 
So alongside a ‘minimal’ continuity of a very organized and developed system of indus-
trial relations and social dialogue, there is a threat to the traditional ‘maximum’ role of 
this dialogue, which is being challenged by increased State intervention in wage bar-
gaining and a struggling policy concertation process.
5 2 Drivers
It is of course difficult to determine the drivers of these trends, or to label them as 
‘structural’, because events are still evolving.
In relation to the ‘troubling’ policy concertation environment, the changing relationship 
between politics and social dialogue emerges from the interviews as a key ‘inter-
mediating’ factor. Political considerations are assuming a greater role in the reform 
process. This trend started even before the crisis, but has been strengthened since. 
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The interviewees advanced several reasons for this changing relationship, which are 
listed below (in no special order):
• The socio-economic consensus between employers and trade unions in Bel-
gium has been weakened, and the Government therefore has to be involved 
to ‘fix’ things. As one of the interviewees stated: “Institutionalizing tripartism 
is something else than ‘doing’ tripartism. ‘Institutionalizing’ tripartism implies a 
discussion and agreement on the political economy through existing bodies or 
in an informal way.”
• The current composition of the Government plays a significant role. Homoge-
nous governments experience fewer internal struggles and therefore need to 
rely less on the social partners, or have greater power to ‘overrule’ or ‘steer’ 
social dialogue. The current Government is less of a multi-party coalition than 
usual in Belgium. The coalition includes no centre-left parties with close links 
and responsibilities to a trade union audience.
• New political parties (especially the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) as the largest 
party) have come to the forefront, and they have a different vision of the social 
partners than the more traditional parties.
• Politics and parties now have to fight much more than before for legitimacy and 
electoral support. This increased competition for votes leaves less space for 
neo-corporatist, consensual politics. Refusing social dialogue can be a way to 
attract voters.
Institutional path dependence can explain the ‘minimal’ continuity; all the existing 
bodies, structures and actors are still looking to perform and deliver. Continued union 
strength (in mobilization and membership) is another important factor. As stated by 
one interviewee: “The Government wants to guarantee social peace and raise the 
importance of social dialogue in this matter”. Finally, the complexity of and demand 
for customized solutions creates a need for the expert involvement of (sectoral) 
social partners. In this regard, the employers’ side maintains a certain scepticism 
towards politics being capable of delivering the kind of quality policies and regulations 
they require.
5 3 Impact of Europe
It is also difficult to determine the impact and influence of European governance 
in these trends. It is certainly true that the new European Semester approach has 
changed the environment for socio-economic policy-making in the country. Politicians 
seem to be looking less in recent years towards the social partners for these strategic 
exercises, but are increasingly required to bargain with the European Commission over 
their policy choices. As such, we can see clearly that:
a) The EU recommendations undeniably acted as a trigger to initiate discussion on 
some more extreme measures (e.g. increase in the retirement age, revision of 
the 1996 Law).
b) The potential for social dialogue to impact on the agreed reforms is very small 
within the Semester approach. An important part of the agenda setting is now 
done through direct interaction between the EC and the Member State, where 
the social dialogue actors are far less present.
772. BELGIAN SOCIAL DIALOGUE SINCE THE CRISIS: THE UPS AND DOWNS OF AN ORGANIZED SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSTALKING THROUGH THE CRISIS | SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS TRENDS IN SELECTED EU COUNTRIES
However, a note of warning is necessary here. The impact was mostly felt when Belgium 
was in the final stages of the corrective SGP procedure and the national Government 
became a coalition – which more strongly supported the course of austerity and struc-
tural reform proposed by the EC. Furthermore, even before this new kind of European 
crisis management took hold, the trends of ‘politics first’ and ‘cost competitiveness as 
top objective’ were already gathering pace.
5 4 Innovation
If we are looking for important innovations in the Belgian social dialogue of recent 
years, we have to turn – maybe paradoxically – to the decentralized levels, where new 
instruments have been developed to breathe new life into the traditional, coordinated 
approach of a productivity coalition. On the one hand, innovation matters are being 
increasingly discussed at sectoral level, and collective performance improvements 
are more and more linked to rewards (CLA 90). On the other hand, instruments and 
experiments have been broadened to implement dialogue on ‘sustainable work’ at the 
workplace level. Companies must, for example, discuss employment plans for older 
workers with the employee representation. As a result, new ways to organize work have 
become more mainstream in the discourse of the social partners. But it remains to be 
seen how this kind of new social dialogue on ‘working smarter’ and ‘sustainable work’ 
will develop in the years to come (Van Gyes and De Spiegelaere, 2015).
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Appendix
List of persons interviewed for the study
Government
Guy Cox, Director-General, General Directorate of Collective Labour Relations, Federal 
Public Service of Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue
Employers’ Organizations
Bart Buysse, General Manager, and Gianni Duvillier, First Counselor, Federation of 
Belgian Enterprises (VBO-FEB)
Workers’ Organizations
Marc Leemans, President, and Marie-Hélène Ska, General Secretary, Confederation of 
Christian Trade Unions (ACV-CSC)
Others
Luc Denayer, General Secretary, Central Economic Council (CRB-CCE)
Paul Windey, President of the National Labour Council (NAR-CNT)
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3.  Coping with the crisis in Finland: 
Challenging times for social dialogue
esa JOkinen
1. Introduction 
The market system in Finland has traditionally been based on social dialogue, with 
a relatively high level of social public spending, and of centralized bargaining (BCG 
and CIETT, 2012). The basic elements in the system are stable and embedded in the 
structure of society and power relations at multiple levels. In Finnish tripartism, which is 
based on a social corporatist model, the key actors are: the Government, three central 
trade union confederations, one central private employers’ organization, two public 
employers’ organizations and the Church.19
There is a relatively high trade union density (65 per cent) and employers’ organization 
density (71 per cent); collective bargaining coverage is also high at 85–90 per cent. 
National agreements therefore tend to be very effective, but their negotiation may be 
very time-consuming and demanding. This is one of the reasons why the Confed-
eration of Finnish Industries (EK) now favours bargaining at the sectoral and local 
levels – another being that the centralized agreements are generally insensitive to sec-
toral – and company-level needs. There is a continuous central-level negotiation system 
in place, in which the social partners take the lead. Once the national agreement has 
been adopted, the sectoral level then negotiates the details and it is implemented at the 
enterprise level. Workplace implementation takes place in collaboration with workplace 
representatives, mainly trade union members (shop stewards); work councils as such 
do not exist in Finland. Traditionally, Finnish industrial relations have been smooth and 
consensus-based, and centralized labour market settlements have been important. 
The economic crisis hit Finland hard in 2008–09 in terms of its GDP, but the country 
quickly recovered. However, a more persistent period of economic downturn set in 
2011, which is still continuing into 2016. No “post-crisis” period has yet been reached 
and the prospects for overall recovery remain uncertain.
19  The three main trade union confederations are: the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (Suomen 
Ammattiliittojen Keskusjärjestö, SAK); the Finnish Confederation of Salaried Employees (Toimihenkilökeskusjärjestö, 
STTK); and the Confederation of Unions for Academic Professionals in Finland (Akateemisten Toimihenkilöiden 
Keskusjärjestö, AKAVA). The Confederation of Finnish Industries (Elinkeinoelämän keskusliitto, EK) represents 
the employers; it was created in 2005 after a merger of the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers 
(Teollisuuden ja Työnantajain Keskusliitto, TT) and the Employers’ Federation of Service Industries in Finland 
(Palvelutyönantajat, PT). 
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It is very difficult to make a clear assessment of the changes in tripartite relations and 
social dialogue during the present economic crisis, and it is too early to draw any firm 
conclusions. The perceptions of different stakeholders differ widely concerning the 
status and benefits of social dialogue during the 2008-15 period. The positions taken 
by the social partners and the Government sometimes seem to be contradictory, and 
the present study reflects this essential feature of social dialogue. 
This study set out to give a broad view of “innovative practice”, taking into consideration 
both the interaction between different actors and their learning aspect. The idea of the 
EU “open coordination” approach is that, by identifying good practices – whether in 
national policies, reforms or, for example, the implementation of European Structural 
and Investment Funds (ESIF) – companies, organizations, management and govern-
ment would be in a position to make more informed decisions. This reflects at least 
in some respects the ideal of evidence-based development of policies and practices 
(Arnkil, 2008).
The desk research covered a wide range of news articles; government documents; 
available analyses on Finnish industrial relations and collective bargaining; descrip-
tions of the system in both domestic and European Union (EU) – level databases; 
statistical information on the economy and employment; as well as information on the 
various reforms, evaluations and econometric studies. The websites of labour organ-
izations and different national agencies were of help in charting the recent trends, 
debates and reforms.
The list of key informants interviewed is presented in the appendix.
Only the key reforms and legislative changes are addressed in this chapter. It goes 
without saying that a great deal more is going on, within parliamentary processes and 
working committees, that impacts on industrial relations.
2. The macroeconomic and political context 
2 1 The 1990s recession
Finland has faced repeated economic shocks since the early 1990s, with recovery 
periods in between. The country suffered not only from cyclical downturns but also 
from severe structural problems in terms of the sustainability of the welfare state. Tri-
partite national social dialogue has been a key element in surviving these crises, and 
many reforms have taken place. 
However, since the late 1990s, the role of the social partners seems to have been 
gradually eroded, and there have been frequent deviations from tripartism. The welfare 
state suffered hard blows during the 1990s – and again in the 2010s; and there was 
a growing trend, during the 2000s, to question the power and role of labour organi-
zations. During the most recent crisis (since 2008), less attention has been paid to 
the qualitative and developmental aspects of working life and the labour market, and 
many efforts to address these challenges have been overshadowed by large-scale 
structural reforms in local government, the Public Employment Service (PES), and the 
pension system. 
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Major changes (cuts) in the social security system already took place in the 1990s, 
when unemployment increased to 18 per cent due to the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the related problems in exports and the banking sector. Structural unemployment 
has remained high ever since. 
No other country in the EU or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) faced such a decline in GDP and increase in unemployment as did 
Finland between 1991 and 1994. Real GDP declined by 13 per cent between 1990 
and 1993; and unemployment increased from 3.1 per cent in 1990 to 16.7 per cent 
in 1994. In many regions, unemployment exceeded 25 per cent. Just as exceptional, 
though, was Finland’s recovery during the years from 1994 to 2000, when annual GDP 
growth averaged 4.5 per cent, far exceeding the EU average. 
The causes of Finland’s problems were many and are still subject to debate; they 
included poor policy decisions relating to the currency, a very rapid deregulation of 
financial markets and the collapse of trade with the Soviet Union (Uusitalo, 1996). 
There was also major industrial restructuring – particularly in the paper industries, 
which had been a traditional backbone of the Finnish economy.
There is evidence that social dialogue during the 1990s was one of the main factors 
contributing to Finland’s recovery from the recession. Achievements of social dialogue 
included social pacts and government cooperation with the social partners, which 
resulted in wage restraint and the settlement of various labour market issues in order 
to maintain competitiveness and stability (Usitalo, 1996). The aim of these agreements 
was to promote job creation. Overall, the policy succeeded in keeping the average 
growth of real labour costs below that of labour productivity. 
2 2 Ongoing crisis 2008–15
Economic decline was steep from 2008 to 2009, followed by a recovery period from 
2010 to 2012 – but after that a more profound economic slowdown and increase in 
unemployment set in (figure 3.1).20 At present, Finland is going through its most serious 
economic downturn since the 1990s. In the short term, the situation is worsened by 
the improving outlook elsewhere in Europe, meaning that Finns face the risk of rising 
interest rates in the Eurozone at the same time as low domestic demand, high unem-
ployment and high household debt (Danske Bank, 2015).
The situation was compounded by the fall of Finland’s industrial flagship company, 
Nokia, problems in the information and communications technology (ICT) sector as 
a whole, and accumulating problems in the European economic area (Ministry of 
Finance, 2015a). A number of other problems emerged as well, such as those relating 
to the paper and metal industries and overall exports to the Russian Federation and 
other countries, leading to major restructuring in many regions. In 2008, the Rus-
sian Federation was the most important export destination for Finland, accounting for 
11.6 per cent of total exports; but in 2009 the share dropped to 8.9 per cent (see 
figure 3.3). The escalation of tensions between the Russian Federation and the EU in 
2014 resulted in a tumbling of the rouble, which further decreased not only Finland’s 
export business but also tourism from Russia. 
20  Official statistics do not take into account hidden unemployment or those who are participating in active labour 
market policy (ALMP) measures.
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Figure 3.1 Finland’s unemployment rate (%) by quarter, 2005 – 15
Figure 3.2 Finland’s national debt, 1980–2014
Source: Statistics Finland (2016a).
Source: Statistics Finland (2016b).
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Constraints on economic recovery included: high wages, high social subsidies, complex 
regulations and high taxes, an ageing population and limited labour force, persistent 
unemployment and growing globalization (Singula and Kumar, 2012); nonetheless, 
Finland seemed to fare better than most Eurozone countries and managed to keep its 
‘triple A’ credit rating (ibid.). However, in Finland too, one factor that might have con-
tributed to the continuation of the crisis was the slowness of politicians to react to the 
crisis (Pihlanto, 2012). 
These issues have been the main focus of the EC Country-Specific Recommendations 
(Council of the European Union, 2015). Although Finland did well in international com-
petitiveness comparisons in 2015, even these showed a striking drop in just a couple of 
years (World Economic Forum, 2015). Public social expenditure has been very high in 
Finland compared to many other countries (figure 3.4) and the economy faces serious 
sustainability problems. The significant use of budgetary automatic stabilizers in Fin-
land helps explain the rapid increase in the share of public expenditure, due to income 
transfers during periods of a downturn in production. At the same time, the reliance 
on these stabilizers may also help to explain the lack of radical political adjustment 
measures during the crisis.
Figure 3.3  Finland’s trade with the Russian Federation and other countries, 
2000-15 (in billion Euros)
Source: Finnish Customs (2015).
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One of the main recent debates relates to (labour) cost competitiveness. According to 
the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, the cost competitiveness of the business 
sector and of the main industries has worsened significantly since the early 2000s, as 
measured through real unit labour costs. One half of the decline in the competitiveness 
can be attributed to slow productivity growth and the other half to the rapid increase in 
labour costs (Maliranta, 2014).
Another controversial issue is the size of the public sector. It was claimed by the new 
Prime Minister that Finland’s public expenditure had risen to 58 per cent of total GDP, 
and this was linked to the over-sized public sector work force (530,000 in 2014). 
This, however, is disputed, as official statistics indicate a significant decrease in the 
number of central government personnel between 2000 and 2014, although there 
has been a smaller increase in local government employees over the same period 
(Ministry of Finance, 2015b; Municipal Employers, 2015). In order to assist recovery 
from the 1990s recession, the long-term Finnish Workplace Development Programme 
(TYKE) was implemented in the context of tripartite arrangements and coordinated 
by the Ministry of Employment. This programme continued under the auspices of the 
Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation (TEKES) from 2008 onwards, but with no more 
programme-based funding of projects. An evaluation study in 2010 concluded that 
there were risks associated with the loss of the strengths of the programmatic approach 
under the new TEKES coordination, and also that there was a lack of representation on 
the part of the social partners.
Figure 3.4 Public social expenditure as % of GDP
Source: OECD (2016).
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The Committee on Social Policy Reform (SATA Committee) was an example of a tripar-
tite working group with heavy responsibilities. It dealt with the interrelations between 
taxation, basic income, unemployment benefits and working life development. In 2009, 
the central trade unions SAK and AKAVA withdrew from the Committee due to their 
mistrust of the Government. Many of the reforms were considered to have been unsuc-
cessful – and even the Government shared this view. Despite these upheavals, there 
was still a certain degree of consensus regarding the financial goals of the reforms.
2 3 The political context 
Various government coalitions have tackled the financial crisis, which hit Finland later 
than most other countries – from 2008 to 2015. The Governments’ attention has 
focused mostly on public expenditure and national debt, which increased greatly due 
to the use of automatic stabilizers to sustain the level of welfare.
There have been four different coalitions and five different Prime Ministers over the 
crisis period, as shown in table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Government coalitions during the crisis
Years Coalition Parties in the coalition
2015 Three-party centre-right 
coalition
The Centre Party – Prime Minister Juha Sipilä, the Finns Party 
and the National Coalition Party
2014–15 Five-party mixed coalition The National Coalition Party – Prime Minister Cai-Göran 
Stubb, The Social Democratic Party, Swedish People’s Party, 
Green Party and Christian Democrats
2011–14 Six-party mixed coalition The National Coalition Party – Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen, 
The Social Democratic Party, Swedish People’s Party, Green 
Party, Christian Democrats and Left Alliance
2010–11 Four-party centre-right 
coalition
The Centre Party – Prime Minister Mari Kiviniemi, The 
National Coalition Party, Swedish People’s Party, Green Party
2007–10 Four-party centre-right 
coalition
The Centre Party – Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, The 
National Coalition Party, Swedish People’s Party, Green Party
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
The political temperature had already begun to rise before the banking crisis, when 
centre-right Governments and Prime Ministers took the helm. The decline in social dia-
logue reflected the diminishing support for and power of the Social Democratic Party, 
which had traditionally been more reliant on the contribution of labour organizations to 
labour market policies. 
The second Government of Matti Vanhanen (2007–10) consisted of a four-party 
centre-right coalition. Alexander (Cai-Göran) Stubb (later to become Prime Minis-
ter between 2014 and 2015) was appointed as Minister for Foreign Affairs, without 
being a Member of Parliament. In 2007, the Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) 
refused central-level bargaining, and sectoral-level negotiations took place instead. The 
Government at that time gave only limited information to the public, and there were 
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some controversies relating to foreign policy – as well as to alleged election financ-
ing irregularities in which labour organizations were involved. The transparency of the 
Prime Minister and his Government was called into question, but without any signif-
icant consequences. For his part, Alexander Stubb questioned Finland’s traditional 
domestic policies, such as appointment practices, as well as foreign policies, and he 
introduced the active use of social media in communications. He also consulted a vari-
ety of experts – bringing in the business world to advise on Finland’s “brand” (2008); 
Finland’s ambassadors to advise on foreign policies (2008); and Swedish experts to 
advise on Finland’s competitiveness (2014). 
3.  The role of social dialogue in national policy-making  
in the post-crisis period 
From interviews held with the trade unions, it would seem that – since the severe reces-
sion in the 1990s – there has been a gradual erosion of the long tradition of active labour 
organizations contributing to the building of the welfare state. Their role has become 
increasingly limited and consultative, while the Government has taken more control while 
seeking compromises to improve the economic outlook. This was visible, for example, 
in relation to the pension reform in 2013 – and again in 2015, during negotiations on a 
social agreement related to the Government’s fiscal consolidation programme.
On the other hand, the EK and its organizational predecessors expressed ambivalence 
towards social dialogue; despite their departures from and criticism of central level 
bargaining, they always returned to the tripartite negotiating table.
After the recession – and despite the economic recovery achieved – changes in the 
labour relations system started to take place by the end of the 1990s; as a result, the 
so-called TUPO (the national income policy agreement) tradition began to weaken. 
This reflected the erosion of the social corporatist model. The role of the Government’s 
social security package to support bipartite agreements diminished, and sectoral-level 
negotiations started taking on greater importance. At the outbreak of the 2008 crisis, 
the era of centralized incomes policy agreements seemed to be coming to an end in 
Finland. The EK announced that sectoral, entreprise and even individual-level bargain-
ing would be the negotiation models of the future. 
This became manifest in 2007, when the EK withdrew from central-level collective 
bargaining altogether and sectoral-level negotiations took place during the 2009–10 
period. These industry-level negotiations, however, led to significant pay rises – at least 
in the construction and health care sectors – which prompted the employers once 
again to return to the national agreements, partly in order to achieve more modest 
pay rises and wage coordination. The new national level agreements were no longer 
called “TUPOs” (national income agreements) but rather “framework agreements”. 
The employers continued to maintain that the time of centralized agreements was over 
but, partly on account of political pressure, they once again became engaged in frame-
work agreements in 2011 (Marttila and Pursiainen, 2015). It should be added that after 
the pacts agreed in 2011 and 2013, the EK declared on 25 November 2015 that the 
current year’s tripartite agreement would be the last for them, causing severe criticism 
from the workers’ side. But this did not yet represent a complete collapse of the tripar-
tite tradition.
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The 2011 agreement was called the “framework agreement 2011–13 to secure Fin-
land’s competitiveness and employment”; among other things, it included modest 
wage rises (2.4 per cent and 1.9 per cent in the second year).
The agreement elicited mainly a positive reaction from the social partners. The crucial 
issue was the raising of the general retirement age, which was turned into a wider 
agenda. The workers’ side saw that well-being at work, rather than the retirement age 
per se, was key to extending careers. The successful agreement was considered signif-
icant proof of the value of tripartite social dialogue and paved the way for the incoming 
Government in 2011 (Jokivuori, 2010). It had not only symbolic but also practical value 
for both companies and employees.
In 2013, the agreement at national level continued under the tripartite tradition, using 
the term “pact for employment and growth”.21 The two main themes were pension 
reform, and the decision to begin developing the bargaining system itself and the Act 
on Mediation in Labour Disputes. The latter gave rise to industrial peace negotiations, 
which broke down in 2015. The difficulties reflected underlying tensions on the eve of 
the new “crisis government” of 2015.
The new Government of 2015 consisted of a three-party centre-right coalition: the 
Centre Party – Prime Minister Juha Sipilä, the Finns Party and the National Coalition 
Party. The Government proposed a “social agreement” on employment and competi-
tiveness for labour market parties, which would have included, inter alia, an agreement 
to extend annual working time in order to reduce unit labour costs by at least 5 per 
cent. In August 2015, SAK rejected the agreement for the first time (it subsequently 
rejected it four times).
The absence of the Social Democratic Party in government since the elections in 2015 
marked another major shift in the role of the social partners and social dialogue in 
Finland. The major reforms concerning local government, the pension system, the 
organization of social and health care and the social security system, were all criticized 
for their slow progress under previous governments, and almost all of them remain still 
to be implemented in full. Nonetheless, these reforms were launched through tripartite 
negotiations held prior to the economic crisis.
The pension reform agreed in 2014 continued to make progress towards implemen-
tation, despite AKAWA’s opposition. In May 2015, the many details that had earlier 
been left open concerning the private sector were agreed upon, under the aegis of 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. The Government proposal22 was taken to the 
Parliament on 3 September 2015 and will be effective from 1 January 2017.
From the point of view of social dialogue, the pension reform was implemented with a 
heavy hand from the Government. The labour organizations were tasked to produce 
a common proposal, with the Government threatening to take action in the event that 
they did not succeed.
The pension reform will raise the retirement age gradually (by three months per age 
cohort) for those born in 1955 or after, towards a statutory pension age of 65 (now 63). 
21  See in English: http://www.akava.fi/files/10395/Pact_for_Employment_and_Growth.pdf.
22  Government proposal (16/2015) on changing occupational pension scheme, available at: https://www.eduskunta.fi/
FI/vaski/HallituksenEsitys/Sivut/HE_16+2015.aspx (18 September 2015).
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Those born in 1962 and after will thus have a retirement age of 65. The pension age 
will be tied to life expectancy, so that the pension age will probably rise by two months 
per year for those born in 1965 or later. The present age-related pension accruals will 
be abandoned – with the exception of those currently aged between 53 and 62 years. 
The calculation base will be a little higher (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 2015). 
The new pension system also intends to encourage part-time jobs for pensioners.
Four separate public sector pension systems will be integrated into one Pension Act 
under the auspices of KEVA (Local Government Pensions Institution). Personal pen-
sion ages will not be raised, while professional pension ages will be raised for those 
born in 1955 or later. 
Overall, the reform will raise the expected average retirement age from 60.9 in 2013 to 
62.4 by 2027. The number of employees is estimated to increase by 24,000 persons 
(1 per cent) by 2027. In the long-term, pensions will be significantly lower in relation to 
salaries. The reform has been assessed as quite promising (Kautto and Risku, 2015). 
The new Government programme was severely criticized23 for its impact on women’s 
employment, traditionally one of the backbones of high employment in Finland. The 
Government’s intention to cut overtime, shift work and Sunday compensation was 
deemed to hit particularly hard the health and service sectors, traditionally dominated 
by women. However, plans concerning cuts in overtime pay and Sunday compensation 
were later replaced by cuts in holiday pay.
During the national level social dialogue process, quite exceptionally, Finland’s Prime 
Minister Juha Sipilä gave a televised speech24 on 17 September 2015, which dealt with 
the ongoing economic crisis. He urged labour unions to agree with the Government’s 
framework. The following day, there was a planned strike by wage earners and 30,000 
people collected in the centre of Helsinki to protest against the Government cuts. The 
Prime Minister gave the workers’ associations one more chance to formulate their pro-
posals on how to reach the competitiveness targets by the end of September.25 The 
employees’ side had a list of several reforms that the Government rejected.26 The social 
partners complained that they should have been consulted over recent cuts to the 
earnings-related unemployment benefits (Eurofound, 2015). After several attempts, 
the national level negotiations (on a Social Agreement) were again interrupted at the 
end of November 2015.
Local bargaining was one major theme in the Government’s programme. The main aim 
was to make hiring easier for employers, by allowing local deviations from the collective 
agreements. In return, the Government introduced the possibility of improving social 
security in the case of employees who were made redundant. One of the changes 
envisaged was to give laid-off workers the opportunity to participate in employment-re-
lated training. In late 2015, there was an ongoing discussion about forming a tripartite 
working group to address questions relating to local bargaining, following the suspen-
sion of national agreement negotiations. The idea of strengthening local bargaining 
23  http://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/a1433910187625 (21 September 2015).
24  http://yle.fi/uutiset/katso_ja_lue_sipilan_puhe_tasta_kokonaisuudessaan/8311098 (21 September 2015).
25  https://twitter.com/juhasipila (21 September 2015).
26  http://www.kansanuutiset.fi/uutiset/kotimaa/3431398/ei-kelvannut-neuvottelupoytaan-palkansaajilla-oli-pitka-
lista-tyoelaman-uudistuksia (21 September 2015).
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seems to be largely accepted by all stakeholder groups – although some interviewees 
saw the public sector as a problem in this model.
To sum up, the early years of the crisis were characterized by the continuation of major 
reforms and initiatives that had been launched before, accompanied by revitalization 
measures. There were several tripartite working committees addressing different issues. 
For a long time, the direction that the structural reform policies took was generally 
regarded as justified, and the social partners were traditionally strongly involved. In the 
light of this history, the Government acknowledged the importance of social dialogue 
and did not suggest major changes to the overall system, even given the interruptions 
to the national level negotiations during the period 2007–10. However, internal political 
wrangling partly overshadowed economic realities and the evolving global crisis, which 
included the taking of somewhat new positions in industrial relations: for example, 
part of the National Coalition Party’s political campaign in 2007 was to push for wage 
increases for nurses. It seems that Finland was caught up in the middle of a structural 
modernization process, a changing political balance of power (towards the right), and a 
redefining of industrial relations, as well as increasing international tensions. All of these 
factors resulted in the erosion of trust between the social partners and the Government.
The social dialogue system in Finland is now at a crossroads. The economic and social 
policies adopted during the crisis reflected fundamental changes in the global and 
domestic spheres, in political power relations and in the competitive environment. The 
main trend, which had already started before the current crisis, has been towards 
downplaying the role of labour organizations and central-level bargaining. But this has 
been countered by the Government using new methods to utilize the potential of labour 
organizations to create commitment to the planned reforms. The results of this new 
practice are ambiguous – and difficult to determine as yet.
The role of the traditional media, social media and other forms of public communi-
cation in relation to social dialogue has increased during the crisis. One outcome of 
this change has been that the achievements and potential of social dialogue are being 
interpreted in new ways by the younger generation, and the fundamentals of traditional 
social dialogue seem to be increasingly called into question by the Government and 
the employers. 
Despite the conclusion of a new Social Agreement and the fact that the basic ele-
ments and institutions of Finnish social dialogue remain, there will undoubtedly be 
major changes in labour legislation and social dialogue in the future, as a consequence 
of economic pressures and of the employers’ demands for local bargaining and labour 
market flexibility. One example is the likely possibility of creating a low-wage sector, 
which does not currently exist in Finland.
The role of the Economic Council is important in the Finnish context, although it does 
not override tripartite agreements. The Council is led by the Prime Minister and con-
sists of representatives of the main workers’ and employers’ organizations, as well as 
of ministries and some expert institutes (“tripartite plus”). It meets once a month and 
its purpose is to create a common awareness of economic factors and developments 
among stakeholders. It commissions studies on important topics and hears different 
experts in the sphere of economics. The Council also monitors international data, Euro-
pean Commission (EC) initiatives and OECD trends.
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The role of the Economic Council, especially in the crisis period, is not easy to describe. 
The trade union representatives considered that the “income and cost development 
Secretariat”, under the Ministry of Finance, was an important cooperation forum 
between labour organizations, economic experts and Government officials, and that 
it was more relevant than the Economic Council, which only has an advisory and 
consultative capacity – although it has clearly helped in building consensus among 
stakeholders on economic trends.27 This has supported the major structural reform 
process. There were no significant changes in the Council’s functioning during the 
economic crisis – although possibly the subject of short-term economic problems was 
more prominent in its meetings during the early years of the crisis. At present, the main 
issue is the long-term solution to problems.28
On the basis of the review of memoranda (State Council, 2015), the role of the Gov-
ernment’s Economic Council is rather moderate and consensus-oriented. However, 
there is also the longstanding Information Committee on Cost and Incomes Develop-
ment (TUKUSETO), which is a tripartite body under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Finance. This body monitors the implementation of labour market policies, and it has 
challenged the Government’s statistical comparisons of industrial productivity and eco-
nomic outlook with other countries (TUKUSETO, 2014). One of its criticisms concerned 
the validity of drawing comparisons with countries having different kinds of industrial 
structures.
The EU Semester, launched in 2010, implements EU steering policy, according to 
which each Member State produces annual National Reform Programmes (NRPs) on 
economic policies and Stability Programmes, on the basis of the Commission’s Annual 
Growth Surveys, analytical country reports, country-specific recommendations and 
other EC guidelines.29 In 2015, Finland was not included in the EC’s Excessive Deficit 
Procedure, but still had imbalances requiring monitoring and policy action.
In Finland, European Semester Officers were appointed somewhat later than in other 
countries, and not long before this study was undertaken. The procedures were not 
yet fully established. Although the EU Semester process is recognized as an impor-
tant opportunity to monitor and compare Finland’s economic progress with other EU 
countries, it is not yet serving as a vehicle for domestic dialogue. The country reports 
seem to have been mostly prepared by Government ministries, without wider dialogue 
with stakeholders.
A number of issues were identified that seem to confirm the strengthening of the 
EU Semester process. First, reports and Finnish policies both seem to reflect EC 
recommendations and other guidelines more today than they did at the start of the 
financial crisis. Second, the EU Semester Officers have clearly become more active, 
and both formal and informal discussions are ongoing. Third, there have been high-
level discussions concerning the possibility of opening up the Semester process to 
parliamentary debate, and even civil dialogue, to correct its lack of democratic partic-
ipation at national level.
27 Interview with AKAVA.
28 Interview with the Economic Council representative.
29 Based on interviews with EU Semester Officer and Member of Parliament, and own observations.
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4.  Industrial relations and collective bargaining  
in the post-crisis period
4 1 Impact of the crisis on collective bargaining
This section will provide a deeper analysis of the “Social Agreements” that were signed 
during the economic crisis, as discussed in the previous section. Before the onset of 
the crisis in 2007, the Finnish tradition of centralized agreements that had begun in 
1968 came to a halt when the private sector employers’ association, the EK, declined 
to negotiate a new national agreement – on the grounds that they wanted greater flex-
ibility in negotiations in order to better accommodate the individual needs of different 
industries and companies. As a result, industry-level bargaining predominated during 
the period 2009-10, although the employers’ central union retained a coordinating 
role. However, in 2011, in response to the worsening economic climate, the social part-
ners agreed on the aforementioned tripartite framework for a new centralized national 
agreement on wages and working conditions. This agreement, while covering a range 
of non-pay issues, mainly set guidelines for negotiations at industry-level – but in con-
trast to the previous general incomes policy settlements, under which all workers were 
covered, the “2011 framework agreement only applied to industries having existing 
collective agreements” (ETUI, 2016). 
The second centralized agreement was signed in October 2013, entitled “the Pact 
for Employment and Growth”. This provided for small pay increments over a two-year 
period and also covered non-pay issues, such as changes in social insurance contri-
butions and unemployment benefit rules. Despite this development, the views of the 
employers’ and workers’ central organizations differed with respect to the significance 
of these agreements: first, because they were called “framework agreements” in 2011 
and 2013 rather than “national incomes agreements”; and second, due to their appar-
ently more restricted coverage.
During the crisis, no amendments were made to the legislation concerning collective 
bargaining. But the new Government that assumed office in May 2015 introduced a 
number of changes to be agreed with the social partners, aimed at revitalizing the 
economy and increasing competitiveness, in particular by cutting labour costs and 
social security, and promoting local-level bargaining. Nonetheless, major disagree-
ments have emerged over the past year regarding the measures necessary to address 
the crisis. These concern, inter alia, the Government’s proposals to boost competi-
tiveness through new legislation to set limits on what may be collectively agreed with 
regard to annual leave and holiday bonuses. The social partners fear that such man-
datory legislation would significantly limit their freedom to negotiate. Furthermore, the 
strategic programme set out by the new Government stated that if the social partners 
did not conclude a ‘Social Agreement’ (or a ‘competitiveness pact’) on measures to 
improve Finland’s competitiveness, fiscal consolidation measures of 1.5 billion Euros 
would follow (Tönnes Lönroos, 2015). 
In March 2016, the Government approved the labour market organizations’ proposal 
for a social contract. The proposition included measures such as extending working 
time by one day per year and increasing employees’ social contributions. However, the 
proposal allegedly only results in about one third of the total increase in competitive-
ness needed, and thus the Government will have to adopt additional measures in any 
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event. Different scenarios may lie ahead, depending upon whether the central labour 
organizations are able to build sufficient internal consensus by June 2016 (SAKb, 
2016). The situation therefore remains open at the time of writing.
Thus although no structural changes have been made to the collective bargaining 
system, it is expected that the State will have a strengthened role – particularly in pro-
posing and demanding solutions from labour organizations to economic problems such 
as pension reform. 
Despite these differences, a number of agreements were signed by the social partners 
during the various stages of the crisis, as may be seen in table 3.2.
Table 3.2 Collective bargaining and other agreements in Finland, 2007–16
Bipartite/tripartite agreement Main points of the agreement Role of the State
2007–10 sectoral agreements. • Employers’ Confederation refused to 
sign the central tripartite agreement. 
This led to considerable pay increases 
and reduced competitiveness through 
industry-level negotiations.
• State not active.
Framework agreement 
2011–13 to secure Finland’s 
competitiveness and maintain 
employment.
• Much lower wage rises than 
previously (2.4 per cent and 1.9 per 
cent in the second year).
• Government 
strongly signalled 
the importance 
of strengthened 
cooperation between 
the social partners. 
The main aim was the 
pension reform.
• State participates 
in the financing 
of unemployment 
insurance in 2012.
Employment and growth 
agreement in August 2013 
(covering 90 per cent of 
workers).
• Modest wage increase of 20 Euros 
per month + 0.4 per cent after 
one year. Increase in pension 
contributions. Pension reform details 
decided upon. Launch of negotiations 
on holidays and system of bargaining. 
• Decrease in 
unemployment 
insurance payments. 
Some incentives for 
unemployed.
Employment and growth 
agreement extended in June 
2015 (until 1 November 2016).
• This national wage agreement 
(covering 90% or all workers) 
provided for a flat rate increase of  
16 Euros per month for salaries 
below 3,720 Euros and a percentage 
increase of 0.43 per cent per month 
for those above it. 
• Employment insurance fee for both 
employers and employees raised by 
0.50 percentage points (to 1.00 and 
1.15 per cent of salary respectively). 
• Short new government 
period 2014-15 
after Prime Minister 
Katainen’s resignation. 
No major initiatives.
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Bipartite/tripartite agreement Main points of the agreement Role of the State
Social Agreement (also known 
as Competitiveness Pact) in 
February 2016
• The negotiations were interrupted four 
times before agreement was reached. 
The terms include the cutting of public 
sector holiday pay by 30 per cent, 
an annual working-time extension 
without additional compensation, 
and increases to employees’ and 
decreases to employers’ social 
security contributions (SAK, 2016a). It 
also contained a preliminary proposal 
for the ‘Finnish model’. 
• Strong intervention by 
the State in order to 
encourage the social 
partners to sign the 
‘Social Agreement’.
Source: Author’s own elaboration, on the basis of, inter alia, Jokivuori (2013).
The ‘Finnish model’ that was primarily agreed upon in the 2016 Social Agreement 
establishes a framework to enable export industries, and other sectors sensitive to inter-
national competition, to set limits on wage increases. It is based on the ‘Swedish wage 
model’. In addition, the agreement gave rise to a new round of sectoral-level collective 
bargaining. The Government is scheduled to review these new collective agreements 
in the coming months and, if satisfied with the outcomes, will most likely – at least par-
tially – abandon the 1.5 billion Euros proposed fiscal consolidation measures.30 
While the crisis is far from over in Finland, the status of the employees’ and employ-
ers’ central organizations is clearly diminishing, despite the conclusion of some partial 
central agreements. The way that labour organizations are being challenged by forceful 
Government law making bears witness to this. The most difficult problem still relates to 
the limited outcomes and benefits of the ongoing negotiations. For its part, the EK has 
declared its intention of abandoning the central-level agreements, which has given rise 
to several objections from the workers’ side. Some critics have suggested terminating 
the Confederation’s existence sooner or later (Marttila and Pursiainen, 2015). There 
have been no consequences as yet in relation to the reorganizations/mergers or the 
role of the central social partners. Discussions concerning a major merger of SAK and 
STTK, as well as some member unions from AKAVA, into a new peak-level trade union, 
have not yet come to fruition. The preliminary steps towards this operation began in 
November 2014, but the difficult negotiation of the new Social Agreement has under-
mined the process by highlighting the opposing views of each organization’s members 
(Marttila and Pursiainen, 2015).
In short, this return to a centralized system of collective bargaining may not have hap-
pened without the crisis. Some support may have come from the joint round table 
on productivity, attended by representatives from all the labour market organizations 
in 2007–12. It preceded the joint Working Life 2020 Strategy (2012) by focusing on 
productivity and working life issues, launching research and development projects, and 
rewarding organizations.
30  https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/working-conditions-labour-market-industrial-
relations-law-and-regulation/finland-developments-in-working-life-q1-2016 (21 September 2015).
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Although collective bargaining in Finland has become increasingly decentralized, the 
unionization rate among wage earners (figure 3.5), as well as the number of collective 
agreements and workers covered by them, remains relatively high. While no official 
statistics are available on the number of collective agreements signed in Finland, a 
communication by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health suggests that the number 
of (binding) sectoral collective agreements in place rose from 140 in 2002 to 165 in 
2015.31 Thus no radical changes can be reported as yet, but these may occur in the 
future. It is difficult to understand or predict future changes in industrial relations in the 
Finnish context merely by looking at labour market statistics, changes in legislation or 
the content of collective agreements. This is because the rather dramatic central-level 
contradictions may lead to an increased social and ideological polarization of the pop-
ulation, especially given the fierce internal confrontations of the past and the poor 
current economic conditions.
The number of labour disputes has varied considerably between years. However, dur-
ing the economic crisis, the number of disputes, as well as the number of working days 
lost, has increased overall (table 3.3). These include the major strikes opposing the 
Government’s plans to impose cuts in 2015. 
31 Communication by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 3 December 2015. 
Figure 3.5  Unionization rate of wage earners (men and women) (%),  
2009 and 2013
Source: Ahtiainen, 2015.
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Table 3.3 Labour disputes, 2006-15
Year Disputes Participants Working days lost
2006 97 48 276 85 075
2007 91 89 729 94 579
2008 92 15 992 16 352
2009 139 50 485 91 899
2010 191 137 526 314 667
2011 163 59 164 127 758
2012 86 14 984 17 254
2013 121 19 567 25 999
2014 128 69 248 40 526
2015 163 134 427 108 911
Source: Statistics Finland (2016).
5. Conclusions 
In this study, observations have been made concerning the changing characteristics of 
Finnish social dialogue in terms of 1) economic developments; 2) tripartite bargaining 
with the Government involved; 3) consultation with the social partners, including the 
activities of the consultative committees and the official consultations; and 4) joint 
actions by the social partners (see table 3.4).
Table 3.4 Summary of the observations
2008-10 2010-14 2015
Issues “Decentralization” “Crisis Escalates” “Crisis Government”
Economy • Moderate increase in 
unemployment, high 
increase in Government 
debt.
• Short recovery period 
and then worsened 
economy.
• Finland exceeded the EU 
average unemployment 
rate of 9.5 per cent 
and funding of welfare 
became threatened.
Tripartite 
bargaining
• Decentralization 2007–
10; The Government 
and employers take 
charge.
• Centralized framework 
agreements in 2011 
and 2013; wage 
moderation.
• Government takes action 
-> ”Social Agreement” 
proposal and four 
deadlines; threat of 
”forceful legislation” to 
improve Competitiveness 
Agreement in February 
2016.
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2008-10 2010-14 2015
Consultation • Government stimulus 
packages in 2009 
and 2010; extending 
careers and related 
working groups; 
struggling with 
pension reform; 
social security reform 
(SATA) in trouble; the 
Government took the 
lead, EK was more 
passive.
• Tripartite pension 
reform 2014; 
negotiation system 
and labour disputes 
law reforms in trouble; 
successful Career 
Agreement 2012.
• Pension reform 
continued; sectoral 
union AKT and EK 
withdraw from 
negotiations; the 
Government promotes 
local bargaining and 
introduces cuts, e.g. to 
unemployment benefits; 
workers dissatisfied.
Joint actions • Workplace Development 
programme (TYKE) 
changes.
• Working life 2020 
programme.
• EU Semester process 
strengthened.
Other 
developments
• Governmental tensions; 
new approaches to 
unemployment (new 
Ministry); flexicurity 
models; privatization 
debate; local 
government reform; 
university reform; 
Labour Force Service 
Centres (LAFOS); 
public expenditure.
• Credit rating dropped 
to AA+; some 
adjustments in social 
security; structural 
political development 
programme (2013-15) 
with meagre results; 
lightening of company 
taxes and obligations 
with limited results; 
PES reform.
• Political power changes; 
major consolidation 
measures and cuttings 
in public expenditure; 
social and health care 
reform; criticism of 
the government plans; 
increase in labour 
disputes; lack of mutual 
trust.
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
No major changes have taken place in the industrial relations landscape or labour 
organizations after the partial return to centralized agreements in 2010. However, the 
Government and the employers have the strong intention to increase sectoral- and 
company-level negotiations. The role of the State has become stronger with the latest 
Government – elected in 2015 – with unforeseen consequences for the industrial rela-
tions and overall national economy.
One aim of this study was to clarify the “learning” aspect of good practices in the 
context of social dialogue. While the employers insist on the need for adaptation to the 
global turmoil, the workers emphasize the need for innovation, education and new strat-
egies. The Government’s programme, as well as the interpretation of the EU Semester 
policies, broadly covers both views but prioritizes the adaptation goal.
To conclude, major reforms are underway (in 2015) to tackle emerging challenges. 
Finland is in the midst of major restructuring and demographic changes. Indeed, it 
would be in a challenging position even without slowing global economic growth and its 
heavy EU-related financial and political obligations. Finland has distanced itself from its 
tradition of neutral foreign policy – and a strong political power struggle is taking place 
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between the various parties. These seem to be bound up with the issue of social dia-
logue and with the Government’s efforts at reform. It is evident that focusing solely on 
the national social dialogue system is somewhat contrary to the wider EU policy inter-
est, which undoubtedly calls for an integrated transnational perspective on this matter. 
The issues at stake are not only the functioning of the labour market but also the 
ideological basis of the economic model, and negotiating different values among the 
Finnish population. At the moment, there seems to be a considerable risk that politics 
may alienate people more than ever before, if the “Social Agreements” fail to deliver. 
This fear has been reflected in the way that the Government has made great efforts 
to engage with the social partners. It remains very unclear, however, whether there is 
sufficient solidarity behind the Government’s reform programme for it to succeed.
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Leila Kurki, Finnish Confederation of Salaried Employees (STTK)
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Minna Etu-Seppälä, Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK)
Workers’ Organizations 
Erkki Laukkanen, Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK)
Raili Perimäki, Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK)
Others
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Seppo Koskinen, Professor, University of Turku
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4.  Social dialogue in the shadow  
of the State in France
Jacques FreyssineT
1. Introduction
The approach applied in this study, for international comparative purposes, raises two 
major problems in the case of France
First, to try and avoid a purely descriptive approach, the terms of reference for the coun-
try studies in this volume utilize a typology of national systems. In most comparative 
research, France is considered as belonging to the “continental model”, on account of 
its welfare state features or the existence of “coordinated capitalism”. However, as far 
as its system of industrial relations is concerned, France is more akin to the southern 
European than to the continental model. A number of recent studies have analysed 
the diversity of relationships between national forms of economic and social regulation 
in response to the crisis; they highlight the fact that France demonstrates charac-
teristics of both the continental and Mediterranean model (Amable, 2016; Gautié, 
2011 and 2015; Jany-Catrice and Lallement, 2015; Pernot, 2013; Schulze-Marmeling, 
2013). This particularity of France must be taken into account throughout the analysis 
that follows.
Second, the terms of reference make a distinction between a period of economic crisis 
(2008-12) and a post-crisis period (2013-15). In France, after a period of recession in 
2009, there was a brief economic recovery in 2010 and 2011 – but this was followed 
by a continuing period of very weak growth up to 2015, with no particular change 
occurring between 2012 and 2013 (see section 2.1). The dramatic change in spring 
of 2012 was instead of a political nature, namely the transfer of power from a right- 
to a left-leaning Government (see section 2.3). This did not give rise to a significant 
change in economic policy, mainly because of the restrictive commitments that France 
had already entered into vis-à-vis the European Union. However, the new President 
did place great emphasis on reviving social dialogue. The French case is thus char-
acterized by a sudden change in the political situation in 2012; it was this, rather than 
France’s entry into a “post-crisis” phase, that had a significant impact on social dia-
logue in the country.
This study is based on official publications and academic research covering the 
period 2008-15, and the most important sources are listed in the Bibliography. They 
include official bodies (in particular, the Ministry of Labour and bipartite or tripartite 
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institutions), employers’ organizations and workers’ organizations. Interviews were con-
ducted with senior civil servants, the leaders of employers’ and workers’ organizations, 
and a European Commission representative (see appendix for details). The author also 
drew upon his personal experiences of social dialogue, both as a member of the Haut 
Conseil du financement de la protection sociale (High Council for the Financing of 
Social Protection), and from having given expert input to bodies such as the Conseil 
économique, social et environnemental (Economic, Social and Environmental Council) 
and the Conseil d’orientation pour l’emploi (Employment Policy Council). 
2. The macroeconomic and political context
Developments in the labour market are directly linked to the changing macroeconomic 
context. It is, however, difficult to establish any causal relationship between the crisis 
and the 2012 change in the political environment. 
2 1 The macroeconomic context
France’s 2009 recession was less severe than the EU national average, but its eco-
nomic recovery was weaker and of shorter duration (see table 4.1). Since 2012, the 
situation has been close to stagnant. 
Table 4.1 Macroeconomic indicators
Year GDP* Trade balance** Public deficit** Public debt** Unemployment 
rate***
2007 2,4 -1,3 2,7 63,9 7,7
2008 0,2 -1,8 3,3 68,2 7,1
2009 -2,9 -1,4 7,5 79,2 8,7
2010 2,0 -1,9 7,0 82,7 8,9
2011 2,1 -2,6 5,1 85,2 8,8
2012 0,2 -2,2 4,8 89,6 9,4
2013 0,7 -1,9 4,1 92,3 9,9
2014 0,2 -1,8 4,0 95,0 9,9
2015 1,2 -1,3 3,5 95,8 10,0
Notes:  *annual growth rate in percentage; **as percentage of GDP; ***as percentage of the labour force (annual 
average in metropolitan France).
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Economics (INSEE).
During the recession, the trade balance deteriorated and has improved only slightly 
since. This situation has had repercussions on social dialogue. Insofar as the loss of 
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competitiveness is attributed to high production costs, and in particular the high cost 
of labour, priority should be given to exerting a downward pressure on wages and on 
employers’ social security contributions. But if, on the other hand, the loss of compet-
itiveness is due to an ill-advised specialization in the international division of labour, 
priority should rather be given to research, new technologies, investments in modern-
ization, and to product quality. Employers’ and workers’ organizations disagree about 
the relative importance of these two elements of competitiveness. Employers often 
argue that the only effective response in the short term is to reduce production costs.
The main argument put forward since 2010 to justify the pressure exerted on the budg-
ets of the State and Social Security systems has been that there is a need to reduce 
the public budget deficit and to stem an increase in the public debt. This situation is a 
direct cause of the deterioration of social dialogue. 
As shown in table 4.1, after the 2009 recession and limited recovery in 2010 and 2011, 
growth slowed significantly in 2012 and stagnation set in – and there have been no 
developments since then to justify labelling 2013-15 as a post-crisis period.
2 2 The labour market context
Labour market developments are determined by macroeconomic trends. Nonetheless, 
given the time lag for the effects of adjustment and labour market policies to be felt, 
these developments have been slower and less drastic in nature. 
The unemployment rate jumped sharply by almost two percentage points in 2009, and 
has been rising more slowly since 2011 (table 4.1). An examination of the composition 
of the unemployed reveals some significant developments (see table 4.2). 
• Although the unemployment rate for women had traditionally been higher than 
that for men, the economic crisis has reversed this pattern. This is because 
jobs in industry have been cut while they continue to be created in the service 
sector. 
• While the unemployment rate for older persons had traditionally been low 
because of the prevalence of pre-retirement mechanisms, it has increased more 
than for other age groups. This may be attributed to the almost complete elimi-
nation of early retirement, and to a pushing back of the retirement age through 
pension reforms (see section 3.2.4). These developments began before the 
crisis and have continued since.
• The unemployment rate for young people has remained well above the average, 
but has risen slower than for other age groups. But it is important to note that 
the unemployment rate (calculated as a proportion of the total working age pop-
ulation) has little meaning for a segment of the population of which the majority 
are in school or higher education. For example, the official unemployment rate 
for young people aged between 15 and 24 years was 23.4 per cent in 2014 – 
whereas only 8.9 per cent were actually unemployed that year (i.e. excluding 
those in education).
• Finally, the disparities in unemployment rate by level of qualification are widen-
ing, to the detriment of the least qualified. Less qualified people are the main 
victims of job cuts and of the increasingly stringent recruitment criteria applied 
in a period of massive unemployment. 
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Table 4.2  Unemployment rate by sex, age and professional category,  
2008 and 2014 (as % of economically active population)
2008 2014
Overall unemployment rate 7.1 9.9
By sex
Women
Men
7.4
6.7
9.6
10.2
By age group and sex
Both sexes
15-24
25-49
50-64
Women
15-24
25-49
50-64
Men
15-24
25-49
50-64
18.3
6.3
4.3
18.1
7.0
4.3
18.5
5.6
4.3
23.4
9.3
6.7
22.2
9.2
6.6
24.4
9.4
6.8
By professional category 
– Executives
– Intermediate professions
– Employees
– Skilled workers
– Unskilled workers
2.8
3.8
7.0
7.0
14.7
4.4
5.6
10.1
15.1
19.9
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE): Employment Survey.
The composition of employment remained remarkably stable across the different cat-
egories of employment and by gender between 2008 and 2014 (see table 4.3). The 
crisis does not appear to have accelerated the trend towards increasing job insecurity, 
which began in the 1980s. This conclusion might hold true when observing only the 
average proportion of workers within each category – but when taking a closer look 
at new recruitment, there is a sharp increase in fixed-term contracts over this period. 
In fact, between the first trimesters of 2008 and 2015, hiring on a fixed-term basis 
increased from 70 to 85 per cent of all (new) recruitment of salaried workers. 
Within the category of fixed-term contracts, the proportion of very short-term hiring has 
also grown: while in the first quarter of 2008 some 60.7 per cent of fixed-term recruit-
ment involved jobs of less than one month’s duration, by the third quarter of 2015 this 
proportion had reached 69.5 per cent. Job mobility is on the increase and concen-
trated among a small fraction of the overall labour force. It accentuates a long-term 
trend towards labour market segmentation. Since 2008, this issue has appeared on the 
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agenda of social dialogue on several occasions and in different ways – unemployment 
benefits, life-long vocational training, social protection, and so on (see sections 3.1 
and 3.2). 
Table 4.3 Composition of employment, 2008 and 2014 (% of total employment)
2008 2014
Non-salaried workers 10.6 11.5
Employees 89.4 88.5
– Permanent contracts 77.6 76.4
– Apprentices 1.3 1.4
– Temporary contracts 2.1 2.1
– Fixed-term contracts 8.4 8.6
Part-time work
Both sexes 17.0 18.9
– Women 29.5 30.8
– Men 5.7 7.8
Source: INSEE: Employment Survey.
Part-time work remains heavily dominated by women. There was a small increase in 
part-time work during the crisis, which was slightly more marked among men than 
women. The proportion of individuals working part-time and stating that they wished to 
work more hours rose from 31.0 per cent to 37.5 per cent between 2008 and 2014.
As with macroeconomic indicators, an examination of annual data on the composition 
of employment and unemployment32 suggests that there was no particular break in 
trends in the period 2012-13. 
2 3 The political context
With regards to the political situation, the period in question can be split into two phases:
• Up to May 2012, the President (Nicolas Sarkozy, elected in May 2007), the Gov-
ernment (with François Fillon as Prime Minister) and the parliamentary majority 
were all right wing. 
• From May 2012 to the present, François Hollande, a socialist, has been Presi-
dent; both Prime Ministers have been socialists (Jean-Marc Eyraud until March 
2014, followed by Manuel Vals), along with a socialist parliamentary majority. 
As we shall see in sections 3.1 and 3.2, the change in the parliamentary majority has 
certainly had an impact on the process of social dialogue, but it has not caused a sig-
nificant change in macroeconomic policy. Upon taking up office, the socialist leaders 
have had to manage levels of budget deficit and public debt that make them subject 
32 The data series are accessible at: www.insee.fr 
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to constraints imposed by the European Union. Unable to find sufficient support for a 
coordinated European economic recovery policy, they have focused instead on difficult 
negotiations to reschedule the reduction of the national budget deficit. In this position 
of weakness, any deviation from the economic policy choices made at the European 
level becomes impossible.
The failure by both parliamentary majorities to kick-start economic growth and reverse 
growing unemployment has been one of the main reasons behind a loss of public 
confidence in traditional political parties and leaders in France. This has become most 
evident through a steady increase in electoral support for the far-right Front National 
(National Front). 
3.  The role of social dialogue in the implementation  
of national policies
There are two main forms of tripartite social dialogue in France. The first is purely 
consultative (see section 3.1), while the second involves the joint production of rules 
governing employment relationships (see section 3.2). European social dialogue has 
had only a minor impact on national social dialogue (see section 3.3). The same holds 
true for the very many consultative institutions, whose operations are often routine – 
with the exception of some specialized institutions, which have focused specifically on 
the impact of the crisis (see section 3.4). 
3 1 The role of social dialogue in consultative processes 
Tripartite discussions, for the most part, take place in bodies that have no legal basis: 
first, at “social summits” and later at “social conferences.”
3.1.1 Social summits
At the outbreak of the crisis, a number of social summits were organized under Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s presidency, albeit not at regular intervals. Sarkozy presided over them, and 
the leaders of the employers’ and workers’ organizations participated. The summits 
served two purposes: first, to present the Government’s plans in the area of social 
policy and to obtain the viewpoints of employers’ and workers’ organizations; second 
(in some cases), to invite these organizations to initiate negotiations on subjects put 
forward by the Government, in accordance with the procedure established in 2007 by 
the Act on the modernization of social dialogue (see section 3.2). 
The context for these summits was determined by the thrust of economic policy. One 
of the first summits on 18 February 2009 was devoted to the presentation of social 
measures to accompany the newly adopted economic recovery plan. Since 2010, the 
social summits have taken place in the context of a fiscal consolidation policy that 
leaves scant resources available for social policy concerns. At these summits, trade 
unions have expressed their increasing dissatisfaction. 
3.1.2 Social conferences
After his success in the presidential elections, François Hollande announced that one 
social conference would be organized each year. These would become the vehicle for 
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building new relationships with social partners. In relation to the social summits, several 
changes were made:
• The yearly interval would allow stakeholders to ensure coherence across social 
policy. Hence the agenda was broader than for the social summits. 
• Preparations for the conferences were made through bilateral and tripartite 
meetings, to jointly draw up the methods of work and agenda. 
• At the end of the social conference, the Government would make public a “social 
policy road map”, summing up the conclusions of the debates and setting the 
agenda for the following year. 
Three social conferences were organized based on these principles, in July 2012, June 
2013 and July 2014. Initially well received by all participants, they subsequently suf-
fered the consequences of an economic policy that gave priority to restoring enterprise 
competitiveness in a context of increasing budgetary austerity. Two of the five repre-
sentative trade unions present, the General Confederation of Labour (CGT) and the 
General Confederation of Labour – Force Ouvrière (CGT-FO), expressed their discon-
tent by walking out of the third conference. 
In consequence, the Government decided not to organize a social conference with a 
comprehensive agenda in 2015. Rather, the fourth social conference, of October 2015, 
focused on three relatively non-contentious issues,33 namely the creation of a personal 
activity account, the energy transition and the digital transition. During this conference, 
the Government also announced its intention to draft a bill on the reform of collective 
bargaining (see section 4.1.2). 
The experience of the social summits and social conferences gives rise to the following 
observations:
• It would be incorrect to characterize these meetings as embodying “informal 
tripartism.” They were organized with some degree of formality; the President 
of France was present, and the participants included the heads of the most 
representative employers’ and workers’ organizations. The conclusions from 
the meetings had an influence on both public policy and cross-sectoral negoti-
ations. But given the absence of a legal basis for their operation, it was the State 
that decided whether or not they should take place. Hence the “social con-
ferences,” an originally ambitious innovation that could have been continued 
as an example of “good practice”, were replaced by more modest gatherings 
in 2015.
• The advantage of the social summits and social conferences was their ability 
to make dialogue on social policy possible at the highest level. The process 
enabled the Government to demonstrate its commitment to social democracy. 
It also allowed the employers’ and workers’ organizations to assert their legiti-
macy as influential social actors in the social policy arena. However, the social 
summits and conferences did not allow for their involvement in determining 
economic policy. 
• It is difficult to claim a causal link between these events and the onset of the 
crisis. Social summits had been organized previously, although only rarely, and 
under exceptional economic conditions. The novel element here was primarily 
33 Only the CGT refused to attend the conference. 
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the frequency with which the meetings were held, and their focus on the social 
impact of the crisis.
• In some respects, these meetings were a facet of the Government’s commu-
nications policy and allowed some participants to use them to attract media 
attention. The debates were so short that it was rarely possible to go beyond the 
re-statement of positions already known to everyone present. The real issue was 
the level of seriousness with which the preparatory meetings were organized: 
did the bipartite meetings enable participants to influence the positions taken by 
the Government at the conference? Different organizations may voice different 
opinions on this matter, perhaps because they do not all enjoy the same degree 
of access to the Government. However, they all agree that there has been a 
deterioration over time; while the 2012 conference was important because it 
proposed a method and outlined prospects for the next five years, by contrast, 
the 2015 conference was postponed and the agenda limited to issues where 
confrontation could be avoided. 
3 2  The role of social dialogue in the joint production of rules governing 
employment relationships
A second mechanism made it possible to coordinate action by the State and the social 
partners. It was based on the combination of a national cross-sectoral collective agree-
ment and a binding act by the State (a law, decree or order) that totally or partially 
validates this agreement. Although it already existed before the crisis, this mechanism 
was used more frequently after 2008. 
3.2.1 Coordination processes
The main coordination process is that of incorporation into law. The Act of 31 January 
2007 on the modernization of social dialogue codified a practice that had been used 
informally since the 1960s. There are now three distinct stages:
• The Government informs employers’ and workers’ organizations about planned 
initiatives in the field of employment relationships, employment and vocational 
training. It provides them with background documents on these issues.
• If the issue is one that is normally subject to a cross-sectoral agreement, these 
organizations may inform the Government that they wish to negotiate. 
• If agreement is reached, the Government drafts a bill, in order to transpose the 
provisions of the agreement into a revised Labour Code. Parliament remains 
sovereign, and is not obliged to respect all the terms of the agreement.34 
A second form of coordination is the approval or extension by the State of a cross-sec-
toral agreement. Employers’ and workers’ organizations have created joint and equally 
managed bipartite bodies that offer benefits to employees. Compulsory contributions 
must be made to finance these bodies or schemes and, in order to have the force of 
law, the agreements must either be approved by the Minister, or be the subject of an 
extension. 
34  This is significantly different from European Union practice: when a European Directive incorporates an agreement, 
it must adopt the exact wording of that agreement. 
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3.2.2 Robust activity during the crisis 
More than 25 agreements were signed between 2008 and 2015, excluding those on 
matters of procedure or the timing of meetings; the main ones are listed in table 4.4. 
Table 4.4  Significant national cross-sectoral collective agreements (ANI) (2008-15)
Date Topic CGT CFDT CGT-FO CFTC CFE-CGC
Management of employment by companies and the operation of the labour market
11/01/2008 Modernization of the labour market X X X X
11/01/2013 Enterprise competitiveness and 
providing employment security X X X
14/11/2008 Planned management of 
employment and skills X X
07/01/2009 Lifelong vocational training X X X X X
14/12/2013 Lifelong vocational training X X X X
Joint bodies
23/12/2008 Unemployment insurance X
25/03/2011 Unemployment insurance X X X X
23/03/2014 Unemployment insurance X X X
18/03/2011 Supplementary pensions X X X
13/03/2013 Supplementary pensions X X X
30/10/2015 Supplementary pensions X X X
12/07/2011 Employment of managers X X X X X
17/02/2012 Modernization of the system of joint management X X X
Labour policy instruments
15/12/2008 Compensation for partial unemployment X X X X
02/10/2009 Compensation for partial unemployment X X X X X
13/01/2012 Compensation for partial unemployment X X X X
06/02/2012 Long-term part-time work X X X X
23/12/2008 Conventions on personal re-classification X X X X
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Date Topic CGT CFDT CGT-FO CFTC CFE-CGC
31/05/2011 Contracts for employment security X X X X X
08/12/2014 Contracts for employment security X X X X X
07/04/2011
29/04/2011
07/06/2011
11/07/2011
Youth employment 
- Assistance to find work
- Access to housing
- Workplace training and internships
- Job retention
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
18/04/2012 Access to housing X X X X X
19/10/2012 Inter-generational contracts35 X X X X X
Working conditions
02/07/2008 Stress at work X X X X X
19/06/2013 Quality of life at work X X X
Note: X indicates that the trade union has signed an agreement. All agreements have been signed by the three employers’ 
organizations, with the exception of the ANI of 2013 on vocational training, which has not been signed by the CGPME.
Source: Annual assessments of collective bargaining.
35
The agreements can be divided into three main categories (Freyssinet, 2011; Pernot, 
2013; Schulze-Marmeling, 2013). 
i) Enterprise-level management of employment and labour market functioning
Two multidimensional, medium-term agreements have aimed to change the rules gov-
erning the functioning of the labour market. 
The first was the agreement of 11 January 2008 on the “modernization of the labour 
market,” which was not signed by the CGT. It combined mechanisms intended to 
improve employees’ mobility and to make career paths more secure (Fabre et al., 
2008; Freyssinet, 2007). Parliament transposed the agreement without making sig-
nificant changes. Although the agreement was reached just before the crisis started, 
it was implemented and completed in the early crisis period, in particular by means of 
two agreements, namely those of December 2008 on unemployment benefits, and of 
January 2009 on life-long vocational training. 
The second was signed five years later. In light of the crisis and persistent high unem-
ployment, the first agreement was supplemented and expanded by that of 11 January 
2013 on “the competitiveness of enterprises and employment security.” So as to bal-
ance the concessions made on either side, juxtaposed measures were implemented in 
several areas (Béthoux and Jobert, 2013; Freyssinet, 2013; Revue de droit du travail, 
2013; Turlan and Cette, 2013). In short, new individual and collective employees’ rights 
were recognized in exchange for extended freedoms for employers in the realm of 
employment management. The agreement was severely criticized by two trade unions, 
35  Under a law adopted on 12 December 2012, the “inter-generational contract” aims to encourage the hiring of young 
people on permanent contracts to work alongside an older person until the latter’s retirement. The Government 
provides some assistance to employers with less than 300 salaried workers. As well as increasing employment, this 
arrangement encourages skills and knowledge transfer between the different generations.
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the CGT and the CGT-FO. During discussion of the bill, the most left-wing branch of Par-
liament exerted considerable pressure, in some cases successfully, for the introduction 
of amendments to strengthen workers’ rights or restrict the extension of freedoms to 
employers (Act of 14 June 2013). As a result, employers’ organizations criticized Par-
liament for not respecting the terms of an agreement negotiated by the social partners. 
As in 2008, the State, employers’ and workers’ organizations respected the terms of 
the 2007 Act that defined their respective roles, but the final result was somewhat 
less satisfying from a social dialogue perspective. The agreement was rejected by two 
workers’ organizations representing almost half of all employees, and its incorporation 
into law was criticized by the employers’ organizations.
A complementary agreement on vocational training was signed on 14 December 2013 
by all employers’ organizations except for the General Confederation of Small- and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises (CGPME), and all trade unions except the CGT. 
ii) The financing and functioning of jointly managed bodies 
Agreements are regularly signed with the aim of assuring the sound management of 
several joint bodies and schemes created by employers’ and workers’ organizations. 
Such bodies exist in the area of vocational training; the rules governing their financing 
and functioning are established in the above agreements.
As a consequence of the economic crisis, the supplementary pension’s scheme was 
subject to difficult negotiations in 2011, 2013 and 2015. Compromises were reached 
by combining a slight increase in contributions, a considerable reduction in entitlement 
to benefits, and drawdowns from the pension scheme’s reserves (Besnard, 2011). 
The joint scheme hardest hit by the crisis was unemployment insurance, suffering a 
simultaneous dwindling of resources and an increase in costs. Agreements on unem-
ployment insurance are re-negotiated every two or three years. However, conflict 
often arises between trade unions demanding an increase in contributions so as to 
improve or at least maintain existing benefits, and employers demanding a reduction in 
expenses and refusing any increase in their contributions. In 2014, a compromise was 
reached – mainly by accepting an increase in the scheme’s debt.
Acknowledging the heterogeneity in the organizational forms of their joint institutions 
and the criticisms levelled about their management, the employers’ and the workers’ 
organizations signed an agreement on 17 February 2012 on “modernizing joint man-
agement,” which defined procedures for ensuring transparency in management and 
for evaluating results.
iii) Employment policy instruments
Some agreements create or broaden the mechanisms used for coping with the cri-
sis. They cover, in particular, compensation for partial unemployment, “contracts for 
increasing employment security” for employees who are made redundant, and meas-
ures aimed at helping young people find jobs. Because their purpose is to help those 
groups who are directly affected by the crisis, the content of these agreements is less 
controversial than that of other agreements. The five trade union organizations usu-
ally sign them; in the few cases where trade unions have refused to sign, it is usually 
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because they found the proposed measures insufficient, rather than questioning the 
underlying principle.
3.2.3. An asymmetric and ambiguous tripartite system
The coordination of Government action with collective bargaining has often been used 
to cope with the crisis. It would, however, be a mistake to view this as a manifestation 
of tripartite consensus. As the Government understands that it is in its own interest 
to use collective agreements to legitimize its actions, it does not just stand back and 
validate the results of negotiations. It proposes topics for negotiation, produces back-
ground documents, sets negotiation deadlines and is ready to take legislative action if 
negotiations fail.
In some areas, such as the tendency towards flexible work schedules, it has used the 
force of law, outside collective agreements or even in contradiction to them, to take 
measures that have the support of employers, but are opposed by trade unions. This 
was the case, for example, with the organization of working time (2008) and with 
evening or Sunday working (2009 and 2015). 
While employers’ organizations do not publicly disagree amongst themselves, save in 
exceptional cases, workers’ organizations do so, unequivocally and frequently. The 
two main Confederations differ markedly in this regard (see table 4.4). The CFDT has 
signed all agreements, while the CGT has signed only a handful. The other three trade 
unions considered representative at the cross-sectoral level have signed most of the 
agreements.36 
Hence, what is special in the French case is the close interconnection between 
cross-sectoral bargaining and public policy. On the one hand, the crisis widened cer-
tain differences between the social partners but, on the other, it increased the need 
for them to work together. Although no tripartite agreements were signed, this did not 
undermine the continuation of tripartite processes characterized by both conflict and 
cooperation, which led to various partial results in different legal forms. 
3.2.4. The case of pension reform
The 2007 Act on the modernization of social dialogue only covers matters that come 
under the Labour Code; it does not cover social protection. The pension reform gave 
rise to severe social conflict in 2010 (Palier, 2010; Freyssinet, 2012), but this was not 
the case when a new reform was introduced in 2014. 
The divisive reform process of 2010
Private sector employees have access to a scheme with clearly defined benefits. Pen-
sions are contingent upon previous earnings and the number of years of contributory 
36  The conditions under which a national cross-sectoral agreement (ANI) is valid have changed since 2013. 
–  Up to 2013, an ANI was considered valid from the moment it was signed by at least one representative trade 
union, provided that a majority of the representative trade unions (that is, three out of the five) did not oppose it. 
Only one minor national cross-sectoral agreement has been invalidated as a result of this procedure.
–  Since 2013, an ANI is considered valid only if the trade unions that are signatories to it have received at least 30 
per cent of votes in representativeness elections, and if trade unions receiving at least 50 per cent of the votes 
have not opposed it. To date, no national cross-sectoral agreements have been invalidated for this reason.
1194. SOCIAL DIALOGUE IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE IN FRANCE
payments. The onset of the crisis reduced the likelihood of future financial equilibrium, 
at least in the event that its impact would be long lasting. The process of reform began 
in April 2010, following its announcement in June 2009; and the Act was promulgated 
on 9 November 2010. While previous reforms gave priority to extending the period over 
which contributions had to be made for entitlement to a full pension, the 2010 reform 
raised the legal retirement age:
• The minimum age to qualify for a retirement pension was to go up in stages from 
60 to 62, between 2011 and 2018. 
• The age for entitlement to a “full pension” (with no reduction in the amount) was 
to increase progressively from 65 to 67, between 2016 and 2023.
This reform was driven by the desire for a rapid effect on the level of spending and 
had non-egalitarian consequences. The lengthening of the minimum contributory 
period barely affected those who started work very young (i.e. workers with few years 
of schooling), but particularly hit hard those who had gone on to higher education. By 
contrast, raising the retirement age has exactly the opposite effect, as workers with few 
qualifications have longer working lives and shorter life expectancy upon retirement.
The Minister of Labour organized bilateral consultations with employers’ and workers’ 
organizations. However, he refused to bring the social partners together, claiming that 
there was a risk of “trade unions overstepping the mark.” The trade unions unani-
mously opposed the reform, denouncing the “sham agreement” and the non-egalitarian 
reform, for which employees would bear 85 per cent of the cost. Between May and 
November 2010, they organized a series of large-scale demonstrations, but managed 
to obtain only minor amendments to the initial plan. 
The Government was probably satisfied with having demonstrated to international insti-
tutions and financial markets its willingness and ability to reduce the deficit, despite the 
level of social discontent that this generated. 
The “limited reform” of 2014
Upon his election, François Hollande was faced with an uncomfortable fact: the 2010 
reform had not been enough to re-establish a long-term financial equilibrium. Learning 
from the previous experience, he opted for a process that would provide sufficient 
time for extensive social dialogue. After hard efforts to reach a compromise solution, 
in 2014 a new reform was adopted, more limited in scope than that of 2010. Although 
neither of the social partners was completely satisfied, it did not lead to any hostile 
demonstrations. 
Unlike the 2010 reform that envisaged raising the retirement age, the 2014 reform 
reverted to the approach of earlier reforms: the length of time over which contributions 
were required in order to receive a full pension would rise progressively from 41 years 
and 9 months to 43 years by 2035. 
The most significant innovation was the creation of a “personal account for the preven-
tion of arduous conditions.” This took into account workers’ exposure, over the course 
of their working lives, to various factors contributing to arduous conditions. On this 
basis, each employee gained rights that he or she could use in three ways: to contrib-
ute towards the cost of vocational training, to compensate for a period of part-time work 
and to finance early retirement. 
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3 3 The role of social dialogue in the European Semester
The relationship between social dialogue at the European and the national level is para-
doxical (Pernot, 2014). European bodies are taking an increasingly forceful position on 
issues that are key to social dialogue in France – but national social dialogue does not 
make explicit reference to European recommendations. The national social partners 
only see links between the two levels in terms of information exchange and comparative 
analysis of problems and solutions. 
3.3.1. European recommendations on issues central to national social dialogue 
Institutional mechanisms established in response to the crisis resulted in direct inter-
ventions by the European Council and the European Commission regarding national 
economic and social policy choices in France. The recommendations are particularly 
restrictive for countries, which, like France, are subject to measures concerning their 
high public deficit. The deadlines set by the European bodies to reduce the deficit are 
determined by national commitments to carry out “structural reforms.” 
The recommendations adopted by the Council in this area focus principally on five 
issues: wage levels, social protection, labour legislation, active employment policy and 
life-long training. Although these issues are central to national social dialogue, there is 
very little interaction between national processes and the European Semester, where 
the Government negotiates its reform programme. 
3.3.2 Weak “top down” coordination
The European Commission, through its European Semester Officer (ESO), communi-
cates actively with the French social partners to keep them informed about European 
reports and recommendations. In so doing, it aims both to engender buy-in and to 
ensure commitment. The Commission acknowledges the limits of the process: there 
is no shared diagnosis. The trade unions believe that the macroeconomic policy rec-
ommendations of the European Union are prolonging the crisis. While some of the 
trade unions may be ready to discuss the “structural reforms”, they will do so only 
in the context of a broader active economic recovery policy. They will not allow the 
reforms to substitute for such a policy. From the trade union perspective, most of the 
European recommendations are aligned with employers’ demands while, for their part, 
the employers maintain either that the recommendations are too limited in scope or are 
implemented too slowly. 
The discussions during the Tripartite Social Summits and the Committee on Social 
Dialogue certainly have an indirect impact, insofar as they help shape the analyses of 
the social partners. It is, however, difficult to see any evidence of this in national social 
dialogue processes. 
3.3.3 Weak “bottom up” involvement
In 1998, a new consultative body was created in France, the Committee on Social 
Dialogue on European and International Issues (CDSEI). It brought together employers’ 
and workers’ organizations and the representatives of relevant ministries, with the Min-
ister of Labour as its chairperson. The social partners welcomed it as a useful source 
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of information and venue for them to express their views through an open dialogue. But 
they do not believe that the discussions within the CDSEI can influence the positions 
taken by the French Government in the European bodies.
In short, there is a clear link between the European authorities’ recommendations for 
France and the reforms introduced by successive French Governments. Nonetheless, 
in the context of national social dialogue, the Government appears to judge it as coun-
terproductive to justify its positions by reference to European recommendations; it has 
no wish to be seen as submitting to injunctions of the European authorities.
3 4 The role and impact of national social dialogue institutions 
Many consultative institutions have been created since the Second World War in 
response to varied needs, but they are lacking an overall coherence. 
The most significant of these, the Economic, Social and Environmental Council, has 
undertaken analysis of the impact of the crisis in many areas. It has traditionally sought 
to build broad consensus on uncontroversial issues and, to achieve this, its opinions 
are very carefully worded. Even though the quality of the Council’s reports is universally 
acknowledged, its opinions do not appear to have significant political impact. 
Various consultative bodies have expertise that could allow them to play an important 
role in social dialogue. Such is the case, for example, for the National Commission on 
Collective Bargaining, the National Council on Employment, Vocational Training and 
Orientation and the Advisory Council on Working Conditions. But, because there are so 
many of them and they tend to be somewhat routine in their operations, these institu-
tions have had only a minor influence on discussions around the crisis. 
There have nonetheless been exceptions: several bodies have undertaken multi-stake-
holder analyses of the impacts of the crisis. One such case is the Employment Advisory 
Council, created in 2005, which brings together representatives of the State (Parlia-
ment and the Government), local authorities, organizations of employers and workers 
as well as experts. Since 2008, it has been analyzing structural changes in employ-
ment linked to the crisis, taking into account international comparative experience. Its 
reports are not submitted to Council members for their explicit approval; nor do they 
commit the organizations or institutions they represent. However, the Council’s perma-
nent members do their utmost to ensure that their reports’ content will not give rise to 
significant objections by participants. Two other bodies that work along the same lines 
in specific areas are the Advisory Council on Retirement and the Senior Council on the 
Financing of Social Protection. 
These are examples of good practice. They allow the development of diagnoses and 
scenarios upon which all concerned parties agree to a great extent, and can serve as a 
shared point of reference during different discussions, particularly at the social confer-
ences and in inter-sectoral collective bargaining. 
4. Industrial relations and collective bargaining during the crisis
The development of collective bargaining during the crisis can only be properly under-
stood by recognizing the critical role played by the State (see section 4.1). Due in part 
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to pressure from the State, collective bargaining increased greatly (see section 4.2). 
Employers’ and workers’ organizations did not change significantly over the period (see 
section 4.3). 
4 1 The decisive role of the state in industrial relations
France has a tradition of strong State intervention in industrial relations. We have 
already addressed the State’s role in setting the agenda and schedule for cross-sectoral 
collective bargaining (see section 3.2, above). At the sectoral level, the State intervenes 
in two ways.
First, as is the tradition, the State extends collective agreements to cover all enterprises 
in the sector concerned. Less often, in those sectors not covered by collective bargain-
ing, the State extends to them collective agreements signed in similar sectors. 
Second, since 1982, bargaining has been made compulsory in several areas, such 
as wages (negotiations must take place every year), vocational training and appren-
ticeships (every three years), and professional classifications (every five years). The 
obligation to bargain collectively does not imply that an agreement must be reached, 
but it does create, perhaps somewhat artificially, a “bargaining dynamic”. 
These mechanisms help explain the fact that over 90 per cent of employees in France 
are covered by sectoral agreements, and this rate did not drop during the crisis years. 
4.1.1. Enterprise-level bargaining: incentives, obligations and sanctions
The trend towards the decentralization of bargaining to the enterprise level during the 
past few years cannot be directly attributed to the crisis (Pignoni and Raynaud, 2013). 
It is clear, however, that the massive and persistent imbalance in the labour market has 
been used to support the argument that the decentralization of bargaining is good for 
job creation. As a rule, company-level bargaining is initiated by employers who want 
to adjust the employment terms and conditions to local production and competition 
conditions. What is special about the French case is the way in which the State has 
encouraged this development through a combination of mechanisms (Naboulet, 2011 
and 2013; Jobert, 2013):
• The law makes it mandatory to open enterprise-level bargaining on certain 
issues.37 If negotiations fail, the enterprise may be required to present a plan 
of action on the issue in question. The agreement or plan is usually subject to 
certain requirements in terms of its content. If these are not met, the enterprise 
faces financial penalties.
• The State offers financial incentives (public assistance or exemption from social 
contributions) for agreements expected to have a positive effect on employment 
(for example, agreements on shorter working hours). 
• Derogations from the law are allowed in certain fields and within certain limits 
(regarding the organization of working time, for example), provided that they 
have been the subject of a collective agreement. 
37  As a rule, collective bargaining is compulsory only in enterprises with more than 50 employees and those with a trade 
union delegate. If a sector-level agreement on the same issue exists, this may in some cases exempt the enterprise 
from collective bargaining. 
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Since 2008, the first mechanism has been applied in various areas such as the employ-
ment of older workers, workplace equality between men and women, arduous working 
conditions and inter-generational contracts. The third mechanism was employed nota-
bly by the Act of 14 June 2013, deriving from the cross-sectoral agreement of 
11 January 2013, under which:
• Agreements on job retention make it possible, when an enterprise faces serious 
financial difficulties, to negotiate company-level agreements in which reduced 
salary and working time are accepted in exchange for employer commitments 
not to lay off staff for economic reasons. 
• Agreements on internal mobility broaden the scope for geographical and profes-
sional mobility within the company, as decided by the employer. 
• Agreements on collective redundancies make it possible to derogate from var-
ious legal provisions regarding procedures for managing redundancies and 
measures to support laid-off workers. 
Somewhat paradoxically, the law has become an instrument through which the State 
promotes decentralized bargaining. It serves to combat resistance on two fronts: by 
employers who do not wish to initiate collective bargaining in their enterprise, and by 
trade unions who are wedded to national level collective bargaining. The application of 
these methods has had a clear impact on the number of company-level agreements 
(see section 4.2) but entails two risks: first, the negotiation of repeated temporary 
agreements in order to access financial support, and second, the adoption of formal 
agreements aimed solely to avoid the imposition of fines. 
4.1.2. A wide-ranging reform process
Following the fourth social conference and initial consultations with employers’ and 
workers’ organizations, the Government presented its plans and schedule for a 
reform of collective bargaining on 4 November 2015 (Prime Minister’s Press Release, 
2015):
• The Labour Code will be redrafted within a two-year period, based on a dis-
tinction between, first, the fundamental rights enshrined in the Code, which 
determine the “public social order” (i.e. provisions from which collective agree-
ments cannot derogate); second, the areas covered by collective bargaining; 
and third, supplementary provisions which apply in the absence of a collective 
agreement. 
• Regarding collective bargaining, the number of branches must be reduced in 
stages from 700 to about 100. The regroupings will be determined voluntarily or, 
if this is not possible, decided by the State. 
• Branch-level agreements will establish a “public professional order” (i.e. pro-
visions from which enterprise-level agreements cannot derogate). As long as 
these provisions are respected, enterprise-level bargaining will be completely 
autonomous. 
• There will be increased recourse to workers mandated by representative trade 
unions in the branch concerned to enable collective bargaining in small enter-
prises that do not have trade union delegates
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4 2 A fragile development of collective bargaining 
Statistical data on collective bargaining provides information on the number of agree-
ments signed and the topics they cover (Ministry of Labour, 2008-15). They give no 
insights into the impact of the crisis on the content of these agreements. 
As indicated above (section 3.2.2), the number of cross-sectoral agreements has 
remained high. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the annual num-
ber of sectoral agreements concluded reached more than 1,300 between 2009 and 
2012; it then decreased to about 1,000 per year in 2013 and 2014. The number of 
company-level agreements increased from 27,000 in 2008 to 39,000 in 2013, before 
declining slightly to 37,000 in 2014 (provisional estimate). 
4 3 The stability of the representational structures 
The crisis did not bring about any significant changes in the structures for representation.
The representativeness of employers’ organizations will be measured for the first 
time in 2017, on the basis of the number of member enterprises. In the interim, the 
available data are not reliable because enterprises are frequently members of several 
organizations. The Movement of French Enterprises (MEDEF) is dominant among the 
cross-sectoral organizations; it heads the employers’ delegation at cross-sectoral nego-
tiations. The CGPME and Union of Professional Artisans (UPA) represent the interests 
of small- and medium-sized enterprises and of artisans, respectively. While the crisis 
may have widened certain divergences of interest between these different enterprise 
categories, it has strengthened their shared priority of securing an increase in labour 
market flexibility and a reduction of wage costs. 
Trade union density, which was more than 30 per cent just after the Second World 
War, has been declining ever since, albeit not consistently. Over the past ten years, 
it has remained stable at around 11 per cent. The rate in the public sector (of about 
20 per cent) is twice as high as that in the private sector (about 9 per cent). In 2013, 
for the first time, elections to measure the representativeness of trade unions covered 
all employees.38 Three trade union confederations remained dominant, gaining 69 per 
cent of all votes outside the civil service and 61 per cent of votes within the civil service 
(27 per cent and 23 per cent respectively for the CGT; 26 per cent and 19 per cent 
respectively for the French Democratic Federation of Labour (CFDT); and 16 per cent 
and 19 per cent respectively for the CGT-FO). Opinion polls indicate that there has 
been a slight drop in workers’ confidence in trade unions since the start of the crisis.39
One possible factor affecting these organizations is the growing influence of the views 
of the National Front on a small minority of members. Its nationalist and xenophobic 
discourse has a greater impact on the social groups who are victims of the crisis or 
feel threatened by globalization, intensified competition, open national borders and 
European economic integration. Faced with this threat, social dialogue should clearly 
demonstrate the capacity of political, economic and social actors to devise a plan to 
ensure that economic performance goes hand-in-hand with social inclusion.
38 Results for the civil service relate to 2014. 
39  In October 2015, 51 per cent of workers reported that they trusted trade unions to defend their interests, whereas the 
equivalent figure for May 2008 was 58 per cent (TNS Sofres Survey). 
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5. Conclusions
Inspired by the reflections made by Christian Welz and David Foden on the pre-condi-
tions for a revival of European social dialogue (Welz and Foden, 2015), some lessons 
may be drawn from the French experience. 
The economic crisis and the content of social dialogue
While it is difficult to establish any causal link between the onset of the crisis and devel-
opments in social dialogue since 2008, it is nonetheless possible to highlight some 
commonalities between these two processes. 
Between 2008 and 2015, there was an intensification of tripartite and bipartite social 
dialogue, as illustrated by the increased frequency of social summits and social confer-
ences, the growing number of national cross-sectoral agreements and the conclusion 
of enterprise-level agreements on new topics. Opinions differ, however, as to the qual-
ity of this dialogue and its outcomes. In the eyes of some, the depth of the crisis 
provided a favorable environment for the emergence of innovative solutions regarding 
both the methods of negotiation and the content of agreements. The State supported 
these developments. A new generation of “win-win” agreements articulated the twin 
objectives of re-establishing competitiveness and job security. Others consider that, 
after a brief period in which consensus was reached on an economic recovery policy, 
governments began giving priority to budgetary austerity, while employers prioritized 
lower payroll costs; together, these developments deprived social dialogue of the ele-
ments necessary to reach balanced agreements. Social dialogue came to focus on 
how to manage the sacrifices demanded in the name of the economic crisis. Per-
sistently high unemployment and the absence of a robust economic recovery did 
not create the conditions for building consensus about future objectives and forms 
of action.
On the other hand, the seriousness of the problems caused by the crisis stimulated 
the activity of tripartite bodies whose main role was to produce shared diagnoses 
and develop alternative scenarios. At these venues, dialogue was facilitated because 
the State was not represented by politicians but by senior civil servants whose com-
petence and ethics were known and respected by everyone present. The purpose 
of these bodies is not to negotiate or develop proposals based on the opinion of the 
majority, but rather to build a broadly shared framework, on the basis of which each 
party can then elaborate its specific position. 
The autonomy of the social partners
A number of European countries have drawn a clear and stable boundary between, 
on the one hand, tripartite social dialogue in which the State organizes the consulta-
tion and concertation process and, on the other, bipartite social dialogue in which the 
social partners conduct autonomous negotiations. In France, this boundary is not so 
marked and can shift over time. We describe this as asymmetric and ambiguous tri-
partism. This is apparent as much in the drafting of laws, with frequent prior recourse 
to cross-sectoral agreements, as in collective bargaining, with its multiple forms of 
State intervention – whether based on incentives or restrictions. 
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During the crisis, the degree of overlap between bipartite and tripartite processes 
increased, leading to heightened dissatisfaction among employers’ and workers’ organ-
izations that wanted their autonomy. However, the crisis also raised tensions between 
the social partners. True to their tradition, either one or the other was tempted to turn 
to the State whenever they thought it was in their best interests to do so. Overall, the 
crisis reduced the autonomy of the social partner’s vis-à-vis the State, contrary to their 
declared intentions. Yet, at the same time, it rendered the State increasingly depend-
ent on the legitimacy it derived from basing its policy decisions on cross-sectoral 
collective agreements. 
The representativeness and legitimacy of the social partners
Trade union density in France is extremely low; trade union representativeness is there-
fore measured by the results of their elections, which have changed very little since 
2008. Trade union legitimacy is harder to gauge. Opinion polls among workers show 
that union legitimacy declined somewhat during the crisis years. Trade unions believe 
that their legitimacy can also be measured by their capacity to mobilize and/or to 
secure concrete benefits for workers. In the context of the crisis, their approach has 
been largely defensive. In this respect, although very few workers sign up to join trade 
unions, the majority still believe that unions are necessary for worker protection.
The situation for employers’ organizations is unclear. Despite having a large mem-
bership, employers join mainly to access the benefits offered by these organizations. 
Numerous studies show that member enterprises are often indifferent to, or even obliv-
ious of, the positions taken by their organizations on various issues. But there is no 
indication that their representativeness is being called into question. 
Under these conditions, national social dialogue, whether tripartite or bipartite, has rep-
resented a way for employers’ and workers’ organizations to demonstrate their capacity 
to take the initiative and exert an influence on social policy in a time of crisis. 
The European Semester and social dialogue
The relationship between social dialogue at the European and the national level is 
somewhat paradoxical. France receives stringent recommendations from the European 
Council on issues that are central to social dialogue, such as wages, the labour mar-
ket and social protection; and these recommendations have without doubt influenced 
public policy in the past few years. Yet, there is no explicit link with the national social 
dialogue agenda. None of the actors concerned wishes to draw attention to what might 
be seen as a loss of autonomy for national social dialogue. 
Post-script
Important developments have occurred in France since the finalization of the country 
chapter. This post-script provides a brief update on developments up to September 
2016.
On 17 February 2016, a bill to overhaul France’s labour laws was made public; it 
received the backing of the two main employers’ organizations but was unanimously 
rejected by the trade unions. Following bilateral consultations, the Government adopted 
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a significantly modified bill on 24 March. The three employers’ organizations criticized 
the “pull-backs” by the Government, which aimed, in their eyes, to appease the trade 
unions. Two of the trade unions (CGT and CGT-FO) continued to demand the total 
withdrawal of the text and organized numerous country-wide protests and demon-
strations against it, involving also various student organizations. The three other trade 
unions (CFDT, the French Confederation of Christian Workers (CFTC) and the French 
Confederation of Managerial Staff – General Confederation of Managers (CFE-CGC), 
although supporting the revisions introduced by the Government, continued to demand 
other amendments that they sought to have adopted during the parliamentary debate 
in the spring of 2016. The parliamentary examination of the bill thus took place against 
a backdrop of profound disagreements between the social partners and conflicting 
criticisms of the legal text. Various new amendments were introduced; but the CFE-
CGC did not consider these adequate, and thereafter joined the opponents of the law.
The law that was finally promulgated on 9 August 2016 (“Law on work, modernization 
of social dialogue and security of workers’ career paths”) was extremely complex, cov-
ering many issues beyond collective bargaining. In so doing, the Government no doubt 
hoped to offer each side gains in certain areas that would lead them to accept losses 
in other areas. But in fact, it gave rise to multiple complaints from the employers’ side 
as well as from the majority of trade unions.
To demonstrate their dissatisfaction, the employers’ organizations refused to grant 
any concessions during negotiations on the renewal of the unemployment insurance 
agreement, which were ongoing at the time of the parliamentary debate on the bill. In 
consequence, these negotiations failed, leading to unanimous protests by the trade 
unions. The Government was obliged to extend the validity of the 2014 agreement 
(see section 3.2.4) until negotiations could be re-launched and a new agreement 
reached. 
It is still too early to assess the lasting impact of this breakdown in tripartite and bipartite 
social dialogue. The situation is unlikely to change before the presidential and parlia-
mentary elections in the spring of 2017. It will be a matter for the new political majority 
to define its strategy regarding a possible revival of social dialogue in the future. 
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Marie-Claire Carrère-Gee, Chairperson of the Employment Policy Council, former Social 
Councillor and then Deputy Secretary-General of the French Presidency
Jean-Denis Combrexelle, Chair of the Social Section of the State Council, former Direc-
tor-General of Labour from 2006 to 2014 (Ministry of Labour)
Yves Struillou, Director General of Labour (Ministry of Labour) since 2014 
Employers’ Organizations
Pierre Burban, Secretary General of the UPA
Jean-François Pilliard, Vice President of MEDEF in charge of social affairs 
Jean-Michel Potier, Vice President of the CGPME, member of the Economic, Social and 
Environmental Council
Workers’ Organizations
Maryse Dumas, Confederate Councillor of the CGT, member of the Economic, Social 
and Environmental Council 
Marylise Léon, National Secretary of the CFDT, in charge of social dialogue
Jean-Claude Mailly, Secretary General of the CGT-FO
Others
Guillaume Roty, Economic Attaché, EC Representation (European Semester Officer)
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5.  Working together: Germany’s 
response to the global economic 
and financial crisis
hagen lesch and sandra VOgel
1. Introduction 
The German labour market emerged relatively unscathed from the crisis triggered by 
the collapse of the American investment bank Lehmann Brothers in the summer of 
2008. As early as October 2010, Ms Ursula von der Leyen (Christian Democratic Union, 
CDU), then Federal Minister for Labour and Social Affairs, announced that unemploy-
ment had fallen below three million from a high of nearly five million in 2005. The news 
magazine Spiegel Online referred to a German “jobs miracle” (Spiegel Online, 2010). 
During the early years of the new millennium, after years of sluggish growth and high 
unemployment, the German Federal Government implemented a series of controversial 
labour market reforms. What became known as ‘Agenda 2010’, introduced by the then 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (Social Democratic Party, SPD) in March 2003, com-
prised several reform packages that were meant to free the German labour market from 
its rigidities and stimulate economic growth and employment (Goecke et al., 2013). In 
addition, employers and unions started to modernize the collective bargaining system 
to allow for greater flexibility. The economy was thriving when the global financial crisis 
hit Germany in 2008.
Whilst no national tripartite social dialogue institution exists in Germany, the social 
partners were nonetheless involved in 2008 and 2009 in debating the immediate cri-
sis measures and policy responses. Germany has a long tradition of free collective 
bargaining and strong social partner organizations. Apart from the national minimum 
wage, wage setting in Germany is usually bipartite, especially when it comes to nego-
tiating collective (wage) agreements. The State grants collective bargaining autonomy 
to both sides of industry. In addition, formal and informal channels exist to involve the 
social partners, for example in times of severe economic crisis. After the bankruptcy 
of Lehmann Brothers, German GDP growth slowed dramatically. Ad hoc meetings, 
whether the so-called ‘crisis summits’ at the Federal Chancellery or bipartite or tripar-
tite discussions with the relevant federal ministries, were used to present and discuss 
the social partners’ views on appropriate crisis responses. Such meetings had already 
taken place before the crisis and have continued since.
This ad hoc dialogue during the crisis was efficient, suggesting that such an approach 
not only worked at that particular juncture, but also represents a basis for an equally 
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successful response to any future crisis. The social partners’ and Government repre-
sentatives who were interviewed for this study do not consider that new institutional 
forms, such as a national social dialogue institution, are necessary. However, formal 
social dialogue structures on a regional basis have been established. Brandenburg was 
the first state to introduce such a structure in 2011, although the idea was born much 
earlier. Sector-level dialogue structures focusing on economic issues also exist.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the macroeconomic and polit-
ical context of the crisis. Against this background, section 3 describes the role of the 
State and the social partners in managing the crisis. Section 4 continues with a short 
overview of the development of industrial relations and wage bargaining and highlights 
the new role of the Government, due to two major reforms of the collective bargaining 
framework. The chapter ends with some main conclusions.
2. The macroeconomic and political context
2 1 Macroeconomic context 
When the global financial crisis hit, the German economy was in good shape. In 2008, 
the German deficit was moderate, GDP growth was positive and the trade balance 
showed a surplus of 153.1 billion Euros. By 2009-10, economic performance had 
worsened: GDP declined by 5.6 per cent in 2009, and the annual deficit increased 
dramatically to 108.9 billion Euros in 2010. The trade balance decreased by nearly 
32 billion between 2008 and 2009, while gross debt climbed substantially between 
2008 and 2012.
Table 5.1  Germany’s annual Government budget deficit/surplus, GDP growth, 
trade balance, and gross debt 
Year Government deficit (–) or 
surplus (+) in billion Euros
Annual GDP 
growth in %
Trade surplus  
in billion Euros
Gross debt  
in billion Euros
2008 -4.5 0.8 153.1 1,666.2
2009 -79.6 -5.6 121.5 1,783.7
2010 -108.9 3.9 134.1 2,090.0
2011 -25.9 3.7 132.1 2,118.5
2012 -2.4 0.6 167.7 2,195.8
2013 -3.1 0.4 169.4 2,181.9
2014 8.9 1.6 196.4 2,184.3
2015 16.4 1.7 236.9 2,158.5
2015: preliminary figures
Sources: Destatis (2016); European Commission (2016).
Nonetheless, the rapid and effective consolidation measures taken helped minimize 
the negative impact of the crisis – and they had already started to reverse its effects 
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by the 2010-11 period. GDP at first recovered well, then stagnated in 2012 and 2013, 
and picked up again in 2014. The foreign trade surplus started to grow again in 2010, 
reaching 236.9 billion Euros by 2015, much higher than its pre-crisis level. From 2012 
onwards, the annual deficit decreased rapidly and moved into surplus in 2014. German 
gross debt remains significantly higher than its pre-crisis levels, but has been relatively 
stable since 2010.
Overall, Germany was hit hard by the financial crisis, but was able to stabilize its eco-
nomic performance quickly due to sound policy choices and consolidation measures. 
Indeed, Germany was characterized by wage moderation at that time, which was often 
criticized as “beggar-thy-neighbour-policy”. However, wage moderation helped to sta-
bilize employment levels – and thereby purchasing power. In this way, the demand for 
goods and services from abroad was maintained.
2 2 Labour market context 
Despite the crisis, Germany’s labour market remained stable. Between 2008 and 2015 
the harmonized unemployment rate in Germany decreased by 2.9 percentage points 
(see table 5.2) and, overall, the reduction was greater for women than for men. Even 
at the height of the crisis in 2009, the labour market suffered only a minimal negative 
impact, with total unemployment rising by 0.2 points from 7.6 per cent in 2008 to 
7.8 per cent in 2009. In 2010, the trend was reversed and unemployment started to 
decline again. In 2015, overall unemployment was 4.7 per cent, while the rates for men 
and women were 5.1 per cent and 4.3 per cent, respectively. At 7.2 per cent, youth 
unemployment is clearly higher than in the other age groups. 
At present, Germany is enjoying the lowest unemployment rates since its reunification 
in 1990. 
Table 5.2 Unemployment rates by sex and age in Germany (%)
2008
Total Youth (15-24) Prime age (25-54) Older population (55-64)
Total 7.6 10.4 7.0 8.5
Male 7.5 10.7 6.9 8.1
Female 7.7 10.0 7.2 8.9
2015
Total Youth (15-24) Prime Age (25-54) Older population (55-64)
Total 4.7 7.2 4.4 4.7
Male 5.1 7.9 4.7 5.2
Female 4.3 6.5 4.0 4.1
Source: OECD (2010; 2015a).
134 TALKING THROUGH THE CRISIS | SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS TRENDS IN SELECTED EU COUNTRIES
The financial crisis had no effect on the collectively agreed weekly working time in 
Germany (37.7 working hours per week). The slight decrease registered in effective 
working hours between 2008 and 2014 (from 29.9 to 29.5 hours per week) was due 
to an increase in part-time work. Effective full-time working hours have remained a 
constant 38 or so hours per week.
2 3 Political context 
From the turn of the millennium, the German Federal Government started working 
through a set of controversial labour market reforms. The 1990s had been charac-
terized by sluggish growth and high unemployment. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
(SPD), who had been leading a coalition Government comprising the SPD and the 
Green Party since 1998, introduced a set of reforms known as the ‘Agenda 2010’ – 
which aimed at freeing the labour market from its rigidities and stimulating economic 
growth and employment (Goecke et al., 2013). 
The reforms deregulated temporary agency work, revised marginal employment reg-
ulations and raised the earnings thresholds up to which the so-called “mini-jobbers” 
and their employers paid reduced social security contributions (Goecke et al., 2013). 
The statutory pension age was raised from 65 to 67 years. 
Statutory unemployment and welfare systems were restructured. Unemployment and 
social assistance were merged and renamed Unemployment Benefit II (UB II), for 
which beneficiaries were means-tested. Stricter rules requiring both UB I (statutory 
unemployment insurance) and UB II recipients to take up work and cooperate with 
the local employment agency, along with other measures, caused a series of protests 
and demonstrations in 2004 (Dribbusch, 2004; Vogel, 2012). Among others, Busch 
and Hirschel (2011) have criticized these reforms and the induced wage restriction for 
distorting price-competition in the Eurozone. They claim that these reforms led to a rise 
in current account surpluses in Germany and high current account deficits in other 
European countries.
In November 2005, the first of three consecutive Merkel administrations came to 
power. The first was a coalition of the SPD, the CDU and the Bavarian CSU; the sec-
ond, in 2009, a coalition of the CDU and the Liberal Party (FDP); and the third, in 
2013, once again the grand coalition of the CDU/CSU and SPD. 
Thus, by autumn 2008, the German labour market and social welfare systems had 
already undergone major reforms. When the crisis hit, the Federal Chancellery invited 
unions, employers and other actors to participate in ‘crisis summits’ and other meet-
ings throughout the autumn and winter of 2008-09, to analyse the situation and 
develop a crisis strategy. As noted by one expert, these meetings were characterized 
by constructive cooperation. There were neither recriminations nor demands. Rather, 
it was agreed that the crisis was not “homemade” and that an effective response 
required a structured approach and mutual effort. This approach was key to winning 
the trust of the population as well as of the social partners. 
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3. The role of social dialogue in policy-making
3 1 Industrial relations and social partnership in Germany
National tripartite social dialogue is not institutionalized in Germany; industrial relations 
and social partnership are mainly bipartite. The Basic Law stipulates freedom of asso-
ciation, from which the constitution of employers’ and workers’ organizations is derived. 
The Collective Bargaining Act provides the legal framework for collective agreements. A 
specific feature of the industrial relations system is that it is not rooted in legislation but 
laid down in contracts and mutual agreements between the main actors: employers’ 
associations, trade unions and works councils (Dustmann, et al. 2014). 
The Works Constitution Act regulates the interaction between management and 
employee representatives at the enterprise level. Works councils can be set up in all 
establishments with at least five employees. Their members do not need to be union 
members, although this is often the case in practice (Stettes, 2015). 
Works councils have co-determination rights, e.g. concerning working time and the 
merging or splitting of organizational units, as well as further information and consulta-
tion rights. Management and works councils can conclude voluntary works agreements 
at the enterprise level on all issues that are not covered by collective bargaining (unless 
the collective agreement opens up the bargaining option for works councils). Unions 
negotiate either with management at the enterprise level or with sectoral employers’ 
organizations, mostly at the regional level, to conclude single- or multi-employer col-
lective agreements. Most often, trade unions and employers’ associations conclude 
sector-based collective agreements, which may apply across several regions or differ 
slightly from region to region.
Nonetheless, tripartite mechanisms are not unknown.40 The interaction of the Federal 
Government and the social partners in 2008 and 2009 represents one of Germany’s 
most successful instances of tripartite coordination and crisis management.
3 2 Crisis management: An invitation from the Chancellor (2008-10)
The Federal Government created several rescue and other packages to limit the nega-
tive impact of the crisis. Immediate action was necessary, and it required the concerted 
efforts of all concerned. Measures to fight the crisis were coordinated at the Federal 
Chancellery.41 The Chancellor’s Office set the overall guidelines and coordinated the 
federal ministries, while each minister was responsible for his or her own policy area. 
Policy responses were mainly drafted under the leadership of the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Affairs (BMWi) and the Federal Ministry of Finance. 
40  The governing boards of Germany’s statutory social security insurance funds include representatives of the 
Government as well as of both sides of industry. There are a number of other examples in Germany’s post-war 
history. The so-called Concerted Action (Konzertierte Aktion) was set up in 1967 to coordinate public, employers’ 
and unions’ interests in a joint wage policy and with respect to other macroeconomic issues. This failed as the 
agreements were informal and non-binding, and the unions were largely unable to convince their members of the 
benefits of a non-inflationary wage policy. The “Alliance for Jobs” (Bündnis für Arbeit) was initiated in 1998 to deal 
with high unemployment; this initiative also failed at the national level due to the inability of the social partners 
to reach agreement on fundamental structural questions. An Alliance for Vocational Training and Further Training 
became tripartite in late 2014, when the German Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB) joined a pre-existing alliance 
of employers’ associations, Government and other civil society representatives.
41  Interview with Ms Rose Langer on 3 September 2015 (currently at the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
(BMAS), Ms Langer formerly worked at the Federal Chancellery).
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Apart from immediate crisis measures to rescue the banking sector, it was recognized 
that additional measures were required (BMWi, 2008). The Federal Chancellery organ-
ized the first economic crisis summit on 14 December 2008. Twenty-six representatives 
from federal ministries, employers’ organizations, unions, companies and financial 
institutions took part (Wirtschaftswoche, 2008). The summit debated possible meas-
ures to boost the economy and private consumption, and to safeguard employment. It 
paved the way for decisions taken in January 2009, when the ruling coalition parties 
met to determine the second rescue package. Informal bipartite or tripartite meetings 
were also held at the operational level of the federal ministries throughout the autumn 
and winter of 2008-09. 
The first rescue package, agreed in November 2008, was entitled “Securing jobs by 
enhancing growth.” Amongst other measures, it included an extension of the regular 
entitlement period for the short-time working allowance granted for economic reasons 
from 12 to 18 months. Tax reliefs and additional investments were introduced to stimu-
late private consumption and economic growth (Zagelmeyer, 2010). The second rescue 
package, the “Pact for employment and stability” (January 2009), further extended the 
entitlement period for the working allowance to 24 months. Employers were reimbursed 
for half the social security contributions they paid for their short-time workers, or a full 
refund if the workers received training during non-working hours. A “wrecking pre-
mium” was introduced to raise demand for private cars.42 The ‘Germany Business Fund’ 
(Wirtschaftsfonds Deutschland), was set up with 115 billion Euros to be used for loans 
or loan guarantees in 2009 and 2010. Other measures included investment in public 
facilities, active labour market instruments, research and development, and simplified 
public procurement procedures. Germany thus hoped to stimulate growth through the 
rescue packages, with the long-term aim of consolidating its public finances.
The Federal Government and its ministries agreed at an early stage that all measures 
must be administered in a fiscally responsible way (BMWi, 2008). New rules on public 
debt were introduced in 2009: under section 109 of the Basic Law, national and state 
governments had to balance their budgets with a strict limit on new debt.43 
3 3 Interlinking the sectoral with the federal level
The metalworking and electrical industry illustrates to what extent the sectoral level 
is linked to federal crisis management measures. Social dialogue and collective bar-
gaining in this sector are usually bipartite. The Federation of German Employers’ 
Associations in the Metal and Electrical Engineering Industries (Gesamtmetall) is the 
umbrella employers’ organization, while the German Metalworkers’ Union (IG Metall) 
and its regional branches represent employees. 
In the autumn of 2008, two parallel developments emerged: the first was the upcoming 
wage bargaining round, and the second was the spreading symptoms of the crisis. In 
September, IG Metall tabled a wage claim of 8 per cent for twelve months – and it was 
42  A premium of 2,500 Euros was paid when a car nine years old or older was scrapped and a new environment-friendly 
car bought and registered by the end of 2009.
43  The rule is that from 2016 onwards, new debt at the federal level – and from 2020 onwards, new debt at the state 
level – may not exceed 0.35 per cent of Germany’s annual GDP. An exception to the new rule is made for emergency 
cases, such as a deep economic recession or a natural catastrophe. The National Government and the Federal States 
can adopt special rules for such situations.
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prepared to go on strike to enforce this demand. Employers considered this exceptionally 
high. However, once the crisis broke, both sides rapidly understood its potential impact 
and switched from “confrontational” to “problem-solving” mode. The sector suffered a 
decline in orders of up to 80 per cent; but Gesamtmetall and IG Metall rapidly agreed 
that this drop was of a cyclical nature, and that the industry was in good shape and 
did not need restructuring. They agreed that safeguarding employment, at affordable 
costs for companies, was the paramount task ahead. Retaining skilled labour was key 
to remaining competitive and profiting from an improved order situation in due course.
The social partners took only two months to negotiate a new agreement, with a sig-
nificantly lower wage rise than the union had initially demanded. At first, the union 
members criticized the agreement – but as the extent of the crisis became obvious, 
they stopped their complaints. In December 2008, IG Metall adopted a seven-point 
programme to safeguard employment, which included the use of short-time work, 
although they insisted that it should be combined with training measures and be 
affordable for small and medium-sized enterprises. The proposals were coordinated 
with the employers in early 2009, and once a common position was reached, discus-
sions were held with the Federal Government. In particular, they requested earmarked 
subsidies to reduce companies’ residual costs for short-time work.
The next collective bargaining round in February 2010 was influenced even more by 
the crisis. The social partners agreed to exploit all the options available, which included 
opening clauses, a reduction of credits on working time accounts, and an overtime ban. 
The main strategy was to reduce working time and wage costs, as was made possible 
by a collective agreement on safeguarding employment adopted in 1994. Gesamtmetall 
pointed out that, under the statutory version of the “short-time working allowances due 
to economic reasons”, the entitlement period was too short and employers were still 
liable to pay wages and social security contributions for hours worked. 
In conclusion, tripartite consultations such as the crisis summits were held to facilitate 
adaptation of the legal framework. The social partners then concluded collective agree-
ments on short-time work, training and employment in Baden-Wurttemberg, and the 
‘Future in Work’ agreement for all other bargaining regions. A new voluntary option on 
short-time work was also introduced, which made longer entitlement periods possible 
and stipulated certain rules and safeguards (Kraemer, 2010).
The steps taken by IG Metall and Gesamtmetall illustrate well the inner workings of the 
social partnership. At first, each side developed its own analysis and then, in a second 
step, the employers and the union worked out a mutual strategy and cooperated with 
the Government to build a common approach to the crisis. The interviews held with 
IG Metall and Gesamtmetall representatives (see appendix) made it clear that mutual 
trust, the ability to work through conflicts as well as to cooperate and find common 
ground, are all essential to successful social partnership. 
3 4 Post-crisis developments
Germany did not set up a national social dialogue forum after the crisis years of 2008-10; 
neither were the meetings in the Federal Chancellery institutionalized – although infor-
mal meetings still take place. Stakeholders continue to express full trust in the German 
institutions of co-determination; bipartite arrangements between the social partners that 
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can be extended to include the Federal Government; and informal tripartite meetings 
that may be convened according to need. According to the Federal Government’s rep-
resentatives, the social partners are closely involved in the European Semester through 
a regular exchange of views and positions. As Eurofound research shows, the formal 
involvement of German social partners in the European Semester is a given, ‘with con-
sultation taking place in a regular, predictable and balanced way’ (Eurofound, 2016). 
However, while employers such as the German Confederation of Employers’ Associa-
tions (BDA) are more favourable to the European Semester, as a mechanism to monitor 
macroeconomic indicators and imbalances (BDA, 2014), the German Confederation of 
Trade Unions (DGB) is much more critical of it (DGB, 2013). The DGB claims that the 
procedure promotes too much austerity at the expense of other goals such as social 
cohesion or poverty reduction. As Eurofound’s research indicates, the DGB criticizes 
the fact that there was not enough time to debate the National Reform Programmes 
(NRP) internally and to formulate responses; neither do they feel that their views would 
have had any impact on the NRP (Eurofound, 2016). Finally, the BDA and DGB agree 
that the European level should not interfere with the national right to collective bargain-
ing autonomy, especially with regard to wage setting.
Apart from the European Semester, new developments with regard to social partner-
ship have occurred at the state level. In 2011, the State of Brandenburg in eastern 
Germany introduced a standing social dialogue committee, the first of its kind in the 
country. Although the 2008-09 crisis was only one of the factors leading to the for-
mation of tripartite dialogue, it did raise the question as to the role the social partners 
might play in a stable economic climate – and not only during a crisis. Since German 
reunification, the number of companies in eastern Germany that do not want to be 
covered by collective agreements has grown, with the result that collective bargaining 
coverage in Brandenburg today is low in comparison to western German states. This 
has contributed to lower wage levels. Demographic transition, the increasingly urgent 
need to secure skilled labour, and a wish to enhance the image of Brandenburg as a 
place to live and work, have all provided a stimulus for the initiation of social dialogue. 
Since 2011, the dialogue has been held twice a year (box 5.1). 
A number of financial incentives are available, using ESF funds to support relevant 
projects at either the company (co-determination) or the sectoral (pioneering collec-
tive agreements) level. The State Government embedded the dialogue in its coalition 
agreement of 2014.
Social dialogue in Brandenburg is limited to the regional level, but it still has strong links 
to the capital. These ties have been strengthened by several joint activities. Other states 
are interested in replicating the Brandenburg model because of its formal structure, its 
resources and its active programme. 
4.  Industrial relations and collective bargaining  
in the post-crisis period 
4 1 Impact of the crisis on collective bargaining and post-crisis developments 
In Germany, the Government and the social partners identified the economic 
crisis as being cyclical rather than structural; as a consequence, no structural 
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Box 5.1 Social dialogue in the Federal State of Brandenburg
In 2011, Brandenburg established Germany’s first formal social partner dialogue at state 
level  Employer and employee representatives signed the “Declaration on Strengthen-
ing Social Partnership” jointly with Brandenburg’s Ministry of Labour (MASGF)  The 
Brandenburg State Government embedded the dialogue in its coalition agreement 
in 2014 
The 2008/09 experience had raised the question as to the role the social partners 
might play in a stable economic climate, and not only during times of crisis  Branden-
burg had already suffered a profound crisis after German reunification in 1991, when 
Communist East Germany’s centrally-planned economy gave way to the social market 
economy and its institutions (Collective Bargaining Act, Works Constitution Act, Free-
dom of Association Act, etc ) 
From the 1990s onwards, the number of companies in eastern Germany withdrawing 
from collective agreements increased, meaning that collective bargaining coverage in 
Brandenburg was low compared to states in western Germany  By 2011, the aware-
ness of social partnership and collective bargaining coverage was limited  Demographic 
transition and the need to secure skilled labour – alongside the wish to enhance the 
attractiveness of Brandenburg as a place to live and work – were factors that encour-
aged the Ministry of Labour to work systematically on the issue of social partnership; it 
found both employers and unions very interested in this approach  
Since 2011, the Brandenburg social partner dialogue has been held twice a year, 
bringing together the heads of the DGB, the regional employers’ organization for 
Brandenburg-Berlin (UVB), and the collective bargaining partners for the metalworking 
and electrical, chemicals, hotel and catering, construction and retail sectors  While 
the Ministry of Labour moderates the dialogue, all participants are equally entitled to 
propose topics for discussion  These have included the reconciliation of family and 
working life, an age-appropriate working environment, and vocational training and pay  
In addition, works council conferences, workshops and symposiums have been organ-
ized  Social partnership has also gained in importance as a result of the cooperation 
between the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry for Economic Affairs  
Financial incentives are also available  Projects are supported at the sectoral level with 
funding from the European Social Fund (ESF), as part of Brandenburg’s unique social 
partnership guidelines  To be eligible, projects must contribute to improved work organ-
ization and to an effective social partnership either at the company or the sectoral level 
The dialogue has resulted in a constructive and trusting atmosphere for talks between 
the Government and the social partners in Brandenburg  An example of its impact has 
been the changing perceptions of the Minister of Labour’s ability to declare regional col-
lective agreements generally binding and to extend them to a whole sector  Employers 
long held a dim view of this option but, according to the Ministry, they now acknowledge 
more openly that it has prevented unfair competition – and that collective agreements 
offer a reliable and secure framework for future planning  Enacted in 2014, the Act 
to Strengthen the Autonomy of Collecting Bargaining has revised the legal basis for 
extending the coverage of collective agreement; Brandenburg first wants to take a 
closer look at how the newly designed instrument can be used, in consultation with the 
social partners  
Source: Interview with Mrs Friederike Haase (Head of Department, Ministry of Labour, Brandenburg)  
on 21 August 2015.
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reforms were implemented. Labour market reforms had already been undertaken 
before the crisis started. 
Following the 1992-93 recession, it was widely acknowledged that the wage bargaining 
system needed to become more flexible. In essence, the debate was about the intro-
duction of the opening clauses and reform of the “favourability principle” laid down in 
the Collective Agreements Act.44 When many trade unions tried to prevent opt-outs, 
employers reacted by replacing sectoral collective agreements by individual agree-
ments. As a result, collective bargaining coverage declined over the last two decades 
(figure 5.1). Current coverage of industry-wide agreements stands at 53 per cent of 
employees in western Germany and 36 per cent in eastern Germany. The share of 
employees working in establishments governed by firm-level agreements has remained 
more or less stable at a rather low level – currently 7 per cent in western and 11 per 
cent in eastern Germany. By 2014, the proportion of establishments bound by a col-
lective agreement, at either sector or company level, had fallen to 33 per cent and 20 
per cent in western and eastern Germany, respectively.
The crisis does not appear to have had an impact on trends in collective bargaining 
in either the eastern or western parts of the country. It was not the crisis that induced 
the erosion of collective bargaining coverage; this had started for other reasons some 
years earlier. 
44  According to this principle, deviations from sector-level collective agreements are permitted only if they are in favour 
of the employee, or are legalized by a collectively-agreed opening clause.
Figure 5.1 Collective bargaining coverage in Germany (%), 1995-2014
Source: IAB (2015b).
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After German reunification, there was a sharp decrease in the net density rate in 
eastern Germany; thereafter, the downward trend continued with the rate falling from 
27.1 per cent in 1994 to 17.5 per cent in 2014 (Biebeler and Lesch, 2015). In conse-
quence, trade unions have little power to enforce collective agreements, especially in 
some service sectors. 
One strategy adopted by the unions to stop the erosion of collective bargaining cover-
age was concession bargaining. Through so-called company-level “alliances for jobs”, 
the union side accepted certain concessions on condition that redundancies would 
be avoided or kept to a minimum. When the crisis set in, the social partners used all 
kinds of opening clauses, especially those enabling a reduction in the weekly working 
time. Flexible labour arrangements made it possible to reduce positive balances on 
working time accounts. These and other measures – such as a heavy use of short-
time work – enabled firms to retain much more of their workforce.
Since the crisis, the focus of collective bargaining has changed. While in 2010 the 
unions aimed to prevent mass layoffs, they have subsequently reverted to higher wage 
demands. This wage expansion has influenced unit labour costs; having been largely 
constant between 2000 and 2007, nominal real unit labour costs have increased by 
17 per cent thereafter. The phase of employment-oriented wage policy, which began in 
the mid-1990s, effectively ended along with the end of the crisis. 
Since 2010, employees’ real purchasing power has increased significantly. Critics 
argue that not all workers have benefited from this real wage increase since the low-
paid sector has grown. As figure 5.3 shows, between 2000 and 2006 the share of 
Figure 5.2 Trade union density rate in Germany (%), 1995-2014
* Different basis for calculation in 1998. 
Sources: ALLBUS (2015); authors’ own calculations.
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low paid workers increased from 15.8 per cent to 18.4 per cent. Since 2007, we can 
see no clear trend. The share of low paid workers reached a peak in 2010, at 19.1% – 
before dropping to pre-crisis levels in 2014.
Together with the expansion in employment, the increase of nominal and real wages 
stimulated private aggregate demand in Germany. A rising aggregate demand could 
help to balance current account deficits by stimulating demand for German imports. In 
addition, the new national minimum wage reduces the share of low-paid workers and 
strengthens low wage earners’ demand for goods and services. 
4 2 Changes in trade unions and employers’ organizations 
As already noted in section 4.1, the German wage bargaining system has remained 
largely stable in recent years. However, the trade union density rate – as well as the 
collective bargaining coverage rate – is still declining, and neither the unions nor the 
employers’ organizations have been able to stop this development (see figures 5.1 and 
5.2). The gradual erosion of the collective bargaining system is incontrovertible. The 
main current issue is how free collective bargaining will be influenced by the Act on 
Strengthening the Autonomy of Collective Bargaining, which creates new opportunities 
for government intervention. It is currently unclear whether the Government will suc-
ceed in stabilizing or increasing the coverage of collective agreements by greater use 
of the extension mechanism. Irrespective of this, all the partners have agreed to make 
efforts to stabilize collective bargaining coverage – and they are doing so to a great 
Figure 5.3 Incidence of low pay
Sources: OECD (2015b).
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extent in an informal way. Formal initiatives, such as the regional Brandenburg social 
partner dialogue, have so far been exceptions. Nonetheless, there is some sectoral 
dialogue focusing on industry-specific issues. 
A major issue in recent political debate has been the increased competition between 
trade unions and the erosion of industrial peace in Germany. For many years, including 
during the crisis, industrial peace was an important factor that attracted investment 
and production facilities to Germany (Lesch, 2015). However, official statistics show 
the number of working days lost to industrial action creeping up since 2010 (BA, 2015). 
Germany nonetheless still enjoys very favourable comparisons to other countries. When 
comparing industrial disputes internationally, Germany joins the United States, Japan 
and Switzerland in a group of peaceful countries, with an average of less than 20 days 
lost per 1,000 employees per year (Lesch, 2015). Germany lost only four days. Other 
economies, such as France and the United Kingdom, were less peaceful. There were 
124 days lost in France and 26 in the United Kingdom. If industrial unrest continues to 
grow, there is a risk that Germany might lose an important economic advantage. The 
new law to restore the principle of ‘one company, one collective agreement’ (Tarifein-
heitsgesetz) aims to restore peace to labour relations by creating more incentives for 
competing unions to cooperate with each other.
4 3 New legislative developments
Since the crisis, the Federal Government has introduced two major labour laws related 
to collective bargaining, but these laws are not a direct result of the crisis itself. They 
were either already under discussion before, as in the case of the statutory minimum 
wage, or – as regards the principle that only one collective agreement can apply in one 
company – they were implemented at the request of the social partners.
4.3.1 Act to Strengthen the Autonomy of Collective Bargaining 
The Act provides for the setting of a minimum wage across the German economy; as 
of 1 January 2015, a national minimum wage of 8.50 Euros per hour has been applied. 
A transition period allows deviation from the national minimum until the end of 2016, 
after which it will apply to all sectors. However, the deviation is restricted to sectors 
that are covered by the Posted Workers Act. A new bipartite commission of employers’ 
and union representatives will fix future minimum wage levels, and a first review was 
scheduled for June 2016. 
While the minimum wage applies, in principle, to all adult employees, an exemption 
exists for the previously long-term unemployed during their first six months in a job. 
The Government estimated that 3.7 million employees would immediately be affected 
by the statutory minimum wage, the biggest government intervention in free collective 
bargaining since the Second World War.
The law also introduced new rules for declaring sectoral collective agreements gener-
ally binding. This gives the Government (at federal and state levels) greater flexibility 
to extend an agreement to other companies in the sector (Schulten and Bispinck, 
2014). Agreements can now be extended to cover the whole sector when the ‘general 
interest’ calls for such a step; employers and unions need only prove that a majority 
of workers are covered, or that an extension protects “collectively agreed standards 
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against negative economic developments.” Despite this, as of July 2015, only 502 – or 
less than 1 per cent – of the approximately 70,000 registered collective agreements 
had been declared generally binding. In addition, the Act also creates the possibility 
of setting sector-specific minimum wages in all sectors, on the basis of the Posted 
Workers Act.
4.3.2. Collective Agreement Unity Act 
This Act, adopted in July 2015, restores the principle that only one collective agree-
ment can apply in a given enterprise. Its basic premise is that, in the event of a conflict 
between different collective agreements, the agreement of the union with the most 
members in the company will prevail. The legislation was passed to forestall a further 
fragmentation of the wage bargaining system and to increase the incentive for compet-
ing unions to cooperate with each other (Lesch and Hellmich, 2014).
The origin of the law goes back to a joint initiative by the social partners in 2010 in 
response to a ruling by the Federal Labour Court, which, after more than 60 years of 
practical application, rejected the rule that ‘only one collective agreement can be in 
effect in any one company’. The Court found that, if there were two or more collec-
tive agreements, the provisions of each collective agreement applied to all members 
of the collective contracting party. This decision led to intense competition among 
trade unions, which jeopardized the functioning of free collective bargaining. The 
new law restores the old practice, which was a cornerstone of the German wage 
bargaining system. 
It should be noted that the two new laws reinforce the role of the Government in the 
wage bargaining process – and in industrial relations in general. The State can now not 
only prescribe a wage floor in the form of a statutory minimum wage but also extend 
the scope of collective agreements to a greater extent than hitherto. It thus becomes a 
substitute for collective bargaining. Opponents of the Act to Strengthen the Autonomy 
of Collective Bargaining criticize the Government for restricting the trade unions’ right 
to strike.
5. Conclusions
When the financial and economic crisis hit Germany in 2008, the Federal Government’s 
immediate response was to stabilize the banking sector. As the crisis started to affect 
the real economy, it used stimulus packages and other measures to support compa-
nies, safeguard employment and bolster private consumption. As a consequence, the 
German labour market remained stable during the crisis. This was mainly due to the 
fact that prior labour market reforms had already introduced more flexible forms of 
employment and modified the social welfare systems. Over the same period, collective 
bargaining had also become more flexible.
Although there is no national tripartite social dialogue institution in Germany, the 
social partners were involved – in 2008 and 2009 – in debating the crisis and policy 
responses. These less formal processes were effective in dealing with the crisis, mobi-
lizing all actors and facilitating consensus on the measures to be taken. 
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The ad-hoc dialogue structure was complemented by an industrial relations system 
built upon the principle of free collective bargaining between employers’ organizations 
and unions. Major collective agreements (such as in the metalworking and electrical 
industry) illustrate how this arrangement contributed to successful crisis management. 
Given that the employers and the trade unions shared the objective of preventing mass 
worker layoffs, they were able to reach consensus on using short-time work and open-
ing clauses to cope with the crisis. 
Even before the crisis hit, the social partners had agreed to reforms to make the collec-
tive bargaining system more flexible. In addition to modernizing the general agreements 
in certain industries, opt-out clauses in sectoral collective bargaining and new options 
for employer organization membership provided companies with more leeway. The 
financial crisis appears to have had no effect on collective bargaining coverage.
Two important new laws have been enacted since the crisis, both in 2015. This leg-
islation has clearly increased the Government’s potential influence on the collective 
bargaining process; how far it will use these powers in practice remains to be seen.
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List of persons interviewed for the study
Government
Dr. Friederike Haase, Head of Department, Labour Ministry of Brandenburg
Dr. Rose Langer, Deputy Director (Unterabteilungsleiter), Federal Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs (BMAS), formerly working at the Federal Chancellery
Employers’ Organizations
Carsten Tacke, CEO Collective Bargaining, Federation of German Employers’ Associa-
tions in the Metal and Electrical Engineering Industries (Gesamtmetall)
Workers’ Organizations
Kay Ohl, retired, former Head of Collective Bargaining Section, German Metalworkers’ 
Union (IG Metall)
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6.  Post-crisis social dialogue and 
economic governance in Ireland
aidan regan
1. Introduction 
The core argument of this chapter is that despite the collapse of social partnership 
in Ireland, the institutional memory of previous negotiations has facilitated the emer-
gence of three important public sector industrial relations agreements: Croke Park, 
Haddington Road and Lansdowne Road. These public sector agreements have facili-
tated the implementation of the Government’s fiscal adjustment programme and have 
promoted industrial peace. In this regard, centralized collective bargaining in the pub-
lic sector has enabled rather than disabled the Government’s ability to adjust to new 
Eurozone constraints. Without these public sector agreements, it is highly questiona-
ble whether the Government could have implemented fiscal adjustment policies whilst 
retaining social peace.
However, whilst collective bargaining has been recentralized in the public sector, it 
has been decentralized to the enterprise level in most of the private sector. In most 
of the non-unionized sectors, the adjustment has occurred via a reduction in jobs 
and employment, rather than wages and working hours. In the competitive traded 
sectors of the economy, particularly in the internationally traded business services 
(computer and information services), there has been wage and employment growth. 
These non-unionized, US foreign direct investment (FDI) – led sectors have been rela-
tively immune from the internal adjustment that has occurred within the public sector.
There have been no “supply-side structural reforms” or liberalization of the labour mar-
ket. On the contrary, there has been increased State regulation of labour relations. In 
response to weak employment protection in the low-paid sectors of the economy, the 
2011-16 centre-right Fine Gael/Labour Party coalition introduced new regulatory pol-
icies that included: the reestablishment of wage-setting councils for the security and 
contract cleaning sectors; the establishment of a low-pay and minimum wage commis-
sion; an increase in the minimum wage; and the introduction of new industrial relations 
legislation aimed at strengthening collective bargaining. The social partners have been 
involved bilaterally, but the main actor responsible for these changes was the minority 
Labour party in government. 
In terms of social dialogue, the only remaining forum where this takes place is the 
National Economic and Social Council (NESC) – which has not been involved in any 
of the crisis or post-crisis economic reforms. The NESC meets monthly but there has 
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been a qualitative shift in domestic politics, in such a way that public policy formation 
is increasingly perceived to be the preserve of Parliament and not that of organized 
interest groups. The NESC is considered to be part of the “old” social partnership 
regime, therefore lacking both the legitimacy and capacity to engage in policy-making. 
In 2015, the outgoing Fine Gael-Labour Government created a new consultative forum 
for “National Economic Dialogue” (NED). This did not take the form of traditional tripar-
tite negotiations. Rather it was designed as a consultation forum to listen to the views 
of societal stakeholders as part of the European Semester. 
2. The economic and political context
Prior to 2008 Ireland experienced a twenty-five year economic boom. Successive Irish 
Governments used this economic growth to both cut income taxes and increase public 
spending. This quid pro quo underpinned the national tax-based income policies of 
seven centralized wage agreements, which were negotiated directly between the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), the Irish Business and Employers’ Confederation 
(IBEC) and senior civil servants in the Prime Minister’s Office (Regan, 2016; Bach and 
Stroleny, 2013; Geary, 2016). This ‘social partnership’ regime was widely considered a 
causal factor behind Ireland’s ‘Celtic Tiger’ economy from 1987. But it also meant that 
it was held responsible for the collapse of the Irish economy in 2008. 
In a period of strong growth, low inflation and relative wage restraint, income tax cuts 
became the main mechanism to increase the disposable income of workers. The path 
dependent effect of this social bargain shaped public policy during the 1990s and it 
continued after Ireland joined the single currency, with the exception of public sector 
wage restraint. During the 2000s, the cheap credit and low interest rate environment of 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), combined with a domestic (and politically 
inspired) pro-cyclical fiscal regime, fuelled a boom in domestic demand, particularly in 
housing. Exports declined, imports increased and the non-traded sectors of the econ-
omy grew in importance. By 2007, construction accounted for approximately 13.3 per 
cent of employment, the highest in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).
In 2007, the Irish debt to GDP ratio was less than 25 per cent, the budget was in 
surplus, and Ireland had a sovereign wealth fund that equalled 20 per cent of GDP 
– or 6,200 Euros per person (Whelan, 2014). All of this suggested that if there was 
a slowdown in the economy, the public finances had sufficient capacity to absorb 
losses. But when the Irish property and banking sector collapsed in 2008, the fragility 
of the public finance regime was quickly revealed. Between 2008 and 2009 real GDP 
declined by 16 per cent, from 190 to 160 billion Euros. Public revenues, which had 
become hugely dependent on taxing property transactions, collapsed by over 30 per 
cent, whilst the Government guaranteed bank debt drove the debt to GDP ratio to 
above 120 cent. 
2 1 The collapse of social partnership and fiscal adjustment (2008-12)
The collapse in government revenue created a crisis of social partnership. The social 
partnership model was built around a centralized wage agreement that provided a 
non-binding framework for pay bargaining. When the crisis hit, the political actors 
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that were party to this regime – the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), the Irish 
Business and Employers’ Confederation (IBEC) and a centrist Fianna Fáil Government 
– received a lot of critical media attention (Roche, 2010). Public opinion towards the 
tripartite model of social partnership changed, leading to a crisis of legitimacy for the 
institutions (Culpepper and Regan, 2014). 
In this context, as the banking crisis unfolded, and under increased pressure from 
external markets and the European Central Bank (ECB), the fiscal policy choices fac-
ing the Government narrowed. In 2009, given the new Eurostat rules (where the bank 
bailout scheme of the Government was included as a public expenditure), the budget 
deficit momentarily increased to a staggering 32 per cent. The Government had little 
room for negotiation with the social partners, unless public sector union leaders could 
ballot their members to vote for direct pay cuts.
This type of concessionary bargaining proved impossible for the Fianna Fáil Govern-
ment, elected in 2007, one year prior to the economic crash. In this election, the 
Fianna Fáil had won 77 seats in Parliament. After the 2011 election, the party held only 
19 seats, reflecting their worst election in history. In 2008, Bertie Ahern, the Fianna 
Fáil leader and then Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister), stepped down, and was replaced 
by Brian Cowen. This was an important change that would influence the trajectory of 
social partnership during the crisis period. Bernie Ahern, and the Fianna Fáil party 
more broadly, were closely associated with the public sector unions, and directly nego-
tiated all but one of the partnership agreements.
Shortly after this change in leadership, the Government implemented a unilateral adjust-
ment programme, from 2008-09, that equalled 18 per cent of GDP – or 28.8 billion 
Euros – in pay/welfare cuts and tax increases. According to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), this is one of the largest fiscal adjustments ever recorded in the contempo-
rary economic world (Whelan, 2014). The adjustment included a wage cut in the public 
sector, which averaged 14 per cent, and required the adoption of new legislation: the 
Financial Emergency in the Public Interest Act (2009) (hereafter referred to as FEMPI). 
It also required passing specific legislation aimed at implementing a public sector tax 
(a pension levy), referred to as Public Service Pension Legislation Acts.45 
This legislation marked the beginning of a series of Government emergency reforms, 
coordinated by the Department of Finance, and later the Department of Expenditure 
and Reform, which were aimed at stabilizing the public finances. 
After a unilateral adjustment of 28.8 billion Euros, which included direct public sec-
tor pay cuts, the Department of Finance suggested that there would be no return to 
the social partnership model. In 2010, however, the Fianna Fáil Government and the 
leadership of the civil and public sector trade unions negotiated a bilateral collective 
bargaining agreement for the public sector called The Croke Park Agreement. From 
2010-14, this Agreement facilitated an additional saving of 7.8 billion Euros, and it 
marked an early attempt by the Government to revitalize social dialogue in the public 
sector, following the cancellation of the social partnership agreement. It was accepted 
by a majority of public sector union members – and whilst there was some opposition, 
45  For more details, see the legislation at: http://www.per.gov.ie/en/public-service-pension-legislation-including-
financial-emergency-in-the-public-interest-fempi-acts-2009-and-2010/
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it was implemented in its entirety over the course of two Governments, without any 
industrial action. 
The Croke Park Agreement was a milestone, in that it was the first time since the foun-
dation of the Irish State that a concessionary collective bargaining arrangement had 
been negotiated in the public sector. The negotiated exchange was based around a 
quid pro quo that the Government would not unilaterally cut pay – in return for flexibili-
zation and a guaranteed no-strike clause. Whilst it was a public sector agreement, the 
no-strike clause provided a broader climate of political stability for the Government’s 
export strategy.
2 2 The shift toward bipartite collective bargaining in the public sector (2013-15)
The Croke Park Agreement created some intra-union conflict, but for the most part 
it provided unprecedented stability for the Government to implement its fiscal adjust-
ment. This fiscal adjustment, however, failed to satisfy the financial markets (primarily 
because of the cost of the bank bailout). In 2010 the interest rate charged on ten-year 
Government bonds exceeded 8 per cent, spurring a sovereign debt crisis. Ireland was 
cajoled into accepting a non-market financial loan from the ECB, the IMF, and the 
European Commission (EC). The loan totalled 85 billion Euros with a blended 5.8 per 
cent interest rate. Fifty billion Euros were provided to run the State (public sector pay 
and social welfare transfers), and 35 billion Euros to recapitalize the banks (plus an 
additional 17.5 billion Euros from the sovereign wealth fund). 
The agreements between the Government and the EU/IMF46 committed the former 
to introducing two additional fiscal reforms to its adjustment, which would prove to be 
politically costly: a new property tax and a new flat rate water charge. Minimal focus 
was placed on bank reform. The water charge was introduced by the newly elected 
Fine Gael/Labour coalition Government in 2011, and was one of the policy reforms 
that would lead to its collapse in 2016. The EU/IMF programme also committed the 
outgoing Fianna Fáil /Green coalition Government to increasing VAT to 23 per cent, 
cutting the hourly minimum wage to 7.65 Euros, reducing public service pensions by 
4 per cent, and cutting social welfare expenditure by an additional 2.4 billion Euros. 
The programme also guaranteed that all new entrants to the public sector would face 
an additional 10 per cent pay cut.47 
As noted above, Fianna Fáil experienced its worst ever electoral result in the 2011 elec-
tion, losing over 50 seats in Parliament. The Green Party lost all its seats. The Fianna 
Fáil/Green coalition was replaced by a centrist Fine Gael/Labour coalition, which 
secured 113 seats, giving the coalition the largest government majority in the history of 
the Irish State. In particular, the Labour party experienced its best ever electoral result, 
winning 37 seats in Parliament, whereas Fine Gael won 76 seats. This massive majority 
of 113 seats, in addition to the Croke Park Agreement, provided the Government with 
unprecedented political stability.
46  EU/IMF in this context refers to the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) – both of them 
acting on behalf of the Eurozone Member States – and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is largely an inter-
governmental arrangement to address the fiscal crisis in Europe, namely in those Eurozone Members under an 
Economic Adjustment Programme.
47  See all Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) at: http://www.finance.gov.ie/what-we-do/eu-international/ireland% 
E2%80%99s-programme-eu-imf-programme/memorandums-understanding
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The Fine Gael /Labour Government was elected on a platform to renegotiate the EU/
IMF agreement. This never occurred. The agreement was continued in its entirety 
by the newly elected Government, successfully implemented from 2011-14, with one 
major exception. The Government reversed the national minimum wage cut. It also 
managed to reduce the interest rate charged on non-market financial loans, in addition 
to reforming industrial relations. But for the most part, its fiscal policies continued with 
structural adjustment in its totality.
2 3 The political consequences of fiscal consolidation 
In 2016, the electorate voted the Fine Gael/Labour coalition Government out of office. 
The coalition went from 113 to 56 seats, well below the 86 seats required to secure 
a parliamentary majority. Fine Gael fell from 76 to 49 seats, whilst the Labour party 
experienced a massive defeat, going from 37 to seven seats. Although Fianna Fáil 
experienced the second worst ever election in its history, it increased its parliamentary 
seats from 21 to 44. The left-nationalist party, Sinn Féin, won 23 seats. The remaining 
seats in Parliament were split across a broad spectrum of independents and vari-
ous left-leaning parties, with the implication that no party was in a position to form a 
government. 
However, the role played by the public sector unions in facilitating the Government’s 
adjustment and promoting industrial stability is – from a social dialogue and indus-
trial relations standpoint – the most important observation from the post-crisis period. 
When the Fine Gael/Labour Government was elected in 2011, it established a new 
Ministry (separate from the Department of Finance) called the Department of Pub-
lic Expenditure and Reform (hereafter referred to as DPER). DPER became the new 
human resources manager of the public sector, dealing directly with the leadership of 
public service unions in implementing the agreement. 
There was limited dialogue in national policy-making with the social partners under 
both the Fianna Fáil /Green and Fine Gael/Labour coalition Governments. Given the 
crisis conditions, economic policy was highly centralized during the Fine Gael/Labour 
Government, and decisions were taken within a newly-formed Economic Management 
Council. This centralized Council consisted of the Prime Minister (Fine Gael), the Dep-
uty Prime Minister (Labour), the Minister of Finance (Fine Gael) and the Minister of 
Public Expenditure and Reform (Labour). It was this Council that decided all economic 
policies, as opposed to the Government, Parliament, or tripartism.
The Fine Gael/Labour coalition renegotiated the Croke Park Agreement in 2013, which 
was rejected by Ireland’s largest trade union, the Services Industrial Professional Tech-
nical Union (SIPTU). In response, the Fine Gael-led Government introduced new 
emergency legislation – the FEMPI, which introduced measures to cut public sector 
pay unilaterally. However, in order to avoid such a move, the Workplace Relations Com-
mission intervened and brokered a new collective bargaining agreement called the The 
Haddington Road Agreement, which passed. 
The Haddington Road Agreement, negotiated between the DPER and the leadership of 
the public service committee of the ICTU, contained one important concession. Public 
service unions received a commitment from the Government that the “pay cuts were 
temporary rather than permanent”. This meant that as the economic recovery began to 
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stabilize in 2015-16, public sector unions could seek a reversal of the crisis pay cuts. 
Further, it sent a signal that in a period of economic growth, trade unions would give 
up their “non-opposition” to government and advance a new battle for pay claims. 
This is precisely what is occurring at the time of writing. In the first quarter of 2016, 
Ireland experienced more days lost to industrial unrest than during the entire period of 
austerity, 2009-15.
2 4 Diminishing role of the social partners
In the absence of structured tripartite national social dialogue, the ICTU and IBEC no 
longer have a direct point of access in the Government to solve industrial disputes, or 
to discuss emergent labour relations problems before they get politicized in the media. 
Senior civil servants in the Taoiseach’s Office previously acted as the focal point. But 
all relations are now built on a bipartite basis with individual ministers and government 
departments. 
The shift away from tripartism was reflected in the Fine Gael/Labour Government’s 
approach to labour market policy. From 2011-16, labour market and employment policy 
was coordinated by the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, and captured 
in the initiative Action Plan for Jobs (hereafter APJ).48 This plan was coordinated by the 
Minister of Jobs but had the authoritative backing of the Taoiseach’s Office (much like 
previous social partnership agreements). However, unlike social partnership, neither 
the ICTU nor the IBEC was directly involved in the implementation of the APJ, which 
was mainly centralized within the Government – which set a target of creating 100,000 
new jobs under this plan from 2012-16 (largely delivered).
The expansion of the United States FDI – led sectors provides an important context 
for understanding the changed politics of social dialogue. New employer lobby groups, 
such as the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM), have become increasingly 
influential within Irish policy-making, given that they represent those firms that are 
shaping the economic recovery. Ireland’s post-2012 recovery has been largely driven 
by FDI (Regan and Brazys, 2016), particularly tech firms in the information and com-
puter services sector. These United States (and predominately non-unionized) firms 
generally do not resort to collective bargaining, social dialogue or industrial relations 
institutions. This structural shift in the labour market is also reflected within the internal 
structures of the IBEC, which is now competing for influence with AMCHAM.
3. The role of social dialogue in national policy-making 
From the standpoint of the ICTU and its affiliates (particularly the SIPTU and the IBEC), 
the absence of social partnership has created an “institutional deficit” (Sheehan, 
2015). This deficit is predominantly caused by the absence of a single point of contact 
within the Government, to discuss policies that cut across individual departments such 
as vocational training, higher education, social insurance, the apprenticeship system, 
pensions and infrastructural investment. Previously, senior officials in the Prime Minis-
ter’s Office took on this coordinating role, both within government and within the social 
48  See: http://www.actionplanforjobs.ie/ and https://www.djei.ie/en/Publications/Publication-files/Action-Plan-for-Jobs- 
2016.pdf 
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partnership process, thereby linking civil society to public policy-making (Hardiman 
and Scott, 2012; Regan, 2016,). 
But from the Government’s perspective, there is little inclination to return to a struc-
tured system of social dialogue in national policy-making, particularly one that is directly 
coordinated via the Taoiseach’s Office. Therefore, policy-makers tend to disagree with 
those trade unions that favour a return to structured tripartite social dialogue. Hence, 
since the collapse of social partnership, the ICTU has had a reduced role to play in 
national policy-making and industrial relations. The presence of the minority Labour 
party in government compensated for this, as will be detailed in sections 4 and 5.
The 2011-16 Prime Minister, Enda Kenny, expressed his views against returning to a 
system of national social dialogue in a number of parliamentary speeches. The follow-
ing quotes illustrate the point:
“We are not going back to social partnership in the way that it was… the pri-
mary point of contact for interaction between representative groups and the 
Government is with the relevant Ministers who have functional responsibility in 
a policy area”.49 
“The social partnership model practised by previous Governments had become 
a closed shop, where decisions with national consequences were made behind 
closed doors by a chosen few, accountable to nobody”.50
The preference of parties in government since 2008 has been to strengthen the poli-
cy-making capacity of Parliament. It is argued that the relationship between the social 
partners and government departments should occur on an informal bilateral basis, 
and that policy responsibility lies with individual ministers. This reflects a growing view 
among Irish parliamentarians that the formal processes of tripartism are not inclusive 
enough. 
The national institutions of social partnership were able to withstand critique during 
the 1990s and 2000s because they were associated with positive economic and 
employment performance. This is no longer the case. Further, from an institutional 
perspective, the coordinating role previously provided by senior government officials 
in the Taoiseach’s Office ensured that the tripartite social partnership agreements had 
authority within the Government. Since the crisis, all of these officials have either been 
moved or retired, with the implication that the institutional memory of social dialogue 
is in decline. 
3 1 National Economic and Social Council
The only remaining statutory tripartite body is the National Economic and Social Council 
(NESC), which is an independent government agency affiliated with the Taoiseach’s Office. 
The NESC was founded in 1973 and mandated to advise the Prime Minister on those 
strategic policies pertaining to socio-economic development. In 1973, the rationale for 
establishing the NESC came from the Labour party in government, who wanted to create a 
49 see http://www.parliamentary-questions.com/question/45695-12/same/ 
50  http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/News/Taoiseach's_Speeches/Speech_by_the_Taoiseach_Enda_Kenny_T_D_
Opening_of_the_National_Economic_Dialogue_Dublin_Castle_Thursday_16_July_2015.html
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strategic planning agency with autonomy from the Department of Finance (O’Riain, 2014; 
Regan, 2016). 
The Secretariat of the NESC is permanent, whereas the Prime Minister appoints 
the thirty-three members of the Council for three-year terms. These include: repre-
sentatives from the business and employers’ community; trade unions; farming and 
environmental groups; community, voluntary and religious charitable organizations; 
representatives from government departments; and independent academic experts. 
The Council meets on a monthly basis – but the overall policy agenda is set by the 
Secretariat, according to the preference of the Government of the day. 
From the standpoint of the NESC Secretariat, the Council’s role has evolved from 
servicing the process of national social partnership to writing technical policy reports 
for individual ministries. These include topics such as environmental protection and 
social housing. From the standpoint of the trade unions and employers, the Council has 
evolved into a “campaigning forum” for a diffuse set of community and voluntary interest 
groups, thereby disabling a more focused strategic approach to labour market issues. 
Hence, in the absence of national tripartite social partnership, the role of the NESC has 
been reduced. It used to provide a problem-solving forum for the leadership of unions 
and employers to engage in dialogue, and it was not obliged to represent the imme-
diate concerns of its members. This enabled the leadership of various organizations 
to reach a ‘shared understanding’ on certain policy priorities. Previously, this ‘shared 
understanding’ among the social partners was considered beneficial, but today it is 
perceived as leading to ‘a phony consensus’. In light of this, unions and employers have 
a preference for a return to a more narrow ‘labour-employer conference’ that would not 
include all of civil society. This is where social dialogue and the European Semester 
may play a future role. 
3 2 National Economic Dialogue 
 As mentioned earlier in the text, the Fine Gael/Labour Government set up a National 
Economic Dialogue (NED)51 in 2015, despite political resistance to the reintroduction 
of a structured process of tripartism. This forum consulted civil society groups before 
the 2015-16 National Budget. In 2015, these consultations took place over a period of 
two days and involved all the major organized interest groups in Irish society, including 
the ICTU and the IBEC, and various independent experts. It was structured around a 
major plenary session, led by the Department of Finance. The plenary session then 
broke up into smaller groups, organized around a set of specific policy themes (such 
as education/skills) with individual ministers. 
The NED differs fundamentally from social partnership and the NESC. When it met 
in 2015, if differed from the Council in three ways. First, it was an open consultation 
where the media could observe and record. Second, it was not a negotiation whereby 
different interests bargained independently via a political exchange aimed at a quid pro 
quo. Third, the Department of Finance laid out the fiscal and macroeconomic policies 
to be discussed. Indeed, the process is more a mere exchange of information rather 
than effective social dialogue.
51 See: http://www.budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2015/BreakoutSession.aspx
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However, it was the first time since the collapse of social partnership that the IBEC 
and the ICTU had sat down at the same table to discuss public policy. It was clear that 
they both agreed on two issues: better public services and a public capital investment 
programme. But disagreements arose as to who should cover the financial costs – i.e. 
taxation. This tension has shaped public debate since the crisis: a preference for more 
expenditure and lower taxes. It is perhaps in this area – the core fiscal problem – that 
the most social dialogue is required.
The aim of the NED in 2015 was to enable the Fine Gael/Labour Government to facil-
itate consultation aimed at social dialogue, which has been specified as an important 
indicator in the new European Semester, as outlined by the EC. But the European 
Semester officers were not invited to the NED, as the political parties in the Govern-
ment considered that the presence of any external monitoring would complicate, rather 
than contribute towards, the revitalization of social dialogue. It is for this reason that all 
discussions on social dialogue refer to domestic economic problems – but not to the 
European Semester.
4. Public sector industrial relations and collective bargaining 
Despite the collapse of social partnership, the Government – as the largest employer 
in the State – did not opt for a unilateral approach to its own industrial relations or 
collective bargaining processes. On the contrary, industrial relations and collective bar-
gaining in the public sector have become even more centralized during the crisis and 
post-crisis period. It is in the public sector where the collective bargaining institutions 
(and unions) are the strongest, implying that the term ‘industrial relations’ is now used 
as shorthand for the State sectors.
This stems from the voluntarist nature of Irish industrial relations. Labour law is minimal 
and built around the tradition of common rather than civil law. The implication is that 
collective bargaining institutions are dependent upon the relative ‘strength’ of unions 
(measured in terms of density and bargaining coverage) rather than legal-formal insti-
tutions and labour laws. This voluntarist system benefits unions where they are strong 
(public sector and manufacturing), but puts them at a disadvantage where they are 
weak (in the non-traded and internationally traded services sector). Simultaneously, 
from the perspective of the Government and employers, it facilitates flexibility in the 
labour market. 
4 1 Public sector industrial relations
During the crisis and post-crisis period most employment changes have occurred in 
those sectors where trade unions are weak. Overall trade union density declined from 
35 per cent in 2007 to 27 per cent in 2015, reflecting an all-time historic low (Walsh, 
2015). In the public sector, it declined from 69 per cent in 2007 to 63 per cent in 2014, 
whilst in the private sector it fell from 24 to 16 per cent during the same time period. 
The result of these trends is that collective bargaining coverage has become increas-
ingly concentrated in the public sector (Roche and Teague, 2014). 
Nonetheless, as noted earlier in the text, centralized industrial relations and collective 
bargaining in the State sectors have proven to be effective in implementing economic 
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adjustment. The presence of these industrial relations institutions meant that the Gov-
ernment could engage in a direct political negotiation, via the DPER, with the leaders 
of the main public sector service unions – via the public service executive committee 
of the ICTU. In this regard, centralized bargaining provided the necessary coordinating 
capacity for the largest employer in the State to implement cost saving reforms.
It is difficult, however, to equate the bipartite public sector agreements with national tri-
partite social dialogue. These bipartite collective agreements did not include any public 
policies pertaining to jobs, employment, taxation, housing and infrastructure; neither 
did they include any involvement from the wider membership of the ICTU and IBEC. 
They are sectoral agreements between the specific interests of the public sector unions 
and the Government – as employer.
There are three public sector agreements that shaped national policy-making during 
the crisis (2008-12) and post-crisis (2013-15) periods: 
• Croke Park Agreement
• Haddington Road Agreement
• Lansdowne Road Agreement
4.2 The Croke Park Agreement
The Croke Park Agreement 2010-14 was brokered by the Chief Executive of the Work-
place Relations Commission (WRC), Kieran Mulvey, and signed by the centrist Fianna 
Fáil/Green Government and the Public Service Committee (PSC) of the ICTU in June 
2010. The Agreement also included the signatories of non-unionized professional 
associations in the public sector – such as those representing the Irish police force. 
Whilst there was some resistance from the teacher unions on the PSC of the ICTU, it 
was overwhelmingly supported. Those unions who opted to vote against the Agree-
ment went along with the majority vote of the PSC and supported its implementation. 
The Croke Park Agreement was one of the first attempts to re-establish public sector 
dialogue following the end of the social partnership agreement in 2009. In addition, it 
had three major policy-making objectives:52
 (i)  To reduce costs in the public sector pay bill through a voluntary reduction in the 
number of people working in the public sector.
 (ii)  To increase the flexibility of the public sector through the redeployment of 
workers.
 (iii)  To increase productivity across the public sector through facilitating an increase 
in the use of shared and online services. 
The Agreement was the Government’s score strategy to consolidate its fiscal adjustment 
from 2010-14 (Higgins and Sheehan, 2010). As long as the unions guaranteed to not 
engage in industrial action, the Government committed to not unilaterally cutting pay 
any further. Crucially, the Agreement provided for the establishment of an implementa-
tion body to measure the progress of reforms in each of the following sectors: health, 
education, security, public administration and local government. This implementation 
52 For more detail see: http://www.per.gov.ie/en/croke-park-agreement/ 
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body not only monitored the implementation of the Agreement, but also was responsi-
ble for the costing of reforms, which became particularly important under the auspices 
of the EU/IMF reviews. 
4 3 The Haddington Road Agreement
In 2013 the Government attempted to renegotiate the Croke Park Agreement before 
it expired. This was aimed at cutting an additional 300 million Euros from the public 
service pay bill before the end of 2013, and then making an additional billion Euros in 
savings before the end of 2015. The outcome was a new collective agreement entitled 
‘Croke Park II’, which was supported by the leaders of all the major trade unions, but 
rejected by the public sector membership, by 54 to 47 per cent.
In response, the FEMPI was passed in 2013, which would have enabled the Govern-
ment to implement a unilateral 7 per cent pay cut. The Government argued that with or 
without union support, it had to achieve its fiscal targets – as set out in the MoU with 
the EU/IMF. In the aftermath of the rejection, the SIPTU leader, Jack O’Connor, called 
on the Government to avoid using unilateral pay cuts to achieve its fiscal targets, if it 
wanted to avoid mass strike action. 
By the end of June 2013 a new industrial relations agreement was negotiated under 
the auspices of the WRC. The new Public Services Stability Agreement: 2013-16 was 
renamed The Haddington Road Agreement’ (HRA) and included very specific sec-
tor-based reforms aimed at reducing the public service pay bill, in order to achieve 
an additional one billion Euros saving before the end of 2015.53 Some of the industrial 
relations reforms included:
• A freeze in automatic increments for different pay grades.
• Additional temporary pay cuts for those earning over 65,000 Euros per annum.
• A cut in the pension for retired public sector workers.
• New flexible workplace practices, including an extension of the working week for 
all public sector employees.
• Increased flexitime for civil servants.
4 4 The Lansdowne Road Agreement
What is perhaps most remarkable from a public policy perspective is that the fiscal 
adjustment was achieved without any trade union industrial action. There was certainly 
disagreement by smaller unions – but, in general, this was minimal. This is reflected 
in the third public industrial relations stability agreement: the Lansdowne Road Agree-
ment, negotiated in May 2015, which extends the HRA until 2018. The new Agreement 
sets out a plan to reverse some of the pay and pension cuts implemented since 2008. 
The Lansdowne Road Agreement has gradually turned the tide on the period of con-
cession bargaining in the public sector. In a period of growth, more conflict is likely 
to emerge. Some of the industrial relations proposals include:
• Most public servants to receive an average pay increase of 2,000 Euros achieved 
over three stages from January 2016 to September 2018. 
53 For a detailed list of reforms in the agreement see: http://www.per.gov.ie/en/haddington-road-agreement/ 
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• A partial reversal of pay cuts and a gradual removal of the public service pension 
levy to allow for this increase. 
• Those earning over 100,000 Euros who had pay cuts implemented under the 
HRA will have these restored by 2017. 
The cumulative cost of these restorations to public service pay will amount to approx-
imately 840 million Euros (Sheehan, 2015a). From the Government’s standpoint, the 
Agreement guarantees three more years of political stability. It will extend into the next 
electoral cycle – with the implication that regardless of what government is elected (or 
not elected), there will be wage stability for at least 24 months.
All unions on the public service committee of the ICTU have accepted the Agreement, 
with the exception of the two secondary school teacher unions: the Teachers’ Union 
of Ireland (TUI) and the Association of Secondary Teachers of Ireland (ASTI). Whilst 
their rejection is not sufficient to block the PSC Committee of the ICTU from ratifying 
the Agreement, they have taken the unusual step of declaring that they will “not be 
bound” by the PSC’s majority decision. This suggests that in a period of economic 
recovery, some trade unions will be willing to use their relative power to challenge 
the Government.
The core inference to be drawn from all of this is that there has been a recentralization 
of collective bargaining in the public sector, which has made it easier for the Gov-
ernment to implement its fiscal adjustment – whilst ensuring industrial stability in the 
public sector. These Agreements have been a defining characteristic of national poli-
cy-making in the post-crisis period of adjustment. Without these collective bargaining 
institutions, it is highly unlikely that the Government could have implemented economic 
adjustment. But it is important to note that these collective agreements are qualitatively 
distinct from the tripartite arrangements of social partnership. 
5.  Private sector industrial relations and collective bargaining  
in the post-crisis period
5 1 The minimum wage
Ireland has the highest gross market income inequality in the OECD (measured at a 
market income Gini coefficient of 0.58). After State intervention and social transfers, 
this is then reduced to the OECD average (measured at a Gini coefficient of 0.31) 
(OECD, 2015). The reduction in market income inequality shows both the distributive 
effect of the social State and the importance of the tax and transfer system in mitigat-
ing household inequality (and from a macroeconomic perspective, maintaining a floor 
below which domestic consumption will fall). But this State role in mitigating market 
inequality also illustrates the constraining effect of high levels of structural unemploy-
ment on fiscal resources.
The weakness of labour earnings at the bottom of the income distribution is in those 
jobs where collective bargaining is weak. This is what prompted the 2011-15 minority 
Labour party in government to introduce a series of legislative changes to improve 
the incomes of the low paid. The first step was to reverse the minimum wage cut. In 
2010, as part of the EU/IMF programme, the Government had been required to cut 
the national minimum wage, which fell from 8.65 to 7.65 Euros. In 2011 the Fine Gael/
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Labour Government restored the rate to 8.65 Euros, and in 2015 it decided to increase 
it to 9.15 Euros – a change that would commence from 1 January 2016, despite 
IBEC opposition. 
5 2 Low pay commission 
From a trade union standpoint, legislative increases to the minimum wage are nec-
essary to compensate for weak collective bargaining institutions. Previously, private 
sector trade unions had been reluctant to support increased State intervention in the 
market as it might potentially undermine the voluntarist nature of Irish collective bar-
gaining. But in a context where trade union density in the private sector is only 16 per 
cent, trade unions are increasingly looking to the Government to provide social pro-
tection measures. Up until 2008, the national minimum wage was negotiated in the 
tripartite social partnership agreements. When this collapsed, there was no forum for 
social dialogue on the question of low pay. As a response, trade unions, particularly 
the SIPTU, turned to the Labour party in government to push for stronger collective 
bargaining rights.
In 2015, the Government established a new low pay commission. This was a direct 
outcome of the appointment of a new ‘Super Junior Minister’ (Labour) within the 
Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, which was designed as a conces-
sion to the Labour party in government. The unions actively supported the creation of 
this post given the absence of social partnership. The new Super Minister, Ged Nash, 
was specifically tasked with delivering two core objectives of the Labour party in the 
Government (and of the trade union movement): strengthening collective bargaining 
legislation and protecting the low paid.
The creation of this new low pay commission marked the first time that a new stat-
utory body – with explicit representation from employers and unions – had been 
created since the collapse of social partnership. However, it was not technically a 
tripartite institution as it contained eight ‘commissioners’ from across the business, 
academic, trade union and civic society sphere (Prendergast, 2015). Representatives 
were selected on the basis of their ‘expertise’ rather than for whom they ‘represented’. 
The IBEC chose not to participate and disputed the extent to which the body was a 
‘technocratic’ agency. 
5 3 Sectoral employment orders 
The second major State intervention to tackle the problem of low pay was to re-es-
tablish the sectoral wage-setting agreements (Sectoral Employment Orders, SEOs), 
which were declared unconstitutional by the High Court in 2013. The new SEOs were 
designed to replace the previous Registered Employment Agreements (REAs), negoti-
ated by employers and unions; they covered several thousand workers in the electrical 
and construction sectors. An additional 190,000 workers in the cleaning, security, 
hotel and retail sectors had their pay set by Registered Employment Orders, negotiated 
via Joint Labour Committees (JLCs) and registered at the Labour Court. The EU/IMF 
challenged the effectiveness of these wage-setting institutions and publicly called for 
their liberalization. But when the High Court declared them unconstitutional in 2013, 
employers simply abandoned them.
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The re-establishment of SEOs was introduced as part of the Industrial Relations 
Amendment Act (2015). Under the new 2015 Act, unions and employers can no 
longer autonomously negotiate an agreement and seek to have it registered at the 
Labour Court. Rather, they can request the Labour Court to examine the pay and 
conditions of employment in a given sector and then ask the Court to make a recom-
mendation. For this to occur, the union requesting an employment review must be 
“substantially representative” of the sector. If this is the case, and if the union and 
employer in question represent a sufficiently large number of employees in the sector, 
then the Labour Court (a voluntarist body) will invite public representations. 
Unlike in the past, however, the Labour Court must take into consideration additional 
economic criteria when making its judgement (Higgins, 2015). These include:
• The potential impact on employment and unemployment 
• The terms and conditions of existing national wage agreements
• The impact on the firm’s competitiveness 
• The existing rates of pay of a class of similar workers who are employed in the 
same sector.
The new legislation also attempts to streamline the number of SEOs in existence, whilst 
restricting the number of additional pay rates that can be added to the minimum rate 
agreed. It allows for ‘two’ additional rates, which must be justified on the basis of skill 
and productivity. Employers can also seek exemptions for three to 24 months on the 
basis of an inability to pay clause. Furthermore, all registered agreements must now be 
published online to ensure transparency in the process. 
The first legally binding orders were signed in 2015 and covered the security and 
contract cleaning sectors. Employers in these sectors, as well as in the electronics and 
construction sectors, were not hostile to the re-establishment of the sectoral wage-set-
ting system, as SEOs provide them with certainty on pay rates. But this does not apply 
to employers in the restaurant and hotelier sector, who have refused to recognize the 
new system. Their argument is that unions only represent 4,000 workers in their sector, 
whereas overall employment in the sector is above 50,000. On this basis, they argue 
that trade unions are not representative, and therefore employers should not have to 
engage with them.
5 4 Collective bargaining legislation 
One of the most important features of the industrial relations regime in Ireland is the 
absence of a legal right to collective bargaining. In 2011, Fine Gael and the Labour 
party negotiated a Programme for Government, which was committed to changing this. 
The right to engage in collective bargaining has been a core objective of the trade union 
movement, particularly since 2007, when the Supreme Court found in favour of Ryanair 
against the Irish Municipal, Public and Civil Trade Union (IMPACT). The Supreme Court 
argued that the ‘employee’ association set up by Ryanair constituted a collective body 
for employees, and therefore equalled collective bargaining. IMPACT argued that it was 
a kangaroo association and not autonomous from the employer.
In June 2015, the minority Labour party in government introduced new collective bar-
gaining legislation to rectify this situation. The new legislation specified that where it 
can be demonstrated that collective bargaining does not exist, a group of workers 
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have a right to be heard at the Labour Court by a trade union. The union can argue, 
on their behalf, for better pay and conditions vis-à-vis the conditions in similar firms. If 
the Labour Court finds in the workers’ favour, the agreement becomes legally binding 
on the employer (Sheehan and Prendergast, 2015). It does not require employers to 
actually recognize trade unions for the purpose of collective bargaining. 
What the legislation does provide, however, is a mechanism for workers to have their 
voices heard collectively in the Labour Court (through a trade union). But the trade 
unions must demonstrate that the pay and conditions of the workers in question are 
out of sync with the pay and conditions of similar workers in a similar sector. To do this, 
they must base their claim on strong empirical evidence, and therefore the strength of 
the claim will be fundamentally contingent upon the quality of information presented in 
front of the Labour Court (Sheehan and Prendergast, 2015). 
It is important to note that the Government’s legislation emerged more from the elec-
toral process than from tripartite social dialogue – and from a commitment contained 
within the Programme for Government. From the State’s standpoint, it is now complying 
with the European Court of Human Rights; and from that of the employers, there is still 
no legal requirement to recognize trade unions or to engage in collective bargaining. 
From the perspective of large private sector unions, such as the SIPTU, the legislation 
is only as strong as the evidence they are able to present in Court.
5 5 Workplace Relations Commission 
To recap, the Government has – during the period of economic recovery, and in 
response to weak collective bargaining for the low paid – actively intervened in industrial 
relations by creating a new Super Junior Minister dedicated to labour affairs; establish-
ing a new low pay commission; increasing the minimum wage; re-establishing sectoral 
wage-setting mechanisms for low paid workers; and introducing new collective bar-
gaining legislation. In addition to this, the Government has implemented a new piece of 
legislation entitled the Workplace Relations Act 2015, which is aimed at simplifying and 
streamlining all the dispute resolution procedures in employment law. 
The legislation integrates all the conflict resolution bodies under one State body: the 
Workplace Relations Commission (WRC). Previously, and depending on the employ-
ment dispute in question, workers could take their complaint to the Employment 
Appeals Tribunal (EAT), the Equality Tribunal, the Labour Relations Commission 
(LRC) and/or the National Employment Rights Authority (NERA). In turn, if there 
was an appeal, it went either to the Circuit Court or to the Labour Court. Institutions 
had been layered on top of each other via successive social partnership agreements 
(Killalea, 2015). 
Under the new system all workplace-related disputes, regardless of what the conflict is 
about, will be referred directly to an ‘adjudication’ officer in the newly established WRC. 
The overriding objective will be to resolve the conflict voluntarily, through mediation, 
and without recourse to the Courts. If a dispute cannot be settled, or an appeal is 
made, it will go directly to the Labour Court (which, since the foundation of the State, 
has been a voluntarist institution – i.e., non-legally binding). However, employers can 
no longer opt out in the first instance when a private adjudication is sought. 
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All the social partners have welcomed these new reforms, as they retain the voluntarist 
nature of Irish industrial relations, whilst reducing legal creep into the collective bar-
gaining process. While some commentators may conclude that these changes reflect 
a new labour-friendly variant of social partnership, others claim differently – mainly 
because many of the changes can be traced back to the minority Labour party in gov-
ernment and not to tripartite social dialogue. Further, the changes directly pertain to the 
low-paid sectors of the economy (where unions are weak) and not to the competitive 
traded sectors – where, in Ireland, the high-tech United States FDI – led sectors remain 
largely union free.
6. Conclusions 
The major conclusion from this study is that throughout the post-crisis period of adjust-
ment there has been a qualitative shift away from national tripartite social dialogue 
toward bipartite public sector agreements. Collective bargaining has been recentralized 
in the public sector and decentralized to the firm level in most of the private sector. This 
recentralization of industrial relations has enabled the Government to internalize the 
constraints of the EMU, and to implement its fiscal adjustment. Hence, contrary to the 
assumptions of the EU/IMF programme, centralized collective bargaining institutions 
have enabled rather than disabled attempts to restore labour market competitiveness. 
Moreover, these collective agreements have provided unprecedented political stability 
for the Government, whilst maintaining open channels of social dialogue between the 
public service executive committee of the ICTU and senior civil servants of the State.
There have been no supply-side structural reforms of the labour market. On the con-
trary, there has been an increase in State regulation of the labour market – in response 
to weak collective bargaining in the low-paid sectors of the economy. This regulation 
has included: increasing the minimum wage; establishing a low pay commission; 
re-establishing sectoral wage-setting mechanisms; and introducing new collective 
bargaining and industrial relations legislation. This legislation is designed to make it 
easier for trade unions to represent employees in the Labour Court, when an employer 
refuses to engage in collective bargaining. These reforms were largely achieved through 
the partisan effect of the minority Labour party in government, and less so through 
national tripartite social dialogue. 
In 2016, the Fine Gael/Labour coalition Government was voted out of office. The Labour 
party, in particular, lost popularity following the years of austerity – despite introducing 
labour-friendly industrial relations reforms. For trade unions, particularly the SIPTU, the 
presence of the Labour party in government meant that they were less willing to revert 
to strike action and to create political instability. But in a period of economic growth, 
and with no Labour party in government and/or no structured national forum for social 
dialogue, trade unions may be more inclined to advance wage and pay claims through 
more traditional methods: strike action. It is just this threat of instability that may lead 
to a formal resurrection of national social dialogue.
Hence, in the absence of a formal process of social dialogue in national policy-making, 
there is an institutional deficit. There is no longer a structured mechanism for the actors 
to engage in a dialogue on those labour market policies that cut across government 
departments: employment, taxation, social insurance, education, capital investment 
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and vocational training. What is more, there is no national wage coordination, with the 
implication that unions are free to bargain independently of any guidance from the 
ICTU. The Government’s present viewpoint is that national social partnership, as it pre-
viously existed, is unlikely to be resurrected. But if political and labour market instability 
becomes an issue, policy-makers, and union leaders, may be compelled to respond 
with a new framework to address the new economic realities.
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Appendix 
List of persons interviewed for the study
Government
Secretary General, Department of Expenditure and Reform
Minister for Jobs, Innovation and Enterprise 
Minister for Labour Affairs
Principal Officer, Department of Jobs, Innovation and Enterprise
Director, National Economic and Social Council (NESC)
Employers’ Organizations
Head of IR/HR, Irish Business and Employers’ Confederation (IBEC)
Workers’ Organizations
General Secretary, Irish Municipal, Public and Civil Trade Union (IMPACT)
General Secretary, Services, Industrial, Professional and Technical Union (SIPTU)
Policy advisor, Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU)
Note: Several interviewees have asked not to be listed. 
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7.  Post-crisis social dialogue  
in Lithuania: The contentious  
path of social policy reform
daiVa PeTrylaiTe
1. Introduction
The first steps towards social dialogue in Lithuania were taken in 1991, through the 
enactment of the Act on Trade Unions. The Constitution, which came into force in 
1992, guaranteed the right of citizens to form and join associations freely and laid 
down the fundamental provisions for trade union activity. The principles of social 
partnership were further strengthened through the ratification of the ILO Tripartite Con-
sultation (International Labour Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 144) in 1994, and 
the signature, on 5 May 1995, of an agreement on tripartite partnership by the Gov-
ernment and national organizations representing employers and trade unions – which 
provided for the establishment of the Tripartite Council of the Republic of Lithuania. On 
13 June 2005, representatives of the Government, trade unions and employers signed 
a new, considerably expanded agreement on tripartite cooperation, setting out their 
priorities and defining the way they would be implemented. It also underscored the 
importance of engaging broader segments of society in social dialogue. The signing of 
these various agreements is an indication of the progressive development of tripartite 
relations in Lithuania. Although the country has well-developed tripartite institutions at 
both national and local levels – namely, the central Tripartite Council and municipal 
tripartite councils – social partnership at the branch and sectoral levels is less well 
established.
Even at the national level, social partnership has demonstrated some limitations. This 
was particularly evident during the early stages of the economic crisis, when only few 
consultations took place between the Government and the social partners. Lithuania 
was exposed to the challenges of the crisis without being sufficiently prepared in terms 
of social dialogue; its trade union membership was low and the system of tripartite 
social partnership was underdeveloped. In the later stages of the crisis, the Govern-
ment reopened channels of communication by resuming its practice of submitting 
questions to the Tripartite Council and consulting the social partners before taking 
social policy decisions. A significant outcome of this was the signing of a National 
Agreement, the ‘social compromise’, in late 2009. This paved the way for the Social 
Partnership Agreement, which was concluded between Lithuanian political parties and 
business organizations in October 2012. 
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Other changes emerged later, between 2012 and 2014, as a result of the investment 
of European Union Structural Funds aimed at strengthening the process of social dia-
logue in Lithuania. Resources were allocated to consolidate the capacity of the social 
partners, especially at sectoral and local levels.
The research for this study drew upon a variety of sources: review of literature (includ-
ing legal documents), practical materials such as collective agreements and tripartite 
agreements, and academic studies (articles, monographs) by national and interna-
tional experts. Statistical data were obtained from Lithuanian Statistics. Interviews were 
also conducted with the relevant actors (social partners, Government representatives 
and academics). 
2. The macroeconomic and political context
2 1 The macroeconomic context
Together with the other Baltic States, Lithuania enjoyed high economic growth rates 
following its accession to the European Union in 2004. Annual GDP growth reached its 
peak in 2007. However, the economy suffered a deep recession in 2009, when GDP 
fell significantly. Positive GDP growth resumed in 2010 and has continued since, albeit 
at a lower rate than before the crisis (see table 7.1).
Table 7.1 GDP growth (% change on previous year)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
9.8 2.9 -14.8 1.6 6.0 3.7 3.4 2.9 1.9
Source: Lithuanian Statistics (Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, STD).
Between 2000 and 2008, Lithuanian GDP grew by 77 per cent, making it one of the 
fastest growing economies in the world during that period. Nonetheless, GDP plunged 
by 15.7 per cent in the first nine months of 2009. The impressive rebalancing of 
the Lithuanian economy after the deep recession in 2009 was achieved through an 
“internal devaluation” process, i.e. a combination of massive real wage cuts and sharp 
fiscal tightening. 
Gross public debt rose from just 15.5 per cent of GDP in 2008 to 40.7 per cent in 2014, 
and is forecast to edge up further to around 44 per cent during the next two years 
(see table 7.2).
Table 7.2 The public debt (% of GDP)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
16.8 15.5 29.4 37.8 38.3 40.5 39.4 40.7 42.7
Source: Lithuanian Statistics (Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, STD).
The economic recession lasted only one year in Lithuania. The Government managed 
to carry out its fiscal adjustment without calling upon the International Monetary Fund 
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(IMF) for support. Lithuania’s currency escaped devaluation and its economy remained 
competitive through an increase in industry efficiency and an expansion of exports. 
The IMF had predicted “strong deflation”, but this never materialized. The highest pub-
lic sector salaries were cut by more than 20 per cent, with a smaller reduction in lower 
salaries; average gross wages declined by 12.4 per cent from their pre-crisis peak to 
their lowest level. While the total tax burden increased only marginally, the structure of 
the tax system changed considerably. Social benefit expenditures had risen by 44 per 
cent in real terms between 2006 and 2008. The Government had no choice but to trim 
benefits, but often did so in a progressive fashion so as to safeguard the most vulner-
able. Eligibility requirements were tightened. The Government also enacted a pension 
reform. In June 2011 the Parliament legislated a gradual increase of the retirement age 
to 65 years for both men and women by 2026 in order to ensure the financial sustain-
ability of the public pension system. Lithuania managed to avoid the devaluation of its 
national currency, overcome the consequences of the crisis, and join the Eurozone on 
1 January 2015.
2 2 Labour market context
Following a huge blow to the labour market at the start of the crisis – whereby unem-
ployment peaked at 17.8 per cent in 2010 (almost twice the EU-28 average of 9.7 per 
cent) – there were signs of recovery in 2011. This recovery benefited all age groups, but 
did not impact the long-term unemployed until later (table 7.3).
Table 7.3  Employment and unemployment in Lithuania, 2007-15
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Employment, 
thousand persons 1,422 1,397 1,290 1,224 1,226 1,244 1,264 1,288 1,301
Employment rate, % 65.0 64.4 59.9 57.6 60.2 62.0 63.7 65.7 67.2
Unemployed, 
thousand persons 64 88 211 270 228 197 172 158 134
Unemployment 
rate, % of active 
population
4.3 5.8 13.8 17.8 15.4 13.4 11.8 10.7 9.1
Share of long-term 
unemployment, % 32.4 21.6 23.7 41.7 52.1 49.2 42.9 44.7 42.9
Youth unemployment 
rate, % 8.4 13.3 29.6 35.7 32.6 26.7 21.9 19.3 16.3
Source: Eurostat.
The number of employed has been steadily decreasing in Lithuania since the beginning 
of the crisis, mainly due to the mass emigration of people of working age (table 7.4). 
This trend began in 2004 after Lithuania’s accession to the EU. The population of 
working age (15-64 years) decreased by 13 per cent between 2004 and 2012, with a 
particularly rapid decrease during the years 2009 and 2010. 
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Table 7.4 Emigration, 2005-15 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
57 885 32 390 30 383 25 750 38 500 83 157 53 863 41 100 38 818 36 621 44 533
Source: Lithuanian Statistics (Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, STD).
The mass emigration can, in part at least, be attributed to low wages. The average 
income in Lithuania is among the lowest in the EU; in 2014, the average gross monthly 
wage was 677.4 Euros (table 7.5). The minimum gross wage was increased to 350 
Euros per month on 1 January 2016. 
Table 7.5 Gross monthly wage, 2007-15
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total, Euros 522.0 623.2 595.5 575.8 592.5 615,1 646.3 677.4 712.1
Men, Euros nd 691.4 638.6 623.0 637.0 661.2 697.6 733.6 756.9
Women, Euros nd 558.5 557.2 534.0 551.2 571.6 597.7 623.7 584.8
Gender pay gap, % nd 19.2 12.7 14.3 13.5 13.6 14.3 15.0 22.7 
Source: Lithuanian Statistics (Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, STD). nd no data available.
Such low earnings make the Lithuanian labour market unattractive to local workers. 
Given the country’s traditionally low levels of immigration, it is likely to become increas-
ingly difficult for Lithuanian businesses to find workers with the right skills. Another 
specificity of the labour market is the mismatch between labour supply and demand in 
terms of both geographical distribution and skills, which became more pronounced dur-
ing the economic downturn. There is a lack of skilled labour in areas outside the major 
cities (i.e., managers, project managers, engineers, doctors and finance profession-
als). Most current concerns and debates revolve around ways to increase employment 
and remuneration, reduce emigration and attract inward investment. To address these 
issues, a National Employment Strategy 2014–2020 has been developed. Its priorities 
include increased labour market flexibility and security; a better matching of labour 
market demands and skills; and more attractive work incentives.
2 3 Political context
Lithuania held parliamentary elections in October 2008 at the height of the economic 
crisis. The Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats – won the most votes 
and was the major party in the coalition (see table 7.6 for a list of Lithuanian Govern-
ments in the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods). On 28 November 2008, Andrius 
Kubilius was appointed as Prime Minister. The centre-right coalition faced a difficult 
financial and economic situation when it came to power. After almost half a decade of 
rapid economic growth and social development, the deficit in the State budget and the 
social insurance fund had started to deteriorate rapidly. The coalition set out to improve 
the situation through a reduction in social expenditure and an increase in labour mar-
ket efficiency. The new Government therefore immediately initiated a programme of 
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action, in December 2008, which included a number of measures to combat slowing 
economic growth, and to address fundamental challenges in the public and social 
spheres. The programme also introduced an “anti-crisis plan” to ease the worsening 
economic and financial climate. The Government advised that failure to implement this 
plan, and its accompanying measures, would result in a severe financial crisis, deeply 
affecting the more vulnerable members of society, including low-income persons, pen-
sioners and the unemployed. It undertook a strong commitment to prevent this from 
happening. 
In an attempt to rescue the public finances, the Government initiated an ambitious 
package of legal reforms, in the framework of the anti-crisis plan, which focused on 
public spending cuts and tax increases. These measures gave rise to protests organ-
ized by the social partners, most notably the demonstrations of 16 January 2009, 
which brought together more than 7,000 demonstrators in front of the Parliament to 
challenge the planned fiscal consolidation measures. The Government softened its 
position in response to the social unrest – and two amendments to the Labour Code 
were subsequently adopted over a period of four years, following their discussion in the 
Tripartite Council. The Government, when proposing its reforms, referred both to the 
ranking of Lithuania’s economic competitiveness (an example being the World Bank’s 
Doing Business 2008 Lithuania, which pointed to certain restrictions on establishing 
start-ups) and to criticisms of the country’s labour market inflexibility, a view shared by 
the Lithuanian employers. 
Table 7.6 Governments of the Republic of Lithuania, 2004-16
Thirteenth 
Government 
2004-06 Coalition Government:
Social-Democrats and Social-Liberals 
Prime Minister: 
Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas
(Social-Democrat) 
Fourteenth 
Government
2006-08 Coalition Government:
Social-Democrats and Social-Liberals
Prime Minister: 
Gediminas Kirkilas
(Social-Democrat)
Fifteenth 
Government
2008-12 Coalition Government:
Conservative Party and Liberal Party
Prime Minister: 
Andrius Kubilius
(Conservative Party)
Sixteenth 
Government 
2012-16 Coalition Government:
Social-Democrats, Social-Liberals (‘Labour Party’) 
and Liberal-Democrats (‘Order and Justice’),
Prime Minister: 
Algirdas Butkevicius
(Social-Democrat)
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the 2009 National Agreement paved the way – fol-
lowing a round of lengthy negotiations – for the Social Partnership Agreement 2012-16, 
concluded between the Lithuanian political parties and business organizations. How-
ever, opinion remains divided on this Agreement and its outcomes in the context of 
social partnership; some commentators maintain that it was a political agreement, 
which had little in common with social dialogue, particularly as the workers were not 
represented. In its official programme, the Government declared its intention to improve 
social dialogue, support trade unions and promote collective bargaining. But there is 
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some feeling that this declared commitment to social dialogue was not fully borne out 
in practice.54 
3.  The role of social dialogue in national policy-making  
in the crisis and post-crisis period 
During the early stages of the Government’s response strategy to the crisis, tax reforms 
were at the forefront of the national agenda. Broadly speaking, the measures imple-
mented under this reform negatively impacted social rights and guarantees (through 
increased taxes and decreased social benefits such as unemployment benefit, 
pensions and social assistance). Social insurance contributions were also levied on 
earnings from new economic activities. In terms of common trends and the situation 
of social compromise, it was clear that due to the severity of the crisis, the Government 
was unable to engage in effective social dialogue or fulfil the objectives set out in its 
programme. The political decision was adopted without consultations at the Tripartite 
Council and presented to society as a ‘fait accompli’. Such a situation – perhaps for 
the first time since Lithuania’s independence – provoked the massive demonstrations, 
referred to in section 2.3, on 16 January 2009. The protest led the Government to 
engage effectively in dialogue with the social partners – and it was this that ultimately 
led to the 2009 National Agreement. 
Nonetheless, many of the social partners and other groups (which included organiza-
tions representing different members of society) refused to sign the Agreement at the 
time, due to a lack of consensus on the issues at hand. Some authors have expressed 
the opinion that the national tripartite social dialogue mechanism that was in place at 
the end of 2008 was ignored so as not to delay urgent decisions being taken (Kallaste 
and Woolfson, 2013). This contributed to a loss of trust in the Government – and per-
haps also led to the failure of the social reforms implemented during the crisis years. 
Social partnership was again encouraged during the crisis and post-crisis periods in 
Lithuania. Particularly significant was the adoption of a Programme on Strengthening 
Social Dialogue in Lithuania for 2007-2011, approved by the Government under resolu-
tion No. 729 on 11 July 2007 (hereinafter – the Programme).55 The main arguments for 
introducing the Programme were as follows: (i) trade union organizations in Lithuania 
are still too weak to function as a counterbalance for employers’ organizations, and 
to initiate social dialogue; (ii) sectoral collective agreements – as the basis for social 
dialogue – are still at an embryonic stage; (iii) an advanced and consistent bipartite 
social dialogue structure is not in place to promote social and economic progress; 
(iv) the social partners lack the capabilities to become involved in social dialogue in 
the regions; (v) Lithuania has an extremely low number of company-level collective 
agreements in place; (vi) the trade unions are often criticized for engaging in industrial 
action and are in need of more highly skilled professionals to participate in the activities 
of various councils and commissions; and (vii) the employers’ organizations are also 
under-represented, and their activities are insufficiently organized. The aim of the Pro-
gramme was to develop and strengthen social dialogue in the regions; promote social 
54  The Ministry of Social Security and Labour challenged this statement, maintaining that meetings of the Tripartite 
Council take place every month, thereby signifying a clear commitment to social dialogue. 
55 Official Gazette, 2007. No. 80-3246.
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partnership, at both bipartite and tripartite levels; provide training to the members of 
bipartite and tripartite councils; improve activities of employers’ and workers’ organiza-
tions; carry out inspections of employment relationships and health and safety at work; 
and disseminate good trade union practices. 
The implementation of the Programme was expected to bring the following results: 
(i) reinforced social dialogue in counties and municipalities; (ii) the establishment of 
new tripartite and bipartite councils and commissions in regions; (iii) the signing of 
territorial, sectoral or company-level collective agreements, or the commencement of 
bargaining for such agreements; (iv) the establishment of committees for occupational 
health and safety in the workplace; (v) the setting up of social dialogue coordination 
centres in regions; (vi) strengthened cooperation between the Government, employers’ 
and workers’ organizations; (vii) training, seminars and meetings for at least 5,000 work-
ers’ representatives, staff of enterprises, employers’ organizations, and representatives 
of State and municipal institutions; (viii) improved capacities of the social partners to 
participate in social dialogue; (ix) availability of regular information for the public on 
achievements in the area of social partnership and employee-relevant decisions taken 
in Lithuania; (x) improved activity and civic-mindedness of employees, as well as a 
growing number of trade unions; (xi) a healthier microclimate at the workplace; and 
(xii) a reduction of social tension and collective disputes.
On 21 February 2012, the Ministry of Social Security and Labour and the European 
Social Fund agreed, with the social partners, to implement a programme entitled “The 
promotion of social dialogue”. The programme which began in March 2012, came 
under the Operational Programme for the Development of Human Resources 2007-
2013 measure ‘Strengthening of social dialogue’. (Eurofound, 2012). EU resources 
were allocated to promote social dialogue and strengthen the capacity of the social 
partners, especially at sectoral and territorial levels. Under this measure, it was planned 
to conclude 289 enterprise-level agreements and 12 sectoral-level agreements. It was 
also envisaged to establish 46 tripartite and bilateral territorial councils and commit-
tees of the social partners, as well as 155 safety and health committees in enterprises. 
Following the implementation of this measure, 263 company-level agreements were 
concluded, 12 sectoral level and 21 territorial agreements were signed, and 44 tri-
partite and bilateral territorial councils and committees of the social partners were 
established – in addition to 151 health and safety committees in enterprises.
In line with the principles of workplace cooperation, a new procedure for the settle-
ment of individual labour disputes came into force in Lithuania in January 2013. The 
main objective of this reform was to change labour dispute resolution at the pre-litiga-
tion stage by replacing labour dispute commissions in enterprises that were remnant 
of the Soviet era with tripartite labour dispute commissions functioning at territorial 
level. The new labour dispute commissions were set up under the regional sub-divi-
sions of the State Labour Inspectorate and function on a tripartite basis. They include 
the labour inspector (who chairs the commission) and two members delegated from 
the national employers’ and workers’ organizations. At present, there are 13 such 
labour dispute commissions. Research into the activities of these commissions has 
proven the reform to be effective. It should be noted that labour dispute commis-
sions now settle about 5,000 labour disputes per year, a much higher figure than 
before the reform. This suggests that employees now feel more encouraged to initiate 
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labour dispute proceedings in order to protect their employment rights. In addition, it 
is clearly indicative of the trust in labour dispute commissions themselves. This trust 
may be attributed to the fact that the dispute resolution procedures are straightfor-
ward and free-of-charge (they are funded by the State budget). Another advantage is 
the efficiency of the procedure: on average, these commissions take 27 days to settle 
a dispute – compared to six months in judicial proceedings. An average of 33 per 
cent of labour disputes end in a peaceful settlement. There is a mediation institute to 
try and help the parties to reach a peaceful solution to their case, without escalating 
and/or delaying the process. The preventive aspect is also important in this context. 
Precedents developed in particular cases are “taken over” by the social partners and 
adapted in their organizations to identify and neutralize social tensions. The social 
partners learn the art of negotiation and are actively engaged in the settlement of 
labour cases.
It must be added that at the beginning of 2016, the Ministry of Social Security and 
Labour approved the Action Plan for the Promotion of Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity for 2016-2020 with a view to encouraging companies to apply the principles of 
social responsibility; they also approved the 2016-2020 Action Plan for Strengthening 
Social Dialogue.
3 1 The ‘Social Model’
With a view to modernizing the legal regulations pertaining to the labour market, the 
Government initiated a project entitled “Creation of the Lithuanian social model to 
increase employment, improve the regulation of labour relations and social insurance 
sustainability” in 2013. The project aimed at improving the legislation regulating labour, 
employment and social security, in order to increase employment, improve labour 
relations and promote investment. The objectives were set within the framework of 
labour legislation to pave the way for a more flexible regulation of labour relations and 
to ensure job security. One of the expected results of this project was a new draft 
of the Labour Code. New bills were prepared, which were intended to encompass 
amendments to minimum wage setting, employment protection legislation (hiring and 
firing regulations), the formulation of new employment legislation for vulnerable groups 
(such as youth and temporary workers), the regulation of temporary employment and 
other non-standard forms of employment, and pension reform (increase of the stat-
utory retirement age, changes in the indexation method, limitation of access to early 
retirement). However, these bills were prepared without consulting the social partners. 
In May 2015, the Government submitted a package of legislative drafts56 to the Parlia-
ment and also forwarded them, at the same time, to the Tripartite Council. It should be 
noted that, in accordance with the law, legislative drafts that are submitted to the Par-
liament on relevant labour, social and economic issues should be agreed in advance 
with the Tripartite Council (Eurofound, 2016). In protest at this lack of consultation, the 
trade unions organized a demonstration against the Social Model on 10 September 
2015. According to the Chairman of the Lithuanian Trade Union Confederation: “The 
56  The package known as the “Social Model” consisted of a number of legislative drafts. The most important of these 
were the draft Labour Code, the Bill on Employment, the Bill on Sickness and Maternity Social Insurance, the Bill on 
the Social Insurance of Occupational Accidents and Diseases, the Bill on Unemployment Social Insurance and the 
Bill on State Social Insurance Pensions. 
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protest next to the Parliament and the Government buildings was not because we are 
against changes. We have never said that we do not want them. We just wanted to 
show that not all matters have been harmonized with the Government. We have already 
achieved and changed a lot, but many sensitive questions remain misaligned”.57 The 
Tripartite Council subsequently held 14 meetings on the matter and, after repeated 
consideration of the “package”, formal consensus was reached on the main articles of 
the draft Labour Code. Nonetheless, continuing collective action of the national trade 
unions against the “package” adopted in Parliament shows that social consensus on 
the “Social Model” has been rather fragile. 
3 2 The European Semester 
In Lithuania, the Ministry of the Economy is responsible for coordinating and harmoniz-
ing the National Reform Programme, which is subsequently submitted to the European 
Commission. The draft Programme is forwarded by the Ministry to the Tripartite Council 
of the Republic of Lithuania for discussion. The first discussion of this type took place in 
March 2014 (Tripartite Council, 2014), when Lithuania was not only preparing its report 
for the European Semester but also undertaking reforms for the adoption of the Euro. 
According to the Minutes of the Council, the representative of the Ministry of Economy 
presenting the Programme regretted that no comments on the draft Programme had 
been received from the social partners, despite their being requested to do so as early 
as January. The second reading of the National Reform Programme took place in April 
2015. During the sitting, the social partners concluded that “… the Tripartite Council 
must pay as much attention as possible to the National Reform Programme and the 
European Commission’s conclusions and recommendations for Lithuania in the future 
…”, but no concrete ideas were put forward or proposals made (Tripartite Council, 
2015). To date, the social partners – and even the Tripartite Council itself – have been 
demonstrating little involvement in the activities of the European Semester. The availa-
ble evidence and material from the sittings of the Tripartite Council shows that, despite 
efforts on the part of the Government (responsible ministries) to cooperate and discuss 
opinions with the social partners, the participation of the latter remains limited (Euro-
pean Commission, 2015; European Council, 2015). 
3 3 The Tripartite Council
The signing of the Agreement on Tripartite Partnership on 5 May 1995 marked a vital 
step towards national social dialogue. It brought together the interests of the Govern-
ment, employers’ and workers’ organizations in tackling social, economic and labour 
problems, and provided for the signature of annual tripartite agreements on these 
issues. In addition, the Agreement paved the way for the establishment of the Tripartite 
Council, as well as for the regulations on its functioning (Tripartite Council, 2002). This 
Tripartite Agreement can be considered as the first major step towards the institutional-
ization of social partnership. The social partners and the Government thereby became 
entitled to determine the competencies, rights and duties of the Tripartite Council, as 
well as the degree of influence this institution might have over decisions of the author-
ities and legislative procedures.
57  Available at: http://www.delfi.lt/verslas/verslas/a-cerniauskas-zaidimas-i-vienus-vartus-arba-ko-nori-profesines-sajun 
gos.d?id=69110328
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At present, the Tripartite Council consists of employers’, workers’ and Government rep-
resentatives, making a total of 21 members – seven from each group. The following 
institutions and organizations are represented: (i) public administration bodies: the 
Ministry of Social Security and Labour, the Ministry of the Economy and the Office of 
the Government; (ii) central (national) trade union organizations: the Lithuanian Trade 
Union Confederation, the Lithuanian Labour Federation and the Lithuanian Trade 
Union “Solidarumus”; (iii) employers’ organizations: the Lithuanian Confederation of 
Industrialists, the Lithuanian Business Employers’ Confederation, the Chamber of Agri-
culture of the Republic of Lithuania, and the Association of Lithuanian Chambers of 
Commerce, Industry and Crafts.
The workers’ and employers’ representatives on the Tripartite Council are governed 
by the agreement concluded between the Lithuanian trade unions and the employ-
ers’ central (national) organizations – “On Recognition of Mutual Social Partnership”, 
approved by a Tripartite Council resolution on 26 February 2008. The Government 
representatives are appointed to the Tripartite Council by means of a Government res-
olution. The Tripartite Council can establish commissions and committees. At present, 
there are three commissions (labour relations, civil servants and tripartite consulta-
tions on implementing international labour law) and several committees (education, 
youth, energy, culture and monitoring of consumers’ rights). The Tripartite Council has 
become a significant institution in public life. It is one that reconciles the interests of the 
social partners, as well as settle a number of labour and social issues. 
Despite this, the situation began to change during the crisis – and it continues to be 
unstable. In late 2008, the programme of the newly formed Fifteenth Government 
stipulated that “socio-economic dialogue” between employees, employers and soci-
ety would be enhanced at all levels – with a view to implementing key reforms in the 
labour market. In addition, decisions were taken to reform the Tripartite Council by 
bringing in non-governmental organizations and transforming it into an “economic and 
social council” that would be able to draft a national agreement on the modernization 
of the national economy. For a number of years, there were discussions about setting 
up this institution along the lines of the European Economic and Social Committee. 
However, the full transformation of the Council never fully materialized. Instead, in 
2009, the Government made a number of internal changes to the Tripartite Council; 
it delegated secretaries of the ministries to the Tripartite Council in place of the earlier 
membership of vice ministers. In 2011 it was decided once again to change the level 
of Government representation. Currently, the Government representatives consist of 
the Prime Minister’s adviser, two vice ministers and four specialists: two Department 
directors, the Chancellor of the Ministry and the Head of Division. Furthermore, repre-
sentatives of various associations – cultural, senior citizens, consumers, medical and 
firefighters, inter alia – are invited to participate in meetings if issues relevant to them 
are being discussed. 
At present, trade unions are critical of the Tripartite Council – particularly of its dimin-
ishing influence. This is reflected, for example, in its inactive website, as well as in 
the reorganization of the Secretariat, which was merged with the Ministry of Social 
Security and Labour in order to save costs. They also criticize the rigid composition of 
the Council, noting that social interests are mixed, and they particularly point out that 
it lacks decision-making capabilities; for example, the resolutions of the Council only 
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serve as a recommendation. The employers’ organizations also criticize the Tripartite 
Council. The President of the Lithuanian Business Confederation, Valdas Sutkus, has 
repeatedly stressed that it does not provide an appropriate representation of society 
and that it is an outdated and ineffective model. Moreover, the Executive Director of 
“Investor’s Forum”, Ruta Skyriene, claimed that the active involvement of society was 
crucial to increase the attraction for foreign investment. She added that: “we always 
stress that we can only achieve the best solutions and results by ensuring close coop-
eration between the State, business and society”.58 Nonetheless, the Tripartite Council 
has, in the past, raised concerns regarding the proper representation of Lithuanian 
employers and workers. Until now, the Council has been a relatively closed organiza-
tion as it is based on the ‘non-rotational principle’, which means that it does not accept 
new members into its structure. This prompted ‘Invest Lithuania’,59 in 2014, to pro-
pose the establishment of a “national labour and social issues council” as a forum for 
the national-level social partners. This council would have a bipartite plus status, with 
30 representatives from the eligible employers’ and workers’ organizations, together 
with representatives of other economic, social and cultural institutions. However, work 
on developing this new council was postponed as the Government and social partners 
preferred to retain their seats on the Tripartite Council in order to steer the changes in 
the draft Labour Code that were being implemented under the “Social Model” project. 
In the final analysis, no significant changes in the composition and activity of the Tri-
partite Council were introduced after the adoption of the new Labour Code. Lithuania 
still retains its “old” national tripartite structure. But it should be noted that some new 
regulations were included: for example, the employers’ and workers’ organizations will 
now have to comply with certain criteria if they wish to delegate representatives to the 
Tripartite Council. Furthermore, a new regulation provides for a four-year tenure for the 
Tripartite Council, but there is no reference to the number of terms of office for individ-
ual members of this Council. Therefore, although the new Labour Code does introduce 
some new rules, it has not made any significant reforms to the Tripartite Council. 
4.  Industrial relations and collective bargaining  
in the post-crisis period
Countries throughout Western Europe displayed a strong tendency towards the decen-
tralization of collective bargaining during the first years of the economic downturn. The 
situation in Lithuania, however, was slightly different. While enterprise-level agreements 
tended to predominate in the past, the Government, seeking to promote higher-level 
collective bargaining, used European funding60 to create financial and organizational 
conditions for social partners to bargain at the sectoral/territorial level. The Government 
had two main objectives: to increase the number of collective agreements at the terri-
torial – and especially sectoral levels; and to increase the number of workers covered 
58  Speaking at an international conference calling for the development of opportunities for Lithuanian citizens to 
participate directly in public affairs. Available at: http://www.lvk.lt/lt/naujienos/tarptautineje-konferencijoje-- 
raginimai-plesti-lietuvos-pilieciu-galimybes-tiesiogiai-dalyvauti-valstybes-valdyme.
59  ‘Invest Lithuania” (Investuok Lietuvoje) is a non-profit organization under the Ministry of Economy of the Republic of 
Lithuania. Its mission is to attract foreign investment.
60  2007–2013 Operational Programme for the Development of Human Resources in Lithuania, Priority 1: “Quality 
Employment and Social Inclusion”, Measure VP1- 1.1-SADM-02-K “Promotion of Social Dialogue", projects 
co-financed by the European Social Fund and the State budget of the Republic of Lithuania.
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by collective agreements. As a result of this funding, under an operational programme 
entitled “Promotion of social dialogue”, 21 territorial and 12 sectoral-level agreements 
were signed between 2013 and 2014.61 However, an analysis of the content of these 
sectoral and territorial collective agreements shows that most of their provisions are 
taken from legal acts and are largely declarative in nature. 
In 2009, in the course of the reforms mentioned earlier, temporary amendments to the 
Labour Code62 were adopted allowing deviation from the imperative provisions of labour 
law in certain cases, when specifically agreed upon in collective agreements. In other 
words, the law as such allowed for the determination of employment conditions in peius 
in collective agreements, i.e., worsening the situation of employees compared to that 
stipulated in the Labour Code in respect of all other employees working in enterprises 
without a collective agreement. During the crisis period, the application of the in peius 
principle was widely adopted. 
According to data collected from Lithuanian Statistics, the number of members of 
trade unions remained almost stable during the first years of the crisis. However, it 
started falling markedly in the so-called post-crisis period; in 2011, 108.900 employ-
ees, or 8.69 per cent of the workforce, were members of trade unions.63 The years 
2012, 2013 and 2014 saw an even larger decrease (table 7.7). It should be noted that 
undisputed data on trade union density in Lithuania is unavailable. According to the 
European Trade Union Institute, trade union density stood at about 9 per cent in 2013 
(ETUI, 2016). Similar findings were reported by the ILO, with trade union density at 
16.8 per cent in 2001 – followed by a significant decrease to 9.3 per cent in 2007. This 
remained relatively unchanged until 2013, which saw a minor increase to 8.8 per cent 
(ILO Stat, 2016).
Table 7.7 Membership of trade unions, 2006-14
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
TU members 
(thousands) 115,7 115,0 111,7 115,4 112,6 108,9 102,3 95,3 94,2
Percentage  
of all employees 9.15 8.68 8.3 8.73 9.0 8.69 8.0 7.35 7.14
Source: Lithuanian Statistics (Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, STD).
By contrast, employers’ organizations have increased their membership. In 2006, 
employers’ organizations had 12,800 members, and this number rose to 13,200 in 
2007. A slight decrease was recorded in 2008 and 2009, respectively – from 12,400 
to 11,800 members. From 2010 onwards, however, there has been a steady growth in 
membership. According to data from the European Commission, employers’ organiza-
tion density (calculated as the proportion of wage and salary earners in member firms 
of employers’ organizations) stood at 14.4 per cent in 2012 (Visser, 2016).
61 Data provided by the Ministry of Social Security and Labour.
62 Amendments to the Labour Code, Official Gazette, 2009, Nos. 93–3993.
63  A representative from the Lithuanian Trade Union Confederation (LPSK) challenged the figures on trade union density 
presented in the study. According to data collected by LPSK, trade union density stands at 15 per cent in Lithuania. 
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An analysis of another indicator – the coverage of collective agreements – shows that 
such agreements are mostly prevalent at enterprise level (there were no higher-level – 
branch, territorial – collective agreements concluded before the crisis at all in Lithuania). 
There is no official record of enterprise-level agreements in Lithuania, but according 
to data collected by the State Labour Inspectorate, they cover less than 3 per cent of 
Lithuanian enterprises (see table 7.8).
Table 7.8 Enterprises and collective agreements, 2006-15
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Number of enterprise 
inspections carried 
out 
18,872 17,600 15,859 15,935 12,411 12,325 6,697 10,069 10,582 6,585
Enterprise-level 
collective agreements 
signed
1,157 1,238 903 290 248 273 204 239 295 348
Coverage of 
enterprise-
level collective 
agreements, %
6.1 7.0 5.69 1.81 1.99 2.22 3.0 2.37 2.78 5.28
Source: State Labour Inspectorate of the Republic of Lithuania, 2016.
It may therefore be deduced that Lithuania was exposed to the challenges of the crisis, 
while being underprepared in terms of social dialogue and collective bargaining – i.e., 
with low trade union membership and lacking a social dialogue culture.
Another important indicator of democracy at work is the number of strikes. According 
to data from Lithuanian Statistics, there were 56 strikes in 2000, of which 21 were 
warning strikes; in 2001, there were 34 strikes, of which 29 were warning strikes. 
Meanwhile, during the 2002-06 period, there was only one strike in 2005, while 2007 
witnessed 161 strikes, all of which took place in educational institutions. Similarly, dur-
ing the first quarter of 2008, as many as 112 strikes were registered in this sector alone. 
A few years of industrial peace ensued (2009–11). It is worth recalling that this was the 
period of economic downturn – and that the implementation of the above-mentioned 
anti-crisis measures was endured in silence.64 The situation changed in 2012, when 
193 strikes occurred – again all in educational institutions. This was followed by a 
period of industrial peace in 2013, and there were only 78 strikes in 2014 (education 
sector). The strikes held in 2012 and 2014 called for the restoration of wages which 
had been cut during the crisis, and an increase in budget allocations for the education 
sector. Again, no obvious reasons can be discerned as to why trade unions were more 
active in this sector than in others, and why they did not take similar action before 2012. 
One of the reasons might be that there had been wage increases, albeit insignificant, in 
these specific sectors before the crisis. From 2009 onwards, drastic cuts were made to 
sectoral wages in response to the crisis. Given the Government’s pledge to restore the 
64  Lithuanians apparently took action during the crisis in a highly specific way – simply by emigrating from Lithuania 
[Trade union: We are not Greek and Spanish, here people sob into their pillows], extracted from Delfi, 10 September 
2011.
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status quo of reduced wages following improvements in the financial situation, trade 
unions chose to abstain from collective action for some time. However, when there 
were signs that the Government might not fulfil its promise, the trade unions resorted 
to strike action. 
5 Conclusions
On the eve of the economic crisis Lithuania had a relatively strong and institutionalized 
system of tripartite social dialogue in place. The legal provisions valid at that time cre-
ated the preconditions for the parties to independently negotiate conditions of work. 
At this point, it is worth recalling that in Lithuania, unlike in other EU Member States, 
the system of industrial relations was underdeveloped, the model of bipartite social 
dialogue was hardly functioning, and the collective bargaining coverage of employees 
was critically low.
At the start of the crisis, the Government took a number of unilateral steps that had 
negative repercussions on social partnership. It subsequently altered its approach, 
which culminated in the signing of the 2009 National Agreement – an unprecedented 
event – whereby attempts were made to agree on measures to overcome the financial, 
economic and social issues emerging in the aftermath of the crisis. However, many 
of the social partners refused to sign it, and for some time afterwards they refused to 
extend or re-sign it, due to a lack of consensus on the issues at hand. During the crisis 
a clear unified voice on core social, economic and employment issues was lacking 
(Vilnius University, 2015; Juska and Woolfson, 2012; Kallaste and Woolfson, 2013). 
These factors contributed to a sense of alienation from decision-making processes 
amongst workers, bringing with it a heightened risk of social unrest – resulting in a 
loss of trust in the Government and perhaps in the limited impact of the social reforms. 
There is no denying that the Government’s quick response to the crisis may have 
played an important role in economic recovery, but more developed social dialogue 
during this time of fiscal consolidation would have helped lead to better outcomes and, 
more importantly, would have increased public confidence. 
The economic crisis revealed the weaknesses of social partnership in Lithuania. As 
stated in this chapter, tripartite social dialogue was not directly affected by the crisis-re-
lated reforms. Nonetheless, the fact that the Government failed to include the trade 
unions and employers’ organizations in consultations over crisis response strategies 
contributed to these weaknesses. The economic crisis made individual labour rights 
more vulnerable, with painful consequences, while the principles of social cooperation 
did not operate successfully and there was a growing distrust in public institutions. 
These negative developments account for the minor role played by the social partners 
in the fight against the economic downturn. The crisis also revealed, and heightened, 
pre-existing functional and structural flaws in tripartite social dialogue mechanisms 
in Lithuania. 
Swift measures therefore need to be taken to reform the state of tripartite social dia-
logue. Taking into account the experience of other European countries and the current 
situation regarding social dialogue in Lithuania, there are two possibilities for the future. 
One option would be to establish a “national labour and social issues council” as a 
forum for the national-level social partners. This council could have a bipartite structure 
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consisting of representatives from the eligible employers’ and workers’ organizations. 
With the aim of achieving more inclusive social dialogue, the authors also suggest the 
implementation of social partnership through social councils at sectoral and territorial 
level. These could play a crucial role in guiding consultations and negotiations for the 
conclusion of bipartite and tripartite agreements, which would provide a social policy 
framework for specific regions or branches of economic activity. Another option would 
be to maintain and strengthen the already existing Tripartite Council, which, accord-
ing to the Government, is most effective at representing the interests of workers and 
employers. Furthermore, there are other councils in Lithuania that deal with specific 
issues; these include the Council for the Affairs of the Disabled and the Council of 
Youth Affairs under the Ministry of Social Security and Labour. Given the existence of 
such bodies, the Government is of the view that wider representation is not necessary. 
Social partnership could also be used to address relevant issues beyond labour policy, 
thereby becoming a more open forum for the social partners. In concluding, the cur-
rent fragmentation of social dialogue frameworks in Lithuania may be attributed to the 
lack of a long-standing culture and tradition of social partnership in the country, rather 
than to legal regulations or constraints imposed by the State. 
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Department of the Ministry of Social Security and Labour of the Republic of Lithuania. 
Employers’ Organizations
Rainys, Gediminas, Director of the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists.
Workers’ Organizations
Jakutavice, Dalia, Vice-President of the Lithuanian Industry Trade Union Federation.
Others
Dr Blaziene, Inga, Associate Professor, Expert in social policy and labour market, 
Labour Market Research Institute of Lithuanian Social Research Centre.
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8.  The Dutch polder model:  
Resilience in times of crisis
rOnald dekker, sOnJa Bekker and Jan creMers
1. Introduction 
The Netherlands has a long and fruitful history of social dialogue under the so-called 
“Polder Model”. This acclaimed Dutch system of consensus-based economic and 
social policy-making has formalized tripartite cooperation between employers’ organ-
izations, labour unions and the Government at the national level. The Social and 
Economic Council (SER)65 serves as the central forum to discuss labour issues and 
has a long tradition of consensus building, often defusing labour conflicts and avoiding 
strike action. In this chapter, we elaborate on the various aspects of social dialogue and 
industrial relations in the Netherlands, and describe developments in these areas over 
the period since the financial crisis. We deal with national reforms and labour mar-
ket developments, focusing especially on the 2012-15 period. All of this is discussed 
against the backdrop of the European Semester policy coordination process between 
the European Commission (EC) and the Member States. The European Semester is 
most relevant for issues at national level – whereas, in the Dutch tradition, impor-
tant employment issues have been decentralized to the sectoral or company levels, at 
which collective labour agreements are concluded.
In general, the role of social dialogue has slightly eroded over the period, also due to 
processes that started well before the onset of the financial crisis. Among these are a 
slow but steady flexibilization of the labour market and a decline in union density over 
a period of four decades (see figure 8.1). Dutch unions have been quite lenient, both 
at national level in the SER and at sectoral level, in allowing for ‘flexibility’ at the mar-
gin, i.e. in the form of contracts that deviate from the ‘standard’ open-ended contract 
defined by employment protection legislation. As a result, an increasing share of the 
workforce has an employment contract that is fixed-term, or with a temporary work 
agency or is otherwise flexible (see figure 8.2). More recently, there has been a steady 
increase in self-employment, which is part of this ongoing tendency towards flexibiliza-
tion. In recent years, externalization in the form of cross-border recruitment of labour 
has further contributed to this trend. 
65  The SER advises the Dutch Government and Parliament on key points of social and economic policy. www.ser.nl/en/ 
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Figure 8.1  Labour force, union membership and union density, 
Netherlands, 1946-2012
Figure 8.2 Share of flexible workforce, Netherlands, 1996-2014
Source: Netherlands Statistics.
Source: Netherlands Statistics.
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The decline in union density has been mitigated by the relatively high level of collective 
bargaining coverage. In 2014, 85 per cent of all employees were covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement negotiated by one or more trade unions and employers’ asso-
ciations (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2014). This puts the Netherlands 
among the countries with the highest collective bargaining coverage rates in Europe 
(Eurofound, 2015). Rising self-employment has recently eroded this coverage to a cer-
tain extent, as the share of ‘direct’ labour hire (i.e. workers on permanent contracts) 
declines slightly within the total workforce, now standing at less than 70 per cent (figure 
8.2). Also the increase of temporary contracts (by mid-2015 up to 22 per cent of the 
total workforce) – in the form of agency workers, on-call workers, as well as workers on 
short contracts and zero-hours contract – has had an effect on union density (Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Employment, 2016).
The combined trends of declining union density and the increasing share of flexible 
labour have led to a somewhat weakened perception of trade union legitimacy – and, 
consequently, to a certain undermining of the legitimacy of social dialogue. Against 
this background, the problems caused by the financial crisis and subsequent reces-
sion in the period 2008-13 in the Netherlands placed additional strain on the process 
of social dialogue (CBS, 2013). In response, and especially after the dispute over 
pension reform, Dutch trade unions, including the Netherlands Trade Union Confed-
eration (FNV) in particular, seem to have opted for a more confrontational strategy in 
recent years.66 
Nevertheless, some major reforms were put into effect in the aftermath of the finan-
cial crisis. Social dialogue continued to be an integral and fundamental component 
of labour relations and the policy process in the country. Some reforms were directly 
related to the crisis, mainly to ease the strain on public finances (i.e. austerity meas-
ures); however, others concerned longstanding issues that were finally resolved, 
possibly benefiting from a political window of opportunity opened by the recession. 
In this chapter, we shall discuss the role of the social partners and social dialogue in 
the process of these reforms. We conclude that the Dutch social partners continue to 
believe in the mutual benefits of social dialogue for the near future. Once economic 
growth picks up again, easing the pressure on Government finances, there will most 
likely be scope for continued cooperation under the Polder Model. Although social 
dialogue and collective bargaining in the Netherlands have been under strain during 
the past few years, they have not fundamentally changed as a result of the financial 
crisis. A recent study (Eurofound, 2015) draws a similar conclusion of continuing strong 
Dutch tripartism and bipartism since the late 1990s. It concludes that before, during 
and after the crisis, the Dutch social partners have continued to reach agreement on 
issues such as: wages; social and employment policies (including implementation of 
EU Directives); industrial relations and labour law, including collective bargaining prac-
tice and procedures; and anti-crisis measures on competitiveness and productivity. 
The developments described in this chapter reflect relevant – but often limited and at 
times only temporary – crisis-related changes in social dialogue, rather than any radical 
break with the past.
66  The FNV members of Parliament formulated two key demands for the 2017 bargaining season: a 2.5 per cent 
wage increase and a fundamental shift from flexible jobs to permanent contracts. See: http://www.flexnieuws.
nl/2016/09/19/fnv-looneis-2-5-procent-en-meer-vaste-banen-in-2017/#.V-PH3DWDTcs 
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1 1 Methodology
We used a combination of desk research and interviews for this chapter. Many inter-
views were conducted for purposes other than the current study. Information was 
gathered from formal and informal talks with relevant stakeholders at the level of 
the national Government, the EU, tripartite and bipartite social dialogue institutions, 
employers’ associations and trade unions (including interest groups for the self-em-
ployed). These interviewees are listed in the appendix.
2. The macroeconomic and political context 
The financial crisis hit the Netherlands severely in 2008. As a result, GDP growth was 
negative (-3.8 per cent) in 2009 (see figure 8.3). After a short period of recovery in 
2010 and 2011, GDP growth was once again negative in 2012 and 2013. 
Figure 8.3  Gross domestic product (year-on-year percentage change), 
Netherlands, 2007-15
Source: Netherlands Statistics. *Estimated values. 
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Some observers argue that the recession in 2012 and 2013 was caused by the fiscal 
consolidation measures taken by the Government in an attempt to balance the budget, 
against the backdrop of a substantial decline in GDP. Nevertheless, the Government 
did succeed in reducing the budget deficit to below 3 per cent by 2013, although the 
public debt ratio remains well above the EU target of 60 per cent (figure 8.4). 
Less well known are the EU targets on trade surpluses. Importantly, large trade sur-
pluses in some countries (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands) place all the burden of 
adjustment on those other countries with trade deficits, which must undergo a painful 
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Figure 8.4 Government deficit and debt (% GDP), Netherlands, 2007-14
Source: Netherlands Statistics. *Estimated values.
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adjustment of wages and other costs in order to become more competitive. Therefore, 
the Netherlands (and Germany) should reduce its trade surplus, especially with other 
Eurozone countries. Within this context, the European Commission issued a recom-
mendation to the Netherlands in 2014 to allow wages to grow. Figure 8.5 shows that the 
Figure 8.5 Trade balance (% GDP), Netherlands, 2007-15
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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Figure 8.6 Unemployment rate in Netherlands and the EU (%), 2007-15
Source: Eurostat.
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Netherlands did not reduce its trade surplus immediately following the crisis, although 
it has decreased somewhat since 2012.
2 1 Labour market context 
Unemployment increased only slightly in the Netherlands in the immediate aftermath 
of the crisis relative to other EU countries, given the substantial drop in GDP. From 2011 
onwards, however, it started to grow more – in contrast to some other countries that 
started to see an economic recovery and a reduction in unemployment (figure 8.6). 
Long-term unemployment (especially among older workers) also increased quite 
significantly. 
No major differences in unemployment between men and women arose as a result of 
the crisis. Job losses initially occurred in industrial sectors (dominated by male workers), 
while employment in healthcare (dominated by female workers) continued to increase 
until 2012. Unemployment of women thus increased less rapidly than that of men.
The major difference between men and women in the Netherlands labour market is their 
share in part-time work; more than three-quarters of women work part-time, whereas 
only about one third of men do so. Both proportions are well above the EU average (see 
figure 8.7). This phenomenon did not change during the crisis. The Netherlands is still 
the largest ‘part-time economy’ in the world. But this cannot easily be interpreted as 
representing ‘hidden’ or ‘partial’ unemployment. The proportion of part-time workers in 
the Netherlands who indicate that this is not their free choice is still much lower than in 
any other country (although it has increased somewhat over the crisis years).
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Figure 8.7  Part-time employment (% of total employment, male/female), 
2007-14
Source: Eurostat.
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Figure 8.8  Temporary employment (% of total employment, male/female), 
2007-14
Source: Eurostat.
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Figure 8.9  Year-on-year change in price of labour, (%), 2002-13
Source: Netherlands Statistics, *estimated values.
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With respect to temporary work, differences between men and women are less 
pronounced but still evident. Temporary work is more often involuntary than freely 
chosen; the vast majority of temporary workers would prefer to have a permanent 
contract. Women are more likely than men to work on a temporary basis, and the 
share of temporary employment in the Netherlands for both sexes is higher than the 
EU average. It is striking that the share of temporary employment in the Netherlands 
for both sexes increased from 2011, while the gap between men and women started 
to narrow (see figure 8.8). This increase in temporary work is one of the main drivers 
of a broader flexibilization trend in the Dutch labour market, along with the increase 
in self-employment.
2 2 Serious wage fall and wage inequality
Although the full assessment of the impact of the crisis is still to come, publications 
already provide some insights. The annual Loonwijzer/Monsterboard Wage Index 
(based on a survey of 185,000 respondents) reveals that wages, as reported by work-
ers themselves, decreased in 2013 by 6 per cent compared to 2012. The average 
hourly wage went down from 15.50 to 14.60 Euros. Sectoral differences were remarka-
ble. The wage fall was the highest in IT (at -8.5 per cent) and banking (at -7.9 per cent), 
and the lowest in tourism and gastronomy (-1 per cent). Such contrasts partly relate 
to the structural increase in wage inequalities between 1977 and 2011 (Salverda et 
al., 2013). However, official statistics reveal that (estimated) wage costs for employers 
increased between 2012 and 2013, as shown in figure 8.9. This could be an indication 
that the increase in wage costs was due mainly to an increase in the so-called ‘tax 
wedge’, and did not result in higher net wages for workers. 
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In times of crisis, the customary recipe of austerity – balancing the public budget by 
lowering or freezing minimum wages and social benefits – has a strong negative effect 
on wages and income equality. The most recent report of the Netherlands Bureau 
for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB, 2015) reveals that the prevalence of precarious 
employment has risen at all skill levels in recent years, but that the rise began earlier 
among low-skilled workers, in 2003; among skilled workers, it started only in 2009. By 
2012, 18.5 per cent of low-skilled and 10 per cent of highly-skilled workers were in pre-
carious employment, compared to 12.5 per cent and 6 per cent, respectively, in 2003. 
The inequality in unemployment remained roughly unchanged, as did the difference in 
poverty between low-skilled and highly-skilled workers.
2 3 Political context 
The Netherlands traditionally has a coalition Government, either centre-left or cen-
tre-right. Typically, centre-left coalitions tend to foster social dialogue more than 
centre-right ones; but, as social dialogue is ‘hard-wired’ into the political system, it 
remains important in the policy-making process even under centre-right coalitions.
There were three Governments in power over the period 2007-15 (see table 8.1). The 
Rutte 1 cabinet was exceptional, comprising two coalition parties that did not have suf-
ficient parliamentary support. Additional support was provided by the PVV (Freedom 
Party), but they were not in the cabinet. The current Government is a two-party coali-
tion spanning the centre ground of politics, comprising the People’s Party for Freedom 
and Democracy (VVD) and the Labour Party (PvdA).
Table 8.1 Netherlands Governments, 2007-15
Government Prime 
minister
Parties Election 
year
Start date Demissionary/
Caretaker 67
End date
Balkenende IV Jan Peter 
Balkenende  
(CDA)
CDA, PvdA, CU 
(centre-left 
coalition)
2006 22 February 2007 20 February 2010 14 October 
2010
Rutte I Mark Rutte  
(VVD)
VVD, CDA
(centre-right 
coalition, 
minority)
2010 14 October 2010 23 April 2012 5 November 
2012
Rutte II Mark Rutte  
(VVD)
VVD, PvdA
(broad coalition)
2012 5 November 2012
67
The financial crisis put an additional strain on the process of political cooperation in 
coalition Governments. Besides, over the years, there has been a process of polarization 
and fragmentation in Dutch politics, making it increasingly difficult to build a coalition 
Government. A large number of coalition partners is needed, and some parties are not 
67  A “demissionary” cabinet is a type of ‘caretaker’ cabinet in the Netherlands, which continues the current government 
after a cabinet has ended. This can either be after completion of the full term of Government, between general 
elections (when the new House of Representatives is installed) when a new cabinet has not yet been formed, or 
following a cabinet crisis.
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able or willing to cooperate. The traditional “people’s parties” have lost a large share of 
their vote and now have to cooperate with a range of smaller and medium-size parties. 
At present, the Parliament consists of 16 different parties.
3.  The role of social dialogue in national policy-making  
in the post-crisis period
3 1 Introduction
3.1.1 The Social and Economic Council
As mentioned earlier in the text, the main body at the national level for social dialogue 
in the Netherlands is the Social and Economic Council (SER), which was legally estab-
lished by the 1950 Industrial Organization Act (Wet op de bedrijfsorganisatie). The SER 
is the main advisory body on social and economic policy to the Dutch Government and 
the Parliament. Its primary function is to provide advice with a view to promoting: 
• balanced economic growth and sustainable development; 
• the highest possible level of employment; and
• a fair distribution of income. 
The SER provides advice either upon a specific governmental request or at its own 
initiative, usually published in book form and available to the public. SER recommen-
dations are not binding on the Government, but the latter has to respond to the SER 
explaining in detail whether or not its advice will be followed, and why. 
The Government, in turn, recognizes that it requires broad social support for policy 
implementation. The SER reports help it determine the level of support that exists among 
the various representative members, including the social partners: unanimous advice 
indicates wide support, whereas a divided opinion pinpoints where support is lacking. 
Arguments put forward by the SER are also drawn upon in parliamentary debates.
The SER has 33 members, consisting of three groups each with 11 members. The 
first group represents the employers, the second represents the unions, and the third 
consists of independent or ‘Crown’ members appointed by Government.
The employers’ representatives are:
• Seven from the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (Verenig-
ing VNO/NCW) 
• Three from the Association of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (MKB 
Nederland) 
• One from the Dutch Organization for Agriculture and Horticulture (LTO) 
The union representatives are: 
• Eight from the Netherlands Trade Union Confederation (FNV) 
• Two from the National Federation of Christian Trade Unions in the Netherlands 
(CNV) 
• One from the Trade Union Federation for Professionals (VCP) 
Recently, both employers and trade unions have set aside one of their (replacement) 
member seats for a representative of the self-employed. In April 2010, Linde Gonggrijp 
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(for the trade union confederation FNV) and Esther Raats-Coster (for PZO, a platform 
for the self-employed) both became SER members.
Crown members are independent experts, often university professors with a chair in 
Economics, Finance, Law or Sociology. Appointed by the King, they are not account-
able to the Government. They are chosen with a view to reflecting different fields of 
interest and political views prevailing in the country.
The SER’s mission is to help create social consensus on national and international 
socio-economic issues. Its advisory reports have a dual role: to help shape cabinet 
policy while ensuring broad support from society, and to help ensure that the business 
sector operates in a socially responsible manner. Its advice is guided by the objective of 
social prosperity in the widest sense, encompassing material progress, social progress 
and high-quality environmental and living conditions.
The SER offers various civil society organizations the opportunity to contribute their 
specific expertise. It shares information extensively with universities and policy-makers 
in the Netherlands and abroad, and maintains regular contact with Parliament and 
various Government departments.
The related, but bipartite, Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid), was founded 
almost directly after the Second World War, on 17 May 1945, to contribute to com-
bined efforts to ‘rebuild’ the Dutch economy. In the beginning, it was primarily focused 
on wage formation but, over the course of time, its scope of work has been broad-
ened to include matters such as pensions, schooling, employability, work-life balance, 
whistle-blowers, and employment protection legislation. The main goal of the Labour 
Foundation is to promote good labour relations in the Netherlands. The Foundation 
holds annual spring and autumn meetings with the Government on labour market 
issues. The SER and the Labour Foundation operate in close cooperation and are 
located in the same building in The Hague. 
3 2 National reforms and labour market developments between 2009 and 2012
The limited number of structural reforms between 2009 and 2012 may be ascribed 
to two main factors: the crisis had only a relatively mild impact at the beginning of this 
period and there were frequent changes of Government. The reform of the pension 
system illustrates both the contribution of the social partners to the final legislative pro-
posals and the strained relationship between them. Among other things, negotiations 
in the SER were tenser than before the crisis.
3.2.1 The labour market and wages
The immediate impact of the financial crisis on the labour market in the Netherlands 
seemed rather mild compared to other EU countries. Although the country went into 
a deep recession, unemployment rates did not increase dramatically – the result of 
a tight labour market before the crisis, in which many companies had difficulties 
attracting labour. The growing availability of labour was thus a relief and enabled the 
filling of vacancies. Moreover, companies hoarded labour as they expected that short-
ages would reappear once the crisis ended, also in view of the ageing work force 
(CPB, 2011). 
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During the first crisis period, the social partners helped to achieve (or rather, continue) 
wage moderation. In exchange for wage increases around the inflation rate of 1 per 
cent, the parties agreed to abolish the payment of unemployment benefit premiums 
by employees (NRC, 2009). This reduced the impact on net wages, thus keeping pur-
chasing power relatively stable. Moreover, the Government implemented a wage freeze 
for civil servants. 
3.2.2 Part-time unemployment scheme
A first Government policy response to the crisis was the implementation of the tempo-
rary part-time unemployment scheme, between October 2008 and July 2011. This was 
a follow-up to the short-time working arrangement used by companies when the crisis 
first started. The scheme aimed to reduce unemployment and was stopped once the 
first recovery period began (around 2011, see figure 8.3). 
3.2.3 Pension reform
For a long time, the Netherlands had a policy objective to link the statutory retirement 
age to (increasing) life expectancy. This was strengthened upon advice from interna-
tional bodies, including the EU’s country-specific recommendations (CSR). Following 
the reform to the first-pillar pension system (which essentially guarantees a lifelong 
basic income, not means-tested, to persons aged 65 years and over), the CSRs are 
continuing to suggest a reform of the second pillar (arrangements for a supplementary 
pension by employers); they are also advising the Netherlands to improve intra-gener-
ational solidarity.68 Pension reform has been a long-standing and controversial issue. 
In 2009, the Balkenende IV Government proposed increasing the statutory retirement 
age to 66 years in 2020 – and to 67 years in 2025. The Government started consul-
tations with the social partners but quickly encountered strong resistance from the 
largest trade union, the FNV, and also a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the employers 
(Goudswaard, 2011). To try to garner more support, the parties started talks within 
the bipartite-plus setting of the SER, but this did not result in any alternative reform 
plans being proposed. The failure to reach agreement put a serious strain on the rela-
tionship between the trade unions and employers’ associations (ibid.). Eventually, the 
Government proposed new pension legislation but, due to elections, this was not imple-
mented. Faced with the continuing challenge of an ageing society, the social partners 
resumed talks within the framework of the bipartite Labour Foundation, which resulted 
in a proposed pension agreement in June 2010. This agreement also failed to get 
widespread support, leading to the conclusion of a second agreement in June 2011 
in the Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid, 2011). This formed the basis of a 
subsequent legislative proposal – which was finally implemented.
3 3 National reforms and labour market developments between 2012 and 2015
During this period, some major reforms were implemented in the areas of employment 
contracts and social security. The social partners played a role in most of these dos-
siers. Both the SER and the Labour Foundation continued to play their ‘institutional’ 
68  For more details on the Dutch pension system, see Van der Smitte (2013).
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role, meaning that the regular interactions between the social partners took place. 
These years witnessed the worst impact of the crisis in the Netherlands, which put the 
negotiations under serious strain. But this did not change the role of these institutions 
in any meaningful way. They continued to operate under these difficult circumstances, 
indicating the strength of these institutions in the Dutch Polder Model.
3.3.1 Employment protection legislation and unemployment benefits 
The current Dutch Government came to power in 2012, and one of its initial aims was 
to look into the balance between open-ended and fixed-term employment contracts. 
This was prompted by the growing labour market flexibilization, which in some cases 
had led to abusive conditions. Another reason was the longstanding debate on the 
revision of employment protection legislation, which had not yet resulted in legislative 
change. In 2013, agreement was reached on rebalancing flexibility and security, and 
this was formalized in a Social Pact with the social partners (see box 8.1). 
Box 8.1 Main components of the Social Pact, 2013
• Employers and employees will together be responsible for preventing unemploy-
ment wherever possible  One way of doing this is to facilitate job mobility  In line 
with this changing division of responsibilities, the labour market’s social infrastruc-
ture will be revised 
• To ensure equal treatment, compulsory procedures for termination of employment 
will be introduced  Employees threatened with redundancy will be entitled to an 
allowance to enable them to train for a new job 
• The position of employees with temporary contracts will be strengthened 
• Business owners will help an additional 100,000 people with an occupational disa-
bility to find work  The Government will help an additional 25,000 people 
The ensuing ‘Work and Security Act’ (adopted in 2014) includes a number of different 
initiatives. Henceforth, the public employment agency (UWV) will examine dismissal 
procedures, redundancies on commercial and economic grounds and cases of long-
term incapacity for work, whereas individual dismissals on personal or behavioural 
grounds will appear before a court. The aim is to make redundancy processes faster 
and less costly, on average. This system is accompanied by a so-called ‘transit allow-
ance’ (transitievergoeding) for employees who have worked for at least two years for 
the same employer. This measure aims to make it easier for redundant workers to find 
a new job or switch careers, by using the allowance to fund training or outplacements. 
The size of the allowance depends on length of tenure.69 
Regarding fixed-term employment, the maximum number (chain) of consecutive con-
tracts has been decreased with the aim of reducing the time needed for a worker to 
69  The general rule is one third of a month's salary per year of tenure and half a month's salary for each year of tenure 
above ten years. There is a ceiling of 75,000 Euros – or a year's salary – for people who earn more than 75,000 
Euros per year.
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secure an open-ended position. The new maximum is two consecutive contracts for 
a duration of two years, with an interval of six months between contracts to restart the 
chain. The possibility to deviate from the national law in collective labour agreements 
is limited.
Concerning unemployment benefits, the maximum duration of public payment is to be 
reduced in steps – by one month per quarter – from 38 months in December 2015 
to 24 months as of 2019. However, the social partners are examining how to pay for a 
third year of benefits themselves, possibly through collective labour agreements.
3.3.2 From the Work Capability Act to the Participation Act
In order to stimulate labour participation, the Government developed the Work Capa-
bility Act “Wet werken naar vermogen” (WWNV), which was renamed the Participation 
Act (Participatiewet). It entered into effect in 2015. The new Act merges three separate 
Acts, covering social assistance claimants, young workers with a disability, and workers 
in sheltered employment. Its primary goal is to improve the options for these groups 
to integrate into the regular labour market. The first indications are that the new Act 
is unlikely to be more successful than its predecessors, in part due to budget cuts for 
reintegration activities.
3.3.3 Funds for fighting unemployment
The lack of jobs and rising unemployment became a major issue around 2013, and 
public funds were made available to fight unemployment – particularly youth unem-
ployment. These funds, often co-financed, at times required the support of the social 
partners and regional-level actors. The initiatives developed into sectoral-level job plans 
– inter alia in the childcare, welfare and youth care sectors, the temporary work agency 
sector, and the chemical industry and the painting sector. The plans are initially drafted 
by the social partners at sectoral level, evaluated by the Government and, if found cred-
ible, they are co-financed. It remains to be seen whether these plans will indeed deliver 
more jobs, or whether they will rather result in increased training initiatives and fewer 
people in unemployment due to their transfer into jobs in other sectors. The Minister 
of Social Affairs and Employment has recently stated that the prevention of unemploy-
ment is an additional legitimate goal for sectoral-level job plans.
3 4 The role of the European Semester 
The European Semester, with its strengthened economic coordination, was imple-
mented during the same period – covering the financial crisis and its aftermath (Bekker, 
2014). Dutch socio-economic policies are evaluated within the European Semester, 
and its recommendations address national-level policy challenges. Each year, the 
bipartite Labour Foundation writes a report on ways in which the social partners are 
contributing to meet the main goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy. Both the SER and the 
Labour Foundation are continuously involved in discussing socio-economic proposals, 
irrespective of whether or not they are specifically related to the EU Semester.
The policy suggestions communicated to the Netherlands via the CSR have always 
been a mix of fiscal requirements, economic policies and social ambitions. Especially in 
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the first years of the crisis, when the Dutch government struggled to meet the Stability 
and Growth Pact criterion of a maximum budgetary deficit of 3 per cent, the emphasis 
was on reducing Government expenditure. However, this call for austerity has always 
been accompanied by the message to invest in growth-enhancing activities such as 
education, innovation and research. Thus, while stricter EU fiscal surveillance has a 
significant impact on welfare states – as tight budgetary criteria make expansionary 
public spending more difficult (De la Porte and Heins 2015) – the CSRs do give some 
space for Member States to plea for investing in their economy (Bekker, 2016). In 2014, 
the Netherlands met the fiscal target of 3 per cent, thereby considerably reducing the 
pressure to make budget cuts. Nonetheless, the need to invest more in research and 
development remained an issue. Other main topics addressed in the CSRs include 
labour market participation rates, especially of vulnerable groups, and the housing 
market. Second-pillar pension reform and intra-generational solidarity remain current 
subjects of discussion. Furthermore, the issues of reducing employment protection leg-
islation and limiting unemployment benefit entitlements were addressed in the CSR 
2013, but only after they had already been raised within the Dutch political context – 
as part of the debates leading up to the Social Pact agreed with the social partners in 
2013. Here, a bottom-up insertion of national concerns in EU-level recommendations 
seems to be the case. In essence, this has also given the bargaining outcomes of the 
Government and the social partners an outlet in EU-level coordination. This insertion 
of national ideas into the EU policy-making process is an important observation when 
determining the room for Member States to add a national flavour to EU socio-economic 
coordination. This space is enlarged by the flexibility the fiscal rules offer to Member 
States,70 as well as by the social concerns the European Semester addresses alongside 
fiscal and economic concerns. Examples of the latter are explained in the next section. 
3.4.1 Recommendations on labour market participation and vulnerable groups
In the CSRs, consistent attention has been devoted to the position of the most vul-
nerable groups in the labour market. In 2012, the main focus was on enhancing 
“participation in the labour market, particularly of older people, women, and people 
with disabilities and migrants, (…) by further reducing tax disincentives for second-in-
come earners, fostering labour market transitions, and addressing rigidities” (European 
Commission, 2012a). In 2013 the advice included: “(.) to reduce tax disincentives on 
labour, including by a faster phasing-out of transferable tax credits for second-income 
earners, foster labour-market transitions and address labour market rigidities, including 
by accelerating the reform of employment protection legislation and the unemployment 
benefit system” (European Commission, 2013). The topic of wages was introduced 
in 2014: “In consultation with the social partners and in accordance with national 
practice, allow for more differentiated wage increases by making full use of the existing 
institutional framework” (European Commission, 2014).
The Government has made it clear, however, that wages do not fall within its com-
petence, but rather belong to the domain of social partner bargaining (European 
70  The position of the European Commission on the flexible use of fiscal rules is published in its 2015 Communication 
(European Commission, 2015b). However, the flexibility might also be indicated by the absence of sanctions on 
countries that have consistently failed to meet the debt and deficit rules, including the recent decision not to impose 
fines on Spain and Portugal in 2016. 
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Commission, 2015a). The issue did not return in subsequent CSRs, suggesting that 
the protective reaction of the Dutch Government succeeded in shielding the autonomy 
of the social partners. Other issues have been raised in EC background documents; 
for example, the 2011 Commission staff working document concluded that there 
was little evidence for the effectiveness of the proposed Participation Act, especially 
concerning the low-skilled (Bekker and Klosse, 2013). As the Participation Act was 
combined with major reductions in budgets for sheltered workplaces and reintegra-
tion tools, the Commission suspected ‘considerable implementation risks’ that could 
hinder municipalities to properly perform the requested tasks (European Commission, 
2012b). 
3 5 Concluding remarks on post-crisis social dialogue
The crisis put serious strain on social dialogue in the Netherlands. It is always more 
difficult to negotiate and distribute the pain of austerity measures than to negotiate 
how to distribute the fruits of economic growth. Negotiations regarding the pension 
system were particularly difficult. Nevertheless, the ‘Polder Model” has shown great 
resilience in accommodating some substantial reforms in the post-crisis years, with-
out requiring significant change to the institutions. In recent years, the fact of having 
a Social Democrat as Minister of Employment and Social Affairs has perhaps led to 
greater involvement of the social partners and dialogue institutions in the policy-making 
process, making them go beyond their ‘formal’ role.
4.  Industrial relations and collective bargaining  
in the post-crisis period
4 1 Wage bargaining and other topics for collective bargaining
It should be noted that industrial relations and collective bargaining are intricately con-
nected with the policy-making process described above. For example, the second pillar 
of the pension system is the full responsibility of the social partners and an integral part 
of collective wage bargaining. But, at the same time, it is closely connected with the 
statutory old-age pension of the first pillar (AOW). This means that an increase in the 
statutory retirement age (as decided by Government policy) has a ‘natural’ follow up in 
the process of wage bargaining between the social partners.
The Dutch wage-setting system relies heavily on coordinated wage bargaining. The 
agreement made at central (national) level serves as advice for negotiations between 
unions and employers’ associations at industry- or company-level, where the actual 
negotiation of contracts and wages takes place. The sectoral level is still the domi-
nant level for bargaining, although the number of company agreements is increasing. 
Wage setting in the Netherlands is not exclusively restricted to the bargaining between 
employers and employees; in addition, a statutory minimum wage exists, as laid down 
by the Minimum Wages and Minimum Holiday Allowance Act of 1968. The statutory 
minimum wage has thus coexisted with an extensive system of wage setting by collec-
tive bargaining for half a century. 
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Because of a legal extension procedure and a high density of employers’ associations,71 
more than 80 per cent of employees are covered by a generally binding collective 
agreement. In this way, wages are set in a collective agreement for the large majority 
of employees. As a result, individual wage bargaining is very limited. Furthermore, the 
system provides for relatively peaceful employment relations and social stability: rela-
tively few working days are lost in strikes. 
At both the central and the decentralized levels of collective labour agreements, Dutch 
labour unions have shown great moderation at the negotiation table in recent decades. 
This may be attributed to a continued consensus about the beneficial effects of wage 
moderation – and this has led to moderate wage increases compared to productivity 
growth. The call for a higher level of wage growth has become somewhat louder in 
recent years, and was included once in the CSR of the EU to the Netherlands. Reasons 
for this are the below-inflation wage growth of the past years, which has affected con-
sumer confidence and purchasing power. 
The Dutch social partners have a very broad bargaining agenda, including not only 
wages but also so-called secondary arrangements such as education and training, 
maternity leave, fixed-term contracts and pre-pensions. The Dutch General Employ-
ers’ Association (AWVN) in fact considers wages to be less and less the focal point of 
collective negotiations (AWVN, 2011). More than half of collective agreements contain 
measures to increase general employability – for instance, training. 
Table 8.2  Evaluation of themes in collective labour agreements (CLA) concluded 
in 2010 and in 2011 (preliminary evaluation) 
Theme in CLA 2010 (%) 2011 (%)
Long-term employability 70 83
General employability 50 59
of which youth 38 33
of which young people with a disability 18 16
Age-related personnel policies 32 55
Diversity 35 49
of which youth 21 23
of which young people with a disability 19 38
Average wage increase past 12 months 1.09 1.68
Most common agreement on wage increase 1 2
Source: AWVN (2016).
71  Sixty to 70 per cent of all companies are members of employers' organization with competences to bargain collectively 
with employees’ representatives. By contrast, only around 20 per cent of employees are members of trade unions. 
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4 2 Assessment of collective bargaining since the crisis
There was not really a sharp divide between the periods 2008-12 and 2013-15 in terms 
of collective bargaining. Although discussions between the social partners were some-
times difficult – most notably during the debate on pensions – they have, until now, 
always resumed talks and reached agreements at the national level. The long-standing 
trends of flexibilization and the ageing workforce have the potential to influence the 
bargaining relationship more than the crisis ever did. However, some interesting trends 
and examples may be identified at the sectoral level. We shall focus in this section on 
general trends in collective bargaining at sectoral level, and give some relevant exam-
ples. These trends reflect the wide variety of collective bargaining agreements within 
the Dutch economy, which depend also on the specific conditions in a sector.
In 2013, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment analysed the development of 
collective bargaining. The report’s analysis was based on a sample of 100 collective 
agreements, which applied in total to 5.1 million workers. Its findings – about the pay of 
direct labour, the floor in the wage structure and distribution, average working time and 
other working conditions – can therefore be regarded as representative for bargaining 
development in 2013 (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2014). 
Average gross pay increased in 2013 by 1.5 per cent, although there was a disparity in 
wage development between the public sector and the private sector. In the same year, 
the level of the lowest wage scales in collective agreements was 1.4 per cent above the 
level of the statutory minimum wage. Compared to 2012, this ratio had deteriorated. 
The gap between collectively agreed wages and the statutory minimum wage was 
the widest among young workers. In the lowest wage scale, the difference between a 
starter and a worker with the maximum years of service was on average 25.7 per cent. 
In the highest pay scale, the difference between the maximum and the minimum was 
substantially higher (at 39.8 per cent). The collectively agreed working time varied from 
36 to 40 hours per week and was on average 37.1 hours. Two types of flexible pay were 
defined: one-time and structural grants on the one hand, and performance-related 
payments on the other. In 72 of the 100 agreements under consideration, provisions 
for flexible pay were settled: on one-time and structural grants in 58 agreements, and 
on performance-related payments in 31 (17 agreements foresaw both types of flexible 
pay). Flexible pay was most prevalent in company-level agreements: 89 per cent of 
the company agreements included one or more forms of flexible pay, against 66 per 
cent of sectoral-level agreements. In its latest report, the Ministry signals a relatively 
stable pattern in flexible pay arrangements over the period 2011-15, except for a recent 
growth of the nominal one-time payments and the 13th month allowances (Ministry of 
Social Affairs, 2016). 
In its regular press releases in 2014 and 2015, the employers’ association AWVN 
sounded the alarm about the poor record of collective labour agreements. The AWVN 
is involved in the bargaining process of over 450 collective agreements (approximately 
65 per cent of the total) and over 300 fringe benefit arrangements. One reason for the 
delay in concluding collective agreements was, according to the AWVN, the trade union 
FNV’s demand for a 3 per cent pay increase in 2014, which the AWVN found ‘unre-
alistic’. Obviously, the FNV thought otherwise and pointed out that wage increases in 
the Netherlands had not been in line with productivity gains for a long time already, in 
sharp contrast to the increasing profits for business in recent years. As a consequence, 
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dozens of collective agreements that expired in 2013 were not initially renewed. For 
instance, in the period January-February 2014, only 20 agreements were finalized, 
substantially below the average number of 50 for the same period in previous years. In 
the spring of 2015, some labour market observers again reported a serious delay in the 
conclusion of collective agreements. In several large industries and certain sectors, like 
the metal sector, negotiations were blocked for a long time with no clear idea as to how 
they would evolve and their eventual outcome (meaning that the old agreement stayed 
valid for a longer time period). In another important sector, the hospitality industry, the 
main employers’ organization decided to refrain from new negotiations after the col-
lective agreement expired in mid-2014; instead, it produced a standard employment 
conditions model for its members without the involvement of the unions. 
This development was seen as an indication of a tougher climate and a deterioration in 
industrial relations. The fact that so many agreements were put on ice meant that the 
social partners did not pick up on other vital items for discussion (such as reform of 
the labour market, employability, pensions and working time). Moreover, the average 
wage increase in the concluded agreements (at around 1.5 per cent) was lower than 
had been predicted in the forecasts of the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis (CPB). Although the economic outlook was improving, there was little indica-
tion of an upward trend in concluded pay deals. A further blow to the relatively peaceful 
tradition of dialogue and bargaining was the fact that, shortly before the parliamentary 
recess in 2015, the Government struck a deal with a number of trade unions – but not 
the largest one, the FNV – for a 5 per cent pay increase and a one-off bonus payment 
of 500 Euros in the public sector, after years of having a wage freeze policy in place.
However, this picture can be nuanced. In fact, several sectoral agreements that expired 
in 2014 were renewed either during or after the summer of 2015. And in a final assess-
ment of the 2015 bargaining period, the AWVN referred to a “two-faced year”. On 
the one hand, the year had got off to a difficult and slow start; on the other hand, the 
annual outcome was in line with the usual overall results, and negotiations had involved 
bargaining partners who had worked towards renewal, mutual trust, tailor-made solu-
tions, joint responsibility and mature industrial relations. By the end of 2015, 72 per 
cent of all expiring collective agreements had been renewed – a percentage that was 
even slightly higher than the normal 70 per cent (AWVN, 2016).
The difficulties in concluding collective labour agreements in some sectors did not 
translate into a consistently higher incidence of strike action (figure 8.10). The year 
2012 was more volatile in terms of working days lost, but in 2013 and 2014 the number 
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decreased again. Overall, unrest in industrial relations remains relatively rare in the 
Netherlands (CBS, 2015). 
A remarkable shift in the course of 2015 was that negotiators opted increasingly 
for peace and contract security, with agreements that had a duration of more than 
twelve months. In the 2013-14 period, 47 per cent of collective agreements had a 
duration of one year, while 33 per cent were for two years or more. In 2015, the 
respective rates were 34 per cent (one year) and 44 per cent (two years or more). 
The AWVN considers this to be normal in a period following an economic crisis. It is 
the consequence of the renewal of structural parts of the collective agreement and 
the introduction of new items (such as the promotion of employability, attention to 
diversity and assistance for people with difficulties finding work) that require imple-
mentation over a longer period. 
5. Conclusions 
All in all, it is fair to say that no major changes occurred in the process of social dia-
logue and collective bargaining as a result of the financial crisis in the Netherlands. 
The ‘Polder Model” is under strain due to longstanding trends of flexibilization and 
de-unionization in the labour market. The dismal economic circumstances in the years 
after 2008 clearly put an additional strain on social dialogue, but the institutions and 
the social partners showed resilience in dealing with the challenges arising from the 
Figure 8.10 Working days lost and labour disputes, 1999-2015
Source: Netherlands Statistics.
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crisis. Eventually, major social policy reforms and new collective labour agreements 
were agreed upon.
This might give cause for optimism in the future of the ‘Polder Model” – but the fact 
remains that these trends of flexibilization of the labour market and declining union 
membership have not ceased; quite the contrary. Most commentators expect the new 
Work and Security Act to have a minimal impact on slowing the progress of labour 
market flexibilization. In addition, the Dutch trade unions do not seem to have found a 
solution for their declining membership. As regards the recent social security reforms, 
the first signs are not convincing in terms of improving the re-integration of vulnerable 
groups into the labour market.
Furthermore, looking at the discussions in the European Semester process (among 
other things), macroeconomic policy measures to balance the budget are sometimes 
clearly at odds with the social policy goals that are the topic of social dialogue. The 
EU’s top policy priority was a reduction in Government expenditure. However, for the 
Netherlands, this fiscal consolidation message was combined with recommendations 
to invest in growth-enhancing activities and to ensure that vulnerable groups could join 
the labour market. While the fiscal consolidation target was part of the daily political 
debate, the more socially-oriented recommendations were hardly discussed.
The financial crisis has not weakened the process of social dialogue in the Netherlands 
but, together with the subsequent recessions, it has shown that it is vulnerable. This 
should be a matter of concern for the tripartite partners most directly involved, and 
in national and European political arenas. At the same time, the Netherlands must 
consider itself lucky to have enjoyed such stable institutions for social dialogue over 
the years. 
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Appendix 
List of persons interviewed for the study
Among the people listed below, some were interviewed specifically for the purpose of 
this study. The majority, however, are people with whom the authors are in regular close 
contact with respect to relevant issues. Many other (unlisted) officials also contributed.
Government 
Maurice Doll, Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs (Government)
Employers’ Organizations
Esther Raats-Coster, PZO (self-employed entrepreneurs’ interest group, SER member)
Workers’ Organizations
Robbert Coenmans, FNV Jong (Trade union, youth organization)
Ron van Baden, FNV Bondgenoten (trade union)
Linde Gonggrijp, FNV Zelfstandigen (trade union for self-employed, SER member)
Others
Mariette Hamer, SER (chairwoman SER, previously: Member of Parliament (PvdA))
Nicolette van Gestel, SER (Crown member, professor at TIAS/Tilburg University).
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9.  Sustaining social dialogue though  
the crisis: The Slovakian experience
ludOViT cziria
1. Introduction 
This chapter analyses the role of social dialogue in Slovakia in combating the economic 
crisis in the 2008-09 period, and during the recovery from 2010 until the present. It 
examines the involvement of the social partners in designing national policy reforms 
and developing industrial relations, tripartite social dialogue and collective bargaining. 
The focus is on the activities of the social partners and the Government within the 
framework of the national tripartite Economic and Social Council (HSR); the chapter 
first examines developments from the second half of 2008 until the end of 2009, when 
the crisis was at its height and its repercussions were most strongly felt, and then the 
period from 2010 onwards, when the recovery started.
The economic crisis had a serious impact on the economy and the population of 
Slovakia. The Government responded by adopting and implementing anti-crisis meas-
ures and introducing changes in labour legislation, for which the social partners 
were consulted within the HSR. The role of tripartite social dialogue increased and 
was consolidated by the Council for the Economic Crisis (RHK), which was estab-
lished by the Government in early 2009. Tripartite social dialogue continued after the 
recovery started in 2010, but attention shifted to the adoption and implementation of 
national reform programmes and related plans, and to changes in labour legislation. 
This had significant repercussions on industrial and labour relations during the period 
2011-15. 
The chapter first gives a brief description of the country’s political background, and 
then summarizes the impact of the crisis and post-crisis developments on the econ-
omy, labour market, industrial relations and collective bargaining. 
As regards social dialogue, it briefly presents the situation leading up to the crisis, 
before detailing events during the crisis years (2008-09) and the post-crisis period 
(from 2010 onwards). The report is based on extensive desk research as well as inter-
views with the relevant actors participating in national social dialogue during the periods 
under examination.
The desk research mainly included an analysis of:
• the country’s economic, labour market and political background; 
• the roles of the social partners and the Government in social dialogue;
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• the national tripartite social dialogue institutions, particularly the Economic and 
Social Council; and
• collective bargaining and its associated outcomes.
The following information sources were used:
• legislation, mainly concerning tripartite consultation, the Labour Code and col-
lective bargaining; 
• minutes from meetings of the HSR and of the Slovak Government;
• the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family (MPSVR SR); 
• workers’ and employers’ organizations; and
• Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic and the Information Sys-
tem on Working Conditions (ISPP). 
To obtain authentic information on tripartite procedures and consultations, the desk 
research was complemented by a series of interviews with representatives of the 
social partners and organizations involved in tripartite national social dialogue. These 
included: the Secretary of the HSR; representatives of the MPSVR SR; the Confeder-
ation of Trade Unions of the Slovak Republic (KOZ SR); the Federation of Employers’ 
Associations (AZZZ); the National Union of Employers (RUZ); the Ministry of Finance; 
and a representative of Industry Bipartite. In addition, a representative of the European 
Commission (EC) in Slovakia was interviewed. In total, nine interviews were under-
taken; the complete list is given in the appendix. 
2. The macroeconomic and political context 
2 1 The macroeconomic context
After the implementation of economic and social reforms in the early 2000s, the Slo-
vak economy was developing well, until the advent of the crisis. During the period 
2004-08, Slovakia – with an average annual GDP growth of 7.3 per cent – was among 
the countries with the highest economic growth in the EU. This growth resulted in 
increased employment and wages, which grew in real as well as in nominal terms. 
According to the Slovak Statistical Office (ŠÚ SR), average real wages increased by 
3.8 per cent between 2007 and 2008. The unemployment rate, which had been at 
more than 18 per cent in 2004, gradually decreased to a level of 9.6 per cent in 2008. 
The economic crisis had a serious impact, especially during the period 2008-09. 
According to ŠÚ SR, industrial production dropped by 14.6 per cent between 2008 
and 2009; this resulted in lower performance in an economy heavily dependent upon 
exports, particularly of cars and tools for machinery. In 2009, GDP decreased by 
5.5 per cent. Due to additional expenditure for the implementation of anti-crisis meas-
ures, the State budget deficit increased from 2.3 per cent in 2008 to 7.9 per cent in 
2009. In the course of 2010, however, the economy started to recover, a trend that 
was linked closely to increasing orders – particularly from other EU countries. Slovak 
exports increased, mainly to Germany, and GDP grew again in 2010 by 5.1 per cent. 
Since 2011, the employment rate has also been increasing, reaching 61.0 per cent 
in 2014; but it has not yet regained its pre-crisis level and remains among the lowest 
rates in the EU-28. Despite the Government’s efforts to bring the budget deficit below 
3 per cent, this was only achieved in 2013. In parallel, the public debt increased from 
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35.6 per cent of GDP in 2009 to 54.6 per cent in 2013. By 2015, the Government 
deficit was 2.7 per cent, while its debt stood at 52.9 per cent of GDP. 
On 1 January 2009, Slovakia joined the Eurozone, which was important for its mone-
tary stability; indeed, annual inflation decreased from an average of 3.4 per cent during 
the 2006-08 period to 0.9 per cent in 2009. After a small increase in the period 2011-
13, the inflation rate decreased again, and by December 2014 it stood at – 0.1 per 
cent, resulting in higher real wages. This trend continued into 2015. Table 9.1 presents 
data on selected key economic indicators. 
Table 9.1 Macroeconomic context
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
GDP change over the previous year (%) 10.8 5.7 -5.5 5.1 2.8 1.5 1.4 2.5 
Employment rate (15-64 year olds) (%) 60.7 62.3 60.2 58.8 59.3 59.7 59.9 61.0
Fiscal deficit (% of GDP) 1.9 2.3 7.9 7.5 4.1 4.2 2.6 2.8
Government debt (% of GDP)   35.56 40.99 43.28 51.94 54.56 53.47
International trade balance  
(million Euro) 400 -500 -100 -700 -400 300 100
Source: Eurostat and ŠÚ SR. 
2 2 The labour market context
In late 2008, employers responded to the emerging recession by embarking on 
company restructuring. From October 2008 to May 2009, employers reported mass 
dismissals of more than 37,000 employees to the regional offices of the Central Office 
of Labour, Social Affairs and Family (ÚPSVAR), mainly in industry. The unemployment 
rate grew from 9.6 per cent in 2008 to 14.5 per cent in 2010, but decreased thereaf-
ter. Although 23,367 employees were affected by mass dismissals in 2009, this figure 
dropped to 3,173 by 2012. This trend continued into 2013 and 2014, with the collec-
tive dismissal of 2,675 and 1,787 employees, respectively. Nevertheless, the crisis had 
a long-term impact on employment rates. For example, the employment rate of 20-64 
year olds decreased, for men, from 77.4 per cent in 2008 to 71.9 per cent in 2010, and 
for women, from 60.3 per cent in 2008 to 57.5 per cent in 2010; employment has still 
not reached pre-crisis levels. High unemployment (above 12 per cent) was sustained 
and its reduction is slow (see table 9.2).
In the third quarter of 2015, the unemployment rate was still at 11.3 per cent, while 
high long-term unemployment and youth unemployment persisted. According to 
Eurostat, long-term unemployment increased from 6.5 per cent in 2009 to between 
9 and 10 per cent from 2010 to 2014, one of the highest rates in the EU. With the 
exception of 2011, women’s long-term unemployment was slightly higher than men’s. 
The youth unemployment rate (age group 15-24 years) increased from 20.1 per cent in 
2007 to 33.6 per cent in 2013, but then dropped back to 27.9 per cent in 2014 (OECD, 
2015) with little gender difference. 
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Table 9.2 Developments in the labour market
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Unemployment rate (%) 11.2 9.6 12.1 14.5 13.7 14.0 14.2 13.2
Long-term unemployment (%) 8.3 6.7 6.5 9.3 9.3 9.4 10.0
Share of part-time work (%) 2.6 2.7 3.6 3.9 4.2 4.1 4.8 5.2
Women/men wage ratio (%) 74.7 75.3 75.8 75.9 77.5 77.0*
Nominal wage increase (%) 7.2 8.1 3.0 3.2 2.2 2.4 2.4 4.1
Real wage increase (%) 4.3 3.3 1.4 2.2 -1.6 -1.2 1.0 4.2
Sources: Eurostat, ŠÚ SR (Gender equality 2014) and Informacný systém o priemerných zárobkoch 4Q/2014*, 
MPSVR SR, Trexima. 
The recovery was closely linked to increasing export orders – but the anti-crisis measures 
adopted, including changes in legislation, also played an important role in maintaining 
employment. According to the ÚPSVAR, these measures helped save up to 45,000 
jobs (SME, 2009). It is claimed that if these measures had not been implemented, 
the unemployment rate in Slovakia would have been 2.3 per cent higher in 2009 
(Kárász, 2009). 
The crisis also slowed down wage growth. During the 2007-08 period, average nominal 
wages increased by 7-8 per cent, but this figure dropped to only 3 per cent in 2009-10, 
declining to a low of 2.2 per cent in 2011, before recovering to more than 4 per cent in 
2014. Real wages showed negative growth in the 2011-12 period, but turned positive 
in 2013. The gender pay gap fluctuated around 25 per cent. For instance, in 2009 it 
was 25.3 per cent, but this decreased to 22.5 per cent in 2013. Conversely, the share 
of part-time work continues to remain low, despite doubling over the period 2007-14 
(from 2.6 per cent to 5.2 per cent). As may be expected, the rate of part-time work 
among women is much higher than it is among men. 
2 3 The political context
In 2005, the right-leaning coalition government of Mikuláš Dzurinda (the Slovak Demo-
cratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (SDKÚ-DS)) paradoxically abolished the 
Act on the Economic and Social Concertation Council (RHSD), which his previous Gov-
ernment had adopted in 2000, replacing it with the Economic and Social Partnership 
Council (RHSP), established under Government Decree. In 2006, the first coalition 
government of Robert Fico (Direction – Social Democracy (SMER-SD)) agreed with 
the social partners on transforming the RHSP into the Economic and Social Council 
(HSR). Since 2007, Act No. 103/2007 on national tripartite consultations has regulated 
this tripartite body. Interestingly, the conservative-liberal coalition government of Iveta 
Radicová (also SDKÚ-DS) of 2010-12 accepted this tripartite body adopted by the 
previous socialist Government of Fico. Table 9.3 shows the successive Governments 
over the period 2006-16.
Changes to labour legislation were a significant part of the political agenda of the Gov-
ernments in power during the 2010-12 and 2012-16 periods. Between 2011 and 2013, 
ˇ
ˇ
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a total of 11 amendments were made to the Labour Code. Two of them introduced 
substantive changes to the governance of work, employment and industrial relations. 
They were driven by completely opposed political motivations and worldviews (Bulla 
et al., 2014). Changes made by the Radicová Government mainly aimed at labour 
market liberalization and more flexible employment relationships. Trade unions were 
disappointed by these changes and distrust between them and the Government grew. 
By contrast, measures implemented in 2012 by the Fico Government paid greater 
attention to workers’ employment security and social protection, and supported more 
involvement of trade unions in social dialogue at company level. There was, in effect, 
a “policy competition” between Governments. Significant changes made by the Fico 
Government to the Labour Code in 2007 were subsequently amended by the Radicová 
Government in 2011. Trade unions demanded the reinstatement of their previous rights 
and competences. After an early election in 2012, the Fico Government returned to 
power and, as promised before the election, reversed most of the previous changes 
through amendments to the Labour Code. The social-democratic Fico Government 
was more open to trade union demands than the Radicová Government, which leant 
more towards the employers’ side.72 It is important – and indicative of the strong rela-
tionship between the social partners and the Government – to note that, despite these 
disagreements, tripartite social dialogue was not interrupted during this period, as had 
been the case during the Vladimír Meciar Government in 1998.73 
3.  The role of social dialogue in national policy-making  
in the post-crisis period 
3 1 The role of social dialogue in the crisis period
The peak crisis years in Slovakia were 2008 and 2009, and the post-crisis period 
started in 2010 when the economy started to recover. During the crisis, the role of tri-
partite social dialogue and of the State in industrial relations increased through the main 
national platform for social dialogue, the tripartite Economic and Social Council (HSR). 
In December 2008, during consultations at the HSR, the Government and social part-
ners recognized the emerging economic crisis as a very serious threat and decided 
to involve more stakeholders in the national level social dialogue.74 Consequently, in 
72 Interview with Executive Director of AZZZ SR. 
73 Interview with Vice-President of KOZ SR. 
74 Interview with MPSVR SR Deputy Minister. 
Table 9.3 The Governments in power 
Period The Government 
07/2006-06/2010 Coalition Government of the centre-left SMER-SD – Prime Minister Robert Fico
07/2010-03/2012 Conservative-liberal coalition Government of the SDKU-DS – Prime Minister Iveta 
Radicová
04/2012-03/2016 Single party Government of the SMER-SD. – Prime Minister Robert Fico.
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
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early 2009, they established a “tripartite plus” Council for the Economic Crisis (RHK). 
This body played an important role in the formulation of the Government’s anti-crisis 
measures in 2009. Through social dialogue at the RHK, the trade unions and employ-
ers submitted recommendations for a better design of anti-crisis measures, and also 
contributed to their smooth implementation. 
The Government also concluded the Memorandum on Cooperation in Solving Impacts 
of Financial and Economic Crises upon Slovak Society with the KOZ SR in February 
2009 (Eurofound, 2009). The Memorandum expressed, inter alia, a joint effort on 
the part of the Government and trade unions to implement measures to alleviate the 
impacts of the crisis on citizens, employers and business. In the Memorandum, the 
Government pledged, among other things, to carry out only such steps as would not 
threaten societal cohesion, and to support sectoral social dialogue between ministries 
and trade union associations. The KOZ SR committed, for example, to bargaining on 
real wages in the light of labour productivity and to use social dialogue as a means to 
preserve social peace. Although the employers did not sign the Memorandum, it pro-
vided a basis for them to reach a consensus with the trade unions regarding measures 
to combat the crisis. It can be stated that both the Government and trade unions hon-
oured the commitments in the Memorandum, contributing to a relatively well-managed 
response to the crisis in 2009.75 
Furthermore, the Government consulted with employers and trade unions at the tri-
partite HSR on the implementation of specific anti-crisis measures and changes to 
labour legislation. Anti-crisis measures were implemented in three packages between 
November 2008 and February 2009.76 These concerned macroeconomic policy, 
support to car production and construction, and to business development (including 
SMEs). The measures set out to maintain employment and jobs in a number of ways: 
by providing State allowances to employers who retained workers on at least 60 per 
cent of their wages, instead of reverting to dismissals; by implementing the so-called 
flexikonto sytem (flexible working hours account); by temporarily reducing compulsory 
contributions to the Solidarity Fund – paid by the self-employed to the Social Insurance 
Agency; and by providing financial support to the registered unemployed who set up 
own-account businesses. The implementation of the flexikonto system (by introduc-
ing amendments to the 2009 Labour Code) played a particularly important role in 
maintaining employment in manufacturing. Some additional measures were adopted in 
November 2009 to tackle high unemployment rates. 
Without this consensus between the social partners and the Government on the need 
to prioritize maintaining employment levels, it would have been impossible to alleviate 
the impacts of the crisis.77 According to the employers, tripartite social dialogue con-
tributed towards solving the social and economic problems generated by the crisis, by 
allowing better communication between the social partners and the development of 
effective mitigation measures.78
75 Interview with Vice-President of KOZ SR. 
76  Práca-ako.sk. Protikrízové opatrenia vlády (Government anti-crisis measures), available at: http://praca-ako.sk/
hospodarska-kriza/protikrizove-opatrenia-vlady/; and Dôsledky hospodárskej krízy a analýza opatrení prijatých na 
ich zníženie v Slovenskej republike (Repercussions of the economic crisis and analysis of the measures adopted to 
alleviate them), available at: http://hospodarskakriza.webnode.sk/news/protikrizove-opatrenia/ 
77 Interview with MPSVR SR Deputy Minister and Vice-President of KOZ SR. 
78 Interview with Executive Director of AZZZ SR and Executive Secretary of RUZ SR. 
2199. SUSTAINING SOCIAL DIALOGUE THOUGH THE CRISIS: THE SLOVAKIAN EXPERIENCE
3 2 Social dialogue in the post-crisis period
After 2010, the Government did not conclude any further tripartite or bipartite social 
pacts with the social partners, and the HSR continued to be the main platform for 
national social dialogue. There were no significant changes in its operation but consul-
tations became less ad-hoc and more planned. Despite some controversies between 
the social partners, tripartite social dialogue was not interrupted. The agenda of HSR 
meetings is closely linked to the Government’s legislative programme and meetings are 
planned well in advance. Consultations are less conflictual – and the social partners 
are more professionally prepared than they were in the period 2008-09.79 In the view 
of a senior representative of the European Commission (EC) in Slovakia, tripartite social 
dialogue at the HSR plays an important role in the development of economic and social 
policy. Recent in-depth tripartite discussions on new legislation regulating vocational 
education and training are one example of this successful dialogue.80 
The content of post-crisis social dialogue mainly concerned the adoption of major 
national economic and social programmes and changes to labour legislation. In rela-
tion to the EU strategy, Europe 2020, the Slovak Government adopted the National 
Reform Programme (NRP) in November 2010. In April 2011, it approved the frame-
work NRP for 2011-2014, which was closely linked to the Stability Programme of the 
Slovak Republic for the same period. Since then, the Government has approved NRPs 
for 2013, 2014 and 2015, and Stability Programmes for 2013-2016, 2014-2017 and 
2015-2018. The Government has consulted the social partners on the NRPs and Sta-
bility Programmes at the HSR each year – and the proposed documents have been 
accepted without significant objections.
3.2.1 New and innovative practices
During the post-crisis period, initiatives by the social partners also contributed to the 
development of social dialogue in Slovakia. Among them, the following can be referred 
to as “new and innovative practices”.
The RHK did not operate at all in 2010 and was finally abolished. The Government 
established a new “tripartite plus” body, the Council for Solidarity and Development 
(RSR) in 2012. It is an informal consultative body of the Government, whose per-
manent members are the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of 
Finance, and the Minister of Labour, Social Affairs and Family. Representatives of trade 
unions, employers, churches, professional institutions and non-profit organizations also 
participate in the RSR meetings. According to the representatives of MPSVR SR and 
the social partners, consultations at the RSR are necessary for decision-making on 
those particular issues that the Government considers important. For instance, on 8 
July 2015, the RSR discussed the current economic and political situation in Slovakia 
and the “Action plan for strengthening the Slovak Republic as a legally consistent State” 
(within the anti-corruption initiative the “Rule of Law”). On average, about four meet-
ings are held each year.81 
79 Interview with Secretary of the HSR.  
80 Interview with the Economic Counsellor at the Representation of the EC in Slovakia.
81 Interview with AZZZ SR Executive Director.
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In the period 2010-14, a project on the National Centre for Social Dialogue was imple-
mented with support from the European Social Fund (ESF). Project activities included 
assistance to tripartite consultations at the national and sectoral levels, and to bipartite 
social dialogue at the sectoral and company levels. These activities provided an oppor-
tunity for the social partners involved to learn more about social dialogue so that they 
might improve their communication skills and engage regularly in consultations. In 
order to support this process, employment and industrial relations specialists prepared 
a series of background papers and studies on such issues as the regulation of strikes; 
the extension of collective agreements; and vulnerable groups in the labour market. 
The project activities also strengthened the social partners’ capacity to cooperate in 
tripartite consultations and bipartite negotiations. Interviewees highlighted the impor-
tance of this project for more effective social dialogue, and expect it to continue in the 
next ESF programming period.
On 31 January 2013, senior representatives of the social partners in the manufacturing 
and construction sectors signed the “Contract on Cooperation”82 and established the 
Industry Bipartite, a body for consultation and coordination of their activities (not for 
collective bargaining). This was the first time such a cross-sector bipartite body had 
been created in Slovakia. The Contract was signed by three sectoral trade unions (OZ 
Kovo, IOZ and OZ PBGN) and five employers’ organizations (ZSP SR, SEA, ZAP SR, 
ZHTPG and ZSPS), representing the most economically powerful sectors of Slovak 
industry. In June 2015, employers in the Industry Bipartite established a joint employ-
ers’ organization for the manufacturing industry and construction – “the Alliance of 
Industry Associations”. According to the Vice-President of the Association of Mechan-
ical Engineers, the Alliance represents employers who employ more than 120,000 
workers and, in September 2015, it requested the MPSVR SR to become a member 
of the tripartite HSR.83 
3.2.2 Social dialogue on labour market reform
Since 2010, two major amendments to the Labour Code have been implemented. This 
followed intensive consultations with representatives of trade unions and employers – 
at first, in specialized working groups established by the MPSVR SR, and later at the 
tripartite HSR. The social partners and the Government focused on the process and 
content of the changes, though they did not sign any tripartite agreements.
Changes in labour legislation mainly concerned the flexibility of employment relation-
ships, the reduction in labour costs, and changes in the rights and competences of 
employee representatives and in the regulation of collective bargaining. These issues 
constituted a significant part not only of tripartite social dialogue but also of the political 
agenda of the three Governments in power between 2006 and 2016 (see section 2.3).
3.2.3 Pension reform 
Changes in social legislation mainly concerned Act No. 461/2003 on social insurance. 
The Radicová Government responded to persistent high unemployment by introducing 
82 For the origin of the Industry Bipartite, see: http://www.zhtpg.sk/?p=330 
83  Interview with the Vice-President of ZSP SR, Juraj Borgula, who is one of the founders of Industry Bipartite. 
ˇ
2219. SUSTAINING SOCIAL DIALOGUE THOUGH THE CRISIS: THE SLOVAKIAN EXPERIENCE
stricter rules for early retirement: employees taking early retirement (within two years 
of the retirement age, at present 62 years) could not be further employed under a 
standard employment contract. This change entered into effect on 1 January 2011. 
The Fico Government made changes in the distribution of compulsory contributions 
to pension funds from 1 September 2012 onwards. The contribution to the private 
(second) pillar was reduced from 9 per cent to 4 per cent, in favour of the public (first), 
solidarity-based pillar, where the contribution increased to 14 per cent (previously con-
tributions to both had been equal at 9 per cent). This measure will expire at the end of 
2016. The social partners were consulted about this change at the tripartite HSR, and 
while they accepted the new regulation on early retirement, the changes to pension pil-
lars were criticized by the employers as well as by the political opposition in Parliament. 
3 3 The role of social dialogue in the EU Semester
Responding to the EU strategy, Europe 2020, the Radicová Government adopted the 
National Reform Programme (NRP) in November 2010 and, in April 2011, it approved 
the framework NRP for 2011-14. The Fico Government approved the NRP 2012 and, 
in April 2013, submitted the NRP 2013 (with an Action Plan attached) and the Stability 
Programme for 2013-16 to the EC. The Commission responded with Country-Spe-
cific Recommendations (CSRs). The Government has since approved NRPs for 2014 
and 2015. 
The NRP 2014 reflects the Government’s Programme Declaration 2012-16 and con-
sists of measures to achieve its goals, as well as to respond to the CSRs for Slovakia. The 
social partners discussed the NRP 14 at an HSR meeting on 14 April 2014. Its main 
areas and objectives included: healthy public finances; employment; social inclusion; 
education; science and innovation; citizens´ health; well-functioning and transparent 
business environment; law enforcement; infrastructure; effective public administra-
tion; energy; and sustainable environment. Discussions at the HSR were constructive 
and consensual. The KOZ SR accepted the NRP without any particular objection. The 
employers also recommended its approval with some comments (RUZ SR on business 
conditions and ZMOS on competences of municipalities). On 26 June 2014, the NRP 
was approved. The social partners were again consulted on the NRP 2015 in mid-April 
2015, and recommended it for further legislative process; the NRP was duly approved 
at the end of the month. 
The tripartite HSR did not consider the CSRs. According to a representative of the Min-
istry of Finance, the CSRs were not a subject of discussion84 as they were linked to the 
country reports, which were not yet on the agenda of the HSR. In the past, the social 
partners have not had enough time to familiarize themselves adequately with their con-
tent. However, according to the MPSVR SR Deputy Minister, more time will be made 
available from 2015 onwards to consult on these issues with the social partners at the 
HSR.85 An effective way to involve the social partners in the CSRs might be for them to 
participate in the preparation of the NRP;86 they are already consulted with respect to 
84  Interview with the Specialist of the Institute of Financial Policy at the Ministry of Finance responsible for the internal 
coordination of CSRs. 
85  Interview with MPSVR SR Deputy Minister.  
86  Interview with MPSVR SR Officer for EU affairs participating in procedures pertaining to CSRs. 
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its implementation measures.87 For instance, the social partners were consulted at the 
HSR in 2014 on the implementation of the EU Youth Guarantee Programme in Slova-
kia – and a specific Tripartite Coordination Committee was subsequently established, 
which usually meets twice a year.88 
The Representative of the EC in Slovakia participates in the preparation of annual coun-
try reports on Slovakia and also organizes activities with stakeholders, including the 
social partners. Consultations with the social partners and civil society representatives 
are held through seminars and presentations on topical issues.89 For example, in Sep-
tember 2014, the EC Representative organized a roundtable of Slovak representatives 
at the EC and representatives of Slovak trade unions on the topic: “Slovakia in the 
context of the EU economic and social policies”. In 2015, a meeting on “The quality of 
the business environment in Slovakia” was held with EC representatives and represent-
atives of employers’ associations and chambers of commerce; a seminar was also held 
on the “sustainable increase in employment”, which was attended by representatives 
of the MPSVR SR and the social partners.
3 4 The role and impact of national social dialogue institutions 
As mentioned in section 3.1, the main platform for social dialogue at the national level 
is the tripartite HSR. It was established in 2007 when tripartite consultation was once 
again regulated by law.90 To be eligible to participate in the HSR, employers’ organiza-
tions need to represent member companies with at least 100,000 employees, which 
are active in several regions of the country. Trade unions must also represent at least 
100,000 employees. Each party has seven seats at the HSR meetings; both employers 
and trade unions are entitled to one seat for every 100,000 employees they represent. 
Three employers’ organizations share seven seats, but the trade unions are repre-
sented only by the KOZ SR – also with seven seats. The HSR meets as needed, but 
usually once a month. Outcomes of meetings include agreements, statements by social 
partners and recommendations for the Government. Minutes of the meetings are pub-
lished on the website of the Government Office.91 HSR meetings are not open to the 
public but after each meeting, a press conference is usually held. 
During the economic crisis, the need for social dialogue increased. As also mentioned 
in section 3.1, the Government established the RHK as a specific, crisis-related “tripar-
tite plus” institution in early 2009. The RHK was a multi-party Government consultation 
body, attended not only by the social partners but also smaller employers, financial 
sector experts, municipalities and researchers.92 The RHK began its operations in 
January 2009 and, over a nine-month period, dealt with a number of policy meas-
ures in response to the economic crisis. Consultations contributed to the elaboration 
and implementation of appropriate anti-crisis measures. When the economy started to 
recover, the next Government discontinued the RHK in 2010. 
87  Interview with HSR Secretary. 
88  Interview with MPSVR SR Deputy Minister.
89  Interview with the Economic Counsellor at the Representation of the EC in Slovakia.
90  The previous Dzurinda Government had abolished its own Act on the Council for Economic and Social Concertation 
(RHSD) and established the Economic and Social Partnership Council by Government Decree.
91  Website of the Government Office, available at: http://www.vlada.gov.sk/ 
92  Na Slovensku vznikne Rada pre hospodársku krízu (Council for the economic crisis will be established in Slovakia), available 
at: http://hn.hnonline.sk/ekonomika-a-firmy-117/na-slovensku-vznikne-rada-pre-hospodarsku-krizu-315523
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Consultations between the Government and the social partners at the HSR also 
became increasingly important. As stated by one interviewee: “the situation was 
extraordinary and needed also extraordinary approaches and solutions”.93 In order to 
alleviate the impact of the crisis on the economy and citizens, the Government adopted 
about 60 crisis-related measures in three packages during the 2008-09 period. Some 
measures were cross-sectoral, while others concerned specific sectors. For instance, 
State subsidies (known as scrappage) promoted the replacement of old vehicles with 
new cars, and grants were given to owners of apartments to help them install thermal 
insulation – which in turn supported the construction sector. 
The crisis was discussed for the first time in Slovakia at the HSR meeting on 15 Decem-
ber 2008.94 The frequency of meetings increased thereafter; 24 were held up to the end 
of 2009. According to the Secretary of the HSR, the number of documents discussed 
also increased. Some meetings worked under tight deadlines, were insufficiently pre-
pared – and consultations were extended. However, no changes in the HSR’s mode 
of operation were needed.95 In the view of the social partners, the communication and 
cooperation between trade unions and employers improved, usually resulting in the 
consensual adoption of anti-crisis measures during the period 2008-2009.
From July 2010, the Radicová Government took charge. To support business develop-
ment and reduce the Government deficit, it adopted a package of economic measures, 
including cuts in the State budget for 2011. But the Government did not make changes 
to the national tripartite HSR.96 In 2010, there were 16 meetings of the HSR – but none 
dealt specifically with “anti-crisis measures”. 
Some changes took place in the operational modalities of the HSR, which can be 
attributed to the prevailing political situation. In 2012, the SMER-SD formed a sin-
gle-party Government, and it started to look for mechanisms to solicit feedback on 
Government decisions. It promised that all proposed measures impacting on workers’ 
and employers’ situations would be discussed with the social partners at the HSR, 
who would also be able to decide upon agenda items for HSR meetings. The operation 
of the HSR is reportedly more planned and regular than before, and the Govern-
ment tries to submit documents to the social partners about 10 days before each 
meeting. However, according to the Vice-President of the Mechanical Engineering 
Association, the opinions of the social partners were given greater consideration by 
the Government in the 2008-09 period. At present, the examination of a huge volume 
of documentation is very time-consuming and some consultations are rather formal. 
Given the limited capacity of the social partners, some feel that it would be better to 
consult only on selected documents of particular importance/interest to them.97 As 
the Act on the HSR was adopted eight years ago, it is perhaps now time to reconsider 
certain aspects of its operation; for example, the criteria for representativeness – and 
93  Interview with AZZZ SR Executive Director.
94  Hospodárska a sociálna rada, available at: http://rpo.rokovania.gov.sk/hsr/Rokovanie.aspx/HtmlFileRedirect?filePath
=PublishHtmlFile%2F7fa238f8-ed66-4471-8274-8d4ce68579d5.htm 
95  Interview with HSR Secretary. 
96  The composition of the Radicová Government was almost the same (only Freedom and Solidarity – SaS – was a new 
party in it) as the Dzurinda Government in 2002-06, which abolished the law on tripartism as of 2000; the RHSD 
was scaled down to an advisory body, the RHSP, which was governed by a less legally binding Government Decree 
(2005). 
97  Interview with Vice-President of the ZSP.
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in relation to multi-employer collective agreements – could be more precisely defined 
in the future.98 
4.  Industrial relations and collective bargaining  
in the post-crisis period 
4 1 Impact of the crisis on collective bargaining and post-crisis developments
Collective bargaining is regulated by Act No. 2/1991, as amended, according to which 
only trade unions are entitled to bargain collectively. Bargaining takes place at the 
sectoral as well as at company level. No national level collective bargaining exists and, 
with the exception of the minimum wage, there is no direct link between the outcomes 
of tripartite consultations and collective bargaining. Provisions of collective agreements 
are legally binding and apply to all employees in companies, regardless of their trade 
union membership. There is no separate bargaining for white- and blue-collar work-
ers. Conditions agreed in multi-employer collective agreements can be improved in 
favour of employees in single-employer agreements. During the 2008-09 period and 
afterwards, there were no changes in the collective bargaining system, including in 
wage-setting mechanisms. The overall trend towards decentralization from sectoral to 
company-level bargaining in the private sector continued. According to the MPSVR SR, 
the number of registered/concluded multi-employer collective agreements decreased 
between 2010 and 2014. However, the decline in registered collective agreements was 
in part attributable to the parallel decline in the number of bargaining units, i.e. due 
to mergers of trade union associations, mainly in 2009; the fact that multi-employer 
agreements often lasted for 2 or 3 years, and were not registered at the MPSVR SR 
each year that they were in force, also played a role. 
According to the trade unions, a slight decrease in collective bargaining coverage was 
recorded; coverage was about 35 per cent in 2008 and between 30-35 per cent from 
2009 to 2014. Coverage differs widely by sector; it is about 90 per cent in the public 
sector (Barošová, 2013), but is relatively low in the private sector. For instance, in the 
metal and chemical sectors and in construction, it is only about 15-20 per cent. 
Changes in the rules for the extension of collective agreements have played an impor-
tant role in collective bargaining coverage. Differing opinions between the social partners 
regarding the extensions led to long-term disputes both before and during the crisis, and 
they persist until today. Trade unions want collective agreements to be extended to the 
greatest number of companies performing similar activities (classified by NACE),99 even 
without the consent of the employer concerned. They state that such extensions would 
result in more equal working conditions and higher wages, and could better combat 
wage dumping.100 But the employers stress that extensions cannot be imposed against 
their will, as there is a risk that this might damage businesses and lead to job cuts.101
In the past, the employers or trade unions were used to pushing through their demands 
depending on the political “colour” of the Government in power. Since 1 September 
98 Interview with MPSVR SR Deputy Minister.  
99 NACE is the “statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community”
100 Interview with Vice-President of the KOZ SR 
101 Interview with Executive Director of the AZZZ SR and Executive Secretary of the RUZ SR. 
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2007, in accordance with Act No. 328/2007, extensions have had to comply with the 
classification of entrepreneurs’ activities by NACE codes, and were possible without 
the employers’ consent. Trade unions made use of this possibility and, after several 
years of absence, five extensions were implemented in 2009 alone. But as from 31 
December 2010 (the Radicová Government), the employers’ consent was again man-
datory. Under legislative changes effective from 1 January 2014, extension without 
the employers’ consent once again became possible, and trade unions proposed to 
extend five multi-employer collective agreements – in mechanical engineering; electri-
cal engineering; construction; metallurgy; extractive industry and geology; and public 
road transport. The extensions more than doubled the number of employees covered 
by collective agreements, from 45,826 to 107,042 (Eurofound, 2014). The same agree-
ments were extended again in 2015. 
Employers accept that extensions can contribute to a more level playing field, but do 
not consider the present arrangements fair. In some cases, a multi-employer collective 
agreement may be concluded by a few companies representing only 10 or 20 per cent 
of all those in the sector – whereas, following extension, it can apply to almost the entire 
sector. Employers proposed to introduce some form of representativeness threshold 
for multi-employer agreements, but, no agreement on this has yet been reached with 
the trade unions. In the employers’ view, there should either be a suitable representa-
tiveness criterion for the extension of a collective agreement, or no extension at all.102 
Neither is it clear why agreements are extended to some companies but not to others. 
In a recent case in the automotive industry where more than 600 companies oper-
ate, about 60 of them concluded an agreement, which was then extended to another 
30 companies. The rest were not affected (Eurofound, 2015).103
During the crisis, trade unions focused their attention on maintaining employment 
in enterprises threatened by the recession. This affected the scope of collective bar-
gaining. In addition to standard bargaining issues – such as working time, wages and 
occupational safety and health (OSH) – provisions to increase employment flexibility 
and reduce the social impacts of dismissals were added into company collective agree-
ments. In order to minimize the impact of the economic decline on their business and 
workforce, some companies, mainly in the automotive and electric industries, imple-
mented flexible working time (flexikonto and short-time working) in agreement with 
employee representatives, usually unions. Sometimes, a reduction in the workforce 
was also needed. In such cases, so as to protect core workers, temporary agency 
workers were cut back and companies withdrew from some previously outsourced 
activities. At the height of the crisis in 2009, the number of companies that agreed 
to generous redundancy pay (above the Labour Code standards) in collective agree-
ments decreased. Private-sector company management sought to reduce labour costs 
by wage moderation and cutting employee benefits and awards. In the public sector, 
moderate wage increases, and even a wage freeze for a couple of years, were agreed. 
No significant changes occurred in working time. Developments in collective bargain-
ing-related issues are illustrated in table 9.4. 
102 Interview with the Executive Director of the AZZZ SR. 
103 Interview with the Vice-President of the ZSP and MPSVR SR Deputy Minister. 
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Table 9.4 Developments in collective bargaining
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Number of multi-employer 
agreements 37 37 35 33 27 23 20 28 35
Number of extensions 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 5 5
Average agreed nominal wage 
increase (%) 6.4 6.3 5.4 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.2 3.5
Average agreed weekly working 
time (hours in single shift work) 38.8 38.4 39.0 38.9 39.0 38.9 39.0 39.4 39.3
Source: MPSVR SR and ISPP.
Limited derogations from the Labour Code in collective bargaining were exceptionally 
allowed in the period 2011-12, when the 2011 Labour Code was effective for about 16 
months. Before 2011 and since 2013 no derogations from Labour Code standards have 
been authorized. Despite the employers’ austerity measures, the social partners main-
tained the social peace, and collective bargaining played an important role in preventing 
labour conflicts. In most collective agreements, mainly signed at the company level, 
procedures for settling labour disputes were included. According to the MPSVR SR, all 
registered collective labour disputes concerning collective bargaining were successfully 
settled by conciliation or arbitration procedures, and none resulted in a strike in 2009. 
4 2 The role of the State in industrial relations
In the period 2008-09, the Fico coalition Government paid attention to the implemen-
tation of ad-hoc anti-crisis measures, with minimum intervention in industrial relations. 
Since 2010, the role of the State in industrial relations has increased through significant 
amendments to the Labour Code and the Act on Collective Bargaining. 
Amendments to the 2011 Labour Code allowed limited derogations from its stand-
ards in favour of employers – for example, one amendment allowed a longer probation 
period for new employees.104 The amendments also codified flexikonto as a permanent 
form of flexible working time, without a time limit for application. They also introduced 
a criterion for the representativeness of trade unions for collective bargaining for the 
first time in Slovakia – which stipulated that a trade union must have at least 30 per 
cent density in the company. This criterion applied to new unions established after 
1 September 2011, and to all unions as of 1 January 2013. But, following the collapse 
of the Radicová Government in October 2011, the new criterion was in fact applied only 
to new unions bargaining for collective agreements for 2012. Act No. 361/2012 of the 
Fico Government repealed the 2011 Labour Code, and so, in reality, the union repre-
sentativeness criterion had little or no impact on collective bargaining. 
The above-mentioned changes to the Collective Bargaining Act have influenced the 
number of employees covered by collective agreements. As of October 2013, the 
104  This option was, however, available only from September 2011 to December 2012, and in practice could be used 
only in bargaining on 2012 agreements.
ˇ
2279. SUSTAINING SOCIAL DIALOGUE THOUGH THE CRISIS: THE SLOVAKIAN EXPERIENCE
extension of collective agreements has again become possible without the relevant 
employers’ consent, and new rules entered into effect on 1 January 2014. 
4 3 Changes in employers’ and workers’ organizations
The economic crisis led to thousands of job cuts and affected trade union density, 
which fell from about 20 per cent in 2007 to about 15 per cent in 2014. Up to 2007, 
there were no significant organizational changes in the trade union associations affili-
ated to the main peak trade union organization, the KOZ SR, which covered more than 
90 per cent of trade unionists in Slovakia. But the decrease in trade union membership 
reduced the income of unions as a result of declining membership fees. In order to 
reduce their costs, associations needed to cut back their paid staff, which resulted in 
the mergers of some sectoral trade unions. In 2008, the Independent Public Road 
Transport Union – and in 2009, the Metallurgy Union – merged with the metal union 
OZ Kovo. The textile and leather union and the transport union merged with the Con-
struction Trade Union Association, establishing the Integrated Trade Union Association 
(IOZ) on 1 January 2009. Also in 2009, the chemical union merged with the energy 
workers’ union to form a joint Energy and Chemical Workers Union (ECHOZ). These 
mergers resulted in a reduction of the number of unions affiliated to KOZ SR – from 
35 in 2007 to 28 in 2010. KOZ SR affiliates further declined to 26 unions by 2015. 
However, as shown in table 9.4, multi-employer collective agreements continued to be 
concluded over this period. Generally speaking, this was because the merged unions 
sought to conclude new agreements to cover all their ‘original’ membership.
Employers are affiliated to three organizations at national level: the Federation of 
Employers’ Associations (AZZZ SR), the National Union of Employers (RUZ SR) and 
the Association of Municipalities of Slovakia (ZMOS). Their density fluctuates between 
30-35 per cent. The crisis had less of an impact on employers’ organizations than it did 
on trade unions. One notable change was the establishment of the Alliance of Industry 
Associations, which also wished to participate in tripartite consultations at the HSR. 
The density of employers’ organizations has remained relatively stable over the last 5-7 
years (Eurofound, 2013a.).
5. Conclusions 
During the period under review, the basic platform for tripartite social dialogue at the 
national level was the Economic and Social Council (HSR). Despite some serious disa-
greements between the social partners and the Government, its operations were never 
interrupted. Tripartite social dialogue played an important role both during and after 
the crisis in the design and implementation of economic and social policy in Slovakia. 
Compared to the crisis years, consultations at the HSR are better organized now, and 
the social partners are more professionally prepared for dialogue. The agenda of HSR 
meetings is closely linked to the scheduled tasks of the Government, and tripartite 
consultations are planned well in advance.
Initiatives on the part of the Government and the social partners contributed to the 
development of tripartite social dialogue. The following are particularly worthy of 
mention: 
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a)  After the abolition of the Council for the Economic Crisis in 2010, the then Gov-
ernment established a new “tripartite plus” body, the Council for Solidarity and 
Development (RSR), in 2012. It is an informal consultative body of the Govern-
ment for its decisions on special issues. 
b) In the period 2010-14, the National Centre for Social Dialogue project was 
implemented. Supported by the European Social Fund, it contributed towards 
providing unions and employers with expert capacities for participating in tripar-
tite and bipartite social dialogue. Social partners expect the project to continue 
in the next ESF programming period. 
c)  To improve cooperation and coordination in tripartite consultations, senior repre-
sentatives of three large workers’ organizations and five employers’ organizations 
from the industry and construction sectors established the Industry Bipartite in 
January 2013. In June 2015, these employers’ organizations established the 
Alliance of Industry Associations, which hopes to participate in tripartite consul-
tations in 2016. 
In terms of bipartite social dialogue, the most relevant changes concerned the exten-
sion of multi-employer collective agreements. The present Collective Bargaining Act 
again allows extensions without the consent of the employers concerned. Trade unions 
have utilized this opportunity, and the extensions implemented in 2014-2015 increased 
collective bargaining coverage in the concerned sectors. 
Tripartite and bipartite social dialogue contributed to post-crisis recovery and economic 
growth in Slovakia, playing an important role in the adoption of all relevant documents 
and measures concerning economic and social development. Since the crisis, particu-
lar attention has been paid to key national policies and related economic, labour and 
social legislation. For example, the Government has worked in cooperation with the 
social partners on consecutive National Reform Programmes (NRPs) and their imple-
mentation at the HSR. It also intensively consulted the social partners on two major 
amendments to the Labour Code in 2011 and 2012. In some cases, tripartite consulta-
tions resulted in consensus between the social partners, e.g. on the adoption of NRPs. 
In other instances, consultations resulted in compromise, depending on the “colour” of 
the Government in power – an example being the amendments to the Labour Code. In 
the cases of minimum wage increases and of the regulation of extensions of collective 
agreements, the social partners were unable to agree on a compromise and the Gov-
ernment acted unilaterally.
Regarding tripartite social dialogue mechanisms, there have been no significant 
changes other than some internal changes in the operation of the HSR. For instance, 
the social partners can jointly decide on items for inclusion in the HSR agenda and 
can each propose issues for consultation. Interviewees for this study considered these 
rules to be an important component of present-day tripartite social dialogue in Slovakia. 
According to the interviewed representatives of employers, trade unions and the Gov-
ernment, the present mechanism of tripartite social dialogue, based on the law, is 
working well, and the role of national level tripartite social dialogue will not be ques-
tioned in the near future. Some interviewees, nevertheless, stated that the current 
representation of social partners at the HSR, particularly of employers, needs to be 
reassessed; for instance, the newly-established Alliance of Industry Associations also 
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wishes to participate. The agenda of the HSR is also considered to be rather extensive 
and demanding for the current expert capacities of the social partners. Their capacity 
could be further strengthened through the continuation of the EU-funded project, the 
National Centre of Social Dialogue. Besides the HSR, the RSR provides a “tripartite 
plus” body, through which a wider range of representatives can be involved and con-
sulted on certain policy issues. 
Regarding collective bargaining, the extension of multi-employer collective agreements 
without the consent of the employers concerned,105 and the undecided representative-
ness threshold for multi-employer collective agreements, are two current concerns. A 
satisfactory resolution of these issues would contribute towards more effective social 
dialogue in Slovakia. 
105  On 16 March 2016, the Constitutional Court decided that the present form of extensions is not in accordance with 
constitutionally acceptable law making. 
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Appendix
List of persons interviewed for the study 
Government
The Deputy Minister, Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family (MPSVR SR)
Director of the European Employment Strategy Department (MPSVR SR)
Specialist of Institute of Financial Policy at the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic 
(MF SR)
Executive Secretary, Economic and Social Council (HSR)
Employers’ Organizations 
Executive Director, Association of Employers’ Federations (AZZZ SR)
Executive Secretary, National Union of Employers (RUZ SR)
Vice-President, Association of Mechanical Engineering (ZSP SR) (also founding mem-
ber of Industry Bipartite)
Workers’ Organizations
Vice-President, Confederation of Trade Unions of the Slovak Republic (KOZ SR)
Others
Economic Counsellor, The Representation of the EC in the Slovak Republic (Acts also 
as European Semester Officer at the Representation)
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10.  Rebuilding social dialogue in 
Slovenia: A complex task for the 
post-crisis period
igOr guardiancich
1. Introduction 
Following Slovenia’s independence in 1991, a democratic industrial relations system 
emerged, with free collective bargaining. Unique among post-socialist countries, Slo-
venia developed functioning ‘competitive neo-corporatism’ (Stanojevic, 2014a). This 
was possible due to strong social partners, in part inherited from Yugoslavia, and to 
the early institutionalization of tripartite social dialogue within the Economic and Social 
Council (ESS) (Crowley and Stanojevic, 2011). 
In 1990, union density exceeded 60 per cent and stabilized at some 40 per cent until 
Slovenia joined the European Union (EU) in 2004. The reformed, socialist-successor 
Association of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia (ZSSS) became the largest labour organiza-
tion in the country, representing mainly blue-collar workers. The Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry of Slovenia (GZS) and the Chamber of Craft and Small Businesses of 
Slovenia (OZS) represented all private entrepreneurs during the period 1991-2006, on 
account of compulsory membership. Moreover, state-controlled enterprises dominated 
the GZS, and espoused an accommodating stance towards social partnership.
Competitive neo-corporatism in Slovenia has had beneficial effects at two levels. At the 
micro level, since 1993, there has been a dual channel of representation in companies, 
with competences shared between the works councils and labour unions (Eurofound, 
2011). As a result, management and labour formed ‘survival coalitions’ at firm and 
sectoral levels, based on non-conflictual micro-exchanges through bipartite collec-
tive agreements. In order to stay competitive, work intensity and functional flexibility 
were compensated by high job security, limitations on dismissals and wage protection 
(Crowley and Stanojevic, 2011; Stanojevic and Krašovec, 2011; Stanojevic, 2012).
At the macro level, the social partners have enjoyed an advisory – and, at times, qua-
si-legislative – role through the ESS. Founded in 1994, the Council set out to establish 
a culture of wage moderation through a centralized collective bargaining system. Since 
then, tripartite social pacts favouring competitiveness and economic stability, both nec-
essary to comply with the Maastricht criteria, have become institutionalized. These 
agreements are the outcome of collective negotiations over economic, social and wage 
policy, specifying the obligations of the social partners and partly setting the agenda for 
incoming governments (Stanojevic, 2010). 
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Following the Slovenian adoption of the Euro, social dialogue started to deteriorate and 
then stalled during the recession. The role of the social partners was subsequently 
weakened. Trade union membership is currently decreasing and the labour movement 
is fragmented as workers have increasingly lost trust in it (Stanojevic, 2014b). The 
employers’ side faces similar problems: membership of employers’ organizations is 
now voluntary, their density is declining and employers are advocating a more radical, 
pro-business stance (Kopac Mrak, 2014). 
A tense relationship arose between the social partners during Borut Pahor’s centre-left 
Government (2008-12). Short-term anti-crisis measures were initially successful and 
introduced with support from both the employers and unions. However, the Govern-
ment then tabled structural reforms in, inter alia, the labour market and pension system 
during the period 2010-11. After some 15 years of peaceful social dialogue, negoti-
ations in the ESS broke down. Four referenda, backed by an alliance of opposition 
parties, trade unions, students and pensioners’ organizations, brought the reforms to a 
halt and led to Pahor’s departure. This inaugurated a period of great political instability 
at the height of the crisis.
In 2012-13, under Premiers Janez Janša (centre-right) and Alenka Bratušek (cen-
tre-left), Slovenia narrowly avoided seeking an international bailout. Since then, social 
dialogue has timidly restarted, boosted by an unanticipated economic recovery. In early 
2015, under Miro Cerar’s centre-left executive, the new Social Agreement 2015-16 was 
signed – six years after the last one expired; the social partners were involved in the 
drafting of key European Semester documents, raising hopes that the situation was 
back to normal. 
Nonetheless, trust between the social partners has remained fragile: all employers’ 
organizations withdrew from the pact by December 2015 in a row over the Minimum 
Wages Act. On a more positive note, bipartite collective bargaining continued to operate 
relatively well during this period, and collective agreements are still successfully being 
forged.
This chapter investigates the challenges facing social dialogue in Slovenia and the 
attempts to revitalize it in the aftermath of the recession. The study is based on an anal-
ysis of official documents and reports, articles from the daily Delo newspaper over a 
period of seven years, and interviews with Government officials, labour and employers’ 
representatives – as well as with the European Semester Officers (ESOs) in Ljubljana. 
2. The macroeconomic and political context 
2 1 Macroeconomic context 
Slovenia’s transition to a market economy, accession to the EU and adoption of 
the Euro were all relatively straightforward. According to Eurostat (2015), Slove-
nian GDP grew on average by almost 4.5 per cent per annum during the period 
1993-2008. Per capita income rose from less than half of the Western European 
average to around 90 per cent of the EU-27 average in 2009. Public finances under-
went only mild deterioration since the early 2000s. Public debt rarely crept over 
27 per cent of GDP, and the average annual budget and current account deficits 
ˇ
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in 1995-2008 were 2.5 and 1.5 per cent of GDP, respectively. Low unemployment, 
relatively high employment, and a robust social safety net underpinned the years of 
buoyant growth.
Three main factors drove socio-economic development (Guardiancich, 2012): a grad-
ual transformation that built on existing institutions (Mencinger, 2004); successful 
competitive neo-corporatism; and technology-intensive, home-bred production (Bohle 
and Greskovits, 2012). 
Notwithstanding, socialism left a legacy of distorted lending and management practices 
of state-owned banks and enterprises, which developed into a Slovenian version of 
state-managed capitalism (Guardiancich, 2016). A rather inefficient and partly incom-
plete privatization process left half the economy, including the banks, in state hands 
and bequeathed serious corporate governance problems. An unstable equilibrium col-
lapsed with the flood of cheap credit that accompanied EU accession. Low interest 
rates and an inflow of foreign funding led to an increase in lending. State-owned banks 
extended massive loans to the corporate sector, without proper risk assessment and 
backed by poor collateral – which fuelled bubbles in real estate, construction and the 
stock market (ATVP, 2013). 
During the crisis, the banks became illiquid and reduced their lending to domestic 
firms, which suffered accordingly. The European Central Bank (ECB) intervened only in 
late 2011, after multiple bankruptcies exposed the poor quality of collateral and caused 
a deterioration in bank assets.
As in other Eurozone countries, the banking crisis in Slovenia triggered a sovereign-debt 
emergency (Pisani-Ferry, 2014). In 2009, GDP fell by almost 8 per cent and, after a 
timid recovery, the country plunged into a double-dip recession in 2012-13. The debt-
to-GDP ratio more than tripled to 80.8 per cent in 2014, due to automatic stabilizers, 
short-term anti-crisis measures, debt servicing and capital injections into the banking 
system (IMAD, 2014a). Unemployment soared.
Recovery took a long time to materialize due to a severe debt overhang in the corporate 
sector (Damijan, 2014), a decline in cost competitiveness and the credit crunch. In 
2014, GDP growth reached 3 per cent and the prospects for 2015-17 look good (Euro-
pean Commission, 2015b). This recovery may be attributed to investment in municipal 
infrastructure (co-financed by EU structural funds), as well as increased consumption 
and exports. 
2 2 Labour market context
The labour market adapted to lower economic activity during the crisis through shorter 
working time, lower employment and higher unemployment rates, and a slowdown in 
wage growth. Employment (15-64 years) fell from 68.6 to 63.3 per cent between 2008 
and 2013. The majority of job losses were in the private sector, whereas the public 
sector adapted by cutting wages (IMAD, 2014). 
Table 10.1 shows that employment prospects declined most dramatically for young 
cohorts (15-24 years), due to shrinking labour-intensive sectors such as construction. 
Moreover, the employability of older workers (55-64 years) had always been low by 
European standards.
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Table 10.1 Activity and employment rates in Slovenia (%), 2000-14
2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Age group
15-24 39.2 40.5 40.6 41.8 42.9 40.9 39.9 37.4 34.4 33.8 33.6
15-64 67.5 70.7 70.9 71.3 71.8 71.8 71.5 70.3 70.4 70.5 70.9
55-64 24.0 32.1 33.4 34.6 34.2 36.9 36.5 33.3 35.1 36.0 38.4
Men
15-24 41.7 44.5 44.4 47.6 47.7 45.4 44.4 42.0 38.1 37.1 36.6
15-64 71.9 75.1 74.9 75.8 75.8 75.6 75.4 73.9 73.7 74.2 74.3
55-64 34.6 45.4 45.8 46.7 46.4 48.2 47.5 42.7 43.6 45.1 45.7
Women
15-24 36.4 36.3 36.4 35.4 37.4 35.8 34.8 32.3 30.0 30.2 30.5
15-64 62.9 66.1 66.7 66.6 67.5 67.9 67.4 66.5 66.9 66.6 67.3
55-64 14.1 18.9 21.4 23.1 22.2 25.6 25.5 23.7 26.5 27.0 31.1
Age group
15-24 32.8 34.1 35.0 37.6 38.4 35.3 34.1 31.5 27.3 26.5 26.8
15-64 62.8 66.0 66.6 67.8 68.6 67.5 66.2 64.4 64.1 63.3 63.9
55-64 22.7 30.7 32.6 33.5 32.8 35.6 35.0 31.2 32.9 33.5 35.4
Men
15-24 35.7 38.1 39.2 43.2 43.0 39.1 37.6 35.7 30.4 29.7 29.5
15-64 67.2 70.4 71.1 72.7 72.7 71.0 69.6 67.7 67.4 67.1 67.5
55-64 32.3 43.1 44.5 45.3 44.7 46.4 45.5 39.5 40.7 41.8 41.8
Women
15-24 29.7 29.8 30.3 31.4 33.2 31.0 30.0 26.9 23.7 23.0 24.0
15-64 58.4 61.3 61.8 62.6 64.2 63.8 62.6 60.9 60.5 59.2 60.0
55-64 13.8 18.5 21.0 22.2 21.1 24.8 24.5 22.7 25.0 25.2 29.0
Source: Eurostat (2015).
The unemployment rate more than doubled since 2008 (see table 10.2), peaking at 
10.1 per cent in 2013 and gradually declining thereafter. Due to the anti-crisis measures 
of the Pahor government (temporary lay-offs and shorter working time) unemployment 
stayed below the Eurozone average.
Activity rate – Overall
Employment rate – Overall
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The difficulties in labour-intensive industries translated into higher unemployment rates 
among less-educated persons. Sectors needing a skilled workforce shrunk less and 
resorted to labour hoarding (IMAD, 2014a). Younger cohorts fared worst, due in part to 
the high prevalence of fixed-term contracts among young people (table 10.3). During 
the crisis, many such contracts were not renewed; so-called student jobs declined 
from 42,000 to 26,000 from 2008 to 2014, mainly due to their increasing cost for 
employers. 
The share of long-term unemployment almost doubled between 2009 and 2014, while 
the rate of young people not in employment or education and training (NEET) also 
increased between 2008 and 2014. Slovenia’s rate of undeclared work is now among 
the highest in the EU (European Commission, 2014).
Table 10.2 Unemployment and NEET in Slovenia (%), 2000-14
2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Unemployment rate – Overall
Total 6.7 6.5 6.0 4.9 4.4 5.9 7.3 8.2 8.9 10.1 9.7
<25 16.3 15.9 13.9 10.1 10.4 13.6 14.7 15.7 20.6 21.6 20.2
25-74 5.4 5.4 5.1 4.2 3.7 5.1 6.5 7.5 7.9 9.2 8.9
Men
Total 6.5 6.1 4.9 4.0 4.0 5.9 7.5 8.2 8.4 9.5 9.0
<25 14.6 14.5 11.6 9.4 9.9 13.8 15.2 15.0 20.3 20.1 19.4
25-74 5.4 5.0 4.1 3.3 3.2 5.0 6.6 7.5 7.3 8.6 8.2
Women
Total 7.0 7.1 7.2 5.9 4.8 5.8 7.1 8.2 9.4 10.9 10.6
<25 18.3 17.8 16.8 11.2 11.3 13.4 13.8 16.8 21.0 23.7 21.3
25-74 5.5 5.9 6.2 5.3 4.2 5.1 6.5 7.5 8.6 10.0 9.9
Long-term unemployment (12 months or more) as % of total unemployment
Total 61.4 47.3 49.3 45.7 42.2 30.1 43.3 44.2 47.9 51.0 54.5
Men 62.8 48.4 49.7 45.3 41.4 28.3 45.0 45.1 48.8 51.9 55.0
Women 59.8 46.3 48.9 46.1 43.0 32.1 41.2 43.1 47.0 50.0 53.9
NEET as % of population aged 15-34
Total - 9.3 9.2 8.1 7.4 9.2 9.6 9.6 11.8 13.2 13.6
Men - 8.1 7.9 6.5 6.4 8.4 9.1 9.1 10.5 11.3 11.4
Women - 10.6 10.6 9.8 8.7 10.1 10.3 10.2 13.3 15.1 16.1
Source: Eurostat (2015).
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As for atypical forms of work, the share of part-time work in Slovenia has remained 
relatively stable at around 9-10 per cent since the crisis broke out (see table 10.3) and 
is highest among youth (15-24 years), especially young women. 
More worrying is the growing segmentation of the Slovenian labour market. Almost 
three-quarters of people aged 15-24 years have fixed-term jobs (80 per cent of these 
contracts are student jobs), vis-à-vis the EU average of 43.4 per cent; among young 
women, the share climbs to 86.4 per cent (IMAD, 2014a). The recent flexibilization of 
permanent contracts and greater protection accorded to student jobs will probably slow 
this trend.
Finally, the number of waged employees has declined. Meanwhile, own-account work-
ers (self-employed who do not have employees) are increasing, possibly implying that 
disguised employment relationships are on the rise. 
Table 10.3 Fixed-term and part-time employment in Slovenia (%), 2000-14
2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Fixed-term employment as % of total
Total
15-64 12.8 17.2 17.1 18.4 17.3 16.2 17.1 18.0 17.0 16.3 16.5
15-24 43.2 62.5 64.2 68.3 69.8 66.6 69.6 74.5 72.0 73.6 72.7
Men
15-64 12.1 15.4 15.2 16.3 15.2 14.9 15.2 16.4 15.6 15.6 16.0
15-24 41.7 55.6 56.4 62.5 62.4 59.2 61.8 67.9 62.4 64.5 62.2
Women
15-64 13.4 19.1 19.1 20.7 19.6 17.6 19.2 19.7 18.5 17.1 17.1
15-24 45.2 71.8 74.9 76.8 80.4 76.9 80.4 83.8 85.3 87.0 86.4
Part-time employment as % of total
Total
15-64 5.3 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.1 9.5 10.3 9.5 9.0 9.3 10.0
15-24 13.4 30.1 29.8 29.8 31.4 36.6 40.9 40.8 38.3 42.5 42.4
Men
15-64 4.0 6.1 6.0 6.5 6.2 7.4 7.4 7.1 6.3 6.5 6.8
15-24 11.2 24.9 23.8 24.5 24.8 28.0 31.5 32.2 29.9 33.4 31.1
Women
15-64 6.9 9.8 10.4 10.0 10.4 12.1 13.6 12.2 12.2 12.6 13.7
15-24 16.6 37.2 38.4 37.9 41.3 48.9 54.4 53.5 50.8 55.5 57.3
Source: Eurostat (2015). 
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Compensation per employee increased in 2008, due to wage adjustment for high prior 
inflation and productivity growth in the private sector. The equalization of wage scales 
in the public sector led to a sharp increase in salaries (IMAD, 2011). As a conse-
quence, unit labour costs grew out of line with labour productivity, and the real effective 
exchange rate (REER) deteriorated vis-à-vis the Eurozone (European Commission, 
2014a), leading to job losses. IMAD (2014a) finds that, although the responsiveness of 
wages to low economic activity was not negligible, it could have been greater if wages 
were determined at firm level rather than through sectoral collective agreements.
Minimum wages represent a controversial subject. Under Premier Pahor – at a time 
of already declining cost competitiveness – they increased by 23 per cent. The ratio 
of the minimum wage to the average gross wage in Slovenia was, at 51.2 per cent, 
the highest in the EU in 2014. This created difficulties for labour-intensive industries 
(IMAD, 2015). The calculation of the minimum wage, based on indexation rather than 
productivity considerations, has often been questioned by the European Commission 
and again became a priority in the 2015 Country-Specific Recommendations (CSR) 
(Council of the EU, 2015). Moreover, the flat distribution of salaries in Slovenia means 
that the poverty line is quite close to the median wage (OECD, 2015a).
2 3 Political context 
The recession in Slovenia coincided with severe political instability, with four successive 
Governments over a period of five years (table 10.4). Cross-parliamentary collaboration 
proved nearly impossible due to political competition between the right-conservative 
and left-liberal blocs. This difficulty fully emerged once Slovenia had achieved the 
common goal of EU accession in 2004; decision-making had been simpler during 
the 1990s. 
The Ninth Government of Slovenia (2008-12), led by Borut Pahor’s Social Democrats, 
underestimated the depth of the crisis. At first it succeeded in applying short-term 
anti-crisis measures to shield the population quite effectively from the economic slow-
down, agreeing upon measures peacefully with the social partners.
However, due to worsening budgetary prospects, the European Council initiated an 
Excessive Deficit Procedure against Slovenia in December 2009. The Slovenian Exit 
Strategy 2010-2013 (Government RS, 2010) presented an ambitious plan of structural 
and institutional adjustments. The relationship between the Government and the social 
partners became strained, as both unions and employers abandoned tripartite negotia-
tions. The referenda on the pension and labour market reforms led to a loss of support 
for Pahor. As the crisis deepened, DeSUS and Zares abandoned the coalition. A vote of 
no confidence in September 2011 paved the way for early elections. 
Janez Janša’s SDS headed the Tenth Government (2012). Despite the troubling reces-
sion the Government was successful in restarting social dialogue under the guidance 
of Labour Minister Andrej Vizjak.
Although Janša’s Government finally succumbed to strikes and demonstrations against 
fiscal consolidation and alleged corruption, it is remembered for four major achieve-
ments (Government RS, 2013): an agreement was signed with public sector unions 
that cut wages and reduced inefficiencies; a new pension reform was introduced that 
2
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Table 10.4  A chronology of developments in social dialogue and Government policy, 2008-15
Period Government Coalition 
parties
Main developments in social dialogue ESS sessions Main policies discussed and outcomes
21.11.08 –
10.02.12
Borut Pahor
(centre-left)
SD
Zares  
DeSUS
LDS
• Good cooperation with the social partners at the 
beginning of the crisis, leading to the approval of 
anti-crisis measures.
• Deterioration of social dialogue in 2010, when 
structural reforms were discussed, followed by 
breakdown in 2011. Unilateral imposition of labour 
market and pension reforms was stopped by several 
referenda that led to defeat of the Government.
42
(Nos. 170 – 211)
• Partial Subsidy of Full-Time Work Act (approved)
• Partial Reimbursement of Payment Compensation 
Act (approved)
• Minimum Wages Act (approved)
• Labour Market Regulation Act (approved)
• Employment Relationship Act (dropped)
• Mini-Jobs Act (rejected at referendum)
• Pension and Disability Insurance Act (rejected at 
referendum)
10.02.12 –
20.03.13
Janez Janša
(centre-right)
SDS
DLGV 
DeSUS 
SLS
NSi
• As the crisis deepened, the social partners managed 
to conclude a number of deals, including on public 
sector wages, pensions and labour relations.
• Civil society protests against corruption and 
austerity led to defeat of the Government.
17
(Nos. 212 – 228)
• Public Finance Balance Act (approved)
• Employment Relationship Act (approved)
• Pension and Disability Insurance Act (approved)
• Starting points for a new social pact (approved)
20.03.13 –
18.09.14
Alenka 
Bratušek
(centre-left)
PS
SD
DL
DeSUS
• During the deepest phase of the crisis, social 
dialogue did not produce many agreements, due also 
to strained relations between the social partners.
• The revival of a new social pact failed.
25
(Nos. 229 – 253)
• Government Measures to Strengthen Bank 
Stability Act (approved)
• Slovenian Sovereign Holding Act (approved)
• Balanced budget fiscal rule and changes to 
referendum rules (Constitutional amendments)
• New Social Agreement (dropped)
18.09.14 –
20.11.15
(date 
of last 
recorded 
meeting)
Miro Cerar
(centre-left)
SMC
SD
DeSUS
• Concomitant recovery of the economy and improved 
relations with the social partners.
• New social pact signed for 2015-16 in early 2015 
showed willingness of social partners to resume 
cooperation; however, a dispute over the Minimum 
Wage Act led to the withdrawal of employers’ 
support for the agreement in November 2015.
26
(Nos. 254 – 279)
• Act on Occasional Student Work (approved)
• Balanced budget fiscal rule (executive act 
approved)
• Social Agreement 2015-16 (approved, but later 
reneged on by the employers)
Notes: DLGV – Gregor Virant’s Civic List; LDS – Liberal Democracy of Slovenia; DeSUS – Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia; NSi – New Slovenia; PS – Positive Slovenia; SD – Social 
Democrats; SDS – Slovenian Democratic Party; SLS – Slovenian People’s Party; SMC – Modern Centre Party; Zares For Real – New Politics
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stabilized the retirement system’s finances until circa 2020: a number of measures 
were taken that reduced labour market segmentation; and the social partners elabo-
rated the starting points for a new social pact.
Alenka Bratušek of Positive Slovenia formed the Eleventh Government (2013), after the 
centre-left coalition stepped in during a period of instability and protest. Although social 
dialogue during Bratušek’s executive did not achieve many significant breakthroughs 
(for instance an attempt to finalize the new social pact failed), her short-lived Govern-
ment did save the banking system (thus preventing recourse to an international bailout) 
and started a privatization programme (Government RS, 2014). The Premier resigned 
on 5 May 2014, because of internal disputes, leading to elections in July 2014.
The current Prime Minister, Miro Cerar, of the newly founded Modern Centre Party 
(SMC), formed the Twelfth Slovenian Government. Despite a difficult start, the coalition 
is holding together as the economic recovery exceeds expectations. Labour Minister 
Anja Kopac Mrak managed to reach consensus with the social partners on the reform 
of student jobs and to finalize the new Social Agreement 2015-16.
Nonetheless, relations between the social partners are still strained, while public trust 
in institutions is still low. 
3.  The role of social dialogue in national policy-making  
in the post-crisis period 
While politics failed to respond to the crisis, the stalemate in tripartite institutions added 
to the paralysis until 2012-13, at great social and fiscal cost for Slovenian citizens. After 
that, the situation improved. As policy-making through the ESS and within the Euro-
pean Semester cycles became smoother, subsequent Governments managed to enact 
some overdue structural reforms. The situation is, however, fragile – as the fate of the 
Social Agreement 2015-16 clearly demonstrates.
3 1 The role of social dialogue in the crisis period (2008-13)
The weakening of Slovenian corporatist consensus-building started well before the 
crisis, right after Janez Janša’s first right-conservative Government was elected in 
mid-2004.
The SDS-led coalition promised radical reforms including labour market de-regulation, 
a flat tax regime and denationalization. The unions, who had not been involved in the 
decision-making, staged mass demonstrations in November 2005 and the Govern-
ment backtracked. Its popularity never recovered, despite expensive public projects 
and higher public sector wages. 
The recession hit Slovenia when Borut Pahor’s centre-left Government took over in 
2008. To stop job losses, it legislated shortened working time and temporary layoffs 
that saved some 25,000 posts in total. These anti-crisis measures were agreed upon 
with the social partners.
The Slovenian Exit Strategy 2010-2013 included 12 new laws under the heading ‘flex-
icurity and social cohesion’, encompassing reforms to the labour market, pensions, 
long-term care and healthcare, as well as measures against poverty and social exclusion. 
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The new Pension and Disability Insurance Act (ZPIZ-2) instantly became a bone of 
contention. The reform proposal was strongly criticized by coalition partner DeSUS, 
who opposed lower indexation, and the unions (principally ZSSS), who objected to 
changes to the requirements for full pension entitlement (Guardiancich, 2013). But it 
was labour market reform that ultimately led to the breakdown of negotiations.
Over two decades, Slovenia underwent the institutionalization of a two-tier labour 
market (Delo, 3 November 2009), in which permanent contracts were seemingly over-
protected, relative to less protected, fixed-term contracts – usually held by younger 
people. Both the Government and employers cherished the idea of crafting a solution 
introducing greater labour market flexibility in exchange for income security.
In a nutshell, the security part of the plan comprised of an increase in the minimum 
wage in line with the minimum consumption basket, and an extension of the coverage 
and duration of unemployment benefits through the Labour Market Regulation Act 
(ZUTD). Flexibility was to be achieved through the new Employment Relationships Act 
(ZDR-1), to slightly liberalize dismissals and reduce non-wage labour costs. Finally, the 
Mini-Jobs Act aimed at unifying fixed-term contracts, which were mainly in the hands 
of student services and organizations.
This ‘packaged’ solution was dismissed early on, following protests by the unions, who 
rejected the linking of minimum wages to revisions in the Employment Relationships 
Act. As a result, the laws were treated separately – to the irritation of all the employers’ 
associations (Delo, 13 January 2010). Premier Pahor and Labour Minister Ivan Svetlik 
felt that the unions would be in agreement with the plan (Delo, 15 January 2010). 
But labour unrest grew, and Pahor’s Government granted a major hike in minimum 
wages via the Minimum Wages Act (ZMP). The employers disagreed, and immediately 
boycotted tripartite negotiations, thereby ending peaceful social dialogue. Mediation 
between the parties on the reform of employment contracts, student jobs and pensions 
proved impossible. The Employment Relationships Act was withdrawn but the Govern-
ment pressed ahead with the other laws, sending them to the National Assembly.
Various interest groups, including pensioners, student organizations, the unions and 
opposition parties SNS and SDS, called a ‘super-referendum’ on 5 June 2011. The 
labour market and pension laws were defeated, provoking the downfall of the Eleventh 
Slovenian Government. 
In December 2011, Janez Janša returned to power and, quite unexpectedly, his 
Government managed to secure agreement with the social partners on some of the 
structural reforms that had failed just a year earlier. The new Labour Minister Andrej 
Vizjak changed the style of engagement with the ESS, announcing that he would per-
sonally head negotiations (Delo, 15 September 2012). 
A number of factors were in his favour. First, Janša adopted confidence-building meas-
ures and put the ESS back on centre stage, stating that: “the efficacy of solving the 
crisis is linked to the degree of consensus reached when adopting decisions” (Kavcic 
and Berlec, 2014). Second, Vizjak was an experienced negotiator. He chaired the 
majority of ESS meetings, including circa 240 hours on pension and labour market 
reforms. Third, the cabinet had a clear list of priorities: pension reform, reducing labour 
market segmentation, and agreeing on a social pact. Fourth, in a context of crisis, 
the trade unions understood they could not resort to referenda and shouldered the 
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responsibility of finding a compromise. Fifth, there was a ‘Nixon in China’ effect; the 
labour movement feared that a breakdown in negotiations under a conservative gov-
ernment would cost them dearly.
As such, the National Assembly de facto delegated labour market reforms to the ESS. 
Under pressure from the European institutions, members of the Assembly agreed not 
to table any amendments to the law as drawn up by the social partners.
Against this backdrop, in less than one year, a major restructuring of industrial relations 
was agreed through the Employment Relationships Act and the amended Labour Mar-
ket Regulation Act. The Pension and Disability Insurance Act put the retirement system 
on a better financial footing. The Confederation of Trade Unions of the Slovenian Pub-
lic Sector (KSJS) agreed on cutting wages, bonuses and several privileges of public 
employees. Finally, the Janša Government planted the seeds of a future social pact.
3 2 The role of social dialogue in the post-crisis period (2013-15) 
The subsequent centre-left Bratušek executive had to focus on the fiscal emergency 
and the banking crisis. Under her Government, nothing significant happened on the 
labour market and pension fronts, apart from a brief reopening of social dialogue on a 
new social pact. Since Miro Cerar took over in September 2014, the situation has been 
slowly returning to normal. However, important reforms, mainly related to the labour 
market, are not being discussed as the employers are distrustful.
The labour laws adopted in early 2013 had the effect of reducing segmentation, 
increasing flexibility and improving the legal security of employees. These effects are 
difficult to quantify given the short period of time that has elapsed since the reforms 
and the generally improved economic circumstances (Ministry of Labour and IMAD 
2014; 2015; IMAD 2014a; 2014b; 2015). Notwithstanding, a few trends emerge. First, 
in all age cohorts, the share of permanent vis-à-vis fixed-term contracts has increased, 
because of subsidies in terms of lower employer contributions, the increased flexibility 
of permanent contracts and the higher costs of temporary employment. Second, the 
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indices have dropped. From 2012-13, the pro-
tection of permanent contracts against individual dismissals has dropped from 2.39 to 
1.99, and the overall protection of temporary contracts has also slightly decreased. The 
EPL index for collective dismissals stayed at 3.38, rather high compared to the OECD 
average of 2.90. 
The 2015 Country Report (European Commission, 2015a) concludes that further 
steps are needed to tackle labour market segmentation, which continues to negatively 
affect younger workers. To this end, the Cerar Government appointed a tripartite-plus 
Steering Committee tasked to reduce the disparities between payroll taxes and con-
tributions for different types of employment contract, professional categories and 
so on. 
With regards to pensions, ZPIZ-2 has produced positive effects in its first year of imple-
mentation and is expected to decrease pension expenditures until circa 2020, when 
baby boomers gradually start to retire (Ministry of Labour, 2014). If savings are not 
sufficient, retirement ages should increase, for women to 62, and for men, to 63. 
Despite these efforts, both the OECD (2013) and the EC (2015a) have suggested 
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further reforms to the pension system. The current Government announced that it 
would prepare the framework for a new reform to guarantee long-term fiscal stability 
and encourage deferred retirement through bonuses, among other measures; this was 
restated in the Social Agreement 2015-16 (ESS, 2015).
In April 2015, Labour Minister Kopac Mrak established a working group to draft a White 
Paper on pensions (Delo, 29 April 2015), while Finance Minister Dušan Mramor has 
also given attention to the issue.
3 3 The role of social dialogue in the EU Semester
According to Slovenian European Semester Officers (ESOs), the European Semester 
has improved coordination, introduced stable and predictable deadlines, and involved 
more formal and informal meetings with the social partners. One of its greatest assets 
has been to post ESOs in loco in each Member State Representation – and they are 
instrumental in creating the conditions for direct and equal social partners’ involve-
ment in European decision-making (it was previously conducted only at the EU level 
through the European Trade Union Conference (ETUC) or BusinessEurope; and, at 
Member-State level, Commission representatives would fly to the country occasionally 
without establishing permanent ties).
In addition to the presence of the ESOs, Commission officials still regularly visit the 
Member States. The number and nature of these visits depends on the procedure 
according to which they are organized: e.g. the European Semester (one per year, 
usually with participation of the social partners) and the Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure (MIP) (two per year, more technical). As Slovenia has participated since the 
beginning in both the European Semester and the MIP, the two procedures have been 
unified and take place at the same time.
Before the advent of the Semester, such consultative meetings with the social partners 
were organized with the OZS and the GZS. Now, meetings are officially held also with 
the trade unions as well as with other employers’ associations, at ESS level. In techni-
cal terms, the ESOs send an invitation to the Secretariat of the ESS, which passes it 
on to the representative social partners. These then decide who shall participate on 
their behalf. In addition, the ESOs have been submitting most of the key documents of 
the European Semester and MIP procedures to the National Assembly (at committee 
level), and keeping the Members of Parliament and the representatives of the social 
partners involved in the process by inviting them to relevant conferences and events in 
Slovenia – or in Brussels.
At the height of the crisis (2011-13), the relationship between the Government, the 
social partners and the National Assembly was tense during preparations for the 
National Reform Programme (NRP). Janša’s Government gave only short deadlines to 
the National Assembly and the social partners for commenting on the proposed set 
of measures. Now that the crisis has ebbed since 2014, the collaboration surround-
ing the European Semester has improved. Major qualitative changes to the CSR have 
occurred; in 2015, the Commission introduced a more streamlined process with fewer 
reports and recommendations (Council of the EU, 2012; 2015). Moreover, the June 
2015 visit of the European Commissioner for the Euro and Social Dialogue was a good 
trust-building exercise.
ˇ
24510. REBUILDING SOCIAL DIALOGUE IN SLOVENIA: A COMPLEX TASK FOR THE POST-CRISIS PERIOD
The social partners’ involvement in the drafting of the NRP has improved over the 
years. In 2015, due to a stronger-than-expected recovery, the sense of impending crisis 
subsided and collaboration surged. In 2015, the NRP drafts were subject to consulta-
tion at various parliamentary committees and the ESS. The Social Agreement 2015-16 
(ESS, 2015) pledges to better include the social partners in the NRP drafting process.
The attitude of the social partners has also become more positive. Initially, there was 
much internal resistance by the unions to reforms perceived as necessary only because 
Brussels demanded them. As the crisis receded, a more collaborative model has been 
established. The social partners acknowledge that regular and direct dialogue with 
the European Commission helped them establish a more accommodating rather than 
adversarial attitude towards reforms.
Relations with the ESOs have also improved, after considerable investment in coordina-
tion with the social partners. The social partners have developed a sense of involvement 
and are increasingly exposed to different European practices and realities. The ESOs 
have recommended synergizing multi-level partnerships between the ESS and its Euro-
pean counterparts (for example, the European Economic and Social Council (EESC)), 
in particular where memberships overlap. This, in fact, opens another avenue for influ-
encing EU-level policy-making.
3 4 The role and impact of national social dialogue institutions
The centrepiece of Slovenian social dialogue is the tripartite ESS, which wields consid-
erable power – even though it is not underpinned by any national legislation, but rather 
by tripartite agreement. The National Assembly only discusses socio-economic legis-
lation once the ESS members have debated it. The ESS participates in the drafting of 
legislation; has the right to initiate the preparation of new legislation or the amendment 
of existing laws; and elaborates opinions as well as positions on legislative drafts, the 
budget memorandum and the State budget. 
Since 2007, each side has up to eight representatives on the ESS. Currently, there are 
eight trade union representatives, and seven each for the employers and the Govern-
ment. The ESS members elect the President for a one-year term. The ESS meets at 
least once a month and decisions are reached by consensus. Each partner has one 
vote, and usually the representatives of each group come to the ESS with a collegial 
position. The ESS is often too big a forum to discuss legislative details. Hence, smaller 
working groups are convened, and the ESS discusses only the final opinions.
Important documents agreed at the ESS include the social pacts, which used to be 
drafted every year or two (Stanojevic, 2010) and specify the social partners’ mutual 
obligations. Economic, social and wage policy are collectively negotiated, which was 
instrumental in the swift adoption of the Euro in 2007. A necessary pre-condition for 
success is trust between the social partners – which has been in short supply since 
the onset of the crisis.
Pahor’s weakness was not to negotiate a new social pact immediately for 2010-11. The 
starting points for a pact were presented to the ESS only in November 2009, by which 
time the relations between labour and the Government were already so strained that 
the unions immediately abandoned the negotiations (Delo, 13 November 2009).
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Nonetheless, the employers’ and union representatives continued to discuss major 
guidelines for a new pact and, in 2012, Janša engaged the social partners in the 
definition of common goals for inclusion in a social agreement. In April 2012, only the 
starting points for the Social Agreement 2012-16 (Government RS, 2012) could be 
signed, and serious negotiations restarted in November 2014. While reduced cuts in 
the public sector served to bring the unions on board, the GZS disagreed and exited 
negotiations before the year-end. However, following continued negotiations and con-
cessions the social partners finally signed the Social Agreement 2015-16 on 5 February 
2015, after six years without a pact in place. 
The agreement covers 12 areas for which it enumerates as many as 140 goals: finance, 
sustainable economic development, new investment cycle, public sector, healthcare, 
wages, labour market, retirement, implementing the European cohesion policy, edu-
cation, legal security and social dialogue (ESS, 2015). The social pact reaffirms the 
central role of the ESS in national tripartism. The Government guarantees adequate 
means for the body’s functioning until 2020, and commits to better involve the social 
partners in drafting key strategic documents within the European Semester. 
Although reactions to the Social Agreement 2015-16 were generally favourable (Kanjuo 
Mrcela, 2015), mutual trust between the social partners had not been fully re-estab-
lished. The dispute over minimum wages confirms this. The unions, through a petition, 
unilaterally sent a proposal to recalculate the minimum wage to the National Assembly 
in September 2015 and, after rather short consultations, the Parliament approved it. 
Even though the cash amounts involved were negligible, the process and outcome 
irritated the employers.
Jože Smole of The Association of Employers of Slovenia (ZDS) remarked (Delo, 
24 November 2015): Probably for the first time in 20 years, the unions wrote, the 
Government approved and the National Assembly adopted a law that imposes higher 
costs on employers. This means that we, employers, will in the future read in the Offi-
cial Gazette what, when and how much we have to pay. The employers accused the 
Government and unions of bilaterally redefining the minimum wage, thereby implicitly 
violating the Social Agreement 2015-16. Their withdrawal from the pact, less than a 
year after signing it, means that rebuilding trust between the social partners in Slovenia 
has barely started (Delo, 27 November 2015; 1 December 2015).
4.  Industrial relations and collective bargaining  
in the post-crisis period 
4 1 Impact of the crisis on collective bargaining and post-crisis developments 
Bipartite collective bargaining was similarly weakened by the crisis in terms of cover-
age and number of agreements. Notwithstanding, collective agreements still proved to 
be a valuable tool of regulation, helping both employers and workers to find mutually 
acceptable solutions above and beyond the anti-crisis measures legislated under the 
Pahor Government. The new Employment Relationships Act further strengthened their 
ability to negotiate autonomously.
The Labour Ministry’s register of collective agreements tracks only sectoral agreements 
and not those at firm level. In September 2015, there were 46 collective agreements 
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covering the Slovenian economy, plus four others concluded before the Collective 
Agreements Act (ZKolP) (Uradni list RS, 43/06) came into force.
Four collective agreements are intersectoral, covering specific issues such as pen-
sions in the public sector, pay increments and reimbursements. Three agreements 
are for individual occupations: journalists, police, and doctors and dentists. The other 
39 agreements concern various sectors or occupations: 23 apply in the private sec-
tor; three concern public sector industries (electricity, coal mining, and railways); and 
13 cover employees in public sector social services (as diverse as social security, 
fire-fighting and education). Twelve collective agreements have been extended to the 
whole sector, including those in catering and tourism, electric industries, metallurgy, 
textiles, forestry and postal services.
Before the crisis, the coverage of collective agreements in Slovenia was one of the high-
est in the EU. In 2007, around 96 per cent of the employed labour force was covered, 
as only managers and senior public officials relied on individual employment contracts 
(Zidar and Mesec, 2010). During the crisis, collective agreement coverage declined to 
65-75 per cent, as a result of two main trends. 
First, the social partners lost membership. In regard to collective agreements, the decline 
in employers’ association density creates challenges (see section 4.3). In addition to 
financial issues and a tougher pro-business stance (see Stanojevic, 2014a; 2014b), it 
has become more difficult to extend collective agreements, which require an employ-
ers’ density threshold of 50 per cent for automatic extension; hence, further declines 
may occur. 
Second, several collective agreements in the private sector were terminated during 
the crisis, e.g. in construction and the chemical and plastics industry (Mrcela, 2015). 
In construction, employers’ representatives explain that the fact that procedures for 
public tenders had to abide by a generous collective agreement was too great a burden 
for enterprises (Delo, 5 September 2013). But the ZSSS maintain that employers only 
wanted to increase their profitability at the expense of workers, through worse condi-
tions agreed at company level. Although some of the terminated sectoral agreements 
have been replaced by firm-level agreements, the trend towards decentralization had 
already started before the crisis; for example, the inter-sectoral general collective agree-
ment for economic activities was revoked in 2005. 
From a qualitative point of view, however, the situation is more vibrant. Slovenian col-
lective agreements used to contain many open clauses, such as on specific conditions 
of employment, extended unpaid leave, redeployment of employees, salary reductions 
etc., which were often successfully used. The economic situation called for greater 
flexibility through collective agreements and an increased role for the social partners in 
the determination of employment relations – both of which subsequently became part 
of the reform agenda of Janša’s Labour Minister Vizjak. The new Employment Relation-
ships Act (ZDR-1) introduced a list of statutory employees’ rights, which might be less 
favourable under collective agreement. These include quotas for temporary agency 
workers, notification periods, severance pay conditions, regulation of working time, 
overtime limits and so on. After the adoption of ZDR-1, the social partners signed eight 
new collective agreements and updated the norms in two others, making extensive use 
of the provisions on possible derogations from the law. They have clearly demonstrated 
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their ability to negotiate and agree on fine details at bipartite level. In fact, based on 
the specific characteristics of the sector concerned, collective agreements now alter-
natively stress the need for flexibility (smaller employers, textiles and clothing), or for 
less segmentation (most collective agreements), or for cost containment (catering and 
tourism, trade, metallurgy).
Regarding flexibility in work organization, the following observations may be made 
(Ministry of Labour and IMAD, 2014; 2015; IMAD, 2014b):
• All collective agreements set additional cases where employees are asked tem-
porarily to perform working tasks which are not in the contract of employment.
• Several collective agreements allow smaller employers to hire employees on 
fixed-term contracts for longer than the limits set by the law.
• In certain cases, collective agreements set longer time limits for overtime, night 
shifts or the average duration of full-time work.
• The share of agency workers in one collective agreement is set at 50 per cent 
(whereas the legal limit is 25 per cent).
With regard to reducing overall segmentation: 
• Some collective agreements determine the conditions for entitlement to a lump-
sum payment upon retirement, and its amount. 
• In certain cases, salary increments for length of service can be stipulated via the 
firm-level collective agreement or through an employer’s general act.
• Apprenticeships and relative salary arrangements are being introduced by many 
collective agreements.
As for measures aimed at cost containment, the social partners have negotiated the 
following:
• Introduction of an eligibility condition for a lump-sum payment upon retirement, 
of minimum employment duration of five years (in more than half the collective 
agreements); and reduction of severance pay to one month’s salary per five 
years of employment (in some).
• Length-of-service salary increments are regulated in a number of collective 
agreements.
4 2 The role of the State in industrial relations
The Slovenian Government’s attitude towards industrial relations during the recession 
has been shifting considerably. Borut Pahor’s Government realized that legislation 
important to the social partners could not be bulldozed through Parliament without 
risking extreme opposition which might jeopardize its very existence.
Hence, Janša’s executive granted the employers and unions greater authority, espe-
cially at bipartite level, by endowing the ESS with legislative power in the reform of the 
Employment Relationships Act in the period 2012-13. As a result, the social partners 
enjoyed greater room for manoeuvre in bipartite sectoral and firm-level bargaining, 
which, as shown above, led to positive results. 
Espousing a different stance, the Bratušek Government amended the Constitution by 
introducing the balanced budget fiscal rule and reducing the ability to call for refer-
enda, especially on budgetary matters (Delo, 24 May 2013; Government RS, 201; 
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Council of the EU, 2013). Under Cerar, the Fiscal Rules Act (ZFisP) followed in July 
2015 (Delo, 10 July 2015), and the Referendum and Popular Initiative Act (ZRLI) was 
still being debated at the time of writing. 
The ‘golden’ fiscal rule aims to balance the budget under normal economic condi-
tions, as required under EMU treaty law.106 The Referendum Act would restrict the 
actors who are entitled to call for a referendum, raise the quorum and list domains in 
which referenda are not admissible, such as taxes and state budget implementation. 
These important procedural changes aim to render legislation less vulnerable to ex post 
annulment by opposed interest groups. According to Stanojevic (2014b), these two 
laws weaken the policy-making clout of employers and unions, thereby changing the 
balance of power in favour of government. 
4 3 Changes in employers’ and workers’ organizations 
The Slovenian social partners experienced fragmentation and declining membership 
during the crisis. 
At a time of reduced trade union membership and density, Mrcela (2015) notes the 
absence of union mergers. Instead, growing fragmentation has made it more difficult to 
negotiate in the public sector. According to Labour Ministry data, there were eight trade 
union confederations and as many as 39 individual unions that fulfilled representative-
ness criteria in late 2015.
Under the partly outdated 1993 Representativeness of Trade Unions Act (ZRSin) 
(Uradni list RS, 13/93), a confederation is considered representative if the affiliated 
unions’ members account for at least 10 per cent of that sector’s workforce; for a 
single unaffiliated union, this requirement climbs to 15 per cent. This gave rise to 
two problems. First, after the reform of public sector salaries at the start of the crisis, 
fragmentation occurred as each profession started defending the privileges of its own 
members. Second, the law does not provide for verification of union representative-
ness over time. A redrafting of the law, including verification procedures and minimum 
membership criteria, is needed.
The long-term decline of union membership in Slovenia accelerated after accession to 
the Eurozone, due mainly to the changing structure of the labour market. Union mem-
bership data are unreliable; however, estimates put gross union density (the ratio of 
union members to the total number of employees) at 43.8 per cent in 2003, declining 
to 26.6 per cent by 2008. Union density may now be around 20 per cent (Mrcela, 
2015). As a consequence, membership fee receipts have declined significantly, lead-
ing to a loss of union staff and professional capacity. 
With regards to employers, employers’ association density has declined from roughly 
80-90 per cent before the crisis to around 60 per cent now. In addition to major 
economic restructuring, legislation changes have contributed to this trend. Member-
ship used to be obligatory in the two Chambers, the GZS and OZS, until 2006 and 
2013, respectively. The results of these developments are twofold: first, a limitation 
to the automatic extension of collective agreements; and second, a reduction in the 
106  Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, also known as the ‘fiscal 
compact’.
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associations’ ability to hire experts accompanying their decline in membership (for 
example, OZS lost 20,000 of its 50,000 members). 
Employers’ organizations also have issues of representativeness and fragmentation. As 
there is no representativeness law, time-consuming counts must be held before each 
election to the National Council (the Parliament’s corporatist second chamber) and to 
the (tripartite) Institute for Health Insurance of Slovenia; the State Election Commission 
then has to validate these. After membership of the GZS and OZS became voluntary, 
big shifts occurred in the balance of power between the associations. Employers also 
have a harder time than unions to adopt common positions in the ESS. Covering as they 
do a multiplicity of heterogeneous interests, disagreements sometimes arise between 
the representatives of small and medium enterprises (such as OZS) and those of larger 
establishments (e.g. GZS, ZDS). 
5. Conclusions
Slovenia’s experience during the crisis was uneven from an economic, political and 
institutional standpoint, shifting between positive and negative developments. 
There is still a backlog of reform. The latest CSR (Council of the EU, 2015) calls upon 
Slovenia, inter alia, to: 1) ensure a sustainable correction of the excessive deficit by 
advancing the long-term reform of the pension system, healthcare and long-term care; 
2) review, in consultation with the social partners, the minimum wage-setting mech-
anism, and increase the employability of the unskilled, long-term unemployed and 
older workers; 3) reduce non-performing loans, increase banks’ monitoring capacity, 
streamline the operations of the ‘bad bank’ and improve the privatization process; and 
4) improve the efficiency of civil justice, thereby reducing the length of proceedings.
Some opportunities to accelerate the Slovenian recovery have been missed and the 
trust between the social partners still needs to be fully rebuilt. Even the most encourag-
ing achievement of social dialogue, the Social Agreement 2015-16, did not survive long, 
which is directly attributable to the strained relations between the social partners. What 
is the role of tripartism under such circumstances? As shown throughout this chapter, 
effective social dialogue is crucial for the efficient functioning of the Slovenian economy 
and for ensuring sustainable reforms. When there is a willingness to engage effectively 
in social dialogue, good policy outcomes have been – and can be – achieved.
The fragmentation of and tension between the social partners challenges the smooth 
operation of the ESS. Three types of intervention might help. First, the Government 
could set clear representativeness criteria for both the trade unions and employers 
in order to reverse current fragmentation trends. Second, the social partners require 
adequate funding and staffing, if they are to carry out an effective and independent 
review of draft legislation. Third, there is a need for a better definition of the role and 
procedures of tripartism, as well as of the fields in which it should operate, possibly 
encoded in law.
The European Semester’s importance is growing. Under the pressure of EU dead-
lines, it is unrealistic to expect that consensus between the Government and the social 
partners in the ESS can always be reached on key policy documents. In this respect, 
the rejection of the Pahor Government’s attempts to introduce reforms by referendum 
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is instructive. Since then, the public’s ability to counter unpopular Government plans 
through referenda has been substantially restricted. As a counterbalance, though, the 
social partners should henceforth have greater involvement in the drafting of National 
Reform and Stability Programmes through consultation, education and information.
Finally, the role of social partnership has shifted due to the reduced macroeconomic 
room for manoeuvre, which necessarily accompanies membership in the Economic 
and Monetary Union. Tripartism has been at least partly overshadowed by more active 
bipartite bargaining at sectoral and firm levels. Greater autonomy of the social partners 
may represent the way forward for Slovenian social dialogue; it would perhaps be best 
to entrust the unions and employers with greater autonomy in bipartite negotiations, 
while concurrently reinforcing the role and impact of the tripartite ESS.
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Appendix
List of persons interviewed for the study
Government
Alenka Kajzer, Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development of the Republic 
of Slovenia (IMAD) 
Peter Pogacar, Ministry of Labour
Mateja Vranicar, Ministry of Finance 
Employers’ Organizations
Tatjana Cerin, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Slovenia (GZS) 
Branko Meh and Maja Rigac, Small Businesses of Slovenia (OZS)
Tatjana Pajhnikar, the Association of Employers of Slovenia (ZDS) 
Workers’ Organizations
Vladimir Tkalec, the Confederation of Trade Unions of the Slovenian Public Sector 
(KSJS)
Others
Ulla Hudina and Tina Vencina, European Commission Representation in Slovenia
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11.  Post-crisis social dialogue in Spain:  
The calm after the storm
Oscar MOlina and FausTO Miguélez 
1. Introduction
In line with a parallel evolution in the economy, tripartite social dialogue in Spain, which 
was once praised for its vitality in the boom years preceding the recession (OECD, 
2007), broke down under the pressure of fiscal consolidation policies during the eco-
nomic crisis. Despite signs of a timid economic recovery since 2013, tripartite social 
dialogue nonetheless remains weak and has delivered few results. This stands in con-
trast to the resilience and positive contribution of bipartite social dialogue, between 
employers’ and workers’ organizations, in coordinating collective bargaining at a diffi-
cult economic and political juncture (Molina and Rhodes, 2011). 
A number of reasons may explain the discontinuity of tripartite social dialogue: its 
non-formalized character and hence its dependence on the economic and political 
context (Espina 1999); the role of fiscal consolidation, structural policies and emer-
gency legislation; and the erosion of the perceived input and output legitimacy of the 
social partners (Molina and Miguélez, 2013, Culpepper and Regan, 2014). The pros-
pects for a revitalization of tripartite social dialogue in the post-crisis period therefore 
remain uncertain at the moment. 
Some tentative steps have been taken in the post-crisis period to rebuild trust between 
the social partners and the Government with a view to re-launching tripartite social 
dialogue. These include a declaration of intent signed by the employers’ organizations, 
workers’ organizations and the Government in July 2014, and a narrow pact on acti-
vation policies for the long-term unemployed in December of the same year. However, 
these developments cannot be considered to mark a turning point with respect to the 
previous dynamics. A long-term process of narrowing down the issues negotiated in 
tripartite social dialogue has also contributed towards detaching social dialogue from 
general economic policy-making. In this vein, the European Semester and the negotia-
tion and implementation of National Reform Programmes have so far contributed very 
little to strengthening tripartite social dialogue. Rather the contrary; the weak involve-
ment of the social partners has opened the Government to criticism, and contributed 
to polarized views on economic policy.
The role of the Economic and Social Council (ESC) has also been questioned in the 
context of the economic and financial crisis. Its narrow advisory role has opened a 
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debate about whether this institution should be maintained. However, some voices 
have pointed to the need to reform the National Social Dialogue Institutions (NSDI), 
including an extension of the role of the ESC and the inclusion of new actors (Plata-
forma Tercer Sector, 2015). Finally, fiscal consolidation and structural policies, together 
with a reform of public administration, have led to the suppression of many economic 
and social councils at regional level.
The remainder of this chapter is divided as follows. The second section provides the 
macroeconomic and politico-institutional background for the analysis of social dialogue 
in the post-crisis period. The third section analyses social dialogue between 2013 and 
2015, and discusses its role in key policy issues such as the labour market and pen-
sions, and in the formulation and implementation of National Reform Programmes 
in the context of the European Semester; it further looks at the part played by the 
NSDIs in the post-crisis period. The fourth section studies the impact of the crisis and 
post-crisis developments in collective bargaining dimensions such as coordination and 
structure. Finally, the fifth section provide concluding remarks.
The methodology used to elaborate this chapter consisted of several research meth-
ods and sources, including secondary sources (journal articles, newspaper articles, 
etc.) and interviews with key actors in social dialogue at national level – including 
the social partners, experts, Government representatives and European Semester 
Officers (ESOs) (see appendix). The interviews were carried out between June and 
October 2015 in Madrid and Barcelona. This was supplemented by quantitative data 
to shed light on the macroeconomic context, labour market developments and indus-
trial relations. 
2. The macroeconomic and political context
2 1 Macroeconomic and labour market context
As regards the macroeconomic framework, there was disagreement among the experts 
interviewed as to whether the current context could accurately be described as ‘post- 
crisis’. Despite positive growth in GDP since the last quarter of 2013, which has been 
accompanied by some growth in employment and a slight decline in total unemploy-
ment, far too many macroeconomic imbalances and labour market challenges remain 
to be able to talk of the crisis in the past tense.
Regarding GDP growth, figure 11.1 shows how the recovery has relied upon the strong 
export performance of goods and services – thanks in part to the internal devaluation 
process. Private domestic demand has remained stagnant, hence contributing very 
little to the recovery. Even though this could, a priori, be taken as a sign of structural 
change in the growth regime, the reality is that tourism and its linked activities (hotels, 
restaurants, etc.) has been one of the most dynamics sectors in terms of employ-
ment creation and growth, followed by retail trade and construction (Miguélez et al., 
2015). These were the very same sectors that led growth in the pre-crisis years, thus 
suggesting that the underlying structural problems remain. At the same time, the 
Government deficit remains high at 5.9 per cent of GDP in 2014, and public debt has 
maintained a steady growth, reaching 99.3 per cent of GDP in 2014 – up from 35.5 
per cent in 2007. 
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One of the Spanish economy’s main problems during the pre-crisis years was low labour 
productivity, due largely to a growth regime based on labour-intensive and low-produc-
tivity sectors. Since the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008, productivity has 
increased (see figure 11.2). However, this is explained not by any structural change in 
production with a shift towards less labour-intensive and higher productivity sectors, but 
Figure 11.1 Key macroeconomic indicators (% of GDP), 2000-14
Source: Eurostat.
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Figure 11.2  Real labour productivity and nominal unit labour costs, 
(% change on previous year), 2000-14
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simply by a greater decline in employment relative to GDP growth. The negative growth 
in nominal unit labour costs has thus contributed to improved external cost competitive-
ness, but without delivering a long-term shift in production methods or sectors.
The second main characteristic of Spain’s recovery is related to the type and quality of 
employment created. As figure 11.3 shows, the crisis triggered a decline in temporary 
employment, which is by definition the first source of employment that disappears in 
the event of an economic slowdown. This has been accompanied by an increase in 
part-time employment, most of it involuntary. The increase in part-time work is the 
result of the employers’ strategy to cut labour costs and explains the increase in the 
number of ‘working poor’, from 10.2 per cent of those employed in 2008 to 12.6 per 
cent in 2014. In fact, some analysts have shown how part-time workers, and in par-
ticular women part-timers, experience a significant wage disadvantage (Ramos et al., 
2015). Finally, self-employment has remained rather stable during the crisis. 
Figure 11.3  Temporary employment, part-time employment  
and self-employment (% of total employment), 2000-14
Source: Eurostat
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Even though the unemployment rate has evolved favourably since 2014, it nonetheless 
remains very high. More importantly, long-term unemployment has increased rapidly 
and does not show any signs of slowing down (see figure 11.4). This is the reason why 
many observers, including some of the persons interviewed, remain sceptical about 
the “post-crisis” notion. As pointed out recently by J. Stiglitz: a two-speed economy 
with a 25 per cent unemployment rate cannot enter into a sustainable recovery.107 The 
high long-term unemployment rate is even more worrying when we consider the reduc-
tion in active labour market policies and the fall in unemployment protection coverage 
107 Interview in El Economista, 13 October 2013.
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Figure 11.4  Unemployment rate (% of labour force) and long-term 
unemployment rate (% of total unemployment), 2000-14
Source: Eurostat.
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(Miguélez et al., 2015). In other words, many of these long-term unemployed workers 
have severe employability problems and, as a result of the fewer resources devoted to 
both active and passive employment policies, they face enormous difficulties not only 
in finding a job, but also in securing a decent standard of living.
2 2 Political context
Since the start of the crisis in 2008, there have been two Governments in Spain. The 
first Socialist government, headed by Mr. Zapatero, was re-elected for a second term 
of office in April 2008, by which time the first symptoms of the crisis were already 
visible. This Government was in charge of implementing the first neo-Keynesian policy 
responses, on the assumption that the crisis would be only temporary and that the 
Spanish economy was well prepared to face it. This Government kept social dialogue 
alive and tried to involve the social partners in discussions on general economic poli-
cy-making, but with very limited results in terms of providing effective, adequate and 
timely responses to the crisis. When the sovereign debt crisis hit Spain, the Government 
had to adopt the first fiscal consolidation packages in 2010 and 2011, which led to a 
significant drop in popular support and strong criticism from opposition parties – who 
accused Zapatero of acting too late and with the wrong policies. As a consequence, 
the Zapatero Government was obliged to bring forward the elections; the centre-right 
People’s Party (PP), headed by Mr. Rajoy, won with an absolute majority in November 
2011. The large parliamentary majority enjoyed by the new Government allowed it to 
adopt strong fiscal consolidation measures for financial stability and to enact significant 
structural reforms in several areas, including industrial relations and the labour mar-
ket. The social partners and opposition parties alike have criticized this Government’s 
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over-reliance on emergency regulation by decree, which requires a shorter procedure 
in Parliament and impedes effective social dialogue. 
The stable and smooth two-party alternation under a quasi-majoritarian electoral 
system came to an end with the last elections, in December 2015. The political compo-
sition of Parliament is much more fragmented and will require a coalition Government if 
any legislation is to be adopted. This fragmentation can, to a large extent, be attributed 
to the erosion of public support for the two largest political parties that have governed 
during the past few years. Moreover, scandals over alleged corruption, as well as the 
Governments’ perceived ineffectiveness in dealing with some of the impacts of the 
crisis, have also damaged their position.
Similarly, the analysis of social dialogue in the crisis and post-crisis periods has to be 
interpreted in the light of a deep and multifaceted parallel crisis in the democratic system 
(Sánchez-Cuenca, 2014). The crisis has triggered an increase in public perception of 
the need to reform the political system, regarding both its institutions and the function-
ing and representativeness of political parties. The social partners, more specifically the 
trade unions, have also been the target of criticism by a large sector of society (including 
the 15-M Movement and the Indignados). They are accused of not offering an alter-
native model and of accepting the policies of both the PP and the Spanish Socialist 
Workers’ Party (PSOE), due to their high degree of institutionalization and dependence 
on State resources (Barranco and Molina, 2014). The two major labour confederations 
acknowledged the weakness of trade unions, as part of the institutional and political 
system, to effectively channel citizens’ demands.108 As a consequence, the public’s 
trust in Spanish trade unions has deteriorated over the crisis years (see figure 11.5). 
108 See http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/09/19/economia/1348047099.html 
Figure 11.5 Trust in trade unions (% of respondents), 2006-14
Source: Eurobarometer.
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Political discontent was aggravated by the perceived imposition of fiscal adjustment by 
EU institutions. Moreover, the negative economic impact of the crisis and the resulting 
fiscal adjustment were viewed as threats to the stability of the democratic system. The 
Indignados movement should, accordingly, be interpreted as an expression of political 
and economic discontent (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2011).
3.  The role of social dialogue in national policy-making  
in the post-crisis period 
3 1 Social dialogue in the crisis period
Three periods regarding tripartite social dialogue can be distinguished since the begin-
ning of the financial and economic crisis (see table 11.1):
• 2008-09: The period of stimulus-response in 2008-2009 was characterized by 
a significant involvement of the social partners; however, this gave few results in 
terms of agreements signed during these years. 
• 2010-13: The 2010 debt crisis led to the adoption of a more unilateral approach 
to policy-making with less room for social partnership. The only exception in 
this regard was the January 2011 Tripartite Social and Economic Agreement. 
The centre-right Rajoy Government, elected in November 2011, maintained the 
unilateral approach to policy-making. The erosion of social dialogue affected not 
only its tripartite dimension, but also bipartite relations between employers’ and 
workers’ organizations. 
• 2014-15: More recently, with the first signs of economic recovery in 2014, there 
has been a slight resumption of tripartite and bipartite social dialogue. How-
ever, it remains fragmented and discontinuous, as the following analysis will 
demonstrate.
Table 11.1  Social dialogue and policy reforms in Spain, 2008-12 
Date Policy Social dialogue
July 2008 Memorandum of Understanding 
for the Recovery of the Economy, 
Employment, Competitiveness and 
Social Progress.
Memorandum of Understanding signed 
between the CCOO (Trade Union Confederation 
of Workers’ Commissions), UGT (General Union 
of Workers), CEOE (Spanish Confederation 
of Employers’ Organizations) and the 
Government.
September 
2009
Agreement for the public sector 
between trade unions and the 
Government 2010-12.
Agreement signed between CCOO, UGT, CSIF 
(Independent Trade Union of Civil Servants) 
and the Government.
January 2010 Inter-confederal Agreement on 
Employment and Collective Bargaining 
2010-12 (AENC-I).
Bipartite agreement signed between the 
CCOO, UGT and CEOE containing guidelines for 
collective agreements.
January 2010 Plan for Immediate Action 2010. Neither consultation nor negotiations between 
the social partners and the Government.
S
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Date Policy Social dialogue
May 2010 Austerity Plan for the Public Sector 
2011-13.
Neither consultations nor negotiations between 
the social partners and the Government.
June –  
September
2010
Labour Market Reform. Tripartite negotiations failed, leading to 
unilateral rule by the Government. 
December 
2010
Industrial Policy Programme – PIN 
2020
The Government consulted the social partners 
about some of the contents, but their 
involvement was limited.
January 2011 Social and Economic Agreement on 
pensions, labour market and collective 
bargaining
Tripartite Social Pact signed by CCOO, UGT, 
CEOE and the Government.
March 2011 Law on Sustainable Economy. The Government consulted the social partners 
about some of the contents, but their 
involvement was limited.
June 2011 Reform of Collective Bargaining Tripartite negotiations failed, thus the 
Government ruled unilaterally.
January 2012 Inter-confederal Agreement on 
Employment and Collective Bargaining 
(AENC-II).
Bipartite agreement: Guidelines for collective 
agreements.
March 2012 Labour Market Reform. Neither consultation nor negotiations with 
the social partners. Unilateral approval by the 
Government. 
Source: Authors’ own analysis.
Between 2008 and 2009, the Socialist government headed by Mr. Zapatero involved 
the social partners in several initiatives before the economic situation rapidly deteri-
orated. Nonetheless, disagreements between the social partners resulted in most of 
these negotiations ending without an agreement, or with pacts that had a very limited 
impact. The sovereign debt crisis and external pressures on the Government to take 
action – especially regarding fiscal adjustment, without awaiting the outcomes of social 
dialogue – led to the breakdown of negotiations on labour market reform in June 2010, 
when the Government decided to regulate unilaterally. 
But social dialogue resumed later that year and a tripartite social pact on employ-
ment and pensions (the only one concluded during the crisis) was signed in January 
2011. This pact can be seen as the exception that proved the rule – i.e., that tri-
partite social dialogue would have a hard time under fiscal consolidation policies. 
In fact, between the signing of the pact in 2011 and 2014, there were no tripartite 
discussions at all between the Government and the social partners. As previously 
mentioned, this erosion of tripartite social dialogue contrasts with the continuity in 
bipartite union-employer peak-level social dialogue, which delivered a new and impor-
tant inter-confederal agreement in January 2012. This agreement was subsequently 
renewed in July 2015. 
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3 2 Social dialogue in the post-crisis period
During the 29 month period between November 2011 and March 2014, tripartite social 
dialogue was discontinued. It was only in March 2014, when employers’ and work-
ers’ organizations urged the Government to restore tripartite social dialogue, that some 
meetings took place at the highest political level. Trade unions considered negotiations 
around three main issues to be of particular importance: fiscal reform, active labour 
market policies and unemployment protection. As a result of these meetings, on 29 
July 2014, the social partners and the Government signed a document on ‘proposals 
for tripartite negotiations to strengthen economic growth and employment’.109 Trade 
unions considered this an important step towards the revitalization of social dialogue. 
Moreover, as a result of the terms laid out in this document, an agreement was signed 
in December 2014: the Programme for Employment Activation.110 This plan included 
an extension of the guaranteed income for the long-term unemployed, accompanied 
by strengthened activation mechanisms for this group. In contrast, it proved impossible 
some months later to reach agreement on the reform of vocational and lifelong learning 
systems; as such the Government, once again under pressure, had to unilaterally pass 
a legislative decree on vocational training in March 2015.111 
The importance of social dialogue in facilitating a quicker, more socially sustainable 
recovery was stressed recently by the employers’ organizations, the CEOE and the 
Spanish Confederation of Small and Medium-sized Industries (CEPYME), in a document 
presenting proposals for promoting economic recovery .112 In addition to identifying a 
number of policy areas where appropriate reforms could foster growth, they empha-
sized the importance of restoring social dialogue in the recovery phase, as a means to 
enhance the efficacy of these reforms.
Table 11.2  Social dialogue and policy reforms in Spain, 2014-15
Date Reform Social dialogue dynamics
July 2014 Proposals for tripartite negotiation 
to strengthen economic growth and 
employment
Tripartite Agreement with no specific policy 
content. It is a declaration of intent for future 
negotiations
December 2014 Plan for Employment Activation Tripartite agreement. 
March 2015 Reform of Vocational Training Unilateral regulation by the Government after 
negotiations with the social partners failed.
July 2015 Inter-confederal Agreement on 
Employment and Collective Bargaining 
2015-2016-2017 (AENC-III)
Bipartite agreement. Guidelines for collective 
bargaining.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
109  Acuerdo de Propuestas para la Negociación Tripartita para Fortalecer el Crecimiento Económico y el Empleo. 
Available at: http://www.ugt.es/Documentos%20de%20apoyo/Acuerdo_Propuestas_negociacion_tripartita_forta 
lecer_crecimiento_economico_y_empleo_29072014.pdf 
110  Programa Extraordinario de Activación para el Empleo, available at: http://www.empleo.gob.es/es/destacados/HOME/ 
activacionempleo/archivos/Acuerdo_PEAE.pdf 
111 Text availabe at: http://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2015-3031 
112  “15 Reformas para Consolidar la Recuperación” (15 reforms to consolidate recovery). Text available at: http://www.
ceoe.es/resources/image/15_reformas_consolidar_recuperacion_2015_10.pdf 
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In July 2015, the social partners signed the third Inter-confederal Agreement on 
Employment and Collective Bargaining, 2015-2016-2017 (AENC III).113 Even though 
negotiations took longer than expected, due to a disagreement around wage increas-
es,114 the trade unions and employers finally agreed on guidelines for collective 
bargaining over the coming three years. This again serves to demonstrate the greater 
resilience of bipartite relative to tripartite social dialogue – consolidating a trend that 
started in the 1990s (Molina and Rhodes, 2011; Molina and Miguélez, 2013). Inter-
views with employers’ and workers’ organizations confirmed their strong commitment 
to the governance of collective bargaining through peak bipartite agreements.
More recently, and before political uncertainty set in following the December 2015 
elections, the social partners created a working committee to elaborate proposals for 
negotiations with the future coalition Government. In this way, they were demonstrating 
their willingness to negotiate with any Government in order to achieve social consensus. 
This shows the growing significance of bipartite social dialogue, not only as a govern-
ance mechanism for industrial relations and the coordination of collective bargaining, 
but also as a leverage mechanism to re-launch tripartite dialogue.
3 3 Best and innovative practices in social dialogue
In a context of weak tripartite social dialogue, the interviewees unanimously pointed to 
the continuation of peak bipartite social dialogue as a best practice in the crisis and 
post-crisis periods. This is certainly not a new development; in the 1990s when tri-
partite social dialogue also experienced challenges, peak union-employer agreements 
emerged as an important governance mechanism. However, the social partners inter-
viewed considered that the signing of the AENC III, adopted in a very difficult economic 
and political climate, has been crucial and marks a significant step towards re-launch-
ing social dialogue in Spain.
3 4 Social dialogue in labour law and pension reform
The crisis has given rise to many changes in labour market regulation in Spain (Pastor, 
2015), mainly to introduce greater labour market flexibility. According to OECD analysis, 
the changes have reduced labour market rigidities as measured by the Employment 
Protection Legislation index (OECD, 2014). However, as table 11.3 clearly shows, tri-
partite social dialogue played only a marginal role in labour market reforms during the 
economic crisis; moreover, in those cases where tripartite negotiations did occur, it 
proved difficult to reach agreement. With economic recovery now in sight, there are 
some signs of a revitalization of social dialogue around labour market reform; but the 
issues currently on the table are of lesser importance than those regulated unilaterally 
by the Government in previous years. 
113  III Acuerdo para el Empleo y la Negociación Colectiva 2015-2016-2017. See text at: http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/ 
2015/06/20/pdfs/BOE-A-2015-6865.pdf 
114  The employers’ organizations were in favour of maintaining a policy of strong wage moderation, while the trade unions 
argued that it was time to boost demand and allow for higher pay increases.
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Table 11.3 Labour market reforms and social dialogue in Spain, 2008-15
Reform Social dialogue dynamics
September 2010 – Emergency measures to reform 
the labour market.  
Tripartite negotiations failed, thus the 
Government unilaterally administered reforms.
June 2011 – Emergency measures to reform 
collective bargaining.
Tripartite negotiations failed, thus the 
Government unilaterally administered reforms.
February 2012 – Emergency measures to reform 
the labour market.
The Government administered reforms unilaterally 
with no tripartite social dialogue – neither did 
they consult the social partners.
January 2013 – Extension of the Programme for 
the re-skilling of long-term unemployed without 
unemployment protection (Prepara Plan).
No social dialogue or consultation with the social 
partners.
December 2013 – Mechanisms to enhance 
employment stability and employability 
Neither social dialogue nor consultation with the 
social partners.
February 2014 – Emergency measures to boost 
employment and open-ended contracts
Neither social dialogue nor consultation with the 
social partners.
February 2014 – Protection of part-time workers 
and other socio-economic policies.
Neither social dialogue nor consultation with the 
social partners.
September 2014 – Employment incentives and 
activation. 
Neither social dialogue nor consultation with the 
social partners.
December 2014 – Extraordinary Programme for 
Employment Activation.
Tripartite negotiations delivered an agreement 
with the Government.
March 2015 – Emergency reform of the vocational 
training system.
Tripartite negotiations did not deliver an 
agreement between the social partners and the 
Government.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
Table 11.4 Pension reform and social dialogue in Spain, 2008-15
Reform Social dialogue dynamics
January 2011 – Social and economic agreement 
on pensions, labour market and collective 
bargaining.
Tripartite social dialogue with the employers’ and 
workers’ organizations delivered an agreement.
March 2013 – Law promoting active ageing and 
continuity in working lives.
Social partners involved in the negotiations, but 
only for a short period of time, and an agreement 
could not be reached.
December 2013 – Law changing the sustainability 
factor and revaluation index of pensions.
Tripartite social dialogue was replaced by 
administrative decision-making through an expert 
committee, which included representatives of 
employers and the two main trade unions.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
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Two main pension reforms have been introduced since 2008. The first was the 2011 
Economic and Social Agreement for Growth, Employment and the Sustainability of 
Pensions115 (Royal Decree Law 1/2011, 1 February). After a general strike in Septem-
ber 2010 and repeated failures to reach a tripartite agreement, the urgency to restore 
social dialogue became apparent to both the employers’ and workers’ organizations. 
After three years of recession and no consensus on appropriate mechanisms to exit 
the crisis, the public began to question the role of the social partners. As one trade 
union official pointed out: “If social dialogue does not deliver sustainable agreements, it 
will be weakened”. Thus the social partners came under pressure to sign agreements, 
despite the unfavourable context. The trade unions were very much in favour of signing 
a comprehensive pact covering the labour market, collective bargaining and old-age 
pensions. The Government supported this initiative – perhaps in an effort to rebuild 
relations with the trade unions following their deterioration over labour market reform 
and the September 2010 general strike. 
A comprehensive tripartite social pact was finally signed in February 2011, which 
included commitments on pensions, youth unemployment, active labour market pol-
icies, a reform of collective bargaining and research and development (R&D). The 
most controversial issue was that of pension reform – and in particular a gradual 
increase in the pensionable age from 65 to 67 years, with the possibility of taking 
retirement at 65, subject to 38 years of contributions having been made. Large fac-
tions within the trade unions heavily contested the reform. The most critical voices 
came from young people who considered it very difficult to contribute a sufficient 
number of years to their pension, due to high rates of temporary employment and 
frequent unemployment spells.
The Government headed by Mr. Rajoy introduced two main changes in the pen-
sion system. First, in March 2013, it approved a Decree in order to restrict early 
retirement, modify conditions for access to partial retirement, and promote active 
ageing.116 Despite the involvement of the social partners in the negotiation process, an 
agreement could not be reached, leading to the Government’s unilateral approval of 
the reform. 
The second main reform came in December 2013.117 In this case, the Government set 
up an expert group (including university professors, trade union officials, employers 
and practitioners) to elaborate a proposal to reform two factors of the pension system: 
first, the so-called Índice de Revalorización (revaluation index), a formula that annually 
updates pension amounts taking into consideration factors such as inflation and the 
total expected expenditure on pensions; and second, the Factor de Sostenibilidad 
(sustainability factor), an automatic instrument allowing for the adjustment of the pen-
sion amount to the life expectancy of pensioners. This reform was not preceded by 
social dialogue, but by a more administrative mechanism based on the report of the 
experts’ committee. 
115  Acuerdo Social y Económico para el Crecimiento, el Empleo y la Sostenibilidad de las Pensiones. See full text at: 
http://www.ugt.es/actualidad/2011/febrero/acuerdo_social_y_economico.pdf
116  Ley 5/2013 de medidas para favorecer la continuidad de la vida laboral de los trabajadores de mayor edad y promover 
el envejecimiento activo. Available at: https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2013/03/16/pdfs/BOE-A-2013-2874.pdf 
117  Ley 23/2013 reguladora del Factor de Sostenibilidad y del Índice de Revalorización del Sistema de Pensiones de la 
Seguridad Social. Available at: http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2013/12/26/pdfs/BOE-A-2013-13617.pdf 
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3.5 The role of social dialogue in the EU Semester
There is no formal mechanism or pre-established process for the negotiation of National 
Reform Programmes (NRPs) with the social partners. As a consequence, the latter’s 
involvement very much depends upon the Government’s willingness to engage them 
in the process. Although the ESOs interviewed acknowledged the difficult climate for 
social dialogue in Spain at the moment, they emphasized the importance of the social 
partners’ involvement – which is non-negotiable at the national level. In doing so, they 
recalled the subsidiarity principle with regards to national social dialogue, and stated 
that they would welcome greater involvement of the social partners in the drafting and 
implementation of the NRPs. However, they also pointed out that the process is, at 
certain stages, somewhat bureaucratic and formal, consisting of making minor amend-
ments to previous Programmes. For this reason, they are not unduly concerned by the 
rather limited social partner involvement. Moreover, the strict schedule imposed by the 
European Commission for the delivery of NRPs often leaves very little time to involve 
the social partners properly in discussions.
The official discourse regarding social partner involvement contrasts with the reality 
of the EC’s recommendations for NRPs, and its review of the NRPs and the national 
documents. An analysis of these texts reveals that no reference was made to social 
dialogue in the 2011, 2012 or 2014 documents. The NRPs contained no reference 
to employers’ or workers’ organizations’ views, and no recommendations were made 
to strengthen social dialogue. Only in 2014 did an Annex to the NRP present the 
contributions of employers’ and workers’ organizations; this NRP also highlighted the 
importance of involving the “third sector”.118 The 2015 NRP included recommenda-
tions of the social partners and highlighted the tripartite agreement of July 2014 that 
covered a number of issues considered important by both the Government and the 
social partners.
The trade unions are of the opinion that their involvement in NRPs is insufficient, and 
they have criticized the Government for not taking into consideration or incorporat-
ing any of their recommendations. They state that the Government should discuss 
and incorporate some of their recommendations into their policies, rather than simply 
attach them in an Annex. In particular, trade unions are critical of the tight schedule 
imposed, which does not allow for a proper discussion of the NRP or for them to pro-
pose amendments to the measures contained therein. 
The ESOs consider the existing institutions channelling social dialogue in Spain to be 
adequate. In particular, they point out how they interact regularly with the Economic 
and Social Council, and they hold meetings with representatives of all three groups. 
They are aware that non-institutionalized social dialogue is contingent upon the eco-
nomic and political situation and, for this reason, they believe it is important to maintain 
an institutional channel with the social partners. 
3.6 The role and impact of national social dialogue institutions
The Economic Council and Social (ESC) is a tripartite institution established in 1991 
as a forum for building understanding between the social partners. Despite the fact 
118 Non-governmental and non-profit-making organizations or associations.
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that the 1978 Constitution (Article 131.2) contained a mandate to create a tripartite 
consultative body, it took almost fifteen years for this to happen. The ESC comprises 
employers’ organizations, workers’ organizations and other representatives of sectoral 
interests. It is a Government advisory body in the socio-economic and employment 
spheres, and its voice is heard in decision-making concerning various sectors of Span-
ish society. It is governed by public law and has a legal personality, full legal capacity 
and organizational and functional autonomy in carrying out its mission. This is attached 
to the Ministry of Labour and Immigration.119
The main functions of the ESC are twofold. First, it issues opinions on a mandatory 
basis on draft bills, draft legislative Royal Decrees regulating socio-economic and 
labour policy, and draft Royal Decrees considered by the Government to be of par-
ticular significance in this field. Second, it studies and analyses issues of concern to 
society, acting upon its own initiative. Its annual report on the socio-economic and 
employment situation in Spain is now an essential point of reference. This second 
function has become more important in the context of the economic crisis and has 
contributed to a revitalization of the ESC’s role. 
The ESC plays a limited and indirect role in non-institutionalized social dialogue, as 
well as in the negotiation of tripartite agreements or social pacts. Given its advisory 
capacity, its involvement is confined to issuing opinions on draft legislation proposed 
by the Government. 
Representatives of the ESC described various attempts at revitalizing its role. Its primary 
goal is to become more pro-active and to initiate and elaborate reports on important 
socio-economic issues. It sees this as a way of overcoming the passive and reactive 
character of its mandated functions. The interviews also revealed a common percep-
tion that the crisis had a significant impact on the ESC. First – and similar to what 
happened in the case of tripartite social dialogue – the ESC had been called into ques-
tion. In several Autonomous Communities, the ESCs were suppressed as part of fiscal 
consolidation packages; this was the case in Madrid, La Rioja, the Balearic Islands, 
Castille La Mancha, Cantabria, Asturias and, more recently, Valencia. The justification 
given in all these cases was that these institutions supposedly had a limited impact on 
policy. This argument was also raised in the context of the Reform of Public Adminis-
tration, initiated by the PP Government in October 2014 to rationalize the public sector, 
including by suppressing institutions whose functions were duplicated at national and 
regional levels; the ESCs were one of the targets of this reform. Employers’ and workers’ 
organizations, as well as left-wing parties including the Socialist PSOE and United Left, 
have strongly opposed the suppression of the ESCs. 
Second, negotiations within the ESC regarding the formulation of policy responses were 
affected by the frequent recourse to emergency procedures for adopting legislation. 
According to the Spanish Constitution (Article 86), the use of emergency procedures 
for law making should be restricted only to cases of “utmost and extraordinary urgency 
and social need”. Under these conditions, the Government may legislate using the form 
of a Decree, which requires less discussion in Parliament, and for which an opinion by 
the ESC is not deemed essential.
119 For more information, see: http://www.ces.es/en/web/guest/naturaleza 
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Over the course of 2014 and 2015, the ESC has repeatedly drawn attention to the lim-
ited time it is given to provide its recommendations and opinions on important issues. 
Trade unions share this view and do not welcome the over-reliance on Royal Decrees. 
This is not a new situation; already in 2009, the Plenary of the ESC had approved a 
joint position requesting the Government to send it draft laws to review so they could 
issue an opinion.120
Notwithstanding the challenges that the crisis posed for the ESC’s role and its pub-
lic perception, some of its opinions have had a significant impact. One example is 
the opinion it issued in September 2013 on the proposed pension system reform:121 
the tripartite members of the ESC unanimously opposed the Government’s attempt to 
de-link pensions from inflation. Another example is the ESC opinion in June 2013 on a 
proposed law on entrepreneurship.122
4.  Industrial relations and collective bargaining  
in the post-crisis period
4 1 Impact of the crisis on collective bargaining
When assessing the impact of the crisis on collective bargaining, it is important to 
bear in mind the divergent evolution of legal reforms and of bipartite agreements on 
employment and collective bargaining. As can be observed in table 11.5, the unilateral 
character of legal reforms over the crisis period contrasts with the resilience of peak 
bipartite social dialogue, as reflected in the three Agreements on Employment and 
Collective Bargaining signed between 2008 and 2015.
Table 11.5  Legislative changes in collective bargaining and bipartite agreements 
on collective bargaining, 2010-15
Legislative changes  
in collective bargaining
Bipartite agreements on employment  
and collective bargaining
2011 – Emergency 
measures to reform 
collective bargaining.
Negotiations 
failed; no tripartite 
agreement signed.
February 2010 – AENC 
I Inter-confederal 
Agreement on Employment 
and Collective Bargaining 
2010-2011-2012.
Bipartite agreement 
between the employers’ 
and workers’ 
organizations.
February 2012 – 
Emergency measures 
to reform collective 
bargaining
Without negotiations; 
unilateral decision by 
the Government.
January 2012 –AENC 
II Inter-confederal 
Agreement on Employment 
and Collective Bargaining 
2012-2013-2014.
Bipartite agreement 
between the employers’ 
and workers’ 
organizations.
120  See: El País, 4 November 2009. El CES recuerda al Gobierno que le debe enviar leyes, available at: http://elpais.com/
diario/2009/11/04/espana/1257289207_850215.html 
121  Opinion No. 7, 2013, approved at the plenary session of 26 September 2013: Sobre el Anteproyecto de Ley reguladora 
del Factor de sostenibilidad y del índice de revalorización del sistema de pensiones de la Seguridad Social, available 
at: http://www.ces.es/documents/10180/631510/Dic072013.pdf 
122  Opinion No. 6, 2013 approved at the plenary session of 1 June 2013: Sobre el Anteproyecto de Ley de Apoyo a los 
emprendedores y su internacionalización’, available at: http://www.ces.es/documents/10180/631510/Dic062013.
pdf 
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Legislative changes  
in collective bargaining
Bipartite agreements on employment  
and collective bargaining
May 2013 – Agreement of 
the Steering Committee 
of the AENC II on the 
extension of collective 
agreements upon expiry. 
Bipartite agreement 
between the employers’ 
and workers’ 
organizations.
July 2015 – AENC III Inter-
confederal Agreement 
on Employment and 
Collective Bargaining 
2015-2016-2017.
Bipartite agreement 
between the employers’ 
and workers’ 
organizations.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
4 2 Post-crisis developments in collective bargaining
The most important development during the crisis was the 2012 unilateral reform, 
which made it more difficult to renew a number of collective agreements; it also had 
an adverse effect on the social dialogue dynamics between trade unions and employ-
ers’ confederations. This became clear in the negotiation of a new Inter-confederal 
Agreement on Employment and Collective Bargaining in 2014, which was more diffi-
cult to conclude than any of its predecessors. The major obstacle was agreeing upon 
wage increases – with the employers’ and workers’ organizations maintaining polarized 
positions; another was the inclusion of automatic indexation mechanisms in collective 
agreements; finally, the difficult issue of the automatic extension of collective agree-
ments (ultraactividad) was raised by the trade unions, thereby going against the 2012 
labour market reform.123 An agreement was finally signed, which provided for a wage 
increase of 1 per cent in 2015 and 1.5 per cent in 2016; it also included guidelines for 
reinforcing the role of national sectoral collective agreements. 
The main instruments for coordinating collective bargaining in Spain are the AENCs 
(peak bipartite cross-sectoral agreements on employment and collective bargaining). 
These agreements provide general guidelines regarding wage increases (see table 
11.6), and contain recommendations on other issues, such as the articulation between 
levels in the collective bargaining structure and internal flexibility. Particularly important 
is the recommendation contained in the AENC II 2012-2013-2014 (signed in Janu-
ary 2012), stressing the need to include flexicurity in collective agreements, whereby 
greater functional flexibility is accompanied by mechanisms guaranteeing effective 
employee protection.
Even though the peak bipartite cross-sectoral agreements on collective bargaining pro-
vide only general guidelines, they have nevertheless played a particularly important role 
in wage setting. Notably, these agreements have allowed for the implementation of a 
wage moderation policy – while at the same time introducing new wage-setting criteria. 
For example, the AENC II uses the European Central Bank (ECB) inflation forecast as a 
123 El País, 20 March 2015.
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benchmark for calculating an ex-post revision of wages; partly in consequence, nego-
tiated wage increases were lower during the crisis, except in 2011. 
Table 11.6  Wage-setting coordination guidelines negotiated by the social partners 
at peak level 
Name of agreement Year Wage-setting guidelines
Agreement on collective bargaining 2002 2002 Forecast inflation (2%) + Ex-post indexation
Agreement on collective bargaining 2003 2003 Forecast inflation (2%) + Productivity + Ex-post indexation
Extension of the 2003 Agreement on 
collective bargaining for 2004 2004
Forecast inflation (2%) + Productivity + Ex-post 
indexation
Agreement on collective bargaining 2005 2005 Forecast inflation (2%) + Productivity + Ex-post indexation
Extension of the 2005 Agreement on 
collective bargaining for 2006 2006
Forecast inflation (2%) + Productivity + Ex-post 
indexation
Agreement on collective bargaining 2007 2007 Forecast inflation (2%) + Productivity + Ex-post indexation
Extension of the 2007 Agreement on 
collective bargaining for 2008 2008
Forecast inflation (2%) + Productivity + Ex-post 
indexation
2009 Forecast inflation (2%) + Productivity + Ex-post indexation
Inter-confederal Agreement on 
Employment and Collective Bargaining 
2010, 2011 and 2012 (AENC I)
2010 1%
2011 1-2%
Inter-confederal Agreement on 
Employment and Collective Bargaining 
2012, 2013 and 2014 (AENC II)
2012
1.5-2.5% (AENC I); 0.5% + Wage indexation 
clause resulting from the difference between 
actual inflation and the ECB inflation criterion of 
2% (AENC II)
2013
0.6% + Wage indexation clause resulting from the 
difference between actual inflation and the ECB 
inflation criterion of 2%
2014
0.6% if GDP growth in 2013 below 1%; 1% if 
GDP growth in 2013 between 1 and 2%; 1.5% 
(maximum) if GDP growth in 2013 above 2%
Inter-confederal Agreement on 
Employment and Collective Bargaining 
2015, 2016 and 2017 (AENC III)
2015 1% maximum
2016 1.5% maximum
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
274 TALKING THROUGH THE CRISIS | SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS TRENDS IN SELECTED EU COUNTRIES
In the post-crisis period, the two main trends characterizing collective bargaining dur-
ing the crisis have continued: first, the decentralization of collective bargaining; and 
second, a decline in the number of agreements and of workers covered. 
Decentralization – the first trend – was intensified as a result of the priority given to 
company-level bargaining by the 2012 reform, and the ability of employers not to imple-
ment the measures contained in collective agreements. The 2012 reform did not result 
in a (quantitative) increase in collective agreements at company level (see figure 11.6), 
but it did provoke a (qualitative) enhancement in the regulatory capacity of lower-level 
agreements. In other words, the reform gave full priority to company-level agreements 
over sectoral ones, and allowed employers to opt out of – or not to apply – collective 
agreements (Cruz et al., 2014; Molina, 2014). 
The relationship between company- and sector-level agreements thus experienced 
a radical change after 2012. Until then, all attempts at collective bargaining reform 
had contained mechanisms for an organized decentralization, with higher-level col-
lective agreements establishing the criteria for lower-level agreements (Martín and 
Alós, 2003). The defence of a multi-level bargaining system was a strategy shared by 
employers’ and workers’ organizations. This was reconfirmed in all the peak intersec-
toral agreements reached after 1997. 
124
The second trend was a decline in the number of collective agreements signed and 
the number of workers covered. Although consolidated data are only available up to 
2012,125 a declining trend is clearly apparent (figure 11.7). In the case of company-level 
124  For instance, if a three-year collective agreement is signed in 2010, its effects are only felt in 2011 and 2012. 
125  Due to the methodology used to register collective agreements (both new ones and the revisions/extensions of 
existing ones), reliable data are available only with a two-year time lag. This means that data for 2013 and 2014 are 
only provisional.
Figure 11.6 Annual number of collective agreements with regulatory effects124
Source: Myess (Ministry of Employment and Social Security): Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales 
(Bulletin of labour statistics).
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collective agreements, this was due to closures and/or downsizing. Moreover, long-
term employer strategies of externalization and fragmentation of production structures 
that were consolidated during the crisis might also have been a contributing factor. In 
the case of sectoral agreements, the decline probably reflects the difficulty in renewing 
collective agreements in many sectors; the 2012 reform, by suppressing the automatic 
extension of collective agreements, may also have reinforced the downturn. 
Despite this, a recovery in the number of collective agreements has been observed 
since 2013. This upturn is linked to the improvement of the economic and labour mar-
ket situation, and may also be a consequence of the priority given to company-level 
agreements over sectoral ones in the 2012 reform. Prior to the reform, many compa-
nies opted not to put in place their own collective agreement due to the transaction 
costs of negotiations and the fact that, in any case, it would always be overridden by the 
sectoral agreement. After the reform, however, more employers may prefer to negotiate 
their own collective agreement, precisely because it can now deviate from the provi-
sions of the sectoral agreement. 
Between 2005 and 2013, the number of workers covered by collective agreements 
decreased by an average of 4.5 per cent. The decline was more pronounced for work-
ers covered by company-level agreements, among whom there was a 19.5 per cent 
drop in coverage; the decline was only 2.7 per cent for workers covered by sectoral 
agreements (figure 11.7). 
4.3 The role of the State in industrial relations
Regarding the autonomy of the social partner vis-à-vis State regulations, developments 
in Spain are a clear illustration of the contradictions inherent in an industrial relations 
system in which the State plays a strong role (Molina, 2014). The social partners – and 
Figure 11.7 Number of workers covered by collective agreements
Source: Meyss: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales. 
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the trade unions in particular – have worked hard to reinforce strong and autonomous 
collective bargaining institutions. The efforts they have made since the mid-1990s to 
strengthen sectoral-level collective bargaining as a means to consolidate organized 
decentralization are an important example. However, some of the policies implemented 
during the crisis years have triggered a recalibration of the State’s role in industrial 
relations. In particular, the regulation of industrial relations and collective bargaining – 
historically reserved for the social partners – was unilaterally determined by the State 
in both 2011 and 2012. 
Developments regarding wage setting during the crisis also demonstrated the tension 
that exists between collective self-regulation and State regulation. In the 1980s, there 
had been a clear trend towards the consolidation of autonomous wage setting in the 
private sector, based on peak-level intersectoral coordination; and even though the 
State had been the main driving force behind the wage pacts of the early 1980s, the 
subsequent conflict between the trade unions and the Socialist Government hindered 
any attempt to replicate incomes policy agreements. Following a period of uncoordi-
nated wage bargaining and decentralization, wage setting became characterized by 
truly autonomous intersectoral coordination from the late 1990s onwards; this was 
achieved through peak bipartite agreements signed each year by the most represent-
ative employers’ and workers’ organizations. The economic crisis seemed to bring a 
temporary halt to this practice, as the social partners failed to reach agreement in 
2009 on the guidelines for collective bargaining – but a new agreement was con-
cluded in 2010 and renewed in 2012 and 2015. These agreements all contained a 
strong commitment to wage moderation, and also to the autonomous regulation of 
collective bargaining. 
One of the major repercussions of the crisis – with its accompanying fiscal consolidation 
and structural measures – has been a move back towards unilateral State regulation 
of public sector working conditions. In 2008 and 2009, wage increases for civil serv-
ants were agreed upon within the General Bargaining Forum. The wages and wage 
increases of salaried employees were negotiated in the second and third collective 
agreements, covering the periods 2006-08 and 2009, respectively; these agreements 
established that salaried employees should receive the same wage increases that had 
been negotiated for civil servants. By contrast, during the 2010-15 period, the Govern-
ment unilaterally implemented pay increases for public sector employees.
5. Conclusions 
This analysis of social dialogue in Spain has clearly shown the contrast between tripar-
tite and bipartite dynamics in the post-crisis period. While tripartite social dialogue has 
struggled to revitalize itself after being discontinued during the crisis, bipartite dialogue 
between the trade unions and employers remains a defining trait of industrial relations 
and a source of stability and coordination in collective bargaining in Spain. 
Based on the evidence presented, it is difficult to talk of any revitalization of tripar-
tite social dialogue. The year 2015 witnessed unilateral State intervention in areas, 
such as the vocational training system, that were traditionally regulated and managed 
by the trade unions and employers. The non-institutionalized dimension of tripartite 
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social dialogue, which takes place outside the ESC, remains weak and shows few signs 
of recovery.
Institutionalized tripartite social dialogue in the ESC has not seen any significant change 
in its functioning, composition or impact. It remains an advisory body with limited 
involvement in the negotiation or implementation of recovery policies. Indeed, fiscal 
consolidation policies have made this institution itself a potential target of budgetary 
savings measures and, as a consequence, a number of regional Economic and Social 
Councils have been dismantled. Notwithstanding, some attempts have been made to 
breathe new life into its role by making its policy advisory function more pro-active.
The future of tripartite social dialogue in Spain remains unclear. As those interviewed 
for this study affirmed, tripartite social dialogue has a strong ideological and politi-
cal basis; for this reason, trade unions still express the hope that it can be revived 
and make an effective contribution to post-crisis recovery, especially in the light of the 
December 2015 election results. However, the main challenge, for both the social part-
ners and social dialogue, is to regain a more central role in policy-making. The gradual 
watering down of tripartite social dialogue to labour market issues diminishes not only 
its capacity to provide the basis for sustainable growth, but also the legitimacy of the 
social partners.
The revitalization of tripartite social dialogue requires, first and foremost, an acknowl-
edgment by the Spanish public authorities that the social partners have an important 
role to play in specific policy areas. One would be in the reduction of income dispari-
ties, where social partners have the capacity to intervene via collective bargaining. In 
Spain, during the crisis, the inequality of earnings and income has risen significantly, 
and this may jeopardize future growth by suppressing domestic demand. An income 
pact, focusing on reducing inequality as well as on moderating wages, could have a 
very positive impact. Putting an end to social exclusion is another policy area where 
the social partners could make an invaluable contribution, including through tackling 
long-term unemployment.
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Appendix
List of persons interviewed for the study
Government
Francisco González de Lena, Economic and Social Council Director of the President’s 
Cabinet
Jesús Barroso Barrero (*), General Director of Active Labour Market Policies, Public 
Employment Service of Spain
Employers’ Organizations
Joan Pujol, General Secretary, ‘Foment del Treball Nacional’ (Employment Develop-
ment Department)
Workers’ Organizations
Ignacio Fernández Toxo, General Secretary, CCOO
Cristina Faciaben (*), Socio-Economic Department, CCOO Catalunya
Camil Ros (*), UGT Catalunya
Others
Juergen Foecking, Head of Political Sector – Permanent Representation of the Euro-
pean Commission in Spain
Ann Westermann, Economic Advisor and European Semester Officer, Representation 
of the EC
(*) Interviews conducted between September 2014 and June 2015 for the Project 
“Socio-Economic Evaluation of Employment Policies in Spain 2012-2014”
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12.  Turbulent times and beyond:  
The Swedish experience
dOMinique anxO
1. Introduction 
As a small, export-oriented economy strongly exposed to international competition, 
Sweden was extremely hard hit by the 2008 global financial crisis. The severe drop 
in aggregate demand between 2008 and 2009 led to a decrease in employment 
of around 100,000 persons and an increase in the unemployment rate from 6.2 to 
8.3 per cent. However, sound public finances – due, inter alia, to early fiscal consoli-
dation measures and structural reforms initiated during the 1990s – gave the Swedish 
Government room for manoeuvre. This included an expansionary macroeconomic 
policy in order to maintain aggregate demand and limit the negative impact of the 
crisis on employment, household income, consumption and welfare. Wage mod-
eration by the social partners was also a feature during the crisis period. Modest 
increases in labour costs during the period 2008-10, combined with the depreciation 
of the Swedish currency on account of the expansionary monetary policy conducted 
by the Swedish Central Bank during the same period, also helped to mitigate the 
negative effects of the recession on output and employment. In other words, and 
without underestimating the role played by expansionary fiscal and monetary pol-
icies, there are strong reasons to believe that part of the Swedish “success story” 
relates to the specificity of the Swedish industrial relations system and the quality of its 
social dialogue. 
One of the fundamental features of the Swedish industrial relations system is a strong 
contractual tradition based on the existence of powerful social partners, who enjoy 
considerable autonomy from the public authorities. Fundamentally bipartite, the 
Swedish model of industrial relations remains characterized by the central role played 
by the two sides of industry in mechanisms for regulating the labour market, notably 
wage formation and working conditions. The bipartite and contractual nature of labour 
market regulations, coupled with the high union density and high coverage rate of 
collective bargaining, creates a favourable institutional environment for the emergence 
of negotiated compromises aimed at balancing flexibility and security in the labour 
market. As stressed in Anxo (2013), Sweden thus constitutes a good illustration of a 
regime of negotiated flexibility, where the social partners are extensively involved in 
the regulation of working conditions and wage formation at the industry and company/
local levels.
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The main objective of this chapter is twofold: to assess the possible impacts of the 
global financial crisis on the Swedish industrial relations system and social dialogue; 
and, in a dialectic sense, to analyse the role of this system, as a productive factor, in 
alleviating the imbalances created by the 2008 economic downturn. Information has 
been drawn mainly from prior research, current literature and interviews.126 This chap-
ter is divided up into a number of sections. Section 2 gives a broad description of the 
macroeconomic context and the main orientations of macroeconomic policies prior to 
and after the 2008 Great Recession, while section 3 analyses the involvement of the 
social partners and the role of social dialogue during and after the Recession. Taking 
a historical perspective, section 4 examines the main transformations of the Swedish 
collective bargaining system, and section 5 – the last section – provides some conclud-
ing remarks. 
2. The macroeconomic and political context
2 1 The political context 
Between 1993 and 2006, a Social-Democratic minority coalition Government was in 
place in Sweden. Following the 2006 parliamentary elections, the Left and Green par-
ties lost the election and a new centre-right coalition Government led by the Prime 
Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt was established.127 Strongly inspired by neo-liberal ideas, 
this Government undertook a number of structural reforms during its two successive 
terms of office (2006-10 and 2010-14). These reforms aimed principally at increasing 
labour utilization in the long run through essentially supply-oriented measures, such 
as tax cuts and reforms of the social protection system. Several tax reforms aimed at 
reducing the tax wedge and increasing labour supply at both the extensive and inten-
sive margins. Reforms of income tax were also implemented gradually, with the most 
important tax reforms in this context being the introduction of a system of in-work tax 
credits aimed at strengthening work incentives for low-income earners, and a reduction 
of marginal tax for high income earners – both reforms entailing a reduction of mar-
ginal tax of around 2-3 percentage points. The reform of the unemployment insurance 
system, particularly the reduction of income replacement rates, also aimed at enhanc-
ing work incentives, intensifying the job search and reducing unemployment spells 
(see section 4). 
2 2 Main orientations of macroeconomic policy during the Great Recession
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the Swedish economy started to deteriorate 
rapidly in the second half of 2008, and in 2009 real GDP decreased by 5.0 per cent. 
With this severe drop in aggregate demand and output, employment decreased by 
around 100,000 persons between 2008 and 2009 (a decreased employment rate by 
2.1 percentage points from 80.3 per cent in 2008 to 78.2 per cent in 2009). The fall in 
output and employment was marked in manufacturing, in particular in the male-dom-
inated export oriented industries, with a decrease of 14 per cent. 
126 See appendix for the list of organizations contacted.
127  This coalition Government, the so-called Alliance, was composed of the conservative-liberal Moderate Party 
(Moderaterna), the Centre Party (Centerpartiet) and the Liberal Party (Folkpartiet liberlalerna).
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Healthy public finances at the onset of the 2008 recession – due, inter alia, to early 
fiscal consolidation measures initiated during the 1990s128 – gave the Swedish Govern-
ment room for manoeuvre in conducting a traditional Keynesian macroeconomic policy 
in order to maintain aggregate demand and limit the negative impact of the crisis on 
employment, household income, consumption and welfare. 
Confronted by the severe deterioration of the situation in the labour market, the Swed-
ish Government, in the early stage of the crisis (2008–09), implemented a package of 
recovery and countercyclical measures, ranging from expansionary fiscal and mone-
tary policy, to active labour market policy (ALMP) and educational policy (Anxo, 2011; 
Anxo, 2013). This included extensive investments in the maintenance and operation of 
the road and rail networks. In order to stimulate activity and maintain labour demand 
in the construction sector, work in the form of repairs, maintenance and improvement 
of one-family houses and rented housing became tax-deductible. Between the years 
of 2009 and 2010, the Government announced further countercyclical expansion-
ary measures to combat the crisis. These new fiscal measures covered mainly two 
areas: increased government grants to municipalities and county councils129 and more 
resources for ALMPs. 
ALMPs have recurrently played a vital role in Swedish stabilization policies. The prefer-
ence for the principle of employment promotion (work-first principle) has predominated 
over benefit options and passive measures for the unemployed. As usual during a period 
of recession, the level of appropriation of the public employment services increased, as 
did the number of participants in various ALMP programmes (labour market training, 
wage subsidies, coaching, etc.). In order to counteract the rise of unemployment, in 
particular long-term unemployment, the number of participants in the various ALMP 
programmes was gradually increased – from 171,000 in 2008 to 314,200 in 2014 
(Public Employment Service, 2015). Regarding education and training policy, the 
Government increased the number of places in post-secondary vocational training, 
local authority upper secondary education for adults, and universities and colleges. 
Although the reinforcement of ALMP measures and the various policies of activation 
and educational measures (in particular the Life Long Learning (LLL) facilities) do not, 
per se, create new jobs in the short run, they remain sound instruments for secur-
ing transitions from unemployment to employment and improving the allocation of 
resources between sectors. These policy measures, by increasing labour market par-
ticipation, have favoured social inclusiveness and limited the development of long-term 
unemployment.
The Swedish economy recovered quickly with an increase of real GDP by 6.6 per cent 
in 2010 and 2.6 per cent in 2011. Employment also increased by 25,000 persons in 
2010, and as much as around 100,000 in 2011. In the aftermath of the economic 
128  In order to cope with the dramatic rising budget deficit and growing public debt, as a result of the 1993 recession, 
the Social-Democratic Government (1994-2006) took a number of fiscal consolidation measures. These 
included a reduction of the income replacement rate of several social protection system and stricter eligibility 
rules (Unemployment Insurance and Sickness Insurance); and a drastic cut in public employment (a reduction 
of 200,000 public jobs between 1995 and 2006). In order to ensure the long-run sustainability of the Swedish 
pay-as-you go pension system, the Government initiated in 1998 a comprehensive pension reform that was fully 
implemented in 2003. The old benefit-defined system was replaced by a mandatory defined contribution scheme 
(See Anxo 2015 for details).
129 In charge of the provision of social services, health, and pre-school, primary and secondary education.
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recession, the average disposable income declined slightly (–1.0 per cent, between 
2008 and 2010), while the median disposable income by consumption unit actually 
increased by above 3 per cent. The crisis’s limited impact on the development of dis-
posable earnings is linked to the extent and generosity of the social protection and 
transfer systems (economic stabilizers), which, by international standards, remain high 
in Sweden. Furthermore, the reforms of the tax system initiated by the Government, 
which entailed a reduction in both average and marginal income tax combined by the 
Government’s countercyclical measures, such as the increase in the number of partic-
ipants in ALMP, may partly explain the limited impact on disposable income. Sweden’s 
relatively quick recovery from the financial crisis in 2009-10 may be ascribed to several 
intertwined factors. These range from the expansionary fiscal policies conducted by 
the Swedish government to more favourable macroeconomic conditions, with a quick 
upturn of exporting industries – thanks to an expansionary monetary policy; and a 
floating exchange-rate regime and wage moderation (see section 3). 
2 3 Impact of the financial and economic crisis on the labour market
At the onset of the global financial and economic crisis (second half of 2008), the 
Swedish economy started to deteriorate rapidly. With the severe drop in output and 
aggregate demand, employment declined sharply. The fall in output and employ-
ment was particularly marked in the male-dominated manufacturing industries 
and construction sector, with decreases of 25 and 20 per cent, respectively. In the 
early phases of the recession, adjustment essentially took the form of a reduction 
of overtime and a dramatic reduction in the number of agency workers and short-
term contracts, in particular among male employees. Between 2007 and 2009 the 
number of notified redundancies dramatically increased (an increase of 65 per cent), 
while hiring and new vacancies decreased significantly (a reduction of 33 and 80 per 
cent, respectively). There was, however, a quick upturn of hiring and new jobs already 
in 2010 and the following years, reflecting the fast recovery of the Swedish economy. 
Despite this, the post-economic crisis (2010–14), did not result in lower rates of unem-
ployment. The rate of unemployment has been rather constant at around 8 per cent 
since 2009. The share of long-term unemployment130 also increased during the period 
2008–13. 
As far as gender is concerned, the relatively stronger impact of the crisis on male 
unemployment relates largely to the abovementioned decline of employment in the 
male-dominated export-oriented manufacturing sector. Regarding older workers, 
Swedish companies have used early retirement to accommodate the recession 
– although to a significantly less extent than in previous economic downturns. 
The employment rate of senior workers (55–64 years of age) remained almost 
unchanged in the early phase of the crisis (and has even increased since then), 
while the unemployment rate among senior workers remained stable.
Youth unemployment and unemployment among non-natives are more sensitive 
to fluctuations in the business cycle. Indeed, the employment prospects of young 
people and foreign-born people had worsened significantly by the end of 2008. 
130  In Sweden, long-term unemployment is defined as six months or more of joblessness (three months for young people 
aged 16-24 years).
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At the end of 2009, youth unemployment rates reached 29 per cent and those for 
foreign-born people 16.4 per cent (compared to 7.8 per cent for native workers). 
Although the issue of labour market integration of foreign nationals has been high on the 
list of government priorities, the situation of immigrants has not significantly improved 
throughout the past decade. The increase in unemployment among non-natives 
relates also to their weak attachment to the Swedish labour market (higher inci-
dence of temporary contracts, lower work experience and concentration in the 
low skill segment of the manufacturing industry and service sector). In March 
2015, the Government initiated tripartite talks with the social partners in order to 
improve and speed up the labour market integration of newly arrived immigrants. 
One objective of these discussions was to accelerate this integration by creating 
fast tracks into the labour market for immigrants with adequate education and 
work experience. The outcome of these talks was the creation of workplace-based 
practical work experience schemes or subsidized employment targeted at newly 
arrived immigrants in industries with labour shortages. Since 2007, a number of 
educational reforms have been undertaken to meet the needs of the labour market, 
improve the quality of the educational and training system and ease the transition from 
school to work. These reforms have placed greater emphasis on vocational training and 
apprenticeship programmes. 
It is interesting to note that the 2008 crisis did not entail an increase in the polarization 
of the occupational structure.131 As shown in Anxo (2014), the 2008 crisis predom-
inantly implied a destruction of low-skilled and low-paid jobs, while the number of 
high-skilled, high-paid jobs rose. If anything, there are reasons to believe that the skills 
upgrading process during the last crisis slightly increased wage inequality, but the 
Gini coefficient remained almost unchanged between 2009 and 2012. While cuts in 
the social protection system and taxation reform – in particular capital taxation and 
the growth of financial markets – undoubtedly explain part of the rise in income ine-
quality in Sweden, the changes in industrial relations and wage-setting systems might 
also have contributed to the widening of income distribution since the 1990s (see 
section 4). The long-term decline in low-skilled jobs and the concomitant increase in 
demand for high-skilled jobs, combined with the higher return to education witnessed 
during the past two decades, help to elucidate this increase in wage inequalities. 
The shift towards decentralized bargaining and individualization has been more pro-
nounced among white-collar and high-skilled workers than among manual workers and 
low-skilled employees, in both the public and private sectors. 
There are strong reasons to believe that this shift towards more decentralized and 
individualized wage setting has increased wage dispersion, particularly for high-skilled 
white-collar workers. Despite the tendency for rising wage inequalities, the relatively 
centralized and coordinated collective bargaining system, and a still compressed wage 
structure, have prevented the development of low paid/low-skilled jobs in Sweden. On 
the contrary, they have boosted policies favouring an upgrading of skills. In effect, the 
large investment in research and development, a well-developed life-long learning and 
training system, the expansion of tertiary education during the past three decades, as 
well as a more balanced bargaining power between the two sides of industry, have 
131  By “polarization of the job structure” we mean here a concomitant increase of both low-skilled and high-skilled jobs 
and a destruction of jobs in the middle layers of the occupational structure.
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limited the tendency towards job polarization that is found, for example, in liberal mar-
ket-orientated welfare states. These factors have contributed to the development of a 
high-skilled knowledge-intensive workforce.
3.  The role of social dialogue in national policy-making  
in the pre- and post-crisis period
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Swedish Model of industrial relations relies on 
powerful, independent, and all-encompassing employers’ and workers’ organizations 
that enjoy a strong autonomy vis-à-vis the central government. Essentially bipartite, the 
Swedish Model of industrial relations is characterized by the crucial role that both sides 
of industry play in mechanisms that regulate the labour market, notably wage forma-
tion and working conditions. Swedish labour law is limited by comparison with labour 
legislation in other EU Member States, and for the most part is ‘optional’; that is to say, 
most provisions of labour market legislation may be, wholly or partly, amended by col-
lective agreements. Despite a recent and notable decline, the average union density in 
Sweden remains one the highest among modern economies – at around 70 per cent 
in 2014. In the same year, the coverage rate of collective agreements stood at around 
90 per cent. It is important to note that the high coverage rate of collective bargaining in 
Sweden does not relate to the existence of legal provisions for the mandatory extension 
of collective agreements but rather to the high density rate of employers’ associations 
and the strong presence of trade unions at the firm/organization level. In fact, Sweden 
is characterized by well-established and strong employers’ organizations. In 2013, the 
density rate of employers’ organizations, measured as the proportion of dependent 
employees working in workplaces affiliated to employers’ associations, reached 87 per 
cent, a density rate significantly higher than union density (Kjellberg, 2015). With some 
exceptions, employers’ and workers’ organizations in Sweden are structured along sec-
toral/industry lines. 
Despite a clear tendency towards decentralization during the past two decades, the 
Swedish bargaining system remains fundamentally a two-tier system, in which bar-
gaining takes place firstly at the industry/sectoral level and afterwards at the company/
organization level. It is important to emphasize that by international standards, the 
Swedish two-tier bargaining model remains centralized and coordinated. Social dia-
logue is institutionalized and well developed; regular consultations take place with the 
social partners132 and are a key element in the Government’s policies related to employ-
ment and social policies. Even though consultations and information sharing regarding 
labour market issues between the Government and the Parliament and both sides 
of industry have a long tradition, and are a common feature of the political process, 
the nature of industrial relations in Sweden remains essentially bipartite. Of course, 
the State is involved in social dialogue in its capacity as employer at the central and 
local authority levels, but this takes place through the respective employers’ and work-
ers organizations. Notwithstanding its fundamental bipartite nature, tripartite talks do 
exist and are favoured in Sweden, and they result in either encompassing collective 
132  The social partners are usually represented on parliamentary and government committees responsible for drawing 
up employment and social policies. In this way, the social partners exert significant influence on the contents of 
labour market legislation. 
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agreements or laws/regulations. Regarding the development of social dialogue during 
the 2008 global financial crisis, the recession had no negative impact on industrial rela-
tions133 and the period 2008–11 remained characterized by industrial peace – in sharp 
contrast to the situation during the previous recession in the early 1990s.134
3 1 The role of the social partners in Swedish recovery
Since, as previously mentioned, the bulk of labour market regulations, working condi-
tions and wage setting in Sweden is determined and regulated by collective agreement, 
an analysis of measures initiated to combat the impact of the economic crisis on 
employment cannot therefore be limited to government action. In contrast to other 
countries with weaker industrial relations systems and an unbalanced bargaining 
power between both sides of industry, the specificity of the Swedish industrial relations 
system also implies a more balanced sharing of the cost of the crisis in terms of both 
working conditions and inequalities at work. An analysis of the last two waves of the 
European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) conducted by the European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) in 2005 and 2010 
(Anxo 2013) did not reveal a significant deterioration of working conditions in Sweden 
in the aftermath of the recession. Working time did not undergo large adjustments, 
work intensity remained almost unchanged, and work satisfaction and work-life bal-
ance opportunities seem to have even increased during the period. 
As far as wage setting is concerned, experience from the deep economic crisis of the 
early 1990s shows that wage moderation characterized wage developments during 
the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s. There were therefore strong reasons 
to expect that, in the wake of the current severe economic and financial crisis, wage 
agreements would also be concluded in order to preserve employment stability and 
limit further increases in unemployment. In effect, an analysis of collective agreements 
shows that wage moderation, and not wage cuts as in some other Member States, 
typified the rounds of collective bargaining during and after the crisis. The depreciation 
of the Swedish currency – due to the above-mentioned expansionary monetary policy 
combined with wage moderation – resulted in a slowdown in the rate of increased 
labour costs. This slowdown helped to alleviate the negative effects of the recession on 
output and employment. The bulk of the adjustment in the public sector also took the 
form of wage moderation (Anxo, 2013), with the public sector following the same wage 
developments as in the private sector. According to short-term wage statistics from the 
Swedish National Mediation Office (2015), the rate of wage increases in 2009 and 
2010 for the economy as a whole was 3.3 and 2.5 per cent, respectively; indeed, the 
increases were significantly below those recorded in the period 2007-08 in both the 
private and the public sector. The stable nominal wage increase also continued during 
the post crisis years 2010–13, when wage agreements concluded remained in the 
range of 2.5–3.0 per cent. In our view, these developments illustrate well the extent of 
133  Currently, there are in Sweden more than 650 central collective agreements on wages and general terms and 
conditions of employment. It should be noted that the 2008 crisis per se did not impact negatively on the number of 
agreements, neither on union density or the coverage rate of collective bargaining.
134  The deep recession of the early 1990s took the form of a dramatic employment crisis. In just three years – from 
1990 to 1993 – the rate of employment decreased by more than 10.5 percentage points to about 73 per cent, and 
the rate of open unemployment increased nearly fivefold, from less than 2 to around 10 per cent of the labour force. 
Furthermore, the Government’s annual budget deficit increased from about zero to some 14 per cent of GNP, whilst 
the public debt increased from 38 per cent to 76 per cent between 1990 and 1995.
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Swedish negotiated wage flexibility during a recession, and the willingness of both sides 
of industry to share more equally the burden of the crisis and limit the potential impact 
of the recession on employment, wage distribution and inequality. The deep recession 
also had no direct impact on industrial relations, and the period 2009–10 remained 
characterized by industrial peace, in contrast to the situation in the 1980s and during 
the previous recession (1992–95) (see figures 12.1 and 12.2).
Figure 12.1 Number of industrial conflicts, Sweden, 1985-2014
Source: Swedish Mediation Office (2014).
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Figure 12.2 Industrial conflicts, number of workdays lost, Sweden, 1985-2014
Source: Swedish Mediation Office (2014).
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In Sweden, structural changes or economic downturns have seldom been accom-
modated by public measures aimed at maintaining employment and favouring 
labour hoarding – for example, by reducing working time or by work sharing meas-
ures, as in the case of France or Germany (Anxo 2011).
In Sweden, employment adjustment due to structural and technological change, 
with the consent/support of the trade unions, has traditionally taken the form 
of external numerical flexibility combined with ALMP measures. Following this 
tradition, the Swedish adjustment process in operation during the 2008 global eco-
nomic crisis was a mix of negotiated numerical flexibility and the active support of 
dismissed workers through ALMP measures and/or negotiated agreements, which 
helped redundant workers find new jobs rapidly or enhance their employability. As 
described in Anxo (2011), in cases of collective redundancy due to restructuring or 
individual notice due to a shortage of work, the Swedish social partners often negotiate 
security/adjustment agreements to help displaced workers find new jobs quickly, by 
way of adjustment measures and financial support. This has been common practice 
since the early 1970s. The two sides of industry (bipartite organizations) administer 
these support programmes: the so-called Job Security Councils (Trygghetsråd) and Job 
Security Foundations (Trygghetsstiftelser). By supplementing the role of local public 
employment agencies, these agreements, covering about half the labour force, contrib-
ute towards improving the security of employees and to enhancing matching efficiency; 
they played an important role in accommodating the 2008 deep economic downturn. 
Sweden is in this way unique in that the social partners assume the responsibility 
of a major part of the active employment policy measures.
It should be noted that in order to alleviate the individual consequences of layoffs and 
plant closures, the former centre-right Government set up a plan for enhancing and 
promoting cooperation between stakeholders. These stakeholders generally include 
the Public Employment Service (PES), the Social Insurance Agency, the abovemen-
tioned Job Security Councils and Job Security Foundations, the European Social Fund 
(ESF), municipalities, companies, non-profit organizations and trade unions.
Furthermore, even though there was no government measure for maintaining employ-
ment by means of short-time working schemes during the early phase of the 2008 
global financial crisis, as for example in France and Germany, initiatives were taken 
by the two sides of industry. By way of illustration: the trade union federation IF 
Metall and the Association of Swedish Engineering Industries concluded a framework 
agreement on temporary layoffs, wage adjustments and training in March 2009. The 
agreement was valid until 31 March 2010, with a three-month notice period. To be 
valid, the agreement had to be endorsed by local agreement between the employer 
and the union. Under the agreement, a person temporarily laid off from work could 
receive at least 80 per cent of his or her usual monthly wage. The Swedish Industrial 
and Chemical Employers’ Association, the Employers’ Association of the Steel and 
Metal Industry, the Employers’ Association of Swedish Mine Owners, the Employers’ 
Federation of Welding Engineering and IF Metall signed a temporary redundancy pay 
agreement on 2 March 2009, enabling local partners at the firm level to conclude 
agreements on temporary layoffs. This agreement is similar to the agreement between 
IF Metall and the employers in the Association of Swedish Engineering Industries. 
Some 400 companies affiliated to this Association concluded such agreements, of 
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which most covered both manual and non-manual workers. On average, these short-
time working agreements included an 18 per cent reduction in working hours and a 
13 per cent reduction in wages; their average duration was a little over six months.135 
In the wake of the tripartite talks initiated by the Government in 2011, the Swedish Par-
liament (Riksdag) adopted a new law on short time working in December 2013 (SFS 
2013:948). According to the law, it is possible to implement a State-subsidized short-
time working system in the event of a severe economic recession. The State support 
is restricted to companies in the private sector covered by a collective agreement at 
the industry level on short time working. The rules regarding short-time working must 
be stipulated by a collective agreement at the company level. As further stipulated 
by the law, the State, the employers and the employees (through wage reduction)136 
share the cost of short-time working, the contribution of the State being one third of 
the total cost.
3 2 Social dialogue and the European Semester
In order to develop and strengthen the dialogue with the social partners within 
the national decision-making process and the EU Semester, successive Swedish 
Governments have, during the past decade, set up reference groups with repre-
sentatives from the ministries concerned and the social partners.137 For example, 
in 2015 the reference group held regular meetings at strategic points in time for 
discussions and consultations on the implementation of the Europe 2020 (EU 
2020) strategy in Sweden. This initiative was adopted after close consultation with 
the social partners. According to the Swedish National Reform Programme (NRP) 
(Swedish Government, 2015), the Prime Minister invited the social partners, in 
March 2015, to participate in a consultation at chair level on the broader issues 
of growth ahead of the meeting of the European Council (March 2015). Consul-
tation meetings also took place at senior official level on four occasions after the 
presentation of the 2015 NRP. By way of illustration, the appendix of the 2015 
Swedish NRP includes various contributions from the social partners reflecting the 
measures and initiatives they have taken in accordance with the guidelines and 
the objectives that contribute to the fulfilment of Europe 2020 targets. Furthermore, 
the appendix includes the social partners’ comments on Government policy as 
regards measures with a bearing on the Council recommendations in the context 
of the European Semester. The EU Semester decision-making process has admit-
tedly triggered some formal procedures regarding consultations with the social 
partners within its framework; but these consultations are also a good illustration 
of the main features of the Swedish industrial relations system and the quality of 
its social dialogue.
135  According to IF Metall these agreements helped to safeguard between 12,000 and 15,000 jobs.
136  The wage reduction is 12 per cent in the event of a working time reduction (WTR) of 20 per cent; a wage reduction 
of 16 per cent in the event of a WTR of 40 per cent; and a wage reduction of maximum 20 per cent in the event of 
a WTR of 60 per cent. 
137  Namely, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), the Swedish 
Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO), the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO), 
the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR), the Swedish Agency for Government Employers, 
and the Swedish Federation of Business Owners.
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4. Industrial relations and collective bargaining 
4 1  Modification of the Swedish industrial relations system:  
An historical perspective  
To understand the major changes in the Swedish system of industrial relations, we 
cannot restrict our analysis to recent years. We must look at its major transformations 
during the past three decades. From 1955 to 1983, the Swedish industrial relations 
system relied on a highly centralized and coordinated collective bargaining system. In 
1983, there was a rupture in the country’s three decades of centralized and coordi-
nated bargaining. Following the abandonment of national inter-industry agreements in 
the mid-1980s, collective bargaining in both the private and public sectors is carried 
out at two levels: industry/sector and enterprise/organization.
The weakening of mechanisms for coordinated collective bargaining, the resurgence 
of industrial disputes during the 1980s, the threat of State intervention, high wage 
inflation and the dramatic increase of unemployment during the recession of the early 
1990s, all had a decisive impact on the emergence of new compromises regarding 
industrial relations. The three main trade unions138 in the sector exposed to inter-
national competition asked their employer counterparts to consider the possibility of 
setting up a new collective bargaining system that fostered both industrial peace and 
wage increases guaranteeing balanced growth and a return to full employment. The 
ensuing talks culminated in the signing of an ‘Industry Agreement’ on Cooperation on 
Industrial Development and Salary Formation in 1997. The spirit of the new Industry 
Agreement was to ensure industrial peace and promote more consensual industrial 
relations. One of the main innovative features of the Industry Agreement, apart from its 
tendency to re-coordinate collective bargaining, is that it explicitly regulates the conduct 
of negotiations and the resolution of disputes. If there is any risk of industrial action, the 
social partners concerned are obliged to notify the “impartial chairs” before the start of 
the notice period for a strike or lockout (Anxo and Niklasson, 2006). 
These changes in industrial relations also re-established the pace-setting role of the 
sectors exposed to international competition and favoured wage adjustments in line 
with productivity developments. Also worth noting is that these modifications in wage 
setting led to a perceptible increase in real wages, in contrast to the previous situa-
tion (mid-1970s up to the end of the 1980s), which was characterized by real-wage 
stagnation. The significant changes in the orientation of monetary policy,139 namely 
the complete autonomy of the Swedish Central Bank and the introduction of a clear 
inflation target140 (in the mid-1990s, in conjunction with the abovementioned re-coor-
dination mechanisms in wage setting) also clearly had an impact on wage formation 
and wage developments. 
The social partners in both the private and the public sector were aware that wage 
developments not compatible with productivity growth and macroeconomic balance 
138  Namely the Swedish Federation of Blue-Collar Workers in the Engineering Industry (IF, Metall), affiliated to LO; the 
Swedish Federation of White-Collar Workers in Industry (Unionen), affiliated to the TCO; and the Swedish Association 
of Graduate Engineers (Sveriges Civilingenjörförbundet, CF). 
139  In particular, the change of the monetary regime (floating rate) in the early 1990s was a clear signal that the Central 
Bank would no longer conduct an accommodative monetary policy via devaluations, as in the past. 
140 Two per cent per year, within a range of plus or minus 1 per cent.
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would not, as previously, be accommodated by devaluations but lead to the implemen-
tation of a restrictive monetary policy (interest rate increase), with a potential negative 
impact on employment and unemployment. We may argue that this reorientation of 
macroeconomic policy played a crucial role in wage development by deterring excessive 
wage increases and wage inflation. It encouraged wage moderation (but still real wage 
increases) and rising employment right up to the 2008 Great Recession. But the other 
side of the coin is that the reformulation of economic policy in the mid-1990s – i.e., the 
priority given to fighting inflation and ensuring fiscal consolidation measures– clearly 
reflected a weakening of the political commitment to the goal of full employment, as 
illustrated by unemployment rates well above those experienced during the Golden Age 
of the Swedish Model. We may therefore argue that the higher level of unemployment 
since the mid-1990s changed the balance of power between the two sides of industry 
in favour of capital and weakened the bargaining power of trade unions.
In addition to the establishment of new procedural rules aimed at insuring industrial 
peace and a re-coordination of wage bargaining at the industry-sector level, we have 
witnessed – since the second half of the 1990s – a clear tendency towards a decen-
tralization and individualization of wage setting and working conditions at the company/
organizational level. This has been the case in both the private and public sector. In 
other words, the abovementioned tendency to re-coordinate collective bargaining at 
the industry level should not be viewed as a weakening of the role played by enter-
prise-level/organization-level negotiations. Negotiations at the company/organization 
level play a central and growing role in the setting of wages, as well as in the terms 
and conditions of employment. In fact, enterprise/organization-level bargaining has 
tended to gather strength in the past decade, particularly in the public sector (Anxo, 
2013). The wages of a large majority of public sector employees are now set locally and 
largely individualized through performance monitoring, in strong contrast to the previ-
ous wage scale system based on seniority that was dominant up to the mid-1990s. 
The acceptance of a more individualized type of wage formation based on individual 
skills/characteristics and performance/productivity rather than on job characteristics, 
as had been the case in the past with the application of the solidaristic wage policy,141 
testifies to societal changes regarding wage norms and norms of fairness, among both 
private and public employees and their representatives. The marked tendency towards 
decentralization, differentiation and the individualization of wages and terms and con-
ditions of employment coincides also with a wider dispersion of the wage distribution. 
It is worth noting, however, that in contrast to other countries with highly decentralized 
and individualized bargaining systems – such as the United States and United King-
dom – the still strong and powerful trade union organizations and high union density at 
company/organization level in Sweden lead to negotiated forms of wage individualiza-
tion and differentiation. There are strong reasons to believe that the tendency towards 
the decentralization of collective bargaining and the individualization and differentiation 
of wages will continue. Collective and undifferentiated ways of setting wages seem 
to be becoming less popular and individualized types of wage formation are being 
141  The solidaristic wage policy involved not only the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work (irrespective 
of sectors, regions or the profitability of companies) but also efforts to reduce wage differentials between jobs, i.e. to 
promote a more compressed wage structure. The primary motivation for the implementation of this wage norm was 
not only fairness and equity aspects but also economic efficiency aspects by fostering and promoting productivity-
enhancing structural changes through the closure of unproductive plants and/or rationalization at the company level.
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generalized across the Swedish labour market, as a whole. It is worth highlighting that 
the modification of the Swedish bargaining system was the outcome of a long process 
that began as early as the mid-1980s, and the 2008 severe economic downturn did 
not entail changes in collective bargaining mechanisms. However, the dramatic dete-
rioration of the situation in the labour market has, as mentioned in section 2, induced 
a series of initiatives and agreements from both sides of industry, which are aimed at 
limiting the negative consequences of the economic downturn. 
As previously mentioned, Sweden has experienced a significant decline in union den-
sity during the past two decades. A number of factors help to explain the fall of trade 
union membership in Sweden (by almost 12 percentage points) between 1990 and 
2014. It is important here to distinguish between long-term transformations related 
principally to major changes in employment and occupational structure and short-term 
factors linked to specific measures or the business cycle. In particular, the reduction 
of employment in manufacturing industry and the public sector142 due to fiscal con-
solidation measures and budget cuts initiated in the 1990s, combined with changes 
in societal norms (individualistic values), account in part for the long-term decline of 
union density. 
The successive reforms of the employment protection system in Sweden – especially 
the introduction of short-term contracts not requiring justification from the employer, 
alongside the deregulation of employment intermediation in the early 1990s – have 
contributed to a significant increase in employment instability and growing duality in 
the labour market between insiders and outsiders. The rise of short-term contracts has 
also played a role in the decline of union density in Sweden; the union density being 
significantly lower among fixed-term contracts compared to open-ended contracts 
(47 per cent versus 74 per cent). 
Although the long-term decline of union density in Sweden may be attributed to struc-
tural factors, the acceleration of this decline after 2006 is closely related to policy 
measures, in particular the reform of the Unemployment Insurance system (UI) ini-
tiated by the centre-right Government in 2007 and 2008. This reform resulted in a 
notable reduction in the generosity of the Swedish UI system; the income replacement 
rate fell from 80 to 70 per cent after 200 days of unemployment, and the maximum 
duration for receiving unemployment benefits was reduced to 300 days. Furthermore, 
the financing of the UI was modified: the contributions of the various Unemployment 
Funds administered by the trade unions (Ghent system)143 were dramatically increased 
and differentiated according to the unemployment level in the sector/industry con-
cerned. In other words, a system of experience rating was introduced, and individual 
unemployment insurance contributions increased or decreased depending on whether 
unemployment grew or declined in an industry. This reform resulted in a large rise in 
individual monthly contributions; in some cases, UI fees paid by individuals tripled.144 
142 The propensity to join a trade union is traditionally higher in these two sectors.
143  The Swedish UI system is a so-called Ghent system based on voluntary membership in UI funds subsidized by the 
State. Various trade unions covering different industries administer the UI funds. 
144  By way of example, between 2006 and 2009 the individual monthly UI fees for construction workers increased 
from SEK 116 (12.4 Euros) to SEK 455 (48.5 Euros); for workers in engineering industries it increased from SEK 93 
(9.9 Euros) to SEK 384 (40.9 Euros); and for employees in hotels and restaurants from SEK 97 (10.3 Euros) to SEK 
430 (45.8 Euros) (See Kjellberg, 2014). If you add the normal affiliation fee for being member of a trade union, the 
monthly cost increase was significant.
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The consequence was both a large decrease in union membership and a dramatic 
decline in the number of dependent employees covered by the UI system: around 
500,000 employees left the unemployment insurance system between 2007 and 
2008.145 As reported by Kjellberg (2015), the decline of union density in the aftermath 
of the UI reform was unprecedented, and as a whole dropped by six percentage points 
(from 77 per cent in 2006 to 71 per cent in 2008). Obviously, the Government’s main 
objectives with these UI reforms were to enhance jobseekers’ work incentives and 
to indirectly influence the outcome of wage bargaining by weakening the bargaining 
power of trade unions – thereby inducing wage restraint.
The 2008 global financial crisis particularly hit sectors exposed to international compe-
tition and blue-collar workers. Against this background, the reform of UI financing had 
a strong impact on union density among LO members, in particular within manufactur-
ing industries -but also in low-skilled and low paid sectors such as the hotel, restaurant 
and retail sectors with a high labour turnover and a large share of short-term contracts. 
There are therefore strong reasons to believe that a significant part of the recent decline 
of union density in Sweden was a consequence of this reform. It is also worth noting 
that while the crisis did not break the decline of union density among blue-collar work-
ers, the reverse was true for white-collars. Although the reform of the UI system also 
affected white-collar workers between 2007 and 2009, the union density of these 
workers increased again in the aftermath of the crisis, and it subsequently reached the 
same level as their 2006. In early 2014, the former centre-right coalition Government 
changed again the rules concerning UI financing, implying that the individual monthly 
UI fees would come back to their 2006 level.146 Against this backdrop, the number of 
UI members has increased during the past two years by almost 55,000 persons, but it 
still remains below its 2006 level. More recently, the Social-Democratic-Green Coalition 
Government that took office in September 2014 increased the UI income replacement 
rate. There are strong reasons to believe that these two recent measures will at least 
contribute towards stabilizing – and at best increasing again – the level of union density 
in Sweden. 
5. Conclusions
From an international comparative perspective, Sweden seems, up until now, to have 
succeeded in overcoming the 2008 economic crisis better than a number of other 
Member States. Despite a long-term tendency towards a reduction in the generosity of 
the Swedish welfare state, the universal social protection system has helped to reduce 
the consequences of the crisis on individuals, as the benefit and transfer systems have 
played their role as shock absorbers and economic automatic stabilizers. The more 
limited negative impact of the Great Recession on the Swedish economy may also be 
attributed to the expansionary fiscal and monetary policies conducted by the former 
centre-right Government. The consistent increase in domestic demand has been a 
large contributor to Swedish economic growth over the past seven years. This stands in 
145  The share of the workforce covered by unemployment insurance decreased from 80 per cent to 67 per cent between 
2007 and 2009.
146  Two main reasons explain this change: a new general election and the fact that the unemployment insurance reform 
resulted in a large number of wage earners, in particular low-paid/low-skilled employees with unstable employment 
conditions, lacking sufficient protection in case of unemployment, thereby increasing the risk of social exclusion.
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contrast to previous recessions, especially that of the early 1990s, where exports were 
the main driver. This has been due to additional appropriations to local government 
securing the provision of welfare services and public employment and an increase in 
disposable household income, on account of various cuts in income tax and targeted 
increases in some transfers. 
The Swedish industrial relations system remains the archetype, the epitome, of a bipar-
tite agreement-based model of labour market regulation. As seen in this chapter, the 
2008 economic crisis did not provoke changes in the Swedish industrial relations sys-
tem or collective bargaining mechanisms. The Swedish model of industrial relations 
has not only demonstrated strong resilience during the crisis but has also contrib-
uted to Sweden’s relatively rapid economic recovery. In effect, the well-established 
and well-developed mechanisms of social dialogue and the active involvement of social 
partners during the crisis acted as a productive factor in helping the economy to over-
come the macroeconomic imbalances, contributing positively to the Swedish recovery. 
The recession had no negative impact on industrial relations and the period 2008–11 
remained characterized by industrial peace – in contrast to the situation during the 
previous deep recession of the early 1990s.
Despite a significant decline in union density, both sides of industry remain firmly in 
control of labour market regulations and wage setting and have played a determinant 
role during the recession, in particular regarding wage developments (wage modera-
tion) – but also in other employment and working conditions. The specific features of 
the Swedish industrial relations system, characterized by a relative balance of power 
between the two sides of industry, also help to explain the even distribution of the ‘cost 
of the crisis’ between various socio-economic groups. Sweden still has one of the high-
est levels of job quality and the recent recession has not adversely affected working 
conditions in terms of wage cuts, longer working hours, higher workloads or increased 
work intensity, as has been the case in other EU Member States (Anxo 2013; Anxo, 
2015). The Swedish experience remains therefore a good illustration of the positive 
role played by healthy public finances, developed social dialogue, and a strong social 
safety net for mitigating and absorbing the negative impact of external macroeconomic 
shocks.
In short, the Swedish experience during the past recession illustrates the resilience of 
a societal model based on a universal and generous social protection system, in addi-
tion to well-developed social dialogue as a mechanism for regulating the labour market 
and social policies, and strong public and political involvement in the provision of a 
wide range of services.147 As noted in Anxo (2015), the ‘Swedish success story ’ during 
the past recession cannot be solely attributable to early fiscal consolidation measures 
initiated during the 1990s. It is clear that alongside the strong automatic stabilizers 
embedded in the Swedish societal model, the additional government support (coun-
tercyclical Keynesian policy and ALMP/training measures) and social dialogue have 
also played an important role in mitigating the effects of the crisis on employment, 
welfare and social cohesion, and appropriately illustrate the resilience of the Swedish 
social model. 
147  Other aspects of this universal system include egalitarianism and pro-active policies for promoting gender equality 
and fighting discrimination and social exclusion.
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Appendix
List of persons interviewed for the study
Employers’ Organizations 
Jonas Berggren, Head of International Secretariat, Svenskt Näringsliv Confederation of 
Swedish Enterprise
Workers’ Organizations
Ellen Nygren, International Secretary, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) 
(Blue-collar)
Mika Domisch, International Secretary and Mats Essemyr, Senior Research Officer, the 
Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO) (White-collar)
Åsa Ehinger Berling, Head of International Secretariat, the Swedish Confederation of 
Professional Associations (SACO) (Professional)
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TALKING THROUGH THE CRISIS
Social dialogue and industrial relations 
trends in selected EU countries
Social dialogue between government, employers’ 
and workers’ organizations is a powerful tool for 
correcting labour market imbalances and promoting 
jobs-rich economic recovery. During and since 
the economic and financial crisis which started 
in 2008, national social dialogue institutions in 
countries of the European Union (EU) have been 
tested but, in many cases, have demonstrated their 
potential to innovate and contribute to a return to 
positive growth. 
This book brings together country case studies 
from eleven EU Member States, which document 
emerging trends in national social dialogue, 
focusing on developments since 2013. The authors 
shed light on the many factors that have influenced 
recent social dialogue and industrial relations 
developments, including the national economic and 
political context, the effectiveness of bipartite and 
tripartite institutions, and the European Semester. 
An introductory comparative overview chapter 
analyses overall trends and specific good practices 
at national level, drawing also on data from other 
countries of the EU-28.
This book will be a valuable resource for policy-
makers, employers’ and workers’ organizations, 
academics and practitioners who are seeking 
new ways to confront the profound changes and 
challenges facing the world of work today. Its 
findings reinforce the centrality of partnership 
through social dialogue in the pursuit of decent 
work and social justice.  
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